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Although  internal  conflicts  are  recurrent  phenomena  in  the  history  of  mankind.  Their 
regulation  by  international  law  has  been  very  slow.  The  usual  explanation  of  this  state  of 
affairs  is  that  such  events  touch  directly  on  the  survival  of  established  Governments  or 
even  the  existence  of  the  State  itself. 
States  view  with  suspicion,  fear  and  even  hostility  any  attempt  at  the  international  level 
to  regulate  their  conduct  vis-1-vis  their  local  enemies. 
They  use  the  principles  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  as  a  shield  against  any 
effective  regulation  of  such  tragic  events  by  humanitarian  law. 
However,  no  serious  attempt  has  been  made  by  international  lawyers  to  study  the  issue 
of  the  influence  of  those  two  principles  on  the  development  of  humanitarian  law  applicable 
in  internal  conflicts. 
This  study  tries  to  establish  with  exactitude  how  and  where  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention  have  been  resorted  to,  in  order  to  hinder  such  regulation,  and  how  other 
considerations  (especially  the  concept  of  human  rights)  have  opened  the  way  to  such 
regulation. 
In  this  respect  the  study  after  clarifying  in  the  first  two  chapters,  the  meaning,  the 
limitations,  and  the  place  in  the  practice  of  states  of  the  principles  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention,  has  concentrated  on  their  influence  on  three  main  issues  raised  by  internal 
conflicts,  namely: 
1.  The  definition  of  internal  conflicts.  In  this  sphere,  the  question  of  the  criteria  or 
thresholds  of  internal  conflicts  to  which  humanitarian  law  is  to  be  applied  and  the  question 
of  which  authority  has  the  power  to  decide  the  existence  of  an  internal  conflict,  are  dealt 
with  in  the  context  of  customary  law,  common  Article  3  and  Protocol  11  of  1977.  It  is 
asserted  that  the  claims  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention  have  been  used  extensively  to 
restrict  any  real  progress  in  this  area. 
2.  The  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars.  In  this  important  area  the  study  tries 
to  trace  the  development  of  specific  legal  norms  for  the  protection  of  the  victims  and  to 
determine  whether  the  concept  of  human  rights  has  contributed  in  any  way  to  better 
protection  of  those  victims. 
Thus,  a  systematic  examination  and  analysis  of  the  travaux  preparatolres  of  the  1949  and 
1974-1977  Diplomatic  Conferences  is  undertaken,  together  with  the  subsequent  practice  of 
states,  in  order  to  establish  where  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention  have  blocked  progress, 
and  where  real  development  has  taken  place. 
3.  Compliance  and  implementation  of  humanitarian  law  in  internal  conflicts.  In  this 
context  it  is  established  beyond  any  doubt  that  the  claims  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention  have  been  used  extensively,  both  in  1949  and  also  1974-1977  to  stop  all 
attempts  to  institute  measures  for  the  control  of  application  of  humanitarian  law,  especially 
those  measures  which  would  involve  third  party  supervision.  However,  it  is  asserted  that 
human  rights  machinery  may  be  used  to  fill  this  loophole  as  the  UN  practice  shows. 
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II INTRODUCTION 
The  aim  of  my  thesis  is  to  undertake  a  systematic  study  and  research  into  the  influence 
of  two  of  the  most  important  principles  of  international  law  of  today,  namely:  sovereignty 
and  non-  intervention  on  the  development  in  the  field  of  humanitarian  law  relating  to 
internal  conflicts. 
Some  may  argue  that  the  result  of  such  an  effort  would  be  an  exercise  in  the  obvious, 
since  there  is  a  wide  measure  of  agreement  that  the  two  principles  have,  to  a  large  extent, 
simply  blocked  any  real  progress,  in  the  field  of  humanitarian  law  applicable  to  internal 
conflicts.  '  In  my  opinion,  this  is  a  very  simplistic  view;  the  issue  is  very  complex  and  needs 
more  thorough  study  and  research  to  establish  with  exactitude  where  the  two  principles 
(sovereignty  and  non-  intervention)  have  blocked  progress  and  whether  other  considerations 
have  led  to  some  important  developments. 
Such  exercise  will  reveal  the  place  and  limits  of  these  two  principles  in  international  law 
and  also  the  extent  to  which  humanitarian  law  has  been  developed  in  the  very  sensitive  area 
of  internal  conflicts  and  eventually  the  relevance  of  international  law  to  one  of  the  most 
difficult  challenges  of  our  contemporary  world,  namely  making  civil  wars  more  human.  In 
other  words,  protecting  human  rights  in  very  hostile  circumstances,  when  the  authority  and 
legitimacy  of  the  established  Government  is  being  challenged  by  force,  by  a  section  of  its 
own  citizens. 
In  order  to  cover  the  subject,  the  thesis  is  divided  into  five  chapters.  The  first  chapter 
deals  with  the  concept  of  sovereignty,  its  meaning,  its  place  in  State  practice,  doctrinal 
viewson  its  role,  if  any,  in  international  order,  and  lastly,  its  limitations  with  human  rights 
as  one  of  the  most  important  limitations.  The  chapter  establishes  that  sovereignty  is  with 
us  for  the  foreseeable  future,  it  is  a  very  important  principle  of  international  law  though 
not  absolute  in  character.  Developments  in  international  law  are  of  capital  importance  in 
any  assessment  of  the  meaning  and  role  of  sovereignty  in  international  law. 
1 
In  this  context,  Best  wrote: 
11...  EA]  strong  doctrine  of  sovereignty  statks  through  these  protocots  Like  a  riot  squad.  In  one 
sense  this  is  no  change  from  1949  or  earHer;  the  Geneva  Convention  Like  the  rest  of  the  taw  of  war, 
were  buiLt  on  the  presumption  that  Governments  tawfulty  were  masters  within  their  own  territories 
and  that  State's  sovereignty  except  in  so  far  as  they  might  votuntarity  shed  positions  of  it,  was 
inviolabte". 
He  further  added  that: 
"States,  insistence  on  the  plenitude  on  their  sovereignty  rights  has  been  the  mightiest  obstacle, 
and  international  humanitarian  Law,  order  and  welfare  were  kept  weak  and  undeveloped  as  a  resuLt. 
Sovereignty's  most  striking  positive  assertion  of  itself  in  the  protocols  comes,  not  surprising  in 
the  opening  'scope'  section  of  protocol  11  ...  M.  * 
(G.  Best:  Humanity  In  Warfare.  Weidenfeld  &  Nicotson,  London,  1980,  pp.  322-323).  Also,  Aldrich,  who  was 
among  the  delegation  which  represented  the  US,  stressed: 
"Excessive  sensitivity  to  any  provision  that  might  be  thought  to  give  an  Internationat  status  to 
rebeLs  within  such  countries  (newty  independent  States)  or  to  retain  the  GovernmentaL  forces  in 
suppressing  rebeLtions,  resutted  in  a  protocot  11  that  affords  very  Limited  protection  and  has 
escape  ctauses  designed  to  make  its  appLicabiLfty  easHy  deniablell. 
G.  H.  Aidrich:  Some  Ref  tections  on  the  Origin  of  the  1977  Protocols  of  Geneva,  in  C.  Swinarski  (ed.  ):  Etudes 
et  essais  sur  te  droit  internationat  humanitalre  et  sur  tes  principes  de  la  Croix  Rouge.  Martinus  Nilhoff, 
1984,  p.  136. 
12 The  second  chapter  is  about  intervention  or  rather  the  principle  of  non-  intervention, 
because  this  principle  has  also  been  always  used  against  the  extension  of  humanitarian  rules 
to  internal  conflicts,  its  place  and  limits  in  international  law.  State  practice,  doctrinal  views, 
in  this  sphere  are  extensive,  my  aim  is  to  establish  what  does  non  -intervention  mean  when 
used  in  the  context  of  internal  conflicts. 
The  other  three  chapters  (3,4  and  5),  which  constitute  the  heart  of  my  thesis  will  deal 
with  three  main  aspects  of  humanitarian  law  in  internal  conflicts  where  the  above  two 
principles  were  used.  These  chapters,  in  effect,  constitute  an  empirical  research  into  how 
and  where  those  two  concepts  have  been  used  by  States,  and  how  they  influenced  the 
emergence  of  new  humanitarian  rules  or  conversely,  how  they  toppled  such  prospects. 
The  third  chapter  deals  with  the  question  of  the  definition  of  civil  wars  (non- 
international  armed  conflicts).  In  my  view,  this  is  a  very  important  question  since  the  whole 
application  of  humanitarian  law  to  such  conflicts  depends  on  how  the  events  which  take 
place  in  a  given  State,  can  be  characterised,  by  whom  and  on  what  grounds. 
Thus,  in  this  context,  the  concept  of  recognition  of  belligerency  in  customary 
international  law,  the  absence  of  definition  of  non  -international  armed  conflict  in  common 
Article  3  of  the  1949  Geneva  Conventions,  and  finally  the  definition  of  such  conflicts  in 
Article  I  of  Protocol  11  of  1977,  constitute  different  reactions  on  the  legal  level  to  the 
question  of  definition. 
My  view  is  that  the  concepts  of  sovereignty  and  non-intervention  have  either  directly  or 
indirectly  influenced  the  course  of  action  in  the  above  three  contexts.  As  a  result,  the 
definition  or  non-definition  policy  was  done  with  due  regard  to  the  principles  of 
sovereignty  and  non-intervention  in  order  to  always  give  priority  to  the  claims  of  the 
established  Government  which  reflects,  in  effect,  the  preference  of  international  law  to  the 
claims  of  legitimacy  of  the  established  Governments,  rather  than  the  plight  of  insurgents. 
Moreover,  definition  or  non-definition  constantly  poses  the  question  of  who  can 
determine  the  existence  of  the  conflict.  No  answer  can  be  found  either  in  customary 
international  law,  common  Article  3  or  Protocol  11.  This,  in  practice,  means  that  the  idea 
of  objectivity  (the  existence  of  objective  criteria  which  does  not  need  any  specific  organ 
for  their  determination)  gives  way  to  the  principles  of  sovereignty  and  non-intervention, 
because  those  principles  would  give  the  Government  in  power  the  presumed  right  of  auto- 
determination. 
The  fourth  chapter  is  a  thorough  study  and  research  into  the  influence  of  the  two 
concepts:  on  the  development  of  humanitarian  rules  relating  to  the  protection  of  the  victims 
of  internal  conflict  (the  civilian  population,  the  sick  and  wounded  and  captured 
combatants).  The  importance  of  this  chapter  stems  from  the  fact  that  it  deals  with  the  fate 
of  human  beings  during  the  tragic  experience  of  civil  wars.  In  effect,  it  is  human  rights 
of  individuals  against  their  own  State  which  is  at  the  root  of  the  problem. 
The  legal  developments  from  customary  international  law  to  the  Protocol  11  in  this  field 
are  dealt  with.  While  on  one  hand,  more  rights  were  granted  to  specific  categories  of  the 
victims  such  as  the  civilians  and  the  wounded  and  sick,  on  the  other  hand,  captured 
combatants  are  still  considered  as  criminals.  The  conclusion  of  this  chapter  is  that  the 
arguments  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  were  not  used  in  a  systematic  way,  to 
13 eliminate  humanitarian  rules  for  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars  because 
human  rights  were  in  general  accepted  as  a  valid  limitation  upon  the  conduct  of  States  Vis- 
i-vis  their  own  citizens. 
The  fifth  chapter  deals  with  the  question  of  enforcement  and  implementation  of 
humanitarian  law  in  internal  conflicts:  it  asks  the  question  of  compliance,  its  importance 
since  the  significance  of  the  rules  adopted  with  respect  to  the  protection  of  the  victims  of 
internal  conflicts,  depends  in  the  final  analysis,  on  their  respect  and  application  in  practice. 
A  general  investigation  into  the  question  in  humanitarian  law  as  a  whole  and  not  only  that 
part  concerning  internal  conflicts  is  carried  out.  It  is  established  that  if  arguments  of 
sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  have  directly  or  indirectly  slowed  down  the  development 
of  legal  mechanisms  for  the  control  of  applications  of  humanitarian  law  between  States.  In 
contrast,  in  the  sphere  of  internal  conflict,  they  destroyed  any  prospect  for  such  a  control. 
The  travaux  prkparatoires  of  Article  3  and  Protocol  11  especially  are  very  clear  in  this 
respect. 
However,  my  argument  is  that  the  ICRC,  and  the  mechanisms  of  human  rights  can,  to 
some  extent,  (in  practice)  fill  this  gap  (of  the  absence  of  mechanisms  of  control).  The 
practice  of  the  ICRC,  the  UN,  and  some  regional  organisations  (such  as  the  OAS)  in  internal 
conflicts,  by  using  the  mechanisms  of  control  of  human  rights,  in  this  respect,  is  very 
important.  This  shows  again  the  importance  of  human  rights  as  a  limitation  upon  State 
sovereignty,  since  States  are  not  systematically  opposed  to  such  attempts. 
The  method  used  in  dealing  with  the  subject  matter  of  my  thesis,  is  generally  an 
historical-  legal  and  positivist  approach.  Legal  development  are  traced  according  to  three 
main  periods:  in  customary  international  law,  in  the  context  of  common  Article  3  and 
finally  in  Protocol  11.  This  has  been  done  especially  with  the  chapters  which  deal  with 
humanitarian  law  (the  third,  fourth  and  fifth  chapters).  In  all  these  periods  the  aim  is  to 
discover  the  influence  of  the  concepts  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention  and  by  the  same 
token  to  find  how  international  law  responds  to  the  problems  posed  by  internal  conflicts. 
The  positivist  element  in  my  method  means  essentially  that  State  practice  will  be  of 
importance,  that  of  course  does  not  exclude  my  use  of  the  doctrine  which  is  a  secondary 
source  of  international  law,  and  at  the  same  time  may  afford  different  interpretation  of 
State  practice.  However,  I  must  make  it  clear  that  travaux  pr6paratolres  occupy  a  very 
special  place  in  my  approach,  especially  in  the  context  of  chapters  3,4  and  5.  The  reason 
is  that  in  order  to  discover  the  influence  of  the  principles  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention,  either  positively  or  negatively,  on  the  development  of  humanitarian  law 
relating  to  internal  conflicts,  a  review  and  analysis  of  the  position  of  States,  during  the 
discussion  of  different  rules  is  essential  to  establish  the  extent  and  the  result  of  the  use  of 
the  two  principles  on  the  development  or  lack  of  development  in  humanitarian  law. 
14 CHAPTER  ONE 
SOVEREIGNTY 
Introduction 
The  State  is  still  the  most  important  unit  in  the  composition  of  contemporary  international 
society  and  also  the  most  important  subject  of  international  law,  sovereignty  is  the  main 
legal  characteristic  of  the  State.  Internal  wars,  on  the  other  hand,  touch  the  heart  of  States, 
they  challenge  directly  or  indirectly,  the  legitimacy  and  authority  of  the  established 
Government.  States  resort  to  the  invocation  of  the  principle  of  sovereignty  in  order  to  have 
a  free  hand  to  deal  with  their  internal  enemies,  and  at  the  same  time  use  the  principle  (of 
sovereignty)  to  oppose  normative  innovations  at  the  international  level. 
Hence,  I  begin  my  thesis  with  a  chapter  dealing  with  sovereignty,  its  meaning,  its  place 
in  State  practice  and  its  limitations.  Doctrinal  views  on  the  role  of  sovereignty  will  also  be 
dealt  with.  This  exercise  will  show  the  exact  position  of  sovereignty  in  modern  international 
law. 
My  opinion  is  that  sovereignty  (which  goes  throughout  the  study),  is  the  main  pillar  of 
the  existing  international  order  and  a  central  element  in  any  discussion  of  a  new  world 
order.  However,  sovereignty  must  be  constructed  and  understood  within  the  framework  of 
the  fundamental  changes  which  have  been  introduced  in  international  law  especially  since 
the  advent  of  the  UN  Charter  in  1945. 
With  the  above  qualifications  in  mind,  sovereignty  cannot  be  used  by  States  to  justify 
massive  violations  of  human  rights,  or  to  deny  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  self- 
determination  or  to  ignore  the  constraints  and  limitations  placed  upon  their  conduct  when 
dealing  with  internal  strife. 
Moreover,  sovereignty  cannot  be  used  as  a  plea  to  pursue  policies  which  contradict  the 
obligations  that  international  law  has  placed  upon  States  when  dealing  with  each  other  such 
as  respect  for  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  others,  and  banning  of  aggression 
in  its  different  forms.  Thus,  sovereignty  can  be  a  guarantee  for  peace  in  international 
society  and  not  an  obstacle  to  it,  viz.  when  understood  and  acted  upon  with  respect  for 
international  law  and  not  outside  it  (international  law  which  has  been  developed  since  the 
UN  Charter).  That  law  which  is  changing  slowly  to  suit  the  new  'rapport  de  force'  in 
international  society  and  becoming  more  and  more  truly  'international'  in  character.  In  my 
view,  sovereignty  can  also  be  a  guarantee  for  peace  and  justice  at  the  national  level,  that 
is  within  States,  however,  when  full  respect  for  self-determination  and  human  rights  is 
adhered  to. 
In  order  to  cover  the  subject  of  this  chapter,  I  will  deal  with  the  following  points:  First, 
the  meaning  of  sovereignty  by  the  differents  shools  of  thaught  such  as  the  Western, 
Communist  and  Third  World  ones  and  the  pronouncements  of  international  courts  on  this 
subject;  secondly,  the  role  of  the  concept  of  sovereignty  in  the  contemporary  international 
order,  i.  e.,  in  State  practice  and  the  doctrine.  Last  but  least,  the  limitations  of  sovereignty 
such  as  the  human  rights,  self-determination,  and  the  prohibition  of  the  use  of  force. 
15 Section  I:  The  Meaning  of  Sovereignty 
Sovereignty  is  the  natural  product  of  the  history  of  Christian  Europe,  but  the  concept  is  not 
strange  to  other  civilizations  and  cultures.  Thus,  the  idea  that  'God'  is  the  supreme 
sovereign  of  the  universe  is  at  the  heart  of  the  Islamic  religion  and  thought,  the  Holy  Koran 
states: 
"Allah,  is  He  beside  Whom  there  is  no  god,  the  sovereign,  the  most  Holy,  the  Source 
of  peace  t  the  Bestower  od  Security,  the  Protector,  the  Mighty,  the  subduer,  the 
Exalted". 
This  means  that  sovereignty  in  Islamic  tradition  belongs  only  to  God;  it  is  absolute  in 
character  and  covers  the  whole  universe.  In  this  context,  in  March  1949,  the  PM  of  the  then 
new  State  of  Pakistan  introduced  a  resolution,  which  he  wanted  to  be  the  Preamble  of  the 
new  Constitution,  and  which  was  adopted  by  the  Constituent  Assembly,  it  stated: 
"Whereas  sovereignty  over  the  entire  universe  belongs  to  God  almighty  alone  and 
authority  which  he  has  delegated  to  the  State  of  Pakistan  through 
3 
its  people  for  being 
exercised  within  the  limits  prescribed  by  him  is  a  sacred  trust". 
In  Europe,  the  contradictions  which  plagued  the  feudal  society  resulted  in  the  triumph  of 
the  King  over  his  competitors,  he  concentrated  the  power  in  his  hands  in  a  defined  territory 
and  succeeded  in  eliminating  his  rivals  in  the  competing  centres  of  influence  and  power 
within  his  State.  In  fact,  sovereignty  was  one  of  the  necessary  elements  in  the  building  of 
the  modern  State  on  the  basis  of  feudalism.  It  permitted  the  establishment  of  a  national 
organisation  in  the  form  of  one  centralised  administration,  with  the  King  as  the  supreme 
sovereign,  which  meant  that  all  officials  within  the  State  were  obliged  to  give  their 
obedience  to  only  one  person.  This  opened  the  way  in  turn  for  the  unifying  of  the  legal 
system  of  the  country,  the  steady  flow  of  revenues  which  led  to  the  establishment  of  strong 
national  armies. 
Sovereignty  has  also  eliminated  any  foreign  influence  or  intervention.  Thus,  practically 
speaking  sovereignty  was  a  very  useful  tool  in  the  emergence  of  the  concept  of  State. 
Actually,  it  (sovereignty)  can  be  legitimately  seen  as  a  valid  description  of  Statehood.  The 
fundamental  changes  which  occurred  in  Europe  in  the  structure  of  the  feudal  society  from 
the  political,  economic  and  social  spheres,  were  translated  in  the  political  and  legal  thought 
in  the  form  of  the  concept  of  sovereignty.  Medieval  doctrine,  especially  Brodin  who  dealt 
extensively  with  the  notion  of  sovereignty,  the  meaning  of  the  notion,  was  exposed.  It 
served  essentially  to  support  the  building  of  unified  strong  States.  Sovereignty  was  seen  as 
absolute,  indivisible  and  embodied  in  the  King,  he  has  the  absolute  legislative  power  within 
his  realm,  externally  he  is  not  subject  to  any  other  higher  authority  or  legislator. 
Sovereignty  was  also  adopted  as  from  the  Peace  of  Westphalia  in  1648  as  the  guiding 
principle  of  relations  among  States.  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  European  origins  of 
2 
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16 sovereignty  in  the  context  of  international  law,  meant  in  practice  that  it  has  been  recognized 
firstly  only  to  Christian  European  States,  which  have  been  characterized  as  'civilized'.  This 
meant  that  those  States  accepted  that  any  attempt  by  any  one  of  them  to  establish  any  kind 
of  hegemony  over  the  others  is  a  clear  violation  of  the  rules  of  international  law. 
Consequently,  less  developed  and  uncivilised  peoples  and  territories  have  been  for  a  long 
time  denied  any  recognition.  As  a  result,  their  territories  were  occupied.  Their  legal  systems 
were  not  recognized  and  their  resources  exploited.  4 
After  these  preliminary  observations,  I  will  now  proceed  to  the  meaning  of  sovereignty 
(as  the  different  definitions  of  the  notion  will  reveal)  in  modern  international  law.  It  must 
be  stressed,  that  the  meaning  of  the  concept  of  sovereignty  has  been  and  is  being  dealt  with 
by  the  doctrine,  since  it  is  a  fundamental  key  to  the  understanding  of  the  relevance  of  the 
limits  of  international  law,  in  internal,  as  well  as  external,  of  the  State's  activities. 
International  courts  (the  PCIJ  and  the  ICJ  particularly)  have,  also,  in  many  instances  found 
it  necessary  to  pronounce  themselves  upon  the  meaning  of  sovereignty  in  order  to  decide 
many  concrete  cases. 
The  simplest  definition  of  sovereignty  (a  dictionary  definition)  concentrates  on  the  main 
formal  attributes  of  the  concept.  Thus,  it  is  "the  freedom  of  State  from  outside  control  in 
the  conduct  of  its  internal  and  external  affairs".  5  In  fact,  there  are  two  aspects  in  this 
definition,  the  internal  and  external  ones.  The  former  means  "freedom  to  manage  its 
domestic  affairs  without  interference.  This  implies  the  power  to  establish  its  own 
constitution  to  make  and  administer  its  own  laws,  and  to  exercise  exclusive  jurisdiction  over 
6  all  persons  and  things  within  its  territory".  Whereas  the  latter  means  "to  conduct  its  foreign 
relations  without  control  on  the  part  of  another  State",  7  in  other  words,  it  means 
independence. 
This  often  used  definition  is  neutral  and  formal.  Neutral  in  the  sense  that  all  regimes  can 
claim  sovereignty  because  the  nature  of  the  regime  (democratic  or  otherwise)  is  irrelevant. 
It  is  as  well  formal  in  the  sense  that  it  hides  the  realities  of  the  'working  sovereignty'  where 
abuse  of  using  sovereignty  as  a  justification  for  illegal  actions  such  as  violations  of  human 
rights  and  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  weaker  States  are  a  common  feature  and 
widespread. 
A.  The  Western  School 
In  this  connection  Brierly  maintains  that  sovereignty 
"...  [S]tands  for  the  power  of  modern  States  to  decide  and  act  without  consulting 
4 
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17 others  and  without  concern  for  anything  but  their  own  interests  as  they  themselves 
conceive  those  interests".  8 
It  seems  to  me  that  this  definition  does  not  differ  much  from  the  one  which  has  been 
advanced  by  Vattel.  The  latter  observes  that: 
*  ....  Cest  une  consiquence  manifeste  de  la  liberti  et  de  l'ind8pendance  des  nations, 
que  toutes  sont  en  droit  de  gouverner  comme  elles  le  jugent  ä  propos  et  qu'aucune 
n'a  le  moindre  droit  de  se  m81er  du  gouvernement  d'une  autre.  "9 
And  he  then  adds: 
"De  tous  les  droits  qui  peuvent  appartenir  A  une  nation,  la  souverainet6  est  sans  doute 
le  plus  prdcieux,  et  celui  que  les  autres  doivent  respecter  le  plus  scrupuleusement  si 
elles  ne  veulent  pas  lui  faire  injure".  10 
In  my  opinion,  Brierly's  definition  would  mean  in  practice,  that  firstly,  powerful  States  will 
enjoy  more  sovereignty  than  others,  since  they  have  the  might  to  decide  and  act  according 
to  their  interests  whereas  weaker  States  cannot  do  the  same.  Secondly,  this  definition  would 
not  guarantee  internally  the  enjoyment  of  human  rights  of  any  State  (whether  weak  or 
strong)  and  the  maintenance  of  public  peace,  since  the  Government  has  a  very  wide  range 
of  discretion  to  do  what  it  sees  and  considers  as  its  own  interest. 
Schwarzenberger  maintains  that  the  meaning  of  sovereignty  as  a  principle  of  international 
law  can  be  found  in  the  Island  of  Palmas  Case,  when  the  sole  Arbitrator,  Max  Weber, 
stated: 
...  [S]overeignty  in  the  relations  between  States  signifies  independence.  Independence 
in  regard  to  a  portion  of  the  globe  is  the  riýht  to  exercise  therein  to  the  exclusion  of 
any  other  State,  the  functions  of  a  State".  1 
On  the  basis  of  this  opinion,  it  seems  that  sovereignty  is  generally  of  a  negative  character 
as  its  main  element  is  the  prohibition  of  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  States. 
Levi  takes  as  a  point  of  departure  in  his  analysis  of  the  meaning  of  sovereignty,  Max 
Huber's  statement  (cited  above).  He  writes  that. 
"...  [S]overeignty  signifies  in  the  political  and  legal  sphere  the  people's  insistence  that 
8 
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18 their  State  shall  be  supreme  and  its  individuality  inviolate".  12 
He  then  remarks  that: 
"...  [A]  State  is  sovereign  when  there  is  no  higher  auýhority  directing  its  behaviour, 
when  it  is  free  to  make  its  own  political  decisions".  ' 
He  also  stresses  that  because  interactions  between  States  are  growing  all  the  time  '...  the 
mutual  sensitivities  among  States  allow  only  for  varying  degrees  of  independence.  '  14  In 
other  words,  there  is  in  fact,  no  absolute  independence,  the  question  is  relative  and  depends 
upon  the  degree  of  co-operation  between  States  at  a  given  time.  He  maintains  that  legal 
sovereignty  is  easy  to  define  since  the  language  of  law  is  more  precise  than  that  used  in 
politics,  however,  the  problem  which  faces  lawyers  '...  is  that  State's  submissions  to 
international  law  may  not  be  reconcilable  with  legal  sovereignty'.  15  Such  a  problem,  in  his 
opinion,  does  not  exist  in  the  political  arena,  because  politicians  always  look  for  pragmatic 
solutions,  they  understand  very  well  that  there  is  no  absolute  independence,  and  that  it  is 
always  a  'question  of  more  or  less'  so  they  try  at  all  times  to  enlarge  independence  and 
diminish  obligations.  16 
The  main  criticism  of  this  view  is  that  it  is  not  only  in  politics  that  the  concept  of 
sovereignty  is  seen  as  relative,  but  as  well  in  legal  theory  and  State  practice  where  the 
overwhelming  view  is  that  sovereignty  is  not  absolute,  and  that  the  submission  of  the  State 
to  international  law  has  never  been  questioned  by  States,  at  least  verbally. 
Visscher  shares  Levi's  view  to  some  extent.  He  writes: 
"....  [T]he  politician  does  not  usually  mistake  the  limits  imposed  on  State  actions  by  the 
existence  of  other  States.  In  the  ordinary  course  of  things  he  accepts  the  duties  and 
burdens  which  these  limits  imply".  17 
However,  he  concedes  that  'the  fact  remains  that  over  and  against  the  law  the  State  holds 
in  reserve  the  plea  of  sovereignty'.  18 
I  believe  if  the  daily  business  of  politicians  (bargaining,  accepting  concessions,  gaining 
advantages  due  to  factual  strength  etc.  )  is  taken  into  account  when  defining  sovereignty, 
a  great  number  of  States  will  be  considered  as  simply  having  no  sovereignty,  or  at  least  only 
having  a  small  portion  of  it.  Hence,  it  is  important  to  know  that  in  law  each  State  has  an 
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19 equal  degree  of  sovereignty,  the  right  to  invoke  it  in  case  of  need  and  that  limitations  upon 
sovereignty  are  not  factual  differences,  however  important,  but  only  agreed  standards. 
Fenwick  sees  sovereignty  of  the  State  as  'the  independence  of  any  higher  control  of  its 
right  to  take  the  law  into  its  own  hands  when  what  it  believes  to  be  its  vital  interest  at 
stake'.  19  This  is  an  extreme  view  of  the  meaning  of  sovereignty  because  it  is  conceived  as 
a  concept  outside  the  bounds  of  international  law,  especially  the  developments  introduced 
by  the  UN  Charter  (e.  g.  Article  2/4).  This  kind  of  meaning  suits  the  powerful;  might  would 
be  right  seen  in  the  context  of  civil  wars,  this  attitude  would  allow  the  State  to  oppose  any 
normative  development  and  would  open  the  door  for  a  wealth  of  cruelties  to  human  beings. 
On  the  other  hand,  Verzijl  introduces  some  important  clarifications  as  to  the  meaning  of 
sovereignty.  According  to  him,  sovereignty  has  ceased  to  be  a  single  concept  and  that  it 
disintegrated  into  different  notions.  As  a  result,  the  legal  theory  distinguishes  between  three 
aspects  of  the  notion  (of  sovereignty)  in  his  words  'one  directed  inward,  one  outward,  one 
sideward  and  one  upward'.  20  Then,  the  inward  aspect  made  sovereignty  appear  as  the 
absolute  power  of  the  King  over  his  country  without  any  competitors  inside  the  land.  The 
outward  and  sideward  aspect  affected  his  relationship  with  his  fellow  Kings,  on  the  one 
hand  and  his  position  vis-k-vis  the  once  paramount  powers  of  the  Emperor  and  the  High 
Pontiff  on  the  other  hand.  21 
The  third  upward  aspect  related  to  the  crucial  problems  as  to  whether  the  'sovereign'  is 
supreme  inside  and  independent  outside  was  completely  exempt  from  any  bounds  or 
remained  subject  to  higher  command. 
Verzijl  argues  that  historically  even  the  most  absolute  monarchs  were  supposed  to  be 
subordinated  to  God  and  his  higher  authority,  however,  it  was  the  work  of  legal  philosophy 
and  Statesmen  who  carried  sovereignty  to  the  extreme.  Hence,  he  writes: 
"The  notion  of  sovereignty  disintegrated  into  three  completely  distinct  concepts: 
Those  supreme  power  within  the  state,  of  independence  from  any  other  earthly 
power;  ang.  of  an  initially  denied  exemption  from  any  legal  or  moral  bound 
whatever  ".  2 
He  then  makes  the  point  that  "by  nevertheless  maintaining  the  same  word  for  three  such 
23  different  notions  legal  doctrine  sowed  the  seeds  of  a  fatal  confusion  of  ideas'.  He  suggests 
that  it  is  better  to  remove  the  term  'sovereignty  from  the  juristic  vocabulary"  because  it 
covers  a  series  of  homonyms  that  threaten  to  make  any  rational  discussion  of  'sovereignty' 
as  such  a  Babylonian  confusion  of  tongues,  and  leave  it  as  a  subject  of  speculation  to  legal 
philosophers  [the  notion  of  Rechtssouver  Anitat]  theologians  [the  sovereignty  of  God]  or 
politicians  [the  Netherlands  Anti  -Re  vol  utionary  Party's  slogan  'sovereignty  in  one's  own 
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20 c,  ircle'".  24  He  then  went  on  to  argue  that: 
the  word  'sovereignty'  is  to  be  banned  from  the  vocabulary  of  international 
law,  then,  it  is  possible  to  replace  it  by  other  Words  which  denote  equivalent  ideas 
in  accordance  with  the  context  in  which  it  was  to  be  used  such  as  independence, 
territorial  supremacy,  higher  authority  etC.  "25 
It  follows  that  it  would  be  possible  to  dissolve  the  notion  of  sovereignty  understood  as  the 
'power  of  the  State  to  act  according  to  its  own  free  will  within  the  limits  of  the  law  of 
nations'26  into  a  number  of  competencies'  as  reflected  in  the  relations  of  a  State  to  other 
States,  regarding  respectively  its  powers  of  exclusive  territorial  supremacy,  of  command 
over  its  nationals  even  abroad  and  the  protection  of  its  vital  interests  against  foreign 
infringement.  27 
Seemingly.  the  general  theme  of  Verzijl's  argument  is  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
sovereignty,  if  we  want  to  be  legally  precise,  there  are  different  elements  (competences)  of 
sovereignty  in  international  law.  It  is  better  to  use  the  name  of  any  element,  according  to 
the  needs  of  the  context.  In  my  view,  this  suggestion  would,  in  practice,  create  many 
problems,  States  may  differ  as  to  the  number  and  the  subject  of  those  competencies  and  the 
relative  importance  of  each  of  them.  Nevertheless,  the  importance  of  Verzijl's  view  lies  in 
the  fact  that  he  sees  sovereignty  as  a  legal  concept  which  is  regulated  and  influenced  by  the 
state  of  development  of  international  law.  In  that  sense  he  is  one  of  those  who  see 
sovereignty  inside  and  not  outside  international  law.  This  is  very  important  for  our  subject 
since  sovereignty  may  mean  that  States  can  be  under  obligation  to  respect  certain  standards 
of  human  behaviour  in  internal  conflicts. 
Lauterpacht  takes  approximately  the  same  view  as  Verzijl.  He  writes: 
"...  [S]overeignty  to  a  State  is  a  condition  for  its  recognition  as  a  subject  of 
international  law,  thus  the  State  must  not  be  sovereign  in  the  sense  of  being 
independent  of  any  other  State  only  but  it  must  also  possess  legal  sovereignty  in  the 
accepted  meaning  of  international  law".  28 
This  implies  that  sovereignty  is  made  as  the  most  important  condition  for  the  coming  into 
existence  of  the  State  onto  the  international  scene.  According  to  him,  sovereignty  on  the 
internal  level  gives  the  State  the  complete  freedom  of  action  within  its  borders.  However, 
it  must  respect  its  obligations  arising  from  treaties  to  which  it  had  given  its  consent.  Also, 
it  must  treat  aliens  in  accordance  with  the  minimum  standards  of  civilization.  As  regards 
the  external  level,  he  observes  that: 
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21 "...  [A]Ithough  the  subjection  of  the  State  to  international  law  is  b?  Jh  indispensable, 
hypothesis  and  an  acknowledged  principle  of  the  law  of  nations". 
He  then  quickly  notices  that  this  subjection  to  international  law  is  purely  formal  and  that 
the  'present  day  international  law  recognises  that  each  State  is  independent  not  only  of  other 
States  but  also  of  the  totality  of  States  acting  as  organs  of  what  is  known  as  the  international 
community,.  30  This  means  that  by  law  each  State  is  the  sole  judge  of  its  own  cause,  and  that 
it  is  free  to  proclaim  and  insist  upon  its  views  in  relation  to  other  States,  however,  always 
within  international  law  rules. 
Moreover,  Lauterpacht,  after  a  detailed  study  of  sovereignty,  arrives  at  the  conclusion 
that  'a  State's  sovereignty  is  a  quality,  a  competence  conferred  by  international  law'.  31  He 
adds: 
"...  [S]overeignty  is  a  delegate's  bundle  of  rights,  it  is  a  power  which  is  derived  from 
a  higher  source  and  therefore  divisible,  modifiable  and  elastic".  32 
We  can  infer  from  Lauterpacht's  opinion  that  sovereignty  is  seen  as  a  legal  concept  capable 
of  being  defined  in  international  law,  the  meaning  of  which  is  closely  linked  with  the  state 
of  advance  of  international  law.  He  stresses  that  sovereignty  is  still  extensive,  internally  and 
externally.  Furthermore,  he  expresses  the  view  that  in  the  absence  of  a  world  legislature  and 
an  obligation  to  submit  disputes  to  a  world  court,  the  role  of  international  law  in  the 
international  society  is  nominal. 
In  my  opinion,  Lauterpacht's  view  which  received  wide  credence  in  the  West,  is  not 
accurate  in  many  respects.  Thus,  to  bind  the  effectiveness  of  international  law  to  the 
existence  of  a  world  legislature  and  a  world  court  is  to  make  a  specific  idea  of  law  prevail, 
that  is  the  Western  tradition  which  stresses  the  importance  of  a  third  party  adjudication. 
However,  international  law  can  be  effective  without  a  real  need  to  a  central  parliament 
and  a  world  court  because  States  can  use,  especially  in  the  area  of  settlement  of  disputes, 
different  methods  which  international  law  provide  and  among  them  but  not  exclusively  the 
courts. 
McLaurin  defines  sovereignty  as  'making  decisions  that  are  primarily  adjustments  to 
33  conditions  and  demands  of  others'.  This  definition  may  be  considered  as  a  description  of 
the  factual  situation  of  the  relations  between  States,  nonetheless,  its  weakness  lies  in  the  fact 
that  it  omits  the  relevance  of  international  law,  which  may  very  well  be  used  to  safeguard 
States  (inparticular  the  weak  ones)  against  demands  which  may  compromise  their 
independence. 
Brownlie  emphasises  that  'the  sovereignty  and  equality  constitute  the  basic  doctrine  of 
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22 the  law  of  nations.  '34  He  writes: 
"If  international  law  exists,  then  the  dynamics  of  state  sovereignty  can  be  expressed 
in  terms  of  law,  and,  as  states  are  equal  and  have  legal  personality,  sovereignty  is  in 
a  major  aspect  a  relation  to  other  states  (and  to  organizations  of  states)  defined  by 
law.  The  principal  corollaries  of  the  sovereignty  and  equality  of  states  are:  (i)  A 
jurisdiction,  prima  facie,  exclusive  over  a  territory  and  the  permanent  population 
living  there;  (ii)  a  duty  of  non-intervention  in  the  area  of  exclusive  jurisdiction  of 
other  states;  and  (iii)  the  dependence  of  obligations  arising  from  customary  law  and 
35  treaties  on  the  consent  of  the  obligor". 
He  adds: 
"...  [T]he  manner  in  which  the  law  expresses  the  content  of  sovereignty  varies,  and 
indeed  the  whole  of  the  law  can  be  expressed  in  terms  of  the  co-existence  of 
sovereignties".  36 
He  concludes  by  stating  that  '"in  general  'sovereignty'  characterizes  powers  and  privileges 
resting  on  customary  law  and  independent  of  the  particular  consent  of  another  State".  37 
The  importance  of  Brownlie's  view  stems  from  the  fact  that,  first,  he  stresses  the 
importance  of  equality  in  dealing  with  sovereignty.  This  factual  inequality  in  sovereignty 
between  States  does  not  infringe  the  legal  equality.  Secondly,  he  regards  sovereignty  as  a 
legal  phenomenon  capable  of  being  defined,  at  any  given  moment,  and  the  importance  of 
international  law  is  emphasized  in  such  exercise. 
However,  the  weakness  of  Brownlie's  view  lies  in  the  fact  that  he  still  stresses  the  formal 
aspects  of  sovereignty.  He  sees  sovereignty  primarily  as  a  legal  category,  there  is  no 
emphasis  on  the  influence  of  self-determination,  or  the  impact  of  the  participation  of  many 
new  States  on  the  meaning  and  content  of  sovereignty.  The  latter  has  ceased,  in  my  view, 
to  be  a  primarily  formal  concept.  It  is  a  very  comprehensive  concept  which  covers 
economic,  social  and  cultural  aspects  as  well. 
It  can  be  concluded  that  the  Western  view  on  sovereignty  is  much  more  concerned  about 
analyzing  the  legal  meaning  of  the  concept,  rather  than  its  political  and  economic 
implications.  Thus,  sovereignty  is  a  number  of  legal  competencies  which  can  be  defined  and 
which  every  State  can  enjoy  under  the  auspices  of  international  law.  Yet,  the  Western  view 
does  not  dwell  on  whether  those  competencies  can  be  exercised  in  practice  by  every  State 
without  any  obstacles  taking  into  account  the  de  facto  inequality  between  States. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  positive  side  of  the  Western  view  is  that  it  can  be  easily  reconciled 
with  the  contention  that  human  rights  must  be  respected  in  all  events  and  especially  in  cases 
of  internal  wars.  Because  the  view  stresses  that  sovereignty  must  be  exercised  within  the 
bounds  of  international  law,  hence  once  we  can  prove  that  human  rights  have  been  accepted 
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23 as  a  legal  limitation  on  sovereignty  by  States,  then  the  competence  of  the  Government  to 
maintain  law  and  order  especially  in  cases  of  civil  wars  is  not  unlimited. 
B.  The  Marxist  Theory  and  the  Meaning  of  Sovereignty 
In  1949,  the  representatives  of  Canada,  China,  France,  the  UK  and  the  US  reported  to  the 
UNGA  (concerning  the  difference  between  the  UN  and  Soviet  plans  for  an  international 
control  systems  for  atomic  energy).  They  stated: 
"All  the  sponsoring  powers  other  than  the  USSR,  put  world  security  first  and  are 
prepared  to  accept  innovations  in  traditional  concepts  of  international  co-operation, 
national  sovereignty  and  economic  organization,  where  these  are  necessary  for 
security.  The  Government  of  the  USSR  put  its  sovereignty  first  and  was  unwilling 
to  accept  measures  which  may  iM  inge  upon  or  interfere  with  its  rigid  exercise  of 
unimpeded  state  of  sovereignty". 
W 
This,  in  effect,  means  that  the  USSR  clinged  to  a  very  rigid  concept  of  sovereignty  like  that 
of  the  18th  and  19th  centuries.  Despite  of  the  above  statement,  it  seems  that  this  is  not 
wholly  true,  the  Soviet  Union  in  fact,  stressed  the  importance  of  international  law  as  a  real 
means  of  settling  different  problems  between  States,  which  indirectly  means  that 
sovereignty  it  not  seen  as  absolute. 
In  this  context,  the  Soviet  representative  at  the  1964  Mexico  City  meeting  of  the  UN 
Special  Committee  on  the  Principles  of  Friendly  Relations  is  reported  to  have  stated  that 
9some  countries  have  even  considered  that  international  law  too  was  an  invasion  of  State 
sovereignty  and  that  his  own  delegation  did  not  share  such  a  view.  He  maintained  that  his 
country  held  the  view  that  the  rules  of  international  law  restricted  the  freedom  of  States 
with  a  view  to  safeguarding  international  peace  and  security,  without  infringing  the 
sovereignty  of  the  States  concerned'.  He  added  that  his  country's  politics  and  Soviet  legal 
doctrine  were  consistent  with  that  view.  '39 
However,  the  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  Communist  writers  in  general,  stress  the 
importance  of  sovereignty  in  international  law,  it  guarantees  the  development  of  different 
social  and  economic  systems,  it  is  one  of  the  democratic  principles  of  classical  international 
law.  They  see  sovereignty  as  a  fundamental  political  rule  which  all  States  adhere  to  since 
it  "excludes  by  its  very  nature  any  'ideological  reconciliation'  between  socialism  and 
imperialism".  40  The  meaning  of  sovereignty  in  their  view  is  not  a  static  one.  Krylov  writes: 
"...  [A]t  different  stages  of  the  evelopment  of  class  society  the  concept  of  sovereignty 
had  different  class  rneaning". 
ý' 
He  stressed  that: 
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24 "...  [F]rom  the  standpoint  of  the  theory  of  international  law,  sovereignty  means  the 
independence  and  autonomy  of  the  State  in  domestic  and  foreign  relations".  42 
Tunkin,  on  the  other  hand,  stresses  that  sovereignty  in  the  present  era  of  the  development 
of  international  relations  is  not  an  obstacle  to  the  realisation  of  the  principles  banning 
recourse  to  force,  the  co-operation  between  States  and  peaceful  co-existence  of  opposing 
social  systems.  He  stated: 
"Cest  la  politique  de  force  suivie  par  les  Etats  impdrialistes  dans  les  intdrdts  des 
grandes  compagnies  priv6es  qui  emp8che  ]a  r6alisation  du  principe  de  non-recours 
A  la  force".  43- 
This  means  that  sovereignty  among  other  things  is  not  an  absolute  concept.  Another  Soviet 
author,  Mouchan  maintains  that  the  notion  of  jus  cogens  contained  in  the  1969  Vienna 
Convention  of  the  Law  of  Treaties  (Article  53)  is  not  confined  to  the  law  of  treaties  but  it 
is  applicable  to  all  actions  of  States  in  every  sphere  of  international  life.  He  observes: 
"Under  the  circumstances  the  notion  of  Jus  cogens  fills  the  gap  and  should  be 
interpreted  as  applicable  to  all  both  unilateral  and  joint,  acts  by  States  in  their 
relations  with  one  another;  it  is  an  integral  component  of  the  concept  of  modern 
international  law  and  order".  44 
It  is inferred  from  the  above  that  the  principle  of  sovereignty  cannot  be  used  to  justify  any 
action  on  the  part  of  States  which  contradict  any  norm  of  Jus  cogens. 
Some  Communist  writers  tried  to  give  a  full  picture  of  the  meaning  of  sovereignty  in 
Communist  thinking.  In  this  contex,  Gedmanu,  a  Romanian  lawyer,  gives  a  detailed 
definition  of  sovereignty.  He  writes: 
"The  unique,  full  and  indivisible  supremacy  of  the  State  power  within  the  limit  of 
the  territorial  frontiers  and  the  independence  of  this  power  in  relation  to  any  other 
power,  which  is  expressed  in  the  State's  exclusive  and  inalienable  right  to  lay  down 
and  carry  out  its  home  and  foreign  policy  independently  to  discharge  its  functions 
to  implement  the  practical  measures  for  organizing  its  social  life  at  home  and  its 
foreign  relations  on  the  basis  of  respect  for  the  sovereignty  of  other  States  for  the 
principles  and  norms  of  international  law  accepted  of  its  own  will  #.  45 
Other  Communist  writers  consider  sovereignty  as  being  the  facility  or  an  aptitude  of  a 
people  to  shape  their  fate  and  destiny  freely.  46  Nastasesco  notes  that  the  main  elements  of 
sovereignty  are:  (i)  exclusive  State  power  in  discharging  the  functions  specific  to  the  State; 
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25 (ii)  indivisibility,  that  is  full  freedom  of  choice  in  using  the  whole  set  of  prerogatives  of 
State  power;  and,  (iii)  inalienability  which  means  the  impossibility  of  ceding  State  power 
either  to  some  foreign  power  or  to  some  international  body.  47 
Chaumont  maintains  also,  that  sovereignty  still  has  a  very  important  role  to  play  in  the 
age  of  nuclear  confrontation,  in  the  tradition  of  dialectic  analysis.  He  stresses  that 
sovereignty  is  not  'un  pouvoir  illusoire  de  tout  faire  ni  un  pouvoir  irr6el  de  tout  refuser'.  48 
He  writes: 
"...  [La  souverainet6]  ne  peux  jamais  disigner  que  l'aptitude  de  l'Etat  ä  participer  au 
maximum  ä  la  vie  internationale  dans  la  situation  oü  la  giographie  et  l'histoire  l'ont 
place  ff  . 
49 
He  sees  a  direct  link  between  sovereignty  and  self-determination.  Thus,  according  to  him, 
'la  souverainet6,  c'est  le  droit  des  peuples  &  son  stade  de  rialisation.  '50  However,  Chaumont 
warns  that  sovereignty  is  not  a  static  concept,  he  adds: 
"Mais  dans  apj!  cu;  Lq4s,  il  ne  s'agit  d'un  concept  statique  car  la  souverainetd  rdalis6e, 
tout  comme  le  droit  des  peuples  dans  la  phase  de  revendication,  est  une  cr6ation 
continue  et  une  vigilance  de  tous  les  instants".  51 
From  the  above  definitions,  it  seems  that  Marxist  lawyers  take  sovereignty  very  seriously, 
it  is  important  for  a  Communist  State  since  it  excludes  foreign  interference  in  its  internal 
affairs  and  it  gives  the  ruling  class  every  power  they  need  for  the  consolidation  of  the 
Communist  regime  inside  the  State.  In  other  words,  sovereignty  can  play  a  very  progressive 
role  as  it  will  be  used  for  the  benefits  of  the  great  majority  of  the  population. 
C.  Third  World  Views  on  the  Meaning  of  Sovereignty 
Third  World  lawyers  in  general  regard  the  traditional  concept  of  sovereignty  as  very 
negative  and  restrictive  in  its  meaning.  They  advocate  like  Socialist  lawyers  a  broad 
meaning.  In  this  respect,  Bedjaoui  for  example.  argues  that  the  classical  concept  of 
sovereignty  which  has  been  translated  into  the  UN  Charter  is  only  defined  by  its  political 
elements  whereas  the  economic  elements  are  absent.  This  leads  to  the  inevitable  consequence 
that  sovereignty  to  a  new  State  is  a  'drapeau,  hymne  national  et  siýge  aux  Nations  UnieS'52 
while  the  reality  of  power  resides  elsewhere. 
in  my  opinion,  Ghozali  seems  to  have  made  the  best  attempt  by  a  Third  World  lawyer  to 
define  sovereignty  and  to  show  its  meaning  in  our  present  era,  where  Third  World  States 
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26 participate  actively  in  international  affairs.  In  his  view,  sovereignty  must  mean  other  things 
than  the  mere  proclamations  of  legal  equality.  He  writes: 
"Elie  [la  souverainet6]  implique  la  prohibition  de  l'intervention,  et  toute  forme 
d'ingdrence.  Comme  toute  menace  dirig6e  contre  la  personnalitd  d'un  Etat,  ou  contre 
ses  616ments  politiques,  6conomiques  et  culturels.  Elie  se  traduit  par  le  droit 
imprescriptible  de  chaque  peuple  de  d6terminer  librement  son  destin,  et  de  choisir 
son  r6gime  politique,  6conomique  et  social".  53 
He  then  adds: 
"La  souverainet8  ne  signifie  plus  uniquement  l'ind8pendance  nationale.  Elle 
s'accomplit  dans  le  diveloppernent.  Elle  signifie  'le  droit  au  diveloppement'n.  54 
As  a  result,  sovereignty  is  seen  by  this  writer  as  a  political  arm  against  inequality  and 
intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  States. 
Third  World  writers  then  stress  that  sovereignty  has  to  be  broadened  and  strengthened. 
It  has  to  give  the  State  the  necessary  powers  to  transform  the  economic,  social  and  cultural 
structures  of  the  society  and  guarantee  that  no  forms  of  interference  in  that  process  by 
outside  powers  is  allowed.  On  the  external  front,  they  advocate  that  a  real  and  positive 
meaning  must  be  given  to  'independence',  so  that  it  allows  a  just  participation  in  the 
economic  relations  and  in  other  fields  also  such  as  communications,  etc. 
The  position  of  Third  World  countries  in  the  Diplomatic  Conference  (1974-1977)  in 
relation  to  the  application  of  that  law  to  internal  conflicts  confirms  their  attachment  to  a 
very  rigid  version  of  the  concept  of  sovereignty.  Nevertheless,  it  must  be  stressed  that  their 
opposition  to  the  extension  of  humanitarian  rules  to  internal  conflicts,  was  not  because  they 
were  inhuman.  The  real  reason  was,  in  fact,  that  they  feared  that  such  extension  would,  in 
practice,  open  the  door  to  foreign  intervention  and  would  violate  their  sovereignty.  They 
wanted  to  have  a  free  hand  to  deal  with  internal  rebellion,  and  consequently  the  concept 
of  sovereignty  offers  them  the  best  defence. 
In  this  context,  the  Indian  representative  in  the  Diplomatic  Conference  (1974-77)  best 
described  the  state  of  mind  of  the  majority  of  States  and  especially  Third  World  countries 
when  he  argued  that: 
" 
... 
[I]f  a  world  government  existed,  there  would  be  no  reason  to  fear  violations  of 
sovereignty  but  things  being  what  they  were,  developing  countries  were  bent  on 
protecting  their  sovereignty  and  had  set  their  hearts  on  working  for  their  own 
"55  development  without  external  interference. 
It  must  be  noted  that  even  among  Third  World  countries  the  feeling  was  that  sovereignty 
must  not  be  seen  as  an  impregnable  fortress,  inroads  into  it  were  necessary  if  mankind  is 
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27 to  be  respected.  Illustrating  this  view,  the  Algerian  delegate  noted  that: 
"...  [H]umanitarian  law  and  national  sovereignty  should  not  be  considered 
irreconcilable  and  ... 
hoped  that  a  suitable  balance  could  be  reached".  56 
The  fact  is  that  the  fear  of  the  Third  World  countries  from  the  extension  of  humanitarian 
law  to  internal  conflicts,  stems  from  their  belief  that  they  are  the  real  theatre  of  such  wars 
which  means  that  allegations  of  violations  of  its  rules  would,  in  practice,  be  directed  against 
them.  Moreover,  they  always  suspect  European  humanitarianism  of  concealing  realms  of 
interference  and  domination. 
Against  this  background,  Bedjaoui  has,  in  a  recent  report,  stressed  that: 
"...  [T]hird  world  should  not  distrust  humanitarian  law  because  of  its  apparent  Western 
flavour.  Concern  for  the  integrity  and  dignity  of  the  human  person  is  a  sort  of 
'common  heritage  of  mankind'  not  the  property  of  one  specific  society". 
He  added  that  humanitarian  law  must  not  become  a  victim  of  the  reactions  of  the  Third 
World  to  alien  domination.  "  These  comments  relate  to  humanitarian  law  in  general  which 
presumably  includes  the  part  of  that  law  concerned  with  internal  conflicts  since  concern  for 
the  integrity  and  dignity  of  mankind  cannot  be  different  according  to  the  formal  nature  of 
the  conflict.  Better,  sovereignty  must  not  abstract  the  application  of  humanitarian  law  to 
internal  conflicts. 
D.  International  Courts  and  the  Meaning  of  Sovereignty 
The  PCIJ  and  later  the  ICJ  have  in  some  actual  cases,  dealt  with  some  aspects  of 
sovereignty.  In  general,  sovereignty  is  seen  as  a  bulk  of  competencies  exercised  by  the  State 
within  the  ambit  of  international  law.  Thus,  in  the  Lotus  Case,  the  PCIJ  held: 
"International  law  governs  relations  between  independent  States 
...  the  rule  of  law 
binding  upon  States  therefore  emanates  from  their  own  free  will  ...  restrictions  upon 
the  independence  of  States  cannot  therefore  be  presumed".  58 
Accordingly,  it  is  independence  which  gives  international  law  its  ralson  d'etre,  its  existence 
and  development,  it  is  directly  connected  with  the  existence  of  independent  States. 
Independence  is  given  here  a  very  broad  scope,  so  it  is  in  essence  unlimited  which  means 
that  the  State  retains  full  freedom  of  action.  Only  when  it  accepts  restrictions  in  the  form 
of  binding  legal  rules  can  that  State  be  considered  prohibited  from  doing  or  not  doing  the 
sort  of  action  agreed  to. 
Many  other  statements  of  international  courts  stress  either  directly  or  indirectly  that 
sovereignty  means  the  right  of  the  State  to  exercise  freely  all  its  competencies  inside  its 
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28 territory  without  any  interference.  The  only  restriction  is  to  respect  international  law, 
however,  when  the  subject  is  dealt  with  and  regulated  by  that  law,  in  the  absence  of  such 
regulations  sovereignty  reigns.  59 
In  the  Customs  Reeime  between  Germanv  and  Austria  (advisory  ODInlon),  the  PCIJ  had 
an  occasion  to  define  independence.  It  stated  that: 
"The  independence  of  Austria  must  be  understood  to  mean  the  continued  existence 
of  Austria  within  her  present  frontiers  as  a  separate  State  with  the  sole  right  of 
decision  in  all  matters  economic,  political,  financial  or  other  with  the  resultthat  that 
independence  is  violated,  as  soon  as  there  is  any  violation  thereof,  either  in  the 
economic,  political,  or  any  other  field,  these  different  aspects  of  independence  being 
in  practice  one  and  indivisible,  a  violation  of  any  of  them  would  mean  a  violation  of 
60  Austria's  independence". 
Seemingly,  the  Court  uses  independence  as  meaning  sovereignty,  it  is  more  than  the  external 
aspect  of  sovereignty,  which  is  essentially  negative  in  character,  it  includes  positive  aspects 
as  well,  since  the  State  is  by  virtue  of  that  independence  capable  of  acting  positively  by 
taking  decisions  in  different  matters  affecting  the  life  of  the  nation.  The  Court  has  also 
emphasised  that  independence  is  indivisible,  in  other  words,  it  cannot  be  broke  up  in  parts 
which  belong  to  more  than  one  State. 
Judge  Anzilotti  has,  in  his  Individual  Opinion  in  the  above  case,  as  well  dealt  with  the 
meaning  of  independence.  He  writes: 
"...  [I]ndependence 
... 
is  really  no  more  than  the  normal  condition  of  States  according 
to  international  law,  it  may  also  be  described  as  sovereignty  (suprema  potestas)  or 
external  sovereignty  by  which  is  meant  that  the  State  has  over  it  no  other  authority 
than  that  of  international  laW".  61 
He  then  added  that: 
"...  [I]independence  in  the  legal  sense  is  affected  neither  by  a  State's  submission  to 
international  law  or  by  constantly  increasing  of  de  facto  dependence  between 
countries".  62 
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29 Consequently,  increased  international  co-operation  between  States  and  adherence  to 
international  law  by  those  same  States,  does  not  mean  the  end  of  independence  as  a  legal 
notion. 
Moreover,  in  his  Separate  Opinion  in  the  Case  Concerning  Right  of  Passage  Over  Indian 
Territory,  Judge  Willington  Koo  has  made  two  important  observations  concerning 
sovereignty:  (i)  International  law  makes  no  distinction  between  one  sovereignty  and  another; 
and  (ii)  it  is  inconceivable  in  international  law  that  one  sovereignty  exists  only  by  the  will 
or  caprice  of  another  sovereignty.  63 
Hence,  equality  is  presumed  between  the  sovereignty  of  all  States  whatever  their  factual 
and  real  differences.  It  must  be  also  noted  that  the  jurisprudence  of  international  courts  and 
tribunals  has  stressed  in  many  cases  that  sovereignty  is  essentially  territorial.  In  this  context, 
in  the  award  of  the  Tribunal  of  Arbitration  in  the  North  Atlantic  Coast  Fisheries  Case 
(Great  Britain  v.  United  States  of  America)  it  is  clearly  held  that: 
"[One  of  the  essential  elements  of  sovereignty  is  that  it  is  to  be  exercised  within 
territorial  limits  and  that,  failing  proof  to  the  contrary,  the  territory  is  coterminous 
with  the  sovereignty".  64 
Thus,  there  is  a  presumption  in  favour  of  the  full  sovereignty  of  the  State  over  its  territory 
unless  a  contrary  rule  can  be  shown  under  which  international  law  limits  such  sovereignty, 
the  State  has  the  exclusivity  of  competencies  over  its  territory.  In  the  Island  of  Palmas 
_Cg1k, 
this  point  was  made  very  clear  when  it  was  held  that: 
"Territorial  sovere  i  gnty,....  involves  the  exclusive  right  to  display  the  activities  of 
StateS".  65 
Furthermore,  Judge  de  Castro  made  an  interesting  analogy  between  sovereignty  and 
property  in  his  Dissenting  Opinion  in  the  Nuclear  Test  Case.  He  stated  that: 
"The  applicant's  complaints  against  France  of  violation  of  its  sovereignty  by 
introduction  of  harmful  matter  into  its  territory  without  its  permission,  is  based  on 
a  legal  interest,  which  has  been  well  known  since  the  time  of  Roman  law:  The 
prohibitions  of  Immissio  (of  water-smoke  fragments  of  stone)  into  a  neighbouring 
66  property  was  a  feature  of  Roman  law". 
He  then  added  that: 
"The  principle  'sic  utertuoutalia  errurn  non  Was'  is  a  feature  of  law  both  ancient  and 
modern-it  is  well  known  that  owner  of  a  property  is  liable  for  the  intolerable  smoke 
or  smells,  because  he  oversteps  the  physical  limits  of  his  property".  67 
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30 So,  territorial  sovereignty  of  each  State  imposes  corresponding  duties  of  abstention  and  non- 
interference  in  whatever  form  on  the  part  of  other  States. 
Further,  Judge  Alvarez  in  his  Individual  Opinion,  in  the  Corfu  Channel  Case  gave  a  very 
interesting  definition  to  sovereignty.  He  writes: 
"...  [B]y  sovereignty,  we  understand  the  whole  body  of  rights  and  attributions  which 
a  State  possesses  in  its  relations  with  other  States.  Sovereignty  confers  rights  upon 
States  and  imposes  obligations  on  them.  These  rights  are  not  the  same  and  are  not 
exercised  in  the  same  way  in  every  sphere  of  international  law.  I  have  in  mind  the 
four  traditional  spheres:  territorial,  fluvial  and  lacustrine-to  which  must  be  added 
three  new  ones:  aerial,  polar  and  floating  (floating  islands).  The  violations  of  these 
rights  is  not  of  equal  gravity  in  all  these  different  sphereS.  "68 
He  concluded  by  stating  that: 
"The  sovereignty  of  a  State  has  now  become  an  institution,  an  international  social 
function  of  a  psychological  character  which  has  to  be  exercised  in  accordance  with 
69  the  new  international  law". 
In  this  opinion,  there  is  an  emphasis  upon  the  relative  importance  of  the  rights  which 
sovereignty  confers  upon  States.  In  my  opinion,  it  seems  that  it  is  difficult  to  prove  that 
States  regard  the  violations  of  particular  rights  as  grave,  whereas  the  same  violations  of 
some  other  rights  as  not  important,  States  regard  all  violations  of  all  their  rights  as  of  equal 
importance.  This  is  the  logic  of  the  concept  of  sovereignty  itself. 
In  the  Nicaragua  Case  Merits).  the  ICJ  had  an  occasion  to  deal  with  the  meaning  and 
limits  of  the  concept  of  sovereignty  in  our  present  era.  Its  pronouncement  on  the  subject 
(of  sovereignty)  is  very  interesting  since  it  is  the  product  of  a  court  which  is  composed  in 
a  way  that  all  cultures  and  civilizations  of  our  world  are  represented.  The  Court  stressed 
that  the  principle  of  sovereignty  is  closely  linked  and  inevitably  overlaps  with  the  principles 
of  the  prohibition  of  the  use  of  force  and  non-intervention,  70  which  means  that  any 
unlawful  use  of  force  or  any  illegal  intervention  is  a  real  infringement  of  the  sovereignty 
of  the  State. 
The  Court  then  and  implicitly  divided  sovereignty  into  two  aspects:  internal  and  external 
and  thoroughly  explained  the  two  aspects.  Concerning  the  internal  aspect  it  held  that: 
"A  State's  domestic  policy  falls  within  its  exclusive  jurisdiction,  provided  of  course 
that  it  does  not  violate  any  obligations  of  international  law.  Every  State  possesses  a 
fundamental  right  to  choose  and  implement  its  political  economic  and  social 
systeMS".  71 
On  the  question  of  the  possibility  of  a  State  binding  itself  by  agreement  to  a  question  of 
domestic  policy  (such  as  that  relating  to  the  holding  of  free  elections  on  its  territory),  the 
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31 Court,  after  observing  that  it  cannot  discover,  within  the  range  of  subjects  open  to 
international  agreements,  any  obstacle  to  hinder  a  State  from  making  a  commitment  of  that 
kind,  stressed: 
"A  State,  which  is  free  to  decide  upon  the  principle  and  methods  of  popular 
consultation  within  its  domestic  order  isýovereign  for  the  purpose  of  accepting  a 
limitation  of  its  sovereignty  in  this  field.  "  2 
This,  in  effect,  means  that  whatever  the  importance  of  any  given  internal  competence,  the 
State  can  always  give  it  away  or  limit  its  exercise.  Moreover,  on  the  finding  of  the  US 
Congress  that  the  Nicaraguan  Government  had  taken  'significant  steps  towards  establishing 
a  totalitarian  Communist  dictatorship',  the  Court  declared  that: 
"However,  the  regime  in  Nicaragua  be  defined,  adherence  by  a  State  to  any  particular 
doctrine  does  not  constitute  a  violation  of  customary  international  law;  to  hold 
otherwise  would  make  nonsense  of  the  fundamental  principle  of  State  sovereignty, 
on  which  the  whole  of  international  law  rests  and  the  freedom  of  choice  of  political, 
"  73  social,  economic  and  cultural  systems  of  a  State 
. 
In  other  words,  whatever  the  nature  or  character  of  the  domestic  policy  options  of  a 
country,  third  States  must  respect  that  choice  and  must  not  use  any  force  or  threat  of  it 
either  directly  or  indirectly  to  change  those  options.  Otherwise  they  will  be  seen  as 
committing  an  infringement  of  that  State"s  sovereignty. 
However,  on  the  external  aspect  of  sovereignty,  the  Court  when  considering  the  criticisms 
expressed  by  the  US  on  the  external  policies  and  alliances  of  Nicaragua,  held  that: 
"Whatever  the  impact  of  individual  alliances  on  regional  or  international  political- 
military  balances.  The  Court  is  only  competent  to  consider  such  questions  from  the 
standpoint  of  international  law.  From  that  aspect,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that  State 
sovereignty  evidently  extends  to  the  area  of  its  foreign  policy  and  there  is  no  rule  of 
customary  international  law  to  prevent  a  State  frýrn  choosing  and  conducting  a 
foreign  policy  in  co-ordination  with  another  State  w.  4 
Then,  in  the  absence  of  clearly  established  legal  obligation  the  State  is  free  to  shape  and  to 
conduct  its  foreign  policy  which  is  in  effect  the  external  aspect  of  its  sovereignty.  The  main 
conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  jurisprudence  of  international  courts  concerning 
sovereignty  are: 
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Ibid,  para  265,  p.  1083.  it  must  be  noted  here  also  that  the  ICJ  when  dealing  with  the  question  of  the 
militarization  of  Nicaragua  which  was  raised  by  the  US  and  which  was  seen  by  the  tatter  as  proving  the 
aggressive  intent  of  Nicaragua,  held: 
"It  is  irrelevant  and  inappropriate,  in  the  Court's  opinion,  to  pass  upon  this  attegation  of  the 
United  States,  since  in  International,  taw  there  are  no  rutes  other  than  such  rutes  as  may  be 
accepted  by  the  State  concerned  by  treaty  or  otherwise,  whereby  the  tevet  of  armaments  of  a 
sovereign  State  can  be  timited  and  this  principte  Is  vatid  for  att  States  without  exception,  $. 
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32 1.  The  confirmation  of  the  importance  and  necessity  of  sovereignty  in  international  law 
is  upheld,  it  is  in  fact  said  to  be  the  real  basis  of  such  law  and  relations. 
2.  In  general,  a  broad  interpretation  is  given  to  the  meaning  of  sovereignty,  it  is  limited 
only  by  rules  of  international  law,  which  were  consented  to  by  the  State;  which  means,  in 
the  last  analysis,  that  international  law  itself  owes  its  existence  and  development  to  the 
working  of  the  principle  of  sovereignty. 
3.  However,  the  jurisprudence  of  the  courts  also  emphasized  that  the  sovereignty  of  the 
State,  consists  generally  of  competencies  granted  by  international  law.  This  means  that  the 
notion  of  sovereignty  is  relative  in  character,  and  its  content  depends  on  the  development 
of  international  law  at  any  given  moment.  This  has  been  confirmed  in  the  Nationality 
Decrees  in  Tunis  and  Morocco  (French  Zone)  Case,  where  the  PCIJ  rightly  held: 
"The  questions  whether  a  certain  matter  is  or  is  not  solely  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
a  State  is  an  essential!;  relative  question,  it  depends  upon  the  development  of 
international  relations.  "  5 
4.  In  the  Nicaragua  Case,  the  Court  answered  one  of  the  biggest  worries  of  Third  World 
States  by  stressing  the  close  link  between  sovereignty  and  the  use  or  threat  of  force  and 
interventions.  Since  any  such  use  of  force  or  threat  of  it  or  resort  to  intervention  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  others  is  considered  by  the  Court  to  be  a  direct  infringement  of 
sovereignty. 
5.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  jurisprudence  of  international  courts  in  general,  confirms  the 
Western  doctrine's  view  that  sovereignty  is  in  the  last  analysis  a  bulk  of  legal  competencies 
exercised  under  the  auspices  of  international  law  (in  fact  many  cases  point  to  that  direction 
such  as  the  Island  of  Palmas  Case,  the  Wimbledon  Case,  the  Corfu  Case  and  to  some  extent 
the  Nicaragua  Case).  Thus,  the  concerns  of  Socialist  and  Third  World  doctrine  which 
underlined  the  importance  of  the  issue  of  inequality,  intervention  and  other  problems  of  a 
political  nature  in  studying  the  notion  of  sovereignty,  are  not  well  represented  although,  as 
I  noted  above,  the  Nicaraguan  Case  seems  to  signal  a  shift  in  the  direction  of  satisfying 
Socialist  and  especially  Third  World  worries  about  what  the  notion  of  sovereignty  should 
mean  and  contain. 
Section  11:  The  Role  of  Sovereignty  In  the  Contemporary  World  Order 
This  section  is  concerned  with  the  inquiry  into  the  role  and  the  place  of  sovereignty  in  the 
present  international  society.  The  importance  of  such  inquiry  spring  from  the  fact  that  some 
lawyers,  especially  in  the  West,  see  sovereignty  as  basically  against  the  idea  of  humanity,  76 
which  means  that  as  long  as  sovereignty  survives  there  is  no  hope  for  the  protection  of 
human  dignity  and  consequently  humanitarian  law  would,  in  cases  of  internal  conflicts,  find 
in  sovereignty  a  real  adversary,  if  not  a  killer. 
This  section,  however,  demonstrates  that  sovereignty  is  not  withering  away,  it  is  with  us. 
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33 State  practice  in  its  different  forms  (treaties,  UN  declarations,  State  pronouncements) 
confirms  unequivocally  that  verdict.  Similarly,  Socialist,  Third  World  and  a  majority  of 
Western  doctrine  stress  for  different  reasons  that  the  idea  of  sovereignty  is  a  fundamental 
guarantee  for  peace  in  our  world  and  that  basically  (sovereignty)  is  not  against  the  idea  of 
the  protection  of  human  dignity  and  development  of  international  law. 
A.  Sovereignty  In  State  Practice 
In  bilateral  and  multilateral  relations  between  States,  sovereignty  occupies  a  very  important 
place.  Thus,  it  is  rare  not  to  find  insistence  upon  it  in  important  treaties  and  declarations 
of  international  organizations.  The  most  important  multilateral  treaty  in  our  present  time, 
the  UN  Charter,  lists  sovereign  equality  as  the  first  principle  upon  which  the  organization 
is  based.  Its  Article  2/7  protects  States  from  the  intervention  of  the  organization  in  their 
domestic  jurisdiction.  Moreover,  Article  14  of  the  Draft  Declaration  on  Rights  and  Duties 
of  States  prepared  by  the  ILC  in  1949  provides  that: 
"Every  State  has  the  duty  to  conduct  its  relations  with  other  States  in  accordance  with 
international  law  and  with  the  princi  le  that  sovereignty  of  each  State  is  subject  to 
the  supremacy  of  international  law.  "W 
However,  it  must  be  noted  that  Korestsky  of  the  USSR  considered  that  Draft  Article  as  a 
'maximum  attack  against  the  principle  of  sovereignty'78  because  of  its  reference  to  the 
supremacy  of  international  law,  which  means  in  essence  that  at  that  time,  the  Soviet  Union 
clung  to  a  very  rigid  and  absolutist  concept  of  sovereignty.  This  in  turn,  can  be  explained 
in  my  view  by  the  fact  that  the  Soviet  Union  was  suspicious  of  the  content  of  that 
international  law  and  was  afraid  to  see  itself  being  forced  to  accept  a  law  which  it  has  not 
consented  to. 
The  UNGA  Resolution  2625  (XXV)  (The  Declaration  on  Friendly  Relations  Resolution) 
gave  in  fact  an  important  place  to  the  principle  of  sovereign  equality,  it  stipulates  that: 
"All  States  enjoy  sovereign  equality,  they  have  equal  rights  and  duties  and  are  equal 
members  of  the  international  community,  notwithstanding  differences  of  economic, 
social,  political  or  other  nature".  79 
Sovereign  equality  includes  among  other  things,  that: 
"...  [E]ach  State  enjoys  the  rights  inherent  in  full  sovereignty".  80 
This  Declaration  makes  it  clear  that  the  principles  embodied  in  it  constitute  the  basic 
principles  of  international  law  and  as  such  would  be  the  guidelines  which  all  States  and  not 
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34 only  members  of  the  organization  should  conduct  their  mutual  relations.  It  must  be  noted 
that  the  ICJ  has,  in  the  Nicaragua  Case.  stressed  the  importance  of  this  Declaration  in 
relations  between  States.  It  held: 
"The  effect  of  consent  to  the  text  of  such  relations  cannot  be  understood  as  merely 
that  of  a  'reiteration  or  elucidations'  of  the  treaty  commitment  undertaken  in  the 
Charter.  On  the  contrary,  it  may  be  understood  as  an  acceptance  of  the  validity  of 
the  rule  or  set  of  rules  declared  by  the  resolution  by  themselves".  8' 
This  means  in  effect  that  the  court  has  given  a  binding  legal  force  to  Resolution  2625 
independently  of  its  relation  to  the  UN  Charter.  Thus,  within  the  UN,  there  is  no 
diminishing  importance  for  sovereignty,  it  is  the  central  feature  of  the  organization. 
Henry  Kissinger,  the  former  US  Secretary  of  State,  was  right  when  he  stated  that: 
"The  United  Nations  Charter  is  based  on  the  proposition  that  the  United  Nations  is 
composed  of  sovereign  States  and  therefore  the  United  Nations  has  never  been 
intended  as  a  world  government  superseding  the  sovereign  government  ".  82 
Such  an  opinion  indicates  that  sovereignty  is  the  central  pillar  of  contemporary  international 
system.  There  is  no  evidence  that  sovereignty  is  regarded  within  the  UN  as  an  obstacle  to 
the  maintenance  of  peace  or  the  protection  of  human  dignity  or  as  an  idea  whose  time  has 
past.  In  this  context,  Chaumont  was  right  when  he  wrote: 
"Ainsi,  loin  que  I'ONU  A  considdrer  la  souverainetd  de  I'Etat  comme  une  notion 
"  83  depassde  elle  lui  reconnait  au  contraire  une  valeur  dynarnique  et  fondamentale 
. 
It  is  to  be  also  noted  that  all  regional  organizations  of  States  mention  in  their  constituent 
instruments,  'sovereignty  and  independence'  as  fundamental  principles  and  that  their 
observance  and  respect  is  the  real  basis  of  their  organizations.  The  latter  it  must  be 
remembered  consist  of  the  membership  of  an  important  number  of  States  in  different  parts 
of  the  world.  The  Charter  of  the  OAS  stipulates  in  its  first  Article  that: 
"The  American  States  establish  by  this  Charter  the  international  organization  that  they 
have  developed  to  achieve  an  order  of  peace  and  justice  to  promote  their  sovereignty, 
their  territorial  integrity  and  their  independence.  "84 
Articles  9,10,11,15  and  16  insist  as  well  upon  different  aspects  of  sovereignty.  The  latter 
is  not  regarded  in  the  Charter  as  incompatible  with  struggling  for  peace  and  justice  or 
attachment  to  human  rights  and  human  dignity. 
The  OAU  Charter,  due  to  the  specific  history  of  the  continent,  which  is  characterised  by 
foreign  domination  and  intervention,  respect  for  sovereignty  and  independence  has  a  very 
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35 special  place.  One  can  speculate  that  it  (non-  intervention)  is,  in  fact,  the  other  name  of  the 
organization.  In  this  respect,  the  Preamble  of  the  OAU  Charter  makes  it  clear  that  the 
organization  is  'determined  to  safeguard  and  consolidate  the  hard  won  independence  as  well 
as  the  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of  our  States'.  85  Article  3  of  the  OAU  Charter 
which  deals  with  the  principles  of  the  organization,  mentions  respect  for  sovereignty  and 
territorial  integrity  of  each  State  and  for  its  inalienable  right  to  independent  existence. 
Article  4  makes  independence  the  fundamental  criteria,  which  must  be  satisfied  by  any 
entity  willing  to  join  the  organization  as  a  member. 
In  the  Arab  world,  aspiration  for  the  unity  of  all  Arab  people  in  one  single  State  has  been 
in  the  front,  at  least,  from  the  time  of  decolonization.  However,  the  Pact  of  the  League  of 
Arab  States  stressed  in  Article  2  that  the  League  will  work  towards  a  closer  relationship 
between  member  States  and  co-ordinate  their  political  activities  with  the  aim  of  realising 
the  closer  co-operation  there,  to  safeguard  their  independence  and  sovereignty  86  which 
means  that  the  rhetoric  of  unity  has  given  way  to  the  reality  of  sovereignty. 
What  emerges  from  these  three  important  organizations  is  the  fact  that  sovereignty  plays 
a  dominant  role  in  their  constituent  instruments  and  also  in  daily  practice  of  their  different 
organs.  The  whole  movement  towards  more  human  rights  has  not  affected  the  attachment 
of  these  organizations  to  sovereignty,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  (sovereignty)  considered  to  be 
the  real  guarantee  for  the  enjoyment  of  such  rights.  Nevertheless,  it  is  important  to  note, 
that  the  attachment  to  the  notion  of  sovereignty  and  insistence  on  its  fundamental  role  in 
international  relations  is  not  the  monopoly  of  Third  World  countries.  The  Conference  on 
Security  and  Co-operation  in  Europe  held  in  Helsinki  in  1975,  and  which  was  attended  by 
more  than  30  countries  among  them  the  US  and  the  USSR,  gave  in  fact  a  large  place  in  its 
Final  Act  (August  Ist,  1975)  to  sovereignty.  Thus,  the  Final  Act  provides  that: 
"I(a)l.  Sovereign  equality,  respect  for  rights  inherent  in  the  sovereignty. 
The  participating  States  will  respect  each  other's  sovereign  equality  and  individuality, 
as  well  as  all  the  rights  inherent  and  encompassed  by  its  sovereignty,  including,  in 
particular,  the  right  of  every  State  to  jVdicial  equality,  to  territorial  integrity  and  to 
freedom  and  political  independence". 
The  Act  also  stresses  the  right  of  every  State  to  choose  and  pursue  freely  the  political, 
social,  economic  and  cultural  systems  which  it  wishes  and  their  right  to  determine  their  laws 
and  regulations,  all  these  rights  are,  in  fact,  fundamental  ingredients  of  the  concept  of 
sovereignty. 
President  Ford,  who  signed  the  Final  Act  for  the  US,  in  an  address  to  the  Conference  on 
August  Ist,  1975,  observed  that  the  documents  agreed  upon  'are  more  than  the  lowest 
common  denominator  of  Governmental  positions.  '88  He  adds  that: 
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36 "[The  documents] 
...  reaffirm  the  basic  principles  of  relations  between  States,  non- 
intervention,  sovereign  equality,  inviolability  of  frontiers  and  the  possibility  of 
peaceful  change".  89 
Even  the  US,  the  richest  country  in  the  world  adheres  to  the  principle  of  sovereignty  and 
sees  in  it  a  basic  principle  of  international  relations. 
The  Charter  of  the  Islamic  Conference  also  makes  out  of  the  'respect  of  the  sovereignty, 
independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  each  member'90  a  fundamental  principle  of  the 
Conference.  This  despite  the  fact  that  Islam  encourages  the  unity  of  the  Umma  (the  Islamic 
Nation)  and  deplores  fragmentation  which  leads  to  the  weakening  of  Islam  and  Muslims  in 
the  face  of  their  enemies.  Moslem  States  were  not  deterred  from  proclaiming  their  strong 
adherence  to  the  principle  of  sovereignty. 
The  Charter  of  the  Council  for  Mutual  Assistance  (COMECON)  which  consists  of  the 
membership  of  most  Communist  States  except  China,  proclaims  in  its  first  Article  that  the 
Council  is  based  on  the  principle  of  'sovereign  equality  of  all  member  countries  of  the 
Council'.  91  The  same  Article  indicates  that  co-operation  between  the  members  in  economic, 
scientific  and  technical  fields  shall  take  place  and  be  guided  by  the  principles  of  'complete 
equality  of  rights,  respect  for  sovereignty  and  national  interest,  mutual  advantage  and 
friendly  mutual  aid'.  92  This  means  that  the  the  unity  of  ideology  between  Communist  States 
did  not  weaken  their  adherence  to  the  concept  of  sovereignty  even  in  their  mutual  relations. 
The  Marxist  prediction  that  sovereignty  would  wither  at  some  stage  of  the  history  of 
Socialist  States  seems  very  far  away  indeed. 
In  Western  Europe  also,  we  can  detect  that  adherence  to  the  principle  of  sovereignty  is 
not  fading  away.  In  this  context,  President  Auriol  of  France  in  an  address  to  the  US 
Congress  in  1951,  stated  that: 
"Convinced  of  the  need  for  supranational  institutions,  France  has  declared  herself 
prepared  to  grant  these  bodies  (of  the  steel  and  coal  community)  in  conformity  with 
her  constitution  and  under  the  condition  Of  reciprocity,  part  of  her  sovereignty.  And 
she  hopes  to  convince  the  still  hesitant  nations  that  they  will  not  curtail  their 
sovereignty  but  on  the  contrary  strengthen  it  by  associating  it  with  others,  by  uniting 
"93  their  resources  and  labour  to  increase  their  forces. 
In  1989  and  with  the  prospect  of  a  united  Europe  in  1992,  most  European  Leaders  still 
believe  that  the  EEC  has  no  business  meddling  in  security  matters.  The  UK  PM,  Mrs. 
Thatcher  was  unready  to  discuss  a  new  common  currency,  and  West  Germany  still  insists 
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37 that  the  time  was  not  ripe  to  talk  about  a  central  bank.  94  Moreover,  when  Jacques  Delors 
the  President  of  the  European  Commission  and  arch-champion  of  a  united  Western  Europe 
was  asked  whether  Europe  is  moving  toward  a  political  federation,  he  answered: 
"The  12  members  have  repeatedly  and  solemnly  reaffirmed  their  will  to  build  a 
political  union.  The  creation  of  a  single  economic  and  social  space  by  1992  constitutes 
the  foundations,  not  for  Gorbachev's  'Common  European  House'  but  for  a  European 
Community  House  ".  95 
He  then  adds  that: 
"...  [B]ut  the  rest  of  the  house  will  remain  to  be  built.  The  cultural  part,  the  foreign 
policy  part,  the  security  part".  96 
In  other  words,  European  States,  after  nearly  40  years  of  close  co-operation,  are  not  ready 
yet  to  give  up  the  last  and  the  most  important  elements  of  sovereignty. 
The  conclusion  is  that  State  practice,  as  the  instances  studied  here  reveal,  proves  beyond 
any  doubt  that  sovereignty  has  an  important  place  in  the  relations  between  States.  It  also 
has  a  role  to  play  in  an  international  society  which  is  divided  among  territorial  units  that 
differ  greatly  in  size,  population  and  wealth.  They  have  different  ways  of  life,  different 
cultures  and  ideologies  too.  Sovereignty  then  is  the  guarantor  of  the  co-existence  of  such 
differences  and  above  all  it  helps  the  weaker  units  of  international  society  to  survive 
without  fear. 
Thus,  the  illusion  which  is  entertained  by  some  people  that  there  is  an  ineluctable  force 
called  integration  which  will  destroy  weak  States  and  cause  them  to  seek  unity  and 
incorporation  with  one  another  in  order  to  survive,  has  no  basis  of  truth  in  the  State 
practice.  Sovereignty  has  proven  its  vitality,  since  without  it,  the  majority  of  today's  States 
would  have  little  chance  of  independence. 
B.  The  Doctrine  and  the  Role  of  Sovereignty 
On  the  doctrinal  level,  we  can  distinguish  two  main  tendencies  concerning  the  role  of 
sovereignty  in  international  law  and  relations.  Some  scholars  maintain  that  the  concept  of 
sovereignty  'as  primarily  responsible  for  insufficiencies  of  the  law  of  nations'97  or  see  it  as 
'a  rigid  barrier  against  the  spread  of  internationalism  and  peaceful  relations  between 
States'.  98  Others,  on  the  contrary,  regard  it  as  a  guarantee  for  democracy  inside  the  State 
and  for  peaceful  and  orderly  international  relations  on  the  outside. 
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38 1.  The  Argument  of  Those  who  Defend  Sovereignty 
Sovereignty  is  seen  by  some  as  the  point  of  departure  in  settling  most  questions  that 
concerns  international  relations  and  any  attempt  at  spiriting  away  from  it  must  remain 
meaningless.  99  Goodspeed  rightly  stated  that: 
"The  facts  of  present  day  international  life  make  it  appear  that  despite  the  need  for 
good  faith  in  interstate  relations  and  the  development  of  complex  interrelations 
among  States,  each  State  in  the  final  analysis  seeks  to  be  its  own  interpreter  of 
international  obligations  and  maintains  the  right  to  determine  its  own  standards  of 
international  conduct".  100 
Sovereignty  then  is  not  lost  in  the  fog  of  interstate  relations,  it  is  still  a  very  important 
element  of  such  relations.  Beitz  invokes  a  moral  basis  for  defending  sovereignty.  He  states 
that: 
"States,  like  persons,  have  a  right  to  be  respected  as  autonomous  sources  of  ends".  101 
He  argues  that  the  claim  to  autonomy  by  a  State  must  rest  on  the  conformity  of  its 
institutions  with  some  'appropriate  principles  of  justice'  102  because  the  autonomy  of  the 
State  is  the  other  face  of  its  legitimacy. 
Other  writers  stress  that  the  notion  of  sovereignty  has  its  foundations  in  ihe  psychology 
of  nations  and  peoples.  It  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  expression  on  the  political  and  legal 
levels  of  the  feeling  of  belonging  to  one  community,  which  shares  many  common  virtues. 
Carty,  however,  argues  that  lawyers  must  take  into  account  the  phenomenon  of  nationalism 
because  "its  appearance  in  the  form  of  the  right  to  self-determination  touches  upon  so  many 
aspects  of  what  is  commonly  regarded  as  providence  of  international  law'.  103  He  then  adds 
that  'in  some  way  or  another,  one  still  has  to  suppose  that  the  nation  State  is  an  individual 
subject  of  law  with  conscience'.  104 
It  seems  to  me  that  it  is  possible  then  to  infer  from  Carty's  opinion  that  nationalism  can 
be  the  basis  for  adherence  to  sovereignty,  since  the  latter  is  the  supreme  form  of  self- 
determination  and  also  because  nationalism  insists  on  particularism  and  distinct  identity, 
sovereignty  then  is  the  legal  and  political  shield  which  protects  that  particularism  and 
distinctness  on  the  level  of  international  society.  Sovereignty  is,  in  the  final  analysis,  the 
major  criteria  which  differentiates  between  nationalism  and  internationalism. 
A  radical  approach  to  defending  sovereignty  has  been  taken  by  Kennan.  He  insisted  that 
'the  interest  of  the  national  society  for  which  a  Government  to  concern  itself  are  basically 
those  of  its  military  security,  the  integrity  of  its  political  life  and  the  well  being  of  its 
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39 people'.  105  He  sees  these  needs  as  having  no  moral  quality,  they  arise  simply  from  the  status 
of  national  sovereignty  which  the  State  is  supposed  to  enjoy,  and  that  those  needs  cannot 
be  classified  as  either  good  or  bad  for  when  the  Government  accepts  to  govern  it  is  implicit 
in  that.  He  adds  that: 
"[I]t  is  right  that  the  State  should  be  sovereign,  that  the  integrity  of  its  political  life 
should  be  assured,  that  its  people  should  enjoy  the  blessing  of  military  security, 
material  prosperity  and  a  reasonable  opportunity  for,  as  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  put  it,  the  pursuit  of  happiness".  '06 
In  my  opinion,  this  is  a  dangerous  way  of  defending  and  asserting  sovereignty  because  the 
notion  (of  sovereignty)  is  conceived  of  as  outside  the  realm  of  law,  this  is  a  going  back  to 
the  Hobbesian  'state  of  nature'.  It  is  an  argument  which  hides  a  strong  claim  to  intervention 
in  the  affairs  of  others  whenever  one  of  the  'needs  of  the  society"  are  threatened. 
Brierly  indirectly  refutes  such  a  kind  of  argument.  He  writes: 
"...  [T]hat  sovereignty  has  come  to  imply  that  there  is  something  inherent  in  the 
nature  of  States  that  make  it  impossible  for  them  to  be  subject5d  to  law,  it  is  false 
doctrine  which  the  facts  of  international  law  do  not  support".  I 
He  then  correctly  adds  that: 
"...  [B]but  to  the  extent  that  it  [sovereignty]  reminds  us  that  the  subjection  of  States 
to  law  is  an  aim  as  yet  only  very  imperfectly  realised  and  on  which  cannot  afford  to 
disregard".  108 
In  fact,  he  rejects  the  idea  of  sovereignty  as  an  idea  outside  the  realm  of  law,  it  is  within 
law,  otherwise  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  the  weak  members  of  the  international  society 
would  become  a  daily  event. 
Levi,  after  arguing  that  interaction  and  interdependence  among  States  made  the  concept 
of  sovereignty  murky,  he  states: 
"...  [N]evertheless  the  demand  for  independence  everywhere  is  responsible  for  the 
organisation  of  international  society,  in  forming  its  institutions,  including  law,  all 
designed  to  give  substance  to  the  demand".  109 
Interdependence  which  is  undeniably  a  real  fact  of  international  life,  did  not  in  any  way 
hinder  the  importance  of  sovereignty.  The  latter,  as  we  have  seen,  has  been  maintained  and 
insisted  upon  in  the  most  adverse  circumstances  and  situations.  Also,  interdependence  did 
not  lead  to  a  world  Government;  on  the  contrary,  it  led  to  fresh  demands  for  giving 
sovereignty  a  real  substance,  by  a  real  reform  of  the  existing  mechanism  of  the  international 
105  G.  F.  Kennan:  Morality  and  Foreign  Policy.  Foreign  Affairs,  1985-86,  p.  206. 
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40 economic  relations. 
On  the  other  hand,  Wildhaber  correctly  pointed  out  that: 
"...  [S]overeignty  expresses  the  essential  position  of  the  State  in  the  international  system 
(or  lack  of  a  system).  it  is  a  'constitutional  principle  of  international  relations  not 
because  it  can  claim  a  higher  sacredness,  morality  or  cogency,  but  simply  because  it 
is,  at  bottom,  an  empirically  correct  description".  110 
Similarly,  Van  Kleffens  stressed  that: 
"The  notion  of  sovereignty  is  not  at  all  a  ghost  we  can  exorcise  at  will.  It  is  a  spirit 
which  is  very  much  alive  and  very  wide  awake.  Some  may  regret  it  but  if  they  fail 
to  recognize  this  fact,  they  abandon  the  firm  foundation  of  reality".  "' 
These  views  confirm  once  again  that  despite  the  growing  interaction  between  States,  people 
and  international  institutions  and  despite  the  rapid  extension  of  international  law  to  regulate 
many  new  fields  in  the  relations  between  States,  sovereignty  is  still  safe  and  well,  and  it 
seems  that  it  is  here  to  stay,  in  fact,  it  is  the  other  name  of  Statehood. 
The  Soviets  lawyers,  like  their  Statesmen,  are  hard  advocates  of  the  doctrine  of 
sovereignty,  arguing  against  it,  is  a  reactionary  thinking  since  it  is  an  implicit  advocacy  of 
domination  and  intervention  by  the  Capitalist  States  and  their  corporations.  In  this  respect, 
Korovin  stressed  that: 
"The  Soviet  Union  is  destined  to  act  as  the  champion  of  the  doctrine  of  'classical' 
sovereignty  in  so  far  as  its  formal  seclusion  acts  as  a  legal  armour  protecting  it  from 
interference  of  those  factors  under  the  pressure  of  which  the  frontiers  of 
contemporary  capitalist  States  are  changed  and  the  forms  of  their  law  altered".  112 
This  means,  in  effect,  that  as  long  as  there  are  Capitalist  States  in  the  international  society, 
any  limitations  of  State  sovereignty  would  not  be  in  the  interests  of  Communist  States.  In 
fact,  the  majority  of  Soviet  writers  maintain  that  sovereignty  is  pre-existing  to  international 
law  and  that  the  latter  is  limited  by  the  former.  In  this  respect,  Koretsky  observed  in  the 
ILC,  in  1949,  that: 
"The  sovereignty  of  States  must  so  regulate  relationships  between  States  that  the 
mastery  of  superiority  of  one  State  over  another  could  not  exist  ...  to  limit  the  power 
of  one's  own  State  was  to  open  the  gates  to  the  intervention  of  other  States.  The 
international  field  must  not  be  dominated  by  those  who  interfere  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  others,  by  reactionaries  who  sought  to  organize  other  countries  by  force".  113 
This  is  a  recourse  to  18th  and  19th  century  theories  of  sovereignty.  However,  the 
justifications  of  such  positions  is  always  political,  it  is  the  protection  of  the  most  advanced 
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41 social  system  in  the  world,  it  is  the  liberation  of  oppressed  peoples  in  colonies  and 
dependent  territories  from  the  imperialist  yoke. 
In  the  last  analysis,  we  can  State  that  the  Soviet  jurists  use  sovereignty  as  a  legal  and 
political  weapon  in  their  theoretical  struggle  against  some  Capitalist  views  on  sovereignty, 
and  generally  against  those  who  believe  that  sovereignty  is  an  obstacle  to  peace  and 
development  of  international  law.  Moreover,  it  is  obvious  that  Soviet  defence  of  sovereignty 
is  not  eternal,  it  is  dictated  by  the  realities  of  the  international  relations  where  Capitalist 
States  are  a  fact  of  life,  and  their  transformation  into  Communist  States  is  not  near  by  any 
means. 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  sovereignty  in  the  relations  between  Socialist  States  do  not  seem  to 
be  very  rigid,  in  reality,  it  no  longer  means  complete  internal  and  external  independence 
in  the  running  of  the  affairs  of  the  State.  It  simply  means  in  the  words  of  Anand  'freedom 
to  act  in  the  interests  of  the  Socialist  world  and  the  interests  of  the  world  revolutionary 
movement'.  114  According  to  this  logic,  the  sovereignty  of  the  Socialist  State  cannot  be 
used  to  claim  the  return  to  Capitalism  since  this  would  not  be  in  the  interests  of  the  Socialist 
camp.  It  undermines  the  gains  of  socialism  and  would  be  contrary  to  the  progressive 
movement  of  history.  Nonetheless,  as  the  "Breshnev  doctrine'  has,  in  practice,  showed  that 
there  is  no  difference  between  this  alleged  'general  interest  of  the  Socialist  world'  and  the 
national  interest  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
Third  World  lawyers  are,  like  their  politicians,  ardent  champions  of  sovereignty.  In  this 
context,  Prakash  Singh  rightly  points  out  that: 
"...  [S]overeignty  is  the  most  treasured  possession  of  the  newly  independent  States.  On 
one  hand  it  makes  them  the  masters  of  their  houses,  on  the  other  hand,  it  provides 
them  with  a  legal  shield  against  foreign  incursion  or  attempts  threat  by  strong 
States".  '  15 
It  is  also  natural  that  sovereignty  is  seen  as  a  means  of  achieving  demands  for  a  fair  share 
in  the  participation  in  the  international  decision-making  process  in  different  fields  of 
international  relations. 
On  the  internal  sphere,  sovereignty  as  Okoye  correctly  remarks  that: 
"...  [I]s  a  powerful  instrument  for  shaping  national  identity,  breaking  the  chains  of 
subordination  which  are  factors  of  backwardness  and  furthering  social  and  economic 
progress".  116 
However  the  danger  in  the  Third  World,  is  that  sovereignty  in  the  internal  sphere  may  well 
be  used  (and  indeed  it  has  been  used)  in  many  instances,  as  a  wall  which  masks  and  justifies 
violations  of  human  rights'  17  and  (as  indeed  chapters  3  to  5  will  reveal)  to  resist  the  efforts 
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42 at  humanizing  the  conduct  of  internal  conflicts. 
In  this  context,  it  seems  to  me  that  insistence  upon  sovereignty  can  be  justified  only  when 
the  State  conduct  itself  in  accordance  with  the  basic  standards  of  the  protection  of  human 
Tights  and  human  dignity  in  times  of  peace  or  war.  Those  standards  and  norms  can  be  found 
in  the  different  instruments  of  human  rights  and  humanitarian  law  as  developed  and 
codified  first,  in  Common  Article  3,  Protocol  11  of  1977  and  in  the  practice  of  regional  and 
universal  Organizations  in  the  field  of  human  rights.  This  stand  will  be  discussed  in  the 
coming  chapters. 
On  the  external  sphere  of  sovereignty,  Third  World  lawyers  insist  on  the  necessity  of 
giving  independence  its  real  meaning  especially  on  the  economic  sphere.  In  this  respect, 
Terki  that: 
"...  [F]ace  A  la  puissance  financiýre  et  technologique  des  Etats  du  Nord  ou  de  leur 
socidtds  multinationales.  11  [the  independence  concept]  est  presque  vid6  de  toute  sa 
substances  &s  I  Wil  est  mis  en  oeuvre  dans  le  domaine  des  relations  6conorniques 
internationales".  'a 
For  this  reason,  Bedjaoui  stressed  that  the  classical  concept  of  sovereignty  needs  to  be 
reformulated.  He  writes: 
"ll  convienderait  de  lui  chercher  une  formulation  nouvelle  capable  de  restituerA  I'Etat 
les  bases  616mentaires  de  son  ind6pendance  nationale  sur  le  plan  6conomique".  119 
He  then  argues  for  the  importance  of  the  economic  independence  as  a  legal  principle  which, 
in  practice,  means  the  real  sovereignty  over  natural  resources  and  Teal  participation  in  the 
structure  of  the  decision-making  process  concerning  international  economic  relations. 
This  is  not  an  exhaustive  survey  of  the  doctrine  on  the  question  of  the  role  and  the  place 
of  sovereignty  in  the  international  society.  However,  it  showed  that  those  who  are  attached 
to  sovereignty  and  maintain  that  it  still  has  a  role  to  play,  invoke  many  grounds  for  their 
assertions.  They  are  basically  as  follows: 
1.  The  State  is  still  the  main  unit  in  the  framework  of  the  international  society, 
sovereignty  is  on  the  legal  and  political  levels  the  expression  of  Statehood. 
2.  In  an  international  society,  in  which  States  follow  different  paths  of  development, 
share  different  ideologies,  sovereignty  means  something.  It  indicates  the  preservation  of 
national  identity  and  national  wealth. 
3.  Some  believe  that  the  other  alternative  to  the  idea  of  sovereignty  would  mean  a  Pax 
Americana  or  a  Pax  Russia. 
4.  Others,  especially  from  the  Third  World  fear  for  their  hard  won  independence  and  see 
that  only  sovereignty  can  preserve  it.  They  insist  at  the  same  time  that  the  idea  of  real 
sovereignty  has  not  been  attained  yet,  it  must  include  the  economic  aspects  as  well. 
5.  Others,  the  Communists  in  particular,  believe  that  the  time  is  not  ripe  yet  for  the 
abolition  of  sovereignty.  Thus  it  is  glorified  and  struggled  for,  since  the  realities  of 
118N.  Terki:  Wormes  Inouvettess  du  droit  international  et  pratique  national:  t1exampte  Atg4rien,  in:  La 
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43 contemporary  international  society  are  against  any  opposite  solution. 
My  conclusion  is  that  without  sovereignty  small  States  which  are  the  majority  of  today's 
world  would  have  very  little  chance  of  becoming  free  from  outside  domination.  120  Then. 
this  instrument  (sovereignty)  of  liberation,  must  not  become  the  instrument  of  killing 
freedom  inside  those  very  States,  sovereignty  must  protect  human  rights  and  human  dignity 
and  further  their  development. 
2.  Opinions  against  the  Usefulness  of  Sovereignty 
There  is  a  growing  tendency,  generally  in  the  West,  which  considers  that  the  notion  of 
s  overeignty  is  obsolete  and  that  it  does  not  correspond  to  the  developments  which  have  been 
taking  place  in  the  international  society.  Nevertheless,  it  must  be  noted  that  attacks  upon 
the  notion  of  sovereignty  are  not  a  new  phenomenon.  In  this  contexet,  as  far  as  1925  Politis 
wrote  that: 
"On  peut  m8me  dire  qu'elle  [la  notion  de  la  souveraintfl  est  d6s  A  pr6sent 
virtuellement  abolie,  si  elle  reste  encore  usit6e  dans  le  language  officiel  et  un  peu 
moins  dans  celui  de  la  science,  c'est  par  d6faut  d'adaptation  visuelle  A  la  disposition 
d'une  lumiýre  qui  pendant  longtemps  a  briII6  d'un  vif  6clat".  121 
He  then  added  confidently  that: 
Vest  un  ecran  qui  viole  la  r6alit6.11  faut  donc  sen  d6barrasser  si  Pon  veut  voir 
c  la  i  rot.  122 
He  then  suggests  the  replacement  of  sovereignty  by  the  notion  of  liberty  because: 
',..  [A]  la  diffirence  de  la  souverainet6,  la  liberti  n'eveille  pas  l'id8e  d'omnipotence 
et  d'absolutisme.  Elle  fait,  au  contraire,  penser  que  l'Etat,  dans  la  communaute 
internationale,  a  une  situation  analogue  ä  celle  de  Pindividu  dans  la  societ8 
modernem.  123 
In  my  opinion,  the  weakness  of  Politis's  argument  lies,  first,  in  the  fact  that  it  is  in  very 
clear  contrast  with  the  reality  of  State  practice  at  that  time.  The  League  of  Nations  was, 
actually,  built  upon  the  collective  guarantee  of  the  independence  of  each  member  (Article 
10  of  the  Covenant).  124  Secondly,  sovereignty,  is  seen  as  basically  absolute  in  character,  it 
is  seen  as  an  extrajudicial  notion  which  makes  the  State  an  institution  above  the  law.  This 
is  simply  not  the  case,  sovereignty  knows  certain  limits  which  the  State  by  its  consent  has 
120 
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44 assented  to.  125 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  some  contemporary  international  lawyers  continue  the  attack  against 
sovereignty,  using  different  grounds  for  their  stands.  Thus,  it  is  argued  that  the  advent  of 
nuclear  weapons  have  created  the  objective  social  basis  upon  which  it  is  possible  to  build 
a  new  political  order  for  world  affairs.  This  means  implicitly  that  the  nation  State  as  the 
'prime  organizing  and  value  realising  unit  in  world  politiCS'126  is  no  longer  viable. 
Falk  made  an  interesting  observation  when  he  stated  that: 
"My  approach  to  international  law  has  been  influenced  by  a  growing  conviction  that 
the  present  structure  of  international  society  cannot  solve  the  problems  of 
technetronic  man".  127 
According  to  him,  we  have  only  two  or  three  decades  to  bring  a  new  system  of  world  order. 
A  system  that  is  arranged  to  identify  and  implement  human  interest  on  a  planetary  scale. 
But,  he  notes: 
"...  [I]f  the  sovereign  State  remains  the  organizing  center  of  polilical  life  in 
international  affairs,  the  outlook  for  human  affairs  is  indeed  bleak".  12 
According  to  his  logic,  the  problems  which  face  humanity  such  as  violence,  population 
explosion,  hunger  and  pollution  can  only  be  solved  on  a  planetary  basis,  which  impliedly 
means  that  only  a  world  Government  can  do  the  job  of  solving  such  delicate  problems. 
Nevertheless,  if  one  looks  at  the  realities  of  international  relations,  it  is  very  hard  to  find 
a  move  in  the  direction  with  Falk  advocates.  Of  course,  States  are  doing  their  best  to  solve 
those  problems  not  by  relinquishing  their  sovereignty,  but  on  the  contrary,  they  insist  that 
sovereignty  must  have  a  central  role  in  that  process. 
On  the  other  hand,  Friedman  maintains  that  only  three  States  may  claim  rightly  that  they 
are  sovereign  (the  USSR,  China  and  the  US)  because  they  are  capable  of  making  an 
effective  military  plan.  In  contrast,  other  States  which  claim  the  traditional  attributes  of 
sovereignty  such  as  the  'diplomatic  and  jurisdictional  immunity'  cannot  survive  or  develop 
by  themselves.  129  He  argued: 
"The  tension  between  the  explosive  outbursts  of  nationalism,  seeking  expression  in 
the  symbols  of  national  sovereignty  in  the  non-Western  world  and  the  utter 
inadequacy  of  nationalism  as  an  effective  expression  of  military,  political  and 
economic  realities  of  our  time,  onstitutes  one  of  the  major  problems  of 
contemporary  international  politics"Y30 
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45 He  sees  no  solution  to  this  problem  except  by  turning  away  from  sovereignty  and  its 
symbols,  he  maintains  that. 
"The  necessity  to  form  partial  and  more  closely  knit  organizations  of  a  military, 
political  or  economic  character,  transcending  the  constricting  bounds  of  national 
borders,  is  an  inevitable  corollary  to  the  last  orgy  of  national  sovereignty".  131 
To  him,  the  contradictions  between  the  symbols  of  national  sovereignty  and  the  realities  of 
international  life  'is  a  principal  cause  for  the  development  of  international  relations  on  three 
levels:  of  universal  supranational  organisations,  of  regional  integration  and  of  diplomatic 
coexistence'.  132  The  main  problem  for  Friedman,  in  my  opinion,  is  that  he  sees  sovereignty 
as  basically  an  obstacle  towards  more  integration  and  hence  real  development.  This  cannot 
be  so,  since  sovereignty  is  adapting  itself  to  the  realities  of  international  relations  for  more 
co-operation  in  order  to  solve  the  dire  problems  which  our  world  faces. 
Moreover,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  any  rejection  of  the  role  of  sovereignty  in 
international  society  would,  in  practice,  be  in  the  interest  of  the  developed  countries  and 
their  multinational  corporations  since  the  latter  are  struggling  for  the  abolition  of  borders 
and  jurisdictions  in  order  to  have  direct  access  to  markets  and  national  resources.  Bedjaoui 
refutes  suggestions  of  integration  and  interdependence  by  going  back  to  history.  He  notes: 
"Les  visages  de  l'interddpendence  d'hier  sont  connus,  l'interdipendence  6conomique 
6tait  impos6e  grAce  i  une  d6pendence  juridique  organis6e.  C6tait  les  temps  des 
'solidarit6s  A  sens  unique'  celle  du  "loup  et  de  I'agneau'  ou  encore  du  'cavalier  et  de 
sa  monture'".  133 
According  to  him,  the  logic  of  these  old  times  are  not  over.  He  states: 
"....  [E]t  A  chaque  instant  il  est  encore  loisible  de  d6busquer  les  thurif6raires  de  I'ordre 
itabli  Wambitionnent,  selon  la  formule  de  'Guepart'  qu'l  'changer  pour  tou-r, 
conserver'  c'est  dans  cette  logique  que  s'incrivent  les  tentatives  de  r6cuperation  du 
nouvel  ordre".  134 
The  crux  of  the  matter  is  that  any  call  for  integration  and  the  abandon  of  sovereignty  will 
never  be  in  the  interest  of  the  weak  units  of  international  society  who  will,  by  abandoning 
their  sovereignty,  lose  everything,  control  over  their  destinies  and  their  social  cultural  and 
political  particularism.  Whereas  the  strong,  the  multinationals  and  their  protectors  (their 
Governments)  will  inevitably  gain  everything  because  of  their  strengths,  might  and  know- 
how.  The  relinquishing  of  sovereignty  would  give  them  a  free  hand  to  shape  the  economic 
face  of  the  world  and  consequently  gain  the  maximum  of  profits. 
Colliard,  in  a  reference  to  the  views  of  Scelle  on  sovereignty  observes: 
"Cet  esprit  g6n8reux  [of  Scellel  a  pu  voir  dans  la  souverainet6  un  obstacle  ä  la 
rialisation  d'une  sockti  viritablement  internationale  fond6e  sur  la  primaut6  des  Atres 
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46 humains".  135 
In  fact,  Colliard  shares  the  humanist  and  internationalist  view  of  Scelle  that  human  beings 
are  the  supreme  essence  of  the  law.  This  idealist  tradition  is  far  away  from  the  realities  of 
the  world,  the  individual,  because  of  the  development  in  the  field  of  human  rights,  can 
aspire  to  the  protection  of  his  minimum  rights,  by  his  Government  or  in  some  cases,  by 
international  machinery  either  regional  or  universal. 
The  contention  that  it  is  necessary  to  abolish  sovereignty  in  order  to  assert  the  supremacy 
of  the  individual  is  not  on  the  agenda.  Some  political  scientists,  like  McLauren  simply 
maintains  that  we  need  not  write  many  words  on  sovereignty  because: 
"...  [T]he  world  is  interdependent  socially,  economically  and  even  juridically  and  the 
sovereignty  of  a  government  consists  in  making  decisions  that  are  primarily 
136  adjustments  to  conditions  and  demands  determined  by  others". 
He  further  asserted  that  the  sovereignty  of  a  Government  is  not: 
"....  [E]ssentially  different  from  the  sovereignty  enjoyed  by  the  prisoner  on  his  way 
to  the  scaffold,  he  is  free  to  de  ide  whether  he  shall  take  short  steps  or  long,  smile 
or  breathe  defiance  or  weep  . 
. 
1; 
$ 
This  kind  of  argument  tries  to  show  that,  in  practice,  sovereignty  does  not  exist  and  that 
interdependence  is  taking  over.  This  under-estimates  the  realities  of  international  life 
where  even  with  the  interdependence  in  economic  life,  States  still  have  a  great  measure  of 
freedom  in  running  their  affairs  and,  are  very  attached  to  their  sovereignty,  especially  when 
their  vital  interests  are  at  stake. 
Furthermore,  within  international  organizations  which  are  supposed  to  be  the  vehicles  of 
such  integration,  sovereignty  is  indeed  their  main  pillar.  Thus,  McLauren's  argument  that 
the  role  of  the  UN  consists  in  enabling  'Governments  to  make  this  loss  of  sovereignty 
beneficial  rather  than  injurious  planned  rather  than  haphazard'138  is  not  the  case.  since  the 
contrary  argument  is  that  precisely  since  sovereignty  at  the  UN  is  not  working  effectively 
in  keeping  peace  and  order  in  the  world.  McDougal  observes  that: 
"The  ascendancy  of  the  nation  State  has  been  such  that  it  has  built  into  the 
perspectives  of  the  world  community  a  bias  in  favour  of  perceiving  advantages  and 
disadvantages  in  terms  of  the  individual  nation  State".  139 
Thus,  the  State  in  a  territorially  organised  world,  became  a  dominant  participant  in  the 
shaping  and  sharing  of  all  values.  Because  of  this  state  of  affairs  'both  the  search  for  and 
135C.  A.  Cottiard:  Institutions  des  relations  internationates.  Dattoz,  Paris,  1978,  p.  91. 
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47 the  discovery  of  common  interests  are  impaired'  140  (proclaims  McDougal  and  his  associates). 
They  also  added  that: 
"...  [T]he  emphasis  on  State  'sovereignty'  in  expression  of  excessive  'nationalism'  has 
further  exacerbated  by  the  rival  ideologies  representing  the  contending  systems  of 
public  order".  141 
Then,  demand  for  human  dignity  and  its  fulfilment  is  largely  dependent  upon  the 
performance  of  Governmental  functions,  this  is  true,  however,  we  must  not  forget  that 
developments  within  the  field  of  human  rights  in  some  instances  (the  European  Convention 
of  Human  Rights)  have  led  to  the  establishment  of  some  machinery,  which  allows 
individuals  to  take  their  cases  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  their  own  State. 
Further,  it  is  Jenks,  who  waged  the  hardest  attack  on  sovereignty.  He  writes: 
*...  [Sovereignty]  holds  no  promise  of  peace.  It  affords  no  prospect  of  defence.  It 
provides  no  assurance  of  justice.  It  gives  no  guarantee  of  freedom.  It  offers  no  hope 
of  prosperity.  It  furnishes  no  prescription  for  welfare.  It  hardens  the  opposition  to 
orderly  and  peaceful  social  change.  It  disrupts  the  discipline  without  which  scientific 
and  technological  innovations  become  the  Frankenstein  of  our  society  (but  a 
remorseless  Frankenstein  perpetually  making  new  monsters).  It  is  a  mockery  not 
fulfilment  of  the  deepest  aspirations  of  humanity".  142 
He  also  thought  that  the  conscious  rejection  of  the  dogma  of  sovereignty  is  an  essential  step 
in  'releasing  our  creative  faculties  that  we  can  build  together  the  prosperity  and  welfare 
of  a  free  commonwealth  in  which  peace  with  justice,  freedom  and  welfare  rest  solidly  upon 
the  common  law  of  mankind'.  143  He  holds  a  firm  view  that  the  world  has  Outgrown 
sovereignty.  He  agrees  with  Max  Huber  that 
"...  [T]he  concept  of  sovereignty  which  existed  long  before  the  Renaissance  may  have 
been  necessary  for  transforming  feudal  medieval  States  in  modern  ones  but  for  any 
ethic  of  a  supranational  community  it  is  mortal  poison". 
"ý 
In  his  view,  sovereignty  is  a  mortal  poison  precisely  it  alters  the  movement  toward  a  world 
community.  He  maintains  that  the  UN  is  moving  towards  that  end. 
In  my  opinion,  sovereignty  is  not  a  mortal  poison,  it  is  a  healthy  medicine.  People  need 
it  to  keep  their  national  identity,  for  which  they  had  fought  hard.  Moreover,  it  makes  them 
the  masters  of  their  destiny,  it  ensures  that  they  have  a  full  right  to  choose  the  forms  of 
their  political  economic  and  social  organization  without  any  interference.  Hence,  big  powers 
cannot  impose  or  prohibit  small  States  from  choosing  their  ways  of  life  as  indeed  the  ICJ 
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141  Ibid. 
142  C.  W.  Jenks:  A  New  World  of  Law?  A  Study  of  Creative  imagination  in  International  Law.  Harlow  Longmans, 
1969,  p.  134. 
143  Ibid. 
144  Cited  by  Jenks,  ibid,  p.  133. 
48 has  noted  in  Nicaragun  Case.  145 
In  fact,  the  Court  implicitly  refuted  any  illusions  that  we  are  moving  towards  a  'world 
Government'.  Sovereignty  is  still  the  main  pillar  of  international  organization.  My 
conclusion  concerning  the  rejection  of  sovereignty  by  some  Western  scholars  would  be  my 
agreement.  Hector  Gros  Espiell  rightly  stated  that: 
"The  concept  of  sovereignty  is  a  necessary  and  fundamental  part  of  international  law 
and  international  life  and  politics  today.  To  seek  to  eradicate  the  concept  and  confirm 
its  incompatibility  with  international  law  as  certain  doctrinaire  schools  has  attempted 
constitutes  a  useless  and  anti-historical  effort  incompatible  with  the  world  as  it  is  and 
the  inescapable  and  undeniable  political  and  mythical  force  of  the  idea  of 
sovereignty".  146 
Furthermore,  I  can  confidently  state  that  the  arguments  against  sovereignty  come  from  a 
section  of  Western  doctrine.  However,  even  within  that  section,  two  basis  for  rejecting 
sovereignty  were  advanced.  The  first  school  is  the  idealist  and  humanist  which  regards 
sovereignty  as  a  real  obstacle  against  the  full  realisation  of  human  rights  on  a  plenatary 
level,  to  this  school,  all  individuals  in  all  countries  are  the  same  and  they  need  to  be  treated 
alike,  only  the  fiction  of  sovereignty  separates  them.  The  main  criticism  of  such  opinion  is, 
that  in  practice,  it  is  doubtful  whether  all  peoples  and  individuals  aspire  to  live  under  the 
umbrella  of  one  world  Government,  especially  in  our  time  which  is  characterised  by 
different  and  opposing  ideologies,  values  and  ways  of  life. 
The  second  school  seems  to  base  its  rejection  of  sovereignty  on  the  basis  of  the  advances 
made  in  technology,  communications,  and  the  expansion  of  business.  To  this  trend,  in  our 
modern  world  sovereignty  has  become  a  real  brake  in  the  face  the  demands  of  trade, 
business  and  international  communications.  In  my  view,  this  kind  of  argument  is  in  the 
interest  of  big  business  since  a  territorially-  organized  world  would  be  a  very  serious 
obstacle'for  the  expansion  of  mighty  multinational  corporations  which  possess  the  necessary 
know-how  in  the  sphere  of  industrial  and  technological  production. 
Bearing  in  mind  that  developing  countries  especially  have  a  very  long  experience  with 
the  exploitation  of  their  natural  resources  and  their  wealth,  they  seem  to  consider  that  in 
order  to  escape  another  wave  of  sophisticated  domination  in  the  economic  field  and  other 
fields,  it  is  best  to  cling  to  sovereignty  and  demand  its  full  achievement.  In  other  words, 
Third  World  countries  and  even  Socialist  States  use  sovereignty  as  a  political  weapon  in  their 
struggle  against  inequality. 
It  is  my  opinion  that  if  the  Third  World  countries  are  justified  in  defending  sovereignty 
to  protect  themselves  from  economic  and  cultural  hegemony  of  the  West.  They  nonetheless 
must  accept  that  sovereignty  should  serve  the  protection  of  human  dignity  inside  their 
territories.  Sovereignty  must  not  be  used  to  justify  violations  of  human  rights  either  in  times 
of  peace  or  emergencies  like  internal  wars. 
145op. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  70,  para.  263,  p.  1083. 
146M.  Gross  Esplett:  Sovereignty,  Independence  and  Interdependence  of  Nations,  In  A.  Graht  Madson  and  Jirl 
Toman  (eds.  ),  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  76,  p.  279. 
49 Section  III:  Limitations  of  Sovereignty 
From  the  above  discussion  the  main  conclusion  to  be  drawn  is  that  developments  in 
contemporary  international  law  makes  any  claim  to  unlimited  and  absolute  sovereignty 
meaningless  and  irrelevant.  But,  it  is  certain  also  that  any  neglect  for  the  role  of  sovereignty 
in  the  present  and  future  structure  of  the  international  legal  order  is  a  sheer  fantasy.  The 
first  and  most  important  limitation  seems  to  be  that  States  cannot  be  free  to  respect  or  reject 
international  law  to  which  they  have  given  their  consent. 
In  fact.  it  seems  that  this  fundamental  limitation  is  deeply  rooted  in  the  conscience  of 
States,  since  there  is  no  single  example  that  they  dared  to  declare  in  an  official  public  act 
that  they  would  not  be  bound  by  rules  of  international  law.  The  jurisprudence  of  the 
international  courts  has  also  established  in  many  instances  that  in  cases  of  conflict  between 
municipal  law  and  international  law,  the  latter  prevails.  In  this  respect,  the  PCIJ  in  the 
Treatment  of  Polish  Nationals  and  Other  Persons  of  Polish  Oriffln  or  SDeech  In  the  Danzie 
Territorv  (advisory  ODInlon),  held: 
"According  to  generally  accepted  principles,  a  State  cannot  rely,  as  against  another 
State,  on  the  provisions  of  the  latter's  constitution  but  only  on  international  law  and 
international  obligations  duly  accepted  ...  and,  conversely,  a  State  cannot  adduce,  as 
against  another  State,  its  own  constitution  with  a  view  to  ýv  ding  obligations 
incumbent  upon  it  under  international  law  or  treaties  in  force.  "  4ý 
Implicitly  then,  it  is  established  that  international  law  limits  the  sovereignty  of  State,  since 
national  law  is  the  most  important  symbols  of  that  sovereignty. 
The  contemporary  State  practice  shows  clearly  that  many  important  inroads  and 
limitations  of  the  classical  concept  of  sovereignty  have  been  made.  They  cover  a  wide  range 
of  issues  (e.  g.  communication,  the  law  of  the  sea,  environment,  air  and  space  law,  etc.  ).  The 
creation  of  international  organizations  had  in  fact  accelerated  the  process. 
A.  Sovereignty  and  Human  Rights 
Human  rights  as  legal  rights,  first  appeared  in  the  context  of  internatfoýa  laws.  In  Britain 
important  instruments  were  proclaimed  (e.  g.  the  1628  Petition  of  Rights,  the  Habeas 
Corpus  Act  of  1676  and  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  1689).  In  the  US,  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  in  1776  and  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  the  State  of  Virginia  in  the  same  year 
contained  many  important  political  and  civil  rights. 
The  most  important  internal  instrument  was  the  French  "136claration  des  droits  de 
I'homme  et  du  citoyen"  of  1789,  which  contained  a  modern  formulation  of  human  rights. 
However,  on  the  international  plan  sovereignty  reigned  supreme.  In  this  context,  Shaw 
rightly  observed  that: 
"Virtually  all  matters  that  today  would  be  classified  as  human  rights  issues  were  at 
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50 that  stage  (the  19th  cintury)  universally  regarded  as  within  the  internal  sphere  of 
national  jurisdiction".  48 
The  advent  of  the  League  of  Nations  did  not  change  the  situation  much,  its  main  concern 
was  the  preservation  of  peace  between  nations  (Article  11).  The  result  was  as  Mandelstarn 
rightly  noted: 
"Mais  en  ce  qui  concerne  la  paix  intirieure,  en  ce  qui  concerne  la  protection  des 
droits  primordiaux  de  Phomme  contre  des  atteintes  i116gitimes  de  la  part  de  l'Etat,  la 
communauti  internationale  s'incline  encore  devant  la  souverainet8  des  Etats  ä  moins 
que  ceux-ci  n'y  aient  derogi  eux-m8mes  en  vertu  des  trait6s  particuliers".  149 
He  then  adds: 
"Il  faut  donc  reconnaltre  CLue  la  neutralit6  devant  les  crimes  de  lese-humanit6  est 
encore  le  droit  commun".  '-')u 
In  contrast,  the  Minorities  Treaties  (14  in  all)  were  seen  as  modest  steps  in  the  direction  of 
the  protection  of  human  rights  but  their  main  weakness  was  they  were  confined  only  to 
some  new  small  States  in  central  Europe.  The  latter  protested  of  discrimination  and  the 
unilateral  limitation  of  their  sovereignty.  151  Moreover,  the  Mandate  System  was  mainly  a 
political  move,  and  was  applied  only  to  ex-colonies  of  the  vanquished  in  the  First  World 
War. 
The  turning  point  came  after  the  Second  World  War,  it  was  realised  that  there  is  a  link 
between  violations  of  human  rights  and  resort  to  war,  the  Nazi  atrocities  against  their  own 
citizens  first,  and  later  resort  to  war  against  independent  States  was  a  very  good  case.  It  was 
realised  that  maintenance  of  peace  between  States  begin  at  home  by  respecting  human  rights 
and  human  dignity. 
In  the  era  of  the  UN  Charter,  the  law  of  human  rights  has  been  developing  and 
expanding  in  an  unprecedented  way  and  no  one  can  deny  that  human  rights  constitute  today 
an  important  part  of  contemporary  international  law.  The  UN  Charter  lays  down  the 
foundation  of  human  Tights  in  the  Preamble  and  in  Articles  1/3.13/16,55(c),  56,62/2,68, 
76(c)  and  78.  These  provisions  were,  however,  formulated  in  a  general  and  rather  vague  way 
which  led  some  lawyers  to  speculate  that  they  are  not  legally  binding. 
In  this  respect,  Hudson  stated: 
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15'Thus, 
on  Sept.  14th,  1925.  Lithuania  proposed  in  the  6th  Session  of  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of  the 
Nations  the  elaboration  of  a  general  convention  dealing  with  the  rights  and  duties  of  States  vis-h-vis  their 
minorities  between  all  members  of  the  League.  Its  delegate  observed: 
"It  nly  aura  pas  d'unit&  morate  possibte  entre  tes  membres  de  ta  Sociftk  des  Nations  ...  tant  que  ta 
souverafnet6  des  uns;  sera  timit6e  par  un  fnt6r6t  sup6rieur,  ators  qua  tvaction  des  autres  ne 
connaltra  pas  cette  timitem. 
Mandetstam,  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  149,  p.  143. 
51 "Whenever  the  question  of  respect  for  human  rights  appeared  in  the  Charter 
... 
it  was 
an  aim  to  be  achieved.  The  Charter  did  not  in  any  way  impose  on  the  members  of 
the  UN  a  legal  obligation  io  respect  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms".  152 
However,  this  interpretation  cannot  be  accepted.  First,  because  the  provisions  in  question 
are  part  of  a  binding  legal  instrument.  Secondly,  the  practice  of  the  UN  shows  very  clearly 
that  neither  the  generality  nor  the  vagueness  of  those  provisions  have  stopped  the 
organization  from  considering  them  as  legally  binding  on  its  members  (e.  g.  the  case  of  South 
Africa).  153 
It  must  be  noted  that  the  mission  of  translating  the  provisions  of  the  UN  Charter  in 
concrete  individual  rights  was  left  to  other  instruments.  The  first  and  most  important 
general  instrument  was  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  which  was  adopted 
without  a  negative  vote  on  December  12th,  1948.  It  contains  30  Articles  which  covered  a 
wide  range  of  human  rights.  The  Declaration  in  itself  is  not  legally  binding  because  it 
is  a  UNGA  Resolution.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a  wide  measure  of  support  that  after  40  years 
it  must  be  considered  as  binding.  Thus,  the  ICJ  in  the  Hostages  Case  (United  States  v. 
Iran)  seems  to  treat  the  Declaration  as  a  binding  legal  instrument,  it  held: 
*  ...  Wrongfully  to  deprive  human  beings  of  their  freedom  and  to  subject  them  to 
physical  constraint  in  conditions  of  hardship  is  in  itself  manifestly  incompatible  with 
the  principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations,  as  well  as  with  the  Qndamental 
principles  enunciated  in  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights".  15 
The  Court  considers  the  latter  (the  Declaration)  as  declaratory  of  'fundamental  principles' 
of  international  law  which  means  that  it  has  a  legal  obligatory  effect.  155  After  the 
Declaration,  an  endless  host  of  conventions  and  resolutions  on  human  rights  have  been 
adopted  not  only  by  the  UN,  but  in  some  instances  by  specialised  agencies  such  as 
UNESCO,  the  ILO  and  by  some  regional  organisations. 
The  instruments  dealing  with  human  rights  can  be  classified  as  Boven  rightly  suggested  156 
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moreover,  it  is  necessary  to  note  that  even  the  Soviet  Union,  which  was  one  of  the  seven  nations  which 
abstained  during  the  adoption  of  the  Universal  Declaration  seems  to  take  the  Declaration  as  having  a  binding 
effect.  Thus,  in  a  debate  in  the  UNCHR  in  Feb.  1968,  its  representative  stated  that: 
0  ...  His  governemnt  has  never  considered  United  Nations  activities  in  connection  with  the  UniversaL 
Dectaratfon  of  Human  Rights  to  be  theoriticat". 
He  then  added  that  his  deLegation: 
N...  Mow  appealed  to  all  States  to  ensure  that  the  Declaration  did  not  remain  a  dead  letter  and 
that  the  Commission's  obligations  were  honored  in  deed  as  well  as  words". 
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52 into  two  main  categories:  First:  general  instruments  of  substantive  human  Tights  law,  they 
are:  the  Universal  Declaration,  the  two  Covenants  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  and  on 
Social  and  Economic  Rights.  The  European  Convention  on  Human  rights  and  the  African 
Charter  of  Human  Rights  can  be  added  to  these  documents. 
The  UN  documents  represent  in  fact  a  worldwide  system  for  the  promotion  and 
protection  of  human  rights.  They  contain  a  comprehensive  enumeration  of  a  very  wide 
range  of  human  rights,  also  the  limits  that  States  may  impose  on  the  exercise  of  those  rights 
were  set  out  clearly.  The  two  Covenants  are  legally  binding  instruments.  They  were  adopted 
on  December  16th,  1966,  entered  into  force  in  1976  and  by  the  Ist  January  1989  the  Social 
and  Economic  Covenant  was  ratified  by  92  States  and  the  Political  Civil  Covenant  was 
ratified  by  87  States.  157 
The  regional  instruments  can  be  considered  as  a  counterpart  of  the  universal  instrument, 
they  contain  specific  versions  of  human  rights  which  reflect  the  priorities  of  each  region 
in  that  field  together  with  a  detailed  procedure  for  their  implementation.  '  58 
Secondly,  in  addition  to  these  comprehensive  instruments  there  are  other  human  rights 
instruments,  which  are  devoted  to  one  specific  subject,  the  UN  has  adopted  a  substantial 
number  of  them.  159  The  ILO  especially,  has  adopted  a  great  number  of  treaties  dealing  with 
different  aspects  of  human  rights  in  the  world  of  employment.  160  The  UNESCO  adopted 
few  instruments  dealing  essentially  with  discrimination  in  education.  161  Likewise,  regional 
organisations  adopted  many  conventions  and  protocols  dealing  with  specific  human  rights 
subjects.  162 
It  must  be  noted  that  human  rights  instruments  either  general  or  specific,  universal  or 
regional,  contain  generally  a  system  of  implementation  which  is  designed  to  make  these 
conventions  work  in  practice.  The  methods  of  such  implementation,  however,  differ  from 
convention  to  convention.  163 
It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that  the  UN  has  devised  other  mechanisms  of  implementation 
which  are  not  linked  specifically  to  any  given  instrument  of  human  rights,  but  apply  to  all 
157  10  HRLJ,  1989.  pp.  111-112. 
158The  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  entered  into  force  on  the  3rd  September  1953;  on  the  1st  January 
1989  it  was  ratified  by  21  States.  8  Protocols  were  added  to  the  Convention,  some  of  them  are  in  force  (see 
for  complete  details,  ibid,  pp.  112-114).  The  European  Social  Charter  entered  into  force  on  February  26th, 
1965,  on  the  Ist  January  1989  it  was  ratified  by  15  States.  fbid,  p.  114.  The  American  Convention  on  Human 
Rights  entered  into  force  on  July  7th,  1978,  on  the  Ist  January,  1989,  it  was  ratified  by  20  States,  ibid, 
p.  114.  The  African  Charter  on  Human  and  Peoples  Rights  entered  into  force  on  October  21st,  19B6,  on  1st 
January,  1989,  it  was  ratified  by  35  States,  ibid,  p.  114. 
159See  for  details,  Ibid,  pp.  114-124. 
160See  ibid,  pp.  116-126. 
161  Ibid,  p.  124. 
162See  ibid,  pp,  112-123. 
163  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  problem  of  implementation  see:  M.  Schreiber:  La  pratique  r6cente  des 
Nations  Unies  dans  le  domaine  de  ta  protection  des  drolts  de  I  'homme.  RCADI,  1975/11,  pp.  303-389;  N.  Singh: 
Enforcement  of  Human  Rights.  Martinus  Mijhoff,  Dorderecht,  Eastern  Law  House  Private  Ltd.,  Calcutta,  1986, 
pp.  36-83;  and  L.  B.  Sohn:  Human  Rights:  Their  implementation  and  Supervision  by  the  United  Nations,  in  T. 
Meron,  (ed.  ):  Human  Rights  In  International  Law:  Legal  and  Policy  Issues.  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  VoL.  2, 
1984,  pp.  369-394. 
53 human  rights,  such  as  the  reporting  system,  where  States  are  requested  to  make  periodic 
reports  to  the  UN  on  the  progress  achieved  in  the  field  of  human  rights  in  their  country.  164 
However,  the  most  important  device  is  that  of  the  well-known  Resolution  1503  (XLVIII) 
adopted  by  the  ECOSOC  in  1970.  This  resolution  in  fact,  authorizes  the  UNCHR  to  receive 
and  examine  communications  from  individuals  or  groups  of  individuals  and  non- 
Governmental  organizations  which  reveal  'a  constant  pattern  of  gross  and  reliably  attested 
violations  of  human  rights'. 
In  this  context,  it  is  important  to  note  that  in  1982,  over  27,000  communications  relating 
to  76  countries  were  received  by  the  UN,  318  replies  were  received  from  41 
Governments  165  which  indicates  that  the  procedure  has  given  the  UNCHR  a  useful  means 
of  curbing  human  rights  violations.  In  addition  to  the  UN  Charter  (provisions  on  human 
rights),  and  the  Conventions  which  are  confined  exclusively  to  human  rights,  the  State 
practice  is  also  full  of  references  to  human  rights,  either  in  the  form  of  bilateral  or 
multilateral  treaties  or  in  declarations  of  State  representatives  in  international  conferences 
and  in  organs  of  the  UN. 
Thus,  the  communlqu6  of  the  Asian-African  Conference  (Bandoung  1955)  included 
among  the  principles  of  the  movement:  "I.  Respect  for  fundamental  human  rights  and 
principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations".  166  The  attachment  of  this  group  of  States 
to  the  principle  of  sovereignty  did  not  prevent  them  claiming  their  adherence  to  human 
rights  too. 
Moreover.  in  Stella  Niadzimbamuto  v.  Desmond  William.  Lardner-Burke  and  Frederick 
Philip  George  Case,  the  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy  Council  went  even  further.  It  held: 
"In  modern  international  law  criteria,  a  regime  which  does  not  conform  to  certain 
minimum  standards  of  human  rights  is  not  in  'effective  control'  so  as  to  entitle  it  to 
recognition.  The  regime  in  southern  Rhodesia  does  not  conform  to  these  standards 
and  it  is  thus  not  in  effective  control  as  evidenced  by  the  absence  of  recognition  by 
any  other  State  in  the  international  community".  167 
This  is  very  important,  human  rights  have  been  made  in  fact  a  central  criteria  of  the 
legitimacy  of  any  regime  in  the  eyes  of  the  international  community.  Furthermore,  the 
recent  'Agreement  for  Peaceful  Settlement  in  Central  America  (August,  7th,  1987)'  between 
the  States  of  Central  America,  stipulated  that: 
"I  Democratization:  The  Governments  commit  themselves  to  promote  authentic 
participatory  and  pluralistic  democratic  process  involving  promotion  of  socialLustice, 
respect  for  human  rights,  sovereignty,  territorial  integrity  of  States  ...  etc.  ". 
164See  Sohn,  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  163,  pp.  373-376. 
165Cited  by  R.  Chatterjfe:  The  United  Nations,  in  R.  J.  Vincent  (ed.  ):  Foreign  PoLicy  and  Human  Rights:  Issues 
and  Responses.  CUB,  Cambridge,  1986,  p.  235. 
166Supra. 
n.  77,  p.  33. 
167C.  Parry  and  J.  A.  Hopkins,  9  BILC,  (SuppLement),  1966-1970,1973,  p.  47. 
16826  ILM,  1987,  p.  1169. 
54 Thus,  again  States  confirm  that  they  do  not  see  any  contradiction  in  proclaiming  their 
attachment  to  the  two  principles  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  and  their  adherence 
to  human  rights. 
These  developments  in  the  field  of  human  rights  rise  directly  the  limits  of  the  concept 
of  sovereignty  in  present  day  international  law.  It  is  argued  here  that  the  sovereignty  of 
State  has  shrunk  substantially  in  this  particular  field  and  it  seems  very  doubtful  whether  the 
argument  that  human  rights  are  solely  within  the  domestic  jurisdictions  of  the  State  can 
hold  any  longer.  In  this  context,  Buergenthal  rightly  observed  that: 
"If  one  looks  at  the  evolution  of  the  past  75  years  there  is  probably  no  other  dramatic, 
more  revolutionary  development  than  the  transformation  of  human  rights  from  a 
subject  deemed  to  be  almost  exclusively  of  domestic  concern  to  one  acknowledged 
to  be  of  international  concern".  169 
Human  rights  then  have  become  a  matter  of  international  concern,  and  the  claim  of 
sovereignty  cannot  be  used  in  cases  of  their  violation.  Indeed  Warren  Christopher,  the  US 
Deputy  Secretary  of  State  in  President  Carter's  administration  has  rightly  stated  before  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  (he  was  advocating  the  ratification  of  4  major 
human  rights  instruments): 
nAlthough  there  have  been  in  the  past  differences  of  opinion  as  to  what  is  and  is  not 
a  matter  of  'international  concern'  it  seems  clear  today  that  no  matter  how  widely  or 
narrowly  the  boundaries  of  'international  concern'  be  drawn,  a  treaty  concerning 
170  human  rights  falls  squarely  within  them". 
Furthermore,  President  Carter  at  a  White  House  meeting  on  November  Ilth,  1978, 
commemorating  the  30th  Anniversary  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  stated 
specifically: 
N 
...  [W]e  will  speak  out  when  individual  rights  are  violated  in  other  lands.  The 
Universal  Declaration  means  that  no  nation  can  draw  the  cloak  of  sovereignty  over 
torture,  officially  sanctioned  bigotry,  or  the  destruction  of  freedom  within  its  own 
borders".  171 
This  is  important,  sovereignty  can  no  longer  mask  or  allow  violations  of  human  rights,  third 
parties  may  and  indeed  can  intervene  at  least  verbally  by  denouncing  such  violations  and 
thus  creating  a  hostile  world  public  opinion  to  any  Government  committing  such  violations. 
On  the  other  hand,  Higgins  summarised  the  position  in  the  UN  practice  by  pointing  out 
that: 
'At  first  glance  at  the  cases  involved  seems  to  indicate  that  the  United  Nations  has 
long  assumed  that  it  has  jurisdiction  over  matters  concerned  with  human  rights  and 
fundamental  freedoms,  certainly  it  is  difficult  to  think  of  a  case  where  the  United 
169  Remarks  by  T.  Buergenthal:  Proceedings  of  the  75th  Anniversary  Convocation,  American  Society  of 
Internationat  Law.  Washington  D.  C.  Aprit  23-25,1981,  p.  96. 
170M.  L.  Nash:  Digest  of  United  States  Practice  in  International  Law.  US  Dept.  of  State,  Washington  D.  C., 
C1979),  1983,  p.  488. 
1711bid,  C1978),  1980,  p.  429. 
55 Nations  has  refused  to  pass  a  resolution.  "172 
This  reading  reading  of  the  UN  practice  clearly  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  human  rights 
are  no  longer  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  the  State. 
However,  Socialist  writers  who  in  fact,  reflect  the  official  positions  of  their  States,  seem 
to  differ  from  Western  doctrine  in  their  assessment  of  the  relationship  between  sovereignty 
and  human  rights.  They  stress  two  important  points,  namely  Article  2/7  of  the  UN  Charter 
and  the  idea  that  individuals  can  never  be  considered  as  subjects  of  international  law.  In 
this  context,  Szabo  maintains  that  the  matter  of  the  relationship  between  sovereignty  and 
the  international  protection  of  human  rights  since  1945  'has  hinged  upon  Article  2  (7)".  173 
He  then  stresses  that: 
"The  fact  is  that  the  recognition  of  human  rights  opens  up  a  new  area  for 
international  law  at  the  United  Nations  in  which  the  question  of  sovereignty  remains 
entirely  open.  Here  the  State  senses  a  threat  on  the  part  of  the  international 
community  and  out  of  principle  takes  a  stand  against  the  community".  174 
The  reason,  it  seems,  is  that  those  States  fear  that  the  UN  may  use  human  rights  as  a  cloak 
for  intervention  in  their  internal  affairs.  Moreover,  they  (human  rights)  may  serve  as  a 
weapon  of  attack  between  States  which  adhere  to  different  political  and  social  systems  and 
in  many  cases  they  are  used  as  pretexts  for  fomenting  international  incidents. 
Soviet  doctrine  and  State  official  policy,  seem  to  favour  international  control  of  human 
rights  in  cases  of  non  -self-  governing  territories,  trust  territories  and  in  cases  of  gross 
violations  of  human  rights  which  may  constitute  a  threat  to  international  peace  in  the 
meaning  of  chapter  VII  of  the  UN  Charter.  This  means  that  they  distrust  international 
control  in  the  cases  of  individual  situations  of  violations  of  human  rights,  in  other  words, 
they  are  against  complaints  by  individuals  to  international  organs. 
In  this  context,  a  Soviet  author,  Kartshinkin  stresses: 
* 
...  [I]magining  themselves  to  be  fighters  for  human  rights  and  freedoms,  bourgeois 
scholars,  diplomats  and  Statesmen  are  trying  at  the  same  time  to  sow  distrust  of  Soviet 
internal  and  external  policy  ... 
They  are  trying  to  replace  the  solution  of  problems  of 
cardinal  importance.  The  liquidation  of  large  scale  and  gross  violations  of  human 
rights  and  freedoms 
...  with  the  question  of  so-Falled  individual  complaints  and  the 
protection  of  the  rights  of  individual  people".  '  5 
However,  in  a  clear  contrast  to  Karshinkin"s  view,  a  Polish  lawyer  Michatska  maintains  that: 
"...  [U]nder  the  present  realities  the  thesis  that  the  leaving  of  human  rights  to  the 
exclusive  competence  of  the  State  is  the  only  progressive  and  democratic  solution  is 
172R.  Higgins:  The  Development  of  International  Law  through  the  Political  Organs  of  the  United  Nations.  Cup, 
1963,  p.  118. 
1731.  Szabo:  Historical  Foundations  of  Human  Rights,  in  Karat  Vasak,  (ed.  ),  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  156,  p.  26. 
1741bid. 
175Cited  by  R.  Szawtowski:  International  Protection  of  Human  Rights:  A  Soviet  and  A  Polish  View".  28  ICLO, 
1979,  p.  778. 
56 unacceptable". 
176 
And  she  then  added: 
*An  analysis  of  Article  2  (7)  in  connection  with  the  remaining  provisions  of  the 
Charter,  in  the  light  of  the  travaux  prkparatoires  and  finally,  of  practice,  justifies, 
in  my  opinion  the  thesis  that  human  rights  do  not  belong  to  the  internal  competence 
of  the  State".  177 
This  is  a  revolutionary  view  in  the  context  of  Communist  doctrine,  which  sees  its  task  as 
primarily  of  defending  official  positions  of  State. 
However,  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between  two  questions,  namely 
the  implementation  of  international  law  that  governs  massive  violations  of  human  rights  on 
one  hand  and  that  which  governs  the  protection  of  specific  individual  rights,  in  this 
context,  Buergenthal  seems  to  me  to  be  correct  when  he  noted  that: 
"...  [T]he  universal  consensus  about  gross  violations  cuts  across  cultural  and  ideological 
boundaries  that  consensus  is  much  weaker  when  it  comes  to  specific  individual  civil 
and  political  rights'.  178 
In  the  last  category  of  rights,  one  can  speak  of  differences  in  ideology  of  regionalism  and 
of  cultural  differences,  he  admits. 
The  conclusion  which  can  be  drawn  from  the  above  discussion  is  that  sovereignty  has 
been  limited  to  a  certain  degree,  it  cannot  be  used  especially  to  justify  massive  violations 
of  human  rights.  In  fact,  the  international  community  in  the  form  of  the  UN,  can  validly 
intervene  by  way  of  discussion,  taking  resolutions,  or  even  by  using  force  under  chapter  VII 
of  the  UN  Charter,  if  it  can  be  established  that  the  conduct  of  any  State  Vis-&-vis  its  own 
citizens  constitutes  a  threat  to  international  peace  and  security.  The  latter  example  has  never 
happened  in  practice,  not  because  of  the  lack  of  the  legal  basis  but  because  of  the  absence 
of  political  will  and  divergence  of  interests  between  the  big  powers. 
The  principle  effect  of  this  important  conclusion  is  that  in  the  context  of  internal 
conflicts,  where  massive  violations  of  the  most  basic  human  rights  (such  as  the  right  to  life, 
prohibition  of  torture  and  inhuman  treatment  and  the  right  to  fair  trial)  are  by  no  means 
uncommon.  The  international  community  may  and  indeed,  can  intervene  by  different  means 
including  force  and  that  under  Chapter  VII  of  the  UN  Charter,  in  order  to  put  an  end  to 
cases  of  massive  and  gross  violations  of  human  rights.  The  State  concerned  in  my  view  is 
barred  from  using  sovereignty  to  justify  its  inhumanity  or  to  prevent  the  intervention  of 
the  international  community  either  in  peace  times  or  even  in  cases  of  emergencies  such  as 
internal  conflicts. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  must  not  exaggerate  the  impact  of  human  rights  on  the  traditional 
concept  of  sovereignty.  In  this  perspective,  I  do  not  share  the  view  that  we  are  witnessing 
(in  the  era  of  the  UN  Charter)  the  emergence  of  sovereignty  of  man.  This  idea  has  been 
176  lbid,  p.  rM. 
1771bid. 
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57 advanced  by  an  eminent  jurist,  H.  Lauterpacht,  who  argued: 
"An  international  legal  system  which  aims  at  effectively  safeguarding  human 
freedoms  in  all  its  aspects  is  no  longer  an  abstraction.  International  law,  which  has 
been  excelled  in  punctilious  insistence  on  the  respect  owed  by  one  sovereign  State  to 
another,  henceforth  acknowledges  the  sovereignty  of  man.  For  fundamental  human 
rights  are  rights  superior  to  the  law  of  the  sovereign  State".  179 
This  statement  raises  fundamental  theoretical  questions  of  international  law,  such  as  the 
relation  between  the  State  and  the  individual  (whether  the  latter  is  an  object  or  subject  of 
international  law)  and  the  relations  between  domestic  and  international  law.  However,  I  am 
not  going  to  dwell  upon  these  fields  but  it  is  indeed  clear  to  me  that  Lauterpacht's  statement 
is  a  pure  wish,  it  has  no  support  in  practice. 
Thus,  Joyce  is  right  when  he  pointed  out  that: 
"This  passage  might  well  become  an  opening  call  for  the  supreme  battle  of  the 
twenty-first  century.  For  twentieth  century  is  dominated  by  the  sovereign  State. 
National  sovereignty  permeates  countless  resolutions  and  declarations  that  flow 
nowadays  from  the  world  forum.  "180 
In  my  opinion,  Lauterpacht's  predictment  ignores  and  underestimated  the  attachment 
especially  of  the  newly  independent  State  to  sovereignty  and  their  fierce  fear  of  using 
human  rights  issues  as  grounds  of  intervention. 
However,  I  think  that  whatever  the  merits  of  that  fear,  it  cannot  be  used  in  any  event  to 
justify  massive  violations  of  human  rights  and  the  reign  of  terror.  Sovereignty  in  order  to 
be  respected  by  the  international  community  must  guarantee  first  that  human  rights  and 
human  dignity,  must  be  respected  and  not  suppressed. 
B.  Self  -Determination  as  a  Limitation  of  Sovereignty 
Self-determination  is  more  than  a  simple  human  right,  it  is  an  essential  condition  for  the 
enjoyment  of  all  other  human  rights,  because  as  the  Egyptian  delegate  stated  at  the  1977 
session  of  the  UNCHR  that: 
"The  real  enjoyment  of  all  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  could  be  attained 
only  when  the  right  of  self-determination  has  been  achieved".  181 
This  explains  in  part  why  both  the  Two  Covenants  of  the  UN  of  1966  begin  with  a  common 
Article  (1)  on  self-determination.  My  concern  is  not  to  trace  the  historical  development  of 
the  right  of  self-determination  or  its  meaning  but  only  its  relation  to  the  principle  of 
sovereignty.  Generally,  there  are  two  main  views  on  this  question.  The  first  sees  that  there 
is  a  contradiction  between  the  two  principles.  In  this  context,  Pornerance  writes: 
179Cited  by  J.  Joyce.  The  New  Politics  of  Human  Rights.  MacMillan,  London,  1978,  p.  225. 
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58 "It  is  no  less  true  today  than  it  was  in  Wilson"s  time  that  the  prineigle  of  self- 
determination  clashes  inevitably  with  other  principles  equally  sacred".  1  2 
She  lists  among  those  principles:  sovereign  equality  and  non-intervention.  She  seems  to 
argue  that  the  prohibition  of  the  right  of  succession  would  subordinate  the  right  of  self- 
determination  to  sovereignty,  hence  empties  self-determination  of  any  real  meaning. 
Western  practice  seems  to  support  such  contention,  self-determination  is  viewed  as 
including  the  right  of  the  people  to  choose  the  political  form  of  their  association  with  their 
own  State,  their  right  to  determine  freely  the  form  of  their  Government  and  especially  the 
right  to  reverse  by  democratic  means  the  prevailing  political  and  social  order  in  their  State. 
This  interpretation  of  the  right  of  self-determination  will  implicitly  allow  secession. 
However,  Pornerance's  view  and  even  the  practice  of  Western  world  express  the  minority 
view. 
The  second  and  popular  view  sees  no  contradiction  between  sovereignty  and  self- 
determination,  the  UN  practice  supports  this  position.  Sovereignty  according  to  this  view 
cannot  be  used  as  a  justification  for  denying  colonial  peoples  and  territories  under  alien  and 
racist  regimes,  their  right  to  self-determination,  in  this  case  their  self-determination  is  a 
very  strong  limitation  on  the  sovereignty  of  States  which  control  those  peoples  and 
territories. 
In  the  case  of  independent  States  which  do  not  subjugate  other  peoples  and  territories, 
the  Friendly  Relations  Resolution  2625  of  1970  seems  to  put  respect  for  the  two  principles 
on  equal  footing.  The  Declaration  stresses  that  the  effective  application  of  the  principle  of 
self-determination  is  based  on  respect  for  the  principle  of  sovereign  equality,  which 
includes  among  other  things  total  respect  for  territorial  integrity  and  political  independence 
and  the  right  of  every  State  to  choose  its  political  and  social  systems. 
Nevertheless,  the  State  in  order  to  enjoy  these  rights,  it  must  as  the  Declaration 
emphasises,  act  in  'compliance  with  the  principle  of  equal  rights  and  self-determination  of 
peoples'.  This  means,  in  my  view,  that  self-determination  is  a  limitation  on  the  sovereignty 
of  all  States  including  the  newly  independent  States,  in  the  sense  that  they  can  invoke 
sovereignty  against  intervention  in  their  internal  affairs,  but  they  must  first  conduct 
themselves  in  accordance  with  the  right  of  self-determination,  by  respecting  the  totality  of 
human  rights.  Respect  for  human  rights  is  the  new  name  of  self-determination  in  my  view. 
The  conclusion  is  that  self-determination  limits  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  in  the  sense 
that  the  latter  is  obliged  to  respect  human  rights,  if  it  is  to  enjoy  the  benefits  of 
sovereignty. 
C.  Prohibition  of  the  Use  of  Force  as  a  Limitation  on  State  Sovereignty 
Before  the  advent  of  the  League  of  Nations,  resort  to  war  and  the  use  of  force  in  its 
different  forms  such  as  reprisals  and  retorsion,  were  accepted  and  recognised  as  cardinal 
components  of  State  sovereignty.  In  fact,  resort  to  war  was  recognized  as  a  legal  means  by 
which  the  State  can  conduct  its  external  affairs.  As  a  result,  the  State  can  either  negotiate 
182M.  Pomerance:  Setf-determination  In  Law  and  Practice.  Martinus  Nilhoff,  The  Hague/London,  1982,  p.  43. 
59 or  resort  to  war,  everything  depends  on  the  vitality  of  the  interests  at  stake.  Randelzhofer 
summarises  the  position  before  the  20th  century  as  follows: 
"Prior  to  this  century  [the  20th]  no  prohibition  of  the  use  of  force  existed.  States  were 
free  to  resort  to  war.  The  medieval  theory  of  bellum  justurn  was  developed  by 
theologians  and  was  never  a  valid  rule  of  public  international  law.  Furthermore  this 
theory  lost  its  war-preventing  properties  when  it  became  accepted  that  war  could  be 
just  for  both  sides.  183 
This  means  that  international  law  at  that  period  did  not  impose  any  limits  of  the  sovereignty 
of  State  in  the  field  of  resorting  to  war. 
The  League  of  Nations  system  did  not  in  fact  prohibit  war  or  resort  to  it,  it  merely  sets 
up  some  procedures  which  States  have  to  observe  before  resorting  to  war.  Members  should 
according  to  the  Covenant  (see  especially  Articles  10-16)  submit  disputes  likely  to  lead  to 
a  rupture,  to  arbitration  or  judicial  settlement  or  inquiry  by  the  Council  of  the  League. 
Members  were  prohibited  from  resorting  to  war  until  three  months  after  the  arbitral  award 
or  judicial  decision  or  report  by  the  Council.  Implicitly  then  the  League  did  not  limit  the 
sovereignty  of  the  State  in  any  significant  way,  since  ultimately  the  State  can  resort  to  war 
if  it  wishes  so,  it  has  only  to  wait  for  the  expiration  of  three  months.  Wehberg  notes  in  this 
respect  that: 
"Mdme  des  esprits  progressistes  ä  cette  ipoque  (1919)  consideraient  le  jus  belli  ac 
pacis  comme  un  attribut  dicisif  de  la  souverainet6  de  l'Etat".  184 
However,  in  order  to  close  the  gaps  in  the  covenant  a  very  important  step  was  taken,  by  the 
signing  in  1928  of  the  General  Treaty  for  the  Renunciation  of  War  (The  Kellog-Briand 
Pact)  The  first  Article  stipulates: 
"The  High  Contracting  parties  solemnly  declare  in  the  names  of  their  respective 
peoples  that  they  condemn  recourse  to  war  for  the  resolution  of  international 
controversies  and  renounce  it  as  an  instrument  of  national  policy  in  their  relations 
with  one  another.  "  185 
The  Pact,  in  fact,  contained  major  deficiencies  among  them:  Firstly  the  absence  of  any 
specific  sanctions  for  its  breach,  Secondly  it  did  not  prohibit  the  use  of  force  in  cases  short 
of  war  and  thirdly  it  contained  no  machinery  for  the  control  of  its  execution.  But,  its  major 
setback  was  that  it  was  not  able  to  prevent  the  outbreak  of  World  War  Two. 
Despite  all  these  shortcomings,  the  Pact  has  never  been  terminated  which  indicates  clearly 
that  there  is  a  widespread  acceptance  that  resort  to  war,  except  in  self-defence  is  a  very 
valid  limitation  on  State  sovereignty. 
However,  the  most  important  development  in  contemporary  international  law  concerning 
183A.  Randetzhofer:  The  Use  of  Force  in  Bernhardt  (ed.  )  Encyclopedia  of  Public  international  Law  (instalment 
4  (1982)  pp.  265-2661. 
184H.  Wehberg:  Interdiction  clu  recours  A  ta  force:  te  principe  et  tes  probtbmes  qui  se  posent.  RCADI, 
1951/1,  p.  33. 
185H.  W.  Briggs:  The  Law  of  Nations:  Cases,  Documents  and  Notes.  2nd  ed.,  Appteton  Century  Crofts,  New  York, 
1959,  p.  968. 
60 the  prohibition  of  the  use  of  force,  has  come  with  the  advent  of  the  UN  Charter.  Article 
2/4  stipulates  that: 
"All  members  shall  refrain  in  their  international  relations  from  the  threat  or  use  of 
force  against  the  territorial  integrity  or  political  independence  of  any  State,  or  in  any 
other  manner  inconsistent  with  the  purpose  of  the  United  Nations".  186 
The  UN  Charter  does  not  prohibit  the  use  of  force  in  cases  of  self-defence  (Article  51)  or 
when  a  decision  by  the  UNSC  for  collective  actions  is  taken  in  accordance  with  its  Chapter 
VII  of  the  UN  Charter. 
Moreover,  the  UN  practice  has  established  that  the  use  of  force  for  the  purpose  of 
attaining  self-determination,  by  colonial  peoples  and  peoples  under  alien  and  racist  regimes, 
is  not  in  breach  of  Article  2/4,  the  Friendly  Relations  Resolution  (2625)  and  the  Declaration 
on  the  Definition  of  Aggression  of  1974,  among  other  resolutions  support  such  contentions. 
The  ICJ  in  the  Nicaragua  Case  has  in  fact  stressed  that  the  rule  contained  in  Article  2/4, 
has  become  a  rule  of  customary  law  or  even  a  rule  of  jus  cogens.  It  held: 
"...  [A]  further  confirmation  of  the  validity  as  customary  international  law  of  the 
principle  of  the  prohibition  of  the  use  of  force  expressed  in  Article  2  (4),  of  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations  may  be  found  in  the  fact  that  it  is  referred  to  in 
statements  by  State  representatives  as  being  not  only  a  principle  of  customary  law  but 
a  fundamental  or  cardinal  principle  of  customary  law".  187 
Implicitly  then,  the  Court  confirms  strongly  the  proposition  that  the  ban  on  the  use  of  force 
is  an  important  limitation  on  State  sovereignty.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  Court  also  made 
a  very  important  statement  concerning  the  use  of  force  for  the  protection  of  human  rights 
by  individual  States.  It  stressed  that: 
"In  any  event,  while  the  United  States  might  form  its  own  appraisal  of  the  situation 
as  to  the  respect  for  human  rights  in  Nicaragua,  the  use  of  force  could  not  be  the 
appropriate  method  to  monitor  or  ensure  such  respect".  188 
The  effect  of  this  statement  is  that  individual  States  cannot  claim  by  their  individual 
capacity  to  have  the  right  of  the  so-called  humanitarian  intervention,  in  the  era  of  the  UN 
Charter.  However,  there  is  nothing  in  the  statement  of  the  Court  which  can  exclude  the 
organization  of  the  UN  to  exercise  such  rights.  It  must  be  remembered  in  this  context 
that  especially  in  the  19th  and  the  beginning  of  the  20th  century,  some  writers  have 
pretended  that  under  international  law  States  can  intervene  in  other  States  to  stop  violation 
of  human  rights.  Borchard  states  that: 
"....  [W]here  a  State  under  exceptional  circumstances  disregards  certain  rights  of  its 
own  citizens  over  whom  presumably  it  has  absolute  sovereignty,  the  other  States  of 
the  family  of  nations  are  authorized  by  international  law  to  intervene  on  grounds  of 
1861bid, 
p.  971. 
187  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  70,  para.  190,  p.  1066. 
1881bid, 
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61 humanity  ".  189 
This  position,  however,  which  was  supported  by  some  prominent  lawyers  such  as  Stowell,  190 
and  Hall,  191  was  not  supported  by  the  whole  doctrine.  Thus,  Rougier  noted  that: 
"It  must  be  recognized  that  the  grounds  of  humanity  is  the  most  delicate  of  the  causes 
which  may  be  expected  to  justify  the  right  of  intervention  and  that  it  raises  judicial 
difficulties  in  regard  to  the  basis  and  the  extent  of  this  right".  192 
Those  who  support  humanitarian  intervention  point  to  the  State  practice  such  as  the 
intervention  of  Britain,  France  and  Russia  in  Greece  in  1827  and  especially  the  intervention 
of  France  in  Syria  in  1860.  However,  in  my  opinion,  those  classical  interventions  were 
arbitrary  and  politically  motivated.  They  were  mostly  against  the  Ottoman  Empire  which 
has  a  different  religion  and  was  very  weak  militarily. 
Moreover,  there  is  evidence  that  even  the  intervention  of  France  in  Lebanon  in  1860 
(which  is  seen  even  by  Brownlie  as  a  true  case  of  humanitarian  intervention),  193  that  the 
Christians  were  the  party  which  provoked  the  crisis,  knowing  in  advance  that  their 
Christian  brothers  would  come  in  help  in  the  event  of  their  plans  failing.  194 
However,  I  think  that  the  most  important  evidence  that  humanitarian  intervention  is  a 
political  device  only  is  provided  by  the  case  of  Nazi  regime.  That  regime  committed  terrible 
atrocities  against  its  own  citizen  but  no  State  claimed  resort  to  humanitarian  intervention 
despite  the  fact  that  all  its  conditions  were  present,  since  a  policy  of  extermination  was 
planned  to  get  rid  of  a  section  of  the  population  because  of  difference  of  religion. 
Even  in  the  era  of  the  UN  Charter,  some  writers  mostly  Americans  (Lillich,  Moore  and 
Reisman  among  others)  still  insist  that  humanitarian  intervention  is  legal.  Their  main 
argument  is  that  since  the  UN  cannot  act  in  cases  of  flagrant  violations  of  human  rights  by 
one  State  against  its  own  citizens,  because  of  the  use  of  the  veto,  individual  States  may  in 
such  cases  and  circumstances  resort  to  humanitarian  intervention.  Furthermore, 
humanitarian  intervention  has  been  advanced  as  one  of  the  many  grounds  for  the  use  of 
force  and  intervention  in  many  cases  (e.  g.  Hungary  in  1956;  the  Dominican  Republic  in 
1960;  Congolese  (Zaire)  intervention  in  1960,1964  and  1978;  Czechoslovakia  in  1968;  South 
Africa  in  the  Angolan  civil  war  in  1975;  Bangladesh  in  1971;  Indonesia  intervention  in  East 
Timor  in  1975,  Kampuchea  in  1979;  the  US  and  six  Caribbean  States  in  Grenada  (1985)  and 
189  L.  B.  Sohn  and  T.  BuergenthaL:  International  Protection  of  Human  Rights.  The  Bobbs-MerriLL  Cie.,  Inc., 
Indianapolis,  Kansas  City,  New  York,  1973,  p.  139 
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62 the  Tanzanian  intervention  in  Uganda  1979-1980).  195  However,  the  UN  has  never  endorsed 
any  of  those  actions.  Thus,  for  instances  in  the  case  of  the  Vietnamese  intervention  in 
Kampuchea,  the  US  delegate  after  observing  that  no  State  has  the  right  to  impose  one 
Government  on  another  stressed  that: 
"The  international  community  could  not  allow  to  pass  in  silence  the  acts  that  had  just 
taken  place  to  do  so  would  only  encourage  Governments  in  other  parts  of  the  world 
to  conclude  that  there  were  no  norms,  no  standards,  no  restrictions  ".  196 
Also,  in  the  case  of  the  Tanzanian  invasion  of  Uganda,  Wani  after  revealing  the  real  motives 
behind  the  Tanzanian  invasion,  concluded  that: 
"The  Tanzanian  invasion  had  at  least  the  single  most  positive  attribute  of  removing 
Amin  from  power  and  raising  the  hopes  of  Ugandans  for  a  new  life  where  they  were 
once  resigned  to  suffering.  The  Teal  objective  of  the  invasion  had  more  to  do  with 
Nyrere's  and  Tanzania's  prestige  and  a  deep  seated  commitment  by  NyTere  to  return 
his  friend  Obote  to  power".  197- 
This  state  of  affairs  confirms  Brownlie's  conclusion  that: 
"There  is  little  or  no  reason  to  believe  that  humanitarian  intervention  is  lawful  within 
the  regime  of  the  Charter.  "  198 
He  then  adds: 
"There  is  virtually  no  modern  State  practice  to  support  that  such  a  right  exists".  199 
The  above  mentioned  ICJ  view  confirms  the  correctness  of  such  assertions.  It  must  be 
stressed  that  it  is  only  humanitarian  intervention  by  one  State  or  a  group  of  States  acting 
outside  the  UN  which  is  prohibited  since  the  UN  can  always  act  by  intervening  in  any  State 
which  violates  consistently  and  grossly  the  most  basic  human  rights  of  its  own  citizens, 
either  in  peace  time  or  even  in  internal  conflicts.  It  can  do  so  under  Chapter  VII  of  the  UN 
Charter,  when  it  sees  that  the  situation  in  the  country  constitutes  a  threat  to  international 
peace  and  security.  However,  the  UN  has  never  acted  in  that  way,  mainly  because  of 
political  reasons.  The  legal  basis  in  the  UN  Charter  does  exist  and  is  waiting  of  its  use. 
Thus,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  the  UN  from  intervention  in  internal  conflicts,  when 
widespread  and  massive  violations  of  human  Tights  exist.  This  is  another  important 
limitation  on  State  sovereignty. 
195  WiLd-Verwey:  Humanitarian  Intervention,  in  A.  Cassese  (ed.  ):  The  Current  Legal  Regulations  of  the  Use 
of  Force.  Martinus  Niihoff,  1986,  pp.  60-67 
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THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  NON-  INTERVENTION 
Introduction 
Together  with  the  principle  of  sovereignty,  the  principle  of  non-  intervention  has  also  been 
advanced  as  a  justification  for  the  non-extension  of  humanitarian  law  to  internal  wars.  It 
has  been  said  that  the  principle,  among  other  things,  excludes  any  international  regulations 
of  the  conduct  of  the  established  Government  vis-i-vis  its  local  opponents,  any  such 
exercise  will  result  inevitably  in  opening  the  door  for  outside  interventions  and  this  leads 
to  the  worsening  of  the  internal  conflicts.  A  careful  reading  of  the  proceedings  of  the  two 
Diplomatic  Conferences  of  1949  and  1974-1977  would  confirm  that  the  principle  was  used 
extensively  by  States,  first  to  resist  any  attempt  at  regulating  internal  wars  and  thereafter 
to  restrict  and  limit  the  content  of  such  regulation. 
This  state  of  affairs,  in  my  view,  imposes  the  need  for  a  real  investigation  and  analysis 
of  the  concept  of  non-  intervention,  its  place,  meaning  and  limits  in  traditional  and 
contemporary  international  law.  Moreover,  it  is  necessary  to  elucidate  the  question  of 
intervention  in  civil  wars,  as  it  is  the  most  relevant  to  my  research. 
Section  1:  Reasons  for  the  Increase  In  Interventionary  Activity 
According  to  one  view  intervention  is  the  natural  product  of  the  existing  system  of 
international  society,  the  combined  effect  of  the  absence  of  a  central  authority  on  the 
universal  level,  on  one  hand,  and  the  existence  of  great  powers,  on  the  other  hand,  will  lead 
automatically  to  the  situation,  where  the  big  will  intervene  in  the  affairs  of  the  weak. 
Intervention  then,  in  the  opinion  of  some  writers,  is  the  logical  consequence  of  greatness, 
Barnet  states  such  idea  as  follows: 
"Intervention,  with  all  its  paraphernalia-  the  aid  missions,  the  CIA  operations,  the 
roaming  fleet  bristling  with  nuclear  weapons,  the  Green  Berets,  the  pacification 
teams,  and  ultimately  the  expeditionary  forces-is  the  inevitable  consequences  of 
greatness-it  is  the  burden  and  the  glory  of  the  republic".  1 
Intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  others,  is  then  among  the  means  by  which  the  great 
power  conducts  its  own  affairs.  Halpern  in  fact  stresses  that: 
" 
... 
[A]  great  power  intervenes  in  the  domestic  realm  of  other  States  when  it  says  'yes' 
and  when  it  says  'no'  indeed  by  its  sheer  existence".  2 
The  logical  consequences  of  such  assertions  is  that  the  independence  of  especially  weaker 
members  of  the  international  community  is  pure  fiction,  also  any  attempt  at  proclaiming 
1 
R.  J.  Barnet:  Intervention  and  RevoLution:  The  US  in  the  Third  WorLd.  Mac  Gibbon  &  Kee.  1970,  pp.  112- 
13. 
2  M.  Hatpern:  Morality  and  Potftfcs,  in  J.  Rosnau,  (ed.  ):  InternationaL  Aspects  of  CiviL  Strife.  Pup, 
Princeton.  New  Jersey.  1964.  p.  251. 
64 the  principle  of  non-  intervention  in  the  relations  between  States,  would  go  against  the  logic 
of  the  composition  of  the  international  community. 
To  me,  these  kinds  of  arguments  are  not  convincing  because  they  are  in  contradiction  with 
contemporary  international  law,  which  stresses  the  sovereign  equality  of  its  members  on  the 
legal  level.  Besides,  even  'greatness'  must  be  subjected  to  law  which  is  based,  among  other 
things,  on  respect  for  sovereignty,  political  independence  and  territorial  integrity,  otherwise 
we  will  go  back  to  the  bad  old  times,  where  the  strong  behaved  as  in  the  state  of  nature  (in 
the  Hobsian  sense)  by  intervening,  invading,  and  colonizing  weak  communities. 
However,  in  the  face  of  the  rapid  increase  in  interventionary  activities  especially,  as  from 
the  1960s  up  to  now,  intervention  has  become  an  increasingly  prominent  feature  of 
international  system.  This  led  a  host  of  political  scientists  and  lawyers  to  study  the  subject 
of  intervention  and  thereby  suggest  the  main  reasons  for  its  increase. 
In  this  context,  Little  suggests  three  main  reasons  as  an  answer:  (i)  The  proliferations  of 
nation  States,  most  of  which  were  not  considered  to  be  capable  of  maintaining  their 
independence.  (ii)  The  existence  of  a  sharp  ideological  cleavage  between  the  two 
'superpowers'  which  precipitated  attempts  to  gain  support  from  new  States.  (iii)  Finally,  the 
production  of  nuclear  weapons  which  eliminates  the  possibility  of  war  between  the  two 
major  actors  and  encourages  them  to  employ  subversive  tactics.  3 
On  the  other  hand,  Moore  advances  four  reasons  for  explaining  the  phenomenon  of 
intervention  in  internal  conflicts:  A.  The  nuclear  confrontation. 
B.  The  shift  from  a  stable  to  a  revolutionary  system. 
C.  An  accelerating  rate  of  social  change  in  developing  countries  with  the  result  of  a 
decrease  in  stability. 
D.  Finally,  the  militancy  of  some  new  leaders  who  advocate  full  use  of  force  for  the 
expansion  of  ideology.  4 
Thus,  if  the  prospect  of  nuclear  confrontation  and  its  obvious  consequences  of  mutual 
defeat  for  the  superpowers,  has  protected  Europe  from  violence,  and  has  given  it  the 
longest  peace  period  in  the  recent  history.  The  fate  of  the  Third  World  is  the  opposite.  It 
has  become  the  battle  ground  for  the  confrontation  between  the  superpowers.  The  dire 
problems  of  underdevelopment  and  the  inequalities  of  the  distributions  of  wealth  within 
those  societies  have,  in  many  instances,  given  rise  to  widespread  dissatisfaction  within  the 
population,  and  have  induced  parts  of  that  population  to  take  arms  against  their  own 
Governments. 
The  superpowers,  especially  have  mercilessly  exploited  such  situations,  by  aiding  and 
assisting  the  faction  which  can  further  their  ideology,  interests  and  influence.  Civil  wars 
in  the  words  of  Falk: 
*...  [P]resent  expanding  nations  and  blocs  with  opportunities  for  strategic  expansion 
that  does  not  involve  the  high  risks  of  reaching  those  self-destructive  levels  of 
conflict  that  are  likely  to  attend  major  armed  attacks  across  international 
3 
R.  Littte:  Intervention.  Rowman  &  Lftttefietd,  Totow,  New  Jersey,  1975,  p.  4. 
4  J.  N.  Moore:  Law  and  the  Indo-China  War.  PUP,  Princeton,  New  Jersey,  1972,  p.  83. 
65 boundarieS".  5 
This  means  that  the  rule  of  non-intervention  is  under  heavy  pressure,  in  fact,  it  is  either 
the  observance  of  the  law  in  the  form  of  abstaining  from  interference  (which  in  the  opinion 
of  the  intervening  States  will  result  in  political  defeat),  or  non-observance  which  may  very 
easily  lead  to  political  victory. 
The  behaviour  of  the  superpowers  especially,  in  this  period  (of  the  1980s)  confirms  to  a 
large  extent  the  above  observation.  The  arrival  of  president  Reagan's  administration 
indicated  that  the  Americans  are  not  in  the  mood  of  tolerating  any  more  Soviet  moves  in 
the  Third  World.  In  this  respect,  the  US  President,  Mr.  Reagan  warned  that: 
"...  [T]he  US  should  intervene  in  wars  in  the  Third  World  countries  whenever  there 
is  a  chance  to  fight  Soviet  or  Marxist  influence,  it  should  do  so  all  round  the  world, 
without  regard  to  particular  local  conditions.  Constraints  on  American  power  too  must 
yield  to  the  ideological  imperatives".  6 
The  Americans  seem  to  give  precedence  to  their  ideological  preferences  over  the  duty  of 
adhering  to  the  law. 
The  mood  of  the  Soviets,  however,  was  stated  in  the  Report  of  the  CPSU  Central 
Committee  to  the  27th  Congress  in  the  following  terms: 
"Capitalism  regarded  the  birth  of  Socialism  as  an  'error'  of  history  which  must  be 
'rectified',  it  was  to  be  rectified  at  any  cost  by  any  means  irrespective  of  law  and 
morality:  by  armed  intervention,  economic  blockade,  subversive  activity,  sanctions 
and  "punishments'  or  rejection  of  all  cooperation.  But  nothing  coul  interfere  with 
the  consolidation  of  the  new  system  and  its  historical  right  to  live'. 
9 
The  Soviets  believe  deeply  that  the  spread  of  socialism  to  all  parts  of  the  world  is  a 
historical  verdict,  no  force  can  stop  that  process.  Moreover,  they  see  that  the  conditions  in 
many  Third  World  countries  are  ripe  for  social  revolution,  and  that  their  duty  is  to  help  and 
assist  the  progressive  forces  to  take  over  political  power. 
The  Americans  on  the  other  hand,  believe  that  their  duty,  on  behalf  of  the  free  world,  is 
to  stop  the  process  of  revolutionary  change  whenever  Communists  are  involved.  They  are 
certain  that  without  Soviet  intervention,  internal  conflicts  and  upheavals  will  not  end  in  the 
victory  of  local  Communists.  Rostow  argues  in  this  regard  that: 
"...  [W]e  Americans  are  confident  that,  if  the  independence  of  this  process  (of 
Modernisation)  can  be  maintained  over  the  coming  years  and  decades,  these  societies 
(the  developing  ones)  will  choose  their  own  versions  of  what  we  would  recognise  as 
a  democratic,  open  society".  8 
5R.  Fatk:  The  Internationat  Law  of  Internat  War,  in  J.  Rosman,  (ed.  ):  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  2,  p.  188. 
6New  York  Times  (Dec.  9th,  1985)  cited  in  the  International  Affairs  (Moscow)  10/1986,  p.  12.  See  also 
P.  J.  Schraeder:  Intervention  in  the  1980s.  US  Foreign  Policy  in  the  Third  World.  Lynner  Rienner  Pub., 
Boulder,  London,  1989. 
7  International  Affairs  (Moscow)  10/1986,  p.  12. 
8W.  Rostow:  Countering  Gueri  its  Attack,  Army  Magazine,  Sept.  1961,  reproduced  in  R.  Falk,  (ed.  ).,  The 
Vietnam  War  and  International  Law.  PUP,  Princeton,  1968,  p.  129. 
66 This  means  that  the  Americans  too  believe  that  the  fate  of  humanity  in  its  poor  parts  is 
connected  with  the  values  of  the  open  society,  and  they  see  it  as  their  mission  to  protect  this 
process.  9 
The  struggle  sometimes  takes  the  overtones  of  the  religious  language  of  bygone  ages, 
Rostow  insists  that: 
* 
... 
[D]espite  all  the  Communist  talk  of  aiding  the  movements  of  national  independence 
they  are  driven  in  the  end  by  the  nature  of  their  system,  to  violate  the  independence 
of  nations"10 
He  then  confidently  asserts  the  'noble'  American  motives: 
"Despite  all  the  Communist  talk  of  American  imperialism  we  are  committed,  by  the 
nature  of  our  system  to  support  the  cause  of  national  independence  and  the  truth  will 
come  out".  " 
However,  the  'support  for  the  cause  of  independence'  which  Rostow  talks  about,  includes 
among  other  things  "learning  to  deter  guerilla  warfare,  if  possible  and  deal  with  it  if 
necessary".  12  This  philosophy  which  advocates  intervention  to  the  maximum  has  been 
applied  to  Vietnam,  and  everybody  knows  the  high  cost  for  international  law,  and  especially 
the  terrible  human  sufferings  of  the  population. 
Also,  as  I  stressed  before,  in  the  1980s  the  Americans  are  again  buoyant,  feeling  that  the 
Soviets  must  be  stopped  in  the  Third  World,  since  in  their  view  the  Communists  are  behind 
all  internal  conflicts,  in  this  respect  Shultz  the  American  Secretary  of  State  wrote: 
* 
...  [TIen  to  fifteen  years  ago  when  the  US  was  beset  by  economic  difficulties 
neglecting  its  defences,  and  hesitant  about  its  role  in  the  world,  the  Soviets  exploited 
the  conditions".  13 
He  then  added: 
* 
...  [T]hey  [the  Soviets]  and  their  clients  moved  more  boldly  in  the  geopolitical  arena, 
intervening  in  such  places  as  Angola  Kampuchea,  Ethiopia  and  Afghanistan, 
believing  that  the  West  was  incapable  of  resisting".  14 
The  Secretary  of  State  does  not  advocate  restraints  and  non  -intervention  as  the  best  policy 
for  keeping  order  in  the  world.  On  the  contrary  he  feels  that  the  US  must  react  by  assisting 
and  aiding  any  faction  which  resists  the  Communists,  he  seems  to  be  proud  that  in  the 
1980s,  the  picture  has  changed  precisely  because  the  Americans  are  on  the  offensive  in  the 
struggle  for  the  Third  World. 
9"  This  is  our  mission  not  the  mission  of  Communists",  proclaims  Rostow.  Ibid. 
101bid, 
p.  130. 
"Ibid. 
12  Ibid,  p.  131. 
13G.  P.  Shultz:  New  Realities  and  New  Ways  of  Thinking,  63  Foreign  Affairs,  1985,  p.  706. 
141bid. 
67 He  thinks  that  communism  is  on  the  retreat  and  the  Western  values  of  peace,  democracy, 
liberty  and  human  rights  are  on  the  offensive,  he  confidently  asserts  that: 
"...  [T]oday  we  see  a  significant  new  phenomenon,  after  years  of  guerrilla  insurgency 
led  by  Communists  against  pro-Western  Governments,  we  now  see  dramatic5and 
heartening  examples  of  popular  insurgencies  against  the  Communist  regimes".  ' 
His  strategic  shift  in  the  struggle  between  the  superpowers  which,  taking  place  in  the  Third 
World,  will  mean  in  practice  that  the  US  in  the  opinions  of  the  Reagan  Administration,  has 
a  duty  to  assist  the  anti-Communist  insurgencies  in  Afghanistan,  Angola,  Nicaragua  and 
many  others;  otherwise,  as  he  put  it: 
"...  [I]f  we  turn  our  backs  on  this  tradition  (the  American  tradition  of  supporting  the 
struggle  of  other  peoples  for  freedom  and  democracy)  we  would  be  conceding  the 
Soviet  Union  that  Communist  revolutions  are  irreversible  while  everything  else  is  up 
for  grabs,  we  would  be  in  effect,  enacting  the  Brezhnev  doctrine  into  American 
law".  16 
This  is  a  clear  advocacy  of  intervention  in  civil  wars,  which  are  taking  place  especially  in 
the  Third  World,  no  legal  restraints  seem  to  be  taken  into  consideration.  The  argument  is 
simple,  because  they  intervene  we  have  to  intervene,  as  he  States: 
"...  [S]o  long  as  Communist  dictatorships  feel  free  to  aid,  and  abet  insurgencies  in  the 
name  of  'Socialist  internationalism'  why  must  the  democracies-the  target  of  thi 
threat-be  inhibited  from  defending  their  own  interests  and  the  cause  of  democracy".  'ý 
This  is  a  summing  up  of  the  mood  of  the  decision  makers  of  a  great  power,  which,  in  my 
opinion,  leads  to  a  very  dangerous  situation,  where  international  law  has  no  impact 
whatsoever  on  the  actions  and  decisions  of  the  most  powerful  nation  on  earth.  The 
conclusion  is  that  intervention  activities,  especially  in  internal  wars,  has  increased.  The 
underlying  reasons  for  such  State  of  affairs  are  connected  with  the  rift  between  the 
superpowers  and  their  mutual  distrust.  Third  World  countries  are  the  first  target  of  such 
activity,  because  of  their  internal  contradictions,  and  the  absence  of  democracy,  this  makes 
rebellion  attractive  to  the  unsatisfied  part  of  the  population. 
This  situation  led  Third  World  countries  especially,  to  see  in  any  action,  even  that  aimed 
at  making  internal  wars  more  human,  as  opening  the  door  to  more  intervention  in  their 
internal  affairs  by  external  countries,  and  by  consequence  as  attempts  at  undermining  their 
independence. 
151bid. 
16  Ibid,  p.  713. 
17 
Ibid. 
68 Section  11:  Definition  of  Intervention 
A.  Intervention  In  Historical  Perspective 
The  history  of  intervention  is  the  history  of  the  State  itself,  it  is  in  the  words  of  Fawcett 
man  old  political  habit  even  a  necessity"18,  the  same  author  emphasises  that: 
"...  [Slince  th  Tý  emergence  of  nation-States  has  there  not  been  intervention  in  progress 
somewhere"  . 
Verzijl  stresses  in  the  same  context  that: 
"If  we  look  at  the  subject  (of  intervention)  from  a  historical  point  of  view  we  find 
ourselves  faced  with  an  endless  series  of  interventionS".  20 
Thus,  on  August  25th,  1215,  England's  Magna  Carta  was  declared  by  Pope  Innocent  III  to 
be  null  and  void.  However,  this  was  in  the  era  before  the  birth  of  the  modern  State. 
Nevertheless  in  practice,  even  after  the  birth  of  the  modern  system  of  States  after  1648 
(Treaty  of  Westphalia)  which  was  based  upon  independence  and  non-  intervention, 
interferences  occurred  and  alliances  were  created  to  intervene  in  the  affairs  of  other  States, 
in  order  to  prevent  change  of  the  political  authority,  or  to  force  such  change. 
The  history  of  the  actions  of  Russia,  Prussia,  Great  Britain  and  Austria  are  well  known 
after  the  fall  of  Napoleon,  the  Quadruple  Treaty  of  Alliance  between  those  powers  of 
November  20th,  1815  stipulates  that: 
"Le  repos  de  I'Europe  est  essentiellement  H6  A  I'affermissement  de  l'ordre  des  choses 
(de  le  dernier  attentent  de  Napoleon  Bonaparte  avait  momentandment  subvertu) 
21  fond6  sur  le  maintain  de  I'autorit6  royale  et  de  la  charte  constitutionnelle". 
In  practice,  this  policy  meant  that  any  attempt  to  rebel  against  the  Royal  regimes  in  any 
part  of  Europe,  even  when  the  revolt  is  widespread  will  be  crushed  by  the  intervention  of 
the  said  powers  on  the  side  of  the  established  Royal  regime.  22 
Pitman  B.  Potter  reveals  that: 
"On  peut  donc  rdsumer  I'histoire  de  la  pratique  de  l'intervention  en  Europe  depuis 
la  revolution  Frangaise  jusquI  nos  jours,  en  disant  que  l'intervention  s'est  61argie 
en  ce  qui  concerne  sa  base,  ses  m6thodes,  ses  objectifs  et  sa  reconnaissance 
23  juridique". 
18  J.  Fawcett:  Intervention  in  International  Law:  A  Study  of  Recent  Cases,  RCADI,  1961/11,  p.  347. 
19  Ibid. 
20 
J.  H.  W.  Verzfjt:  International  Law  In  Historical  Perspective.  VoL.  I:  General  Subjects.  A.  W.  Sijthoff, 
Leyden  1968,  p.  238. 
21 
Cited  by  Verzill.  ibid,  p.  239. 
22 
Thus,  In  1821,  following  successful  revolutions  against  Royal  Absolutism  in  Spain  and  NapLes,  French 
and  Austrian  troops.  respectively  dispatched  wider  aegis  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  intervened  to  restore 
eager  Monarchs  to  their  full  prerogatives.  Cited  by  T.  J.  Farer:  The  Regulation  of  Foreign  Intervention 
in  Civil  Armed  Conflict.  RCADI,  1974/11.  p.  320. 
23 
P.  S.  Potter:  L'Intervention  en  droit  internationaL.  RCADI,  1930/11,  p.  633. 
69 He  adds  that  intervention  had  been  resorted  to  more  often  than  the  I  8th  century  especially 
by  the  European  powers  and  the  US. 
in  my  opinion,  colonialism  includes  among  other  things  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs 
of  non-European  States  and  entities,  thus  for  the  Third  World  the  experience  was  even 
worse.  conquest,  aggressions  and  military  interventions,  were  accepted  as  legal  devices,  in 
order  to  gain  new  territories,  influence  and  markets. 
In  this  context,  it  is  not  strange  that  Stewart  Mill  advocated  non-  intervention  between  the 
States  which  possess  the  same  degree  of  civilization  and  intervention  in  States  and  entities, 
which  are  of  a  'low  grade  of  social  improvementS24.  He  writes: 
*The  sacred  duties  which  civilized  nations  owe  to  the  independence  and  nationality 
of  each  other  are  not  binding  towards  those  whom  nalionality  and  independence  are 
"15  either  a  certain  evil,  or  at  least  a  questionable  good. 
He  calls  them  'barbarians'  and  to  him  they  have  no  rights  as  nations.  Thus,  according  to 
him: 
*The  criticisms  therefore,  which  are  so  often  made  upon  the  conduct  of  the  French 
in  Algeria  and  on  the  English  in  India,  proceed  it  would  seem,  mostly  on  a  wrong 
principle  "26 
This  means  that  the  right  principle  justifies  morally  and  legally  interventions  in  barbarian 
States  without  limits.  On  the  other  hand,  between  civilised  States  intervention  was  not 
justified  at  least  theoretically. 
However,  especially  after  the  advent  of  the  UN,  and  under  the  influence  of  the  newly 
independent  States,  the  former  and  the  actual  victims  of  interventions,  a  real  legal  stock  of 
treaties  bilateral  and  multilateral,  UN  resolutions  and  the  ICJ  pronouncements,  especially 
the  last  one  in  Nicaragua  Ciat  1986,  non-intervention  has  acquired  a  very  important  place 
at  least  on  the  normative  level. 
B.  The  Definition  of  Intervention 
If  it  is  clear  that  the  control  of  intervention,  in  general,  and  intervention  in  domestic 
conflicts,  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  problems,  confronting  the  future  of  peace  and  security 
in  the  world  and  also  the  future  of  international  law,  then  the  question  of  definition  of 
intervention  is  very  important  since  it  will  help  in  identifying  what  constitutes  that  activity 
and  reveal  the  extent  to  which  international  law  has  tried  to  limit  the  legality  of 
interventions. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  noted  that  many  Western  lawyers  especially,  express  the 
opinion  that  any  attempt  at  defining  'intervention'  will  lead  to  confusion.  Part  of  the 
confusion  as  Moore  feels,  lies  in  'the  tendency  to  define  intervention  in  high  level 
24 
J.  S.  Mitt:  A  Few  Words  on  Non-Intervention,  In  Falk  (ed.  ).,  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  8,  p.  32. 
25  Ibid. 
26 
lbid,  p.  33. 
70 generalisation  without  careful  separation  of  the  issues  and  contextS"27  whereas  Potter 
attributes  the  situation  to: 
"A  cause  de  sa  large  utilisation  (intervention)  par  tant  d'auteurs  qui  l'ont  appliqu6  a 
nombre  de  phdnom6nes,  qui  diMrent  considdrablement  entre  eux,  ce  terme  est  arriv6 
"28  maintenant  A  poss6der  une  significance  emminemment  variable  et  uncertaine. 
He  then  adds: 
"Il  suffit,  A  I'heure  actuelle,  de  prononcer  le  mot  intervention  pour  provoquer,  chez 
beaucoup  de  spdcialistes  de  droit  international  un  sourire,  voir  un  froncement  de 
sourcilS.  "29 
In  my  opinion,  lawyers  who  think  that  there  is  a  great  confusion  in  the  definition  and  the 
law  of  intervention  are  generally  those  who  think  that  any  flat  prohibition  of  intervention 
in  whatever  form,  is  not  a  realistic  exercise  and  that  the  rule  of  non  -intervention  must  yield 
to  the  exigencies  of  the  real  international  life,  where  interventions  are  sometimes  welcomed, 
due  among  other  things,  to  the  inactivity  of  the  UN,  in  the  face  of  some  important 
problems.  They  maitain,  or  at  least,  a  portion  of  them  think,  that  it  is  imperative  to  review 
the  rule  of  non-  intervention  because  it  is  sometimes  in  contradiction  with  State  practice. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  talk  of  the  existence  of  a  great  confusion  in 
the  subject  of  intervention,  did  not  prevent  the  doctrine  from  attempting  at  formulating 
definitions  of  the  subject. 
Vattel  who  is  to  be  the  first  lawyer  who  tried  to  lay  down  the  theoretical  foundations  of 
non-intervention,  as  the  corner  stone  of  a  system  of  international  law,  which  is  based  on 
equal  sovereign  members,  in  his  view,  non-intervention  is  the  logical  consequence  of 
freedom,  it  indicated  that  all  States  have  the  full  right  to  govern  themselves  in  any  way  they 
choose.  No  third  party  can  intervene  in  such  a  process.  30 
This  means  in  my  opinion  that  intervention  is  principally  forbidden  in  whatever  form, 
the  reason  used  by  Vattel  is  that  States  are  like  persons.  They  are  obliged  to  refrain  from 
doing  anything  to  each  other  even  for  a  supposed  good.  31 
However,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  in  the  era  before  the  UN  and  even  after  the  UN  at  least 
for  some  Western  lawyers,  the  element  of  coercion  and  the  use  of  force  have  played  a 
significant  role  in  defining  some  actions  of  States  as  interventions,  which  means  that  all 
forms  which  do  not  involve  military  force  were  considered  not  constituting  interventions. 
Winfield  typifies  this  trend  when  he  states: 
'70p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  4,  p.  127. 
28 
Supra.  n.  23,  p.  611. 
29  Jbid,  p.  612. 
30 
OP.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1,  n.  9,  p.  297. 
311n 
this  context,  Carty  stresses  that  Vattet  "drew  upon  a  tradition  of  natural  law  which  especially 
rejected  the  possibility  that  any  individual  could  enjoy  a  divine  or  natural  authority  over  another", 
COp.  cit..  supra.  chapter  1,  n.  103,  p.  89). 
71 *As  to  the  amount  of  meddling  necessary  to  constitute  intervention,  there  must  be 
compulsion  or  the  threat  thereof,  and  the  threat  is  to  be  understood  as  a  direct  or 
indirect  request  by  one  State  to  the  parties  or  one  party  in  the  context  to  do  or  refrain 
from  doing  something  upon  pain  of  violence"32 
He  accepts  the  view  of  Westlake  that  tender  of  advice  may  be  injudious,  but  it  is  not 
intervention,  he  suggests  that  such  advice  may  be  treated  as  a  'pacific  intervention'.  Also 
to  him  bloodshed  is  undesirable  but  it  is  an  inevitable  incident.  Lawrence  is  even  more 
explicit,  he  writes: 
*There  can  be  no  intervention  without  on  one  hand,  the  presence  of  force  naked  or 
veiled,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  absence  of  the  consent  on  the  part  of  both  the 
combatants".  33 
This  means  that  other  acts  which  do  not  involve  force,  are  not  to  be  seen  as  constituting 
intervention.  Stowell  on  the  other  hand,  observes  that: 
"Depuis  longtemps  dijä,  le  mot  d'intervention  est  employ6  dans  les  affaires 
internationales  pour  designer  le  recours  ä  des  misures  de  force,  soit  sous  forme  de 
menace,  en  vue  d'obtenir  que  les  autres  Etats  adoptent  une  certain  ligne  de  conduite, 
ou  de  mettre  fin  ä  des  hostilitis  ou  autres  activit8s  indisirableS«.  34 
For  Hall,  intervention  is  'not  a  means  of  obtaining  redress  for  a  wrong  done,  but  a  measure 
of  prevention  or  of  police,  undertaken  sometimes  for  the  express  purpose  of  avoiding 
35  war'.  Intervention  is  then  viewed  as  a  'surgical  operation'  its  goal  is  to  oblige  the  victim 
to  do  or  to  refrain  from  doing  some  particular  action. 
It  is  very  easy  to  infer  from  these  definitions  that  intervention  will  be  used  in  practice 
only  by  powerful  nations,  since  no  small  power  can  oblige  a  strong  State  to  do  or  refrain 
from  doing  a  particular  action.  Moreover,  we  can  infer  that  the  powers  which  resort  to 
intervention  are  the  final  judges  in  deciding  whether  to  intervene  or  not.  In  this  respect, 
Winfield  cites  the  examples  of  France  sending  naval  forces  to  Korea  in  1866,  the  reason  was 
the  murder  of  a  French  vicar,  also  in  1838  France  intervened  in  Argentina,  by  instituting 
32  Supra.  n.  30,  p.  140. 
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72 a  blockade  on  the  coast  of  Buenos  Aires,  the  reason  being  the  'unjust  imprisonment  of  two 
French  subjects'  and  because  six  other  French  subjects  have  been  obliged  to  serve  in  the 
native  army. 
Oppenheim  gives  a  definition  which  is  often  quoted  as  reflecting  the  view  of  classical 
international  law  on  the  subject.  He  States: 
"...  [I]ntervention  is  dictatorial  interference  by  a  State  in  the  affairs  of  another  State 
for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  or  altering  the  actual  conditions  of  things".  36 
The  word  'dictatorial'  has  been  interpreted  as  meaning  first  that  the  intervening  State  acts 
without  being  invited  by  the  target  State.  Secondly,  that  the  intervening  State  uses  the 
threat  or  use  of  force.  He  stresses  that  intervention  in  order  to  be  forbidden  by  international 
law  '...  must  be  always  dictatorial,  not  interference  pure  and  simple'37  which  means  that 
other  forms  are  legal  in  principle.  Oppenheim's  definition  which  is  used  as  a  standard 
definition  of  classical  international  law,  has  been  attacked  by  Moore,  who  after  quoting  the 
definition  observed: 
"Such  definitions  are  by  themselves  so  devoid  of  content  that  any  real  meaning  they 
convey  is  little  more  than  pseudo  -knowledge  comparable  t  saying  that  sleeping  pills 
put  one  to  sleep  because  they  contain  a  dormative  agent".? 
ý 
This  remark  enters  in  the  whole  policy  of  the  school  of  policy  oriented  approach,  which 
stresses  that  any  simplistic  definition,  will  not  cover  the  complex  nature  of  the  phenomenon 
of  intervention. 
The  conclusion  is  that  intervention,  from  Vattel  onwards  has  been  seen  as  violation  of  the 
sovereignty  and  independence  of  the  State  against  which  it  is  used.  This  is  a  very  important 
result  for  international  law,  and  the  survival  of  the  international  system  as  a  whole.  It 
means,  at  least  theoretically,  that  States  aspire  for  a  more  orderly  world,  where  the  strong 
has  some  limits  which  must  be  respected  in  his  relationships  with  the  weaker  members  of 
the  international  community,  non  -intervention  excludes  by  its  nature  any  state  of  nature 
approach  to  international  relations. 
On  the  negative  side,  the  concrete  definitions  of  intervention,  did  not  adhere  completely 
to  the  declared  general  principle  of  non-  intervention  advocated  by  Vattel  and  others. 
They  defined  the  prohibited  intervention,  as  that  which  contains  the  elements  of  coercion 
and  force,  thus  other  forms  which  were  widespread  (such  as  economic  and  diplomatic 
interventions)  and  even  more  dangerous  were  not  considered  to  be  worthy  of  prohibition. 
State  practice  is,  in  fact,  in  many  respects,  opposite  to  the  general  principle  (of  non- 
intervention)  and  even  to  the  definitions  of  the  prohibited  intervention  suggested  by 
lawyers.  Thus,  the  Holy  Alliance,  considered  intervention  by  whatever  means  against  any 
36 
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73 rising  against  Monarchy  in  Europe  as  legitimate  and  acted  upon  that  premise  in  many 
instances. 
The  US  intervened  extensively  in  central  and  Latin  America  essentially  for  the  protection 
of  economic  interests  of  its  subjects  in  the  area. 
European  powerful  nations  also  intervened  extensively  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Asian  and 
African  States  and  communities,  the  flagrant  examples  are  the  repeated  interests  of 
different  European  powers  in  the  ottoman  Empire,  which  led  to  its  eventual  disintegration, 
also  the  intervention  of  France  and  then  Britain  in  Egypt,  and  the  intervention  of  France 
in  Tunisia  and  Morocco. 
This  state  of  affairs  leads  me  to  conclude  that  non-intervention  was  basically  derived  from 
natural  law  and  the  logic  of  State  sovereignty,  rather  than  State  practice. 
C.  The  Position  of  Intervention  after  the  Charter 
There  are  in  general  two  currents,  concerning  what  intervention  includes  and  whether  there 
are  exceptions  to  the  rule  of  non-  intervention  in  contemporary  international  law.  The  first 
view  holds  that  the  situation  after  the  Charter,  has  changed  dramatically  for  the  legal 
position  of  the  principle  of  non-intervention. 
Thus,  when  reading  closely  Articles  2/4  and  2/7  of  the  UN  Charter  together  with  the 
legal  stock  of  treaties,  Charters  and  resolutions  condemning  intervention  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  other  States,  the  result  is  clear.  the  principle  (of  non-  intervention)  has  been 
strengthened,  the  rule  is  absolute,  no  exceptions  can  be  admitted. 
Moreover,  according  to  this  view  intervention  has  been  defined  in  a  way  that  it  does  not 
cover  only  coercive  intervention,  but  any  other  form  of  intervention  such  as  economic, 
diplomatic  and  ideological  interventions. 
This  view  is  held  generally  by  the  victims  of  intervention  in  the  past  and  in  the  present 
(Third  World  States)  and  by  socialist  States.  However,  for  the  Soviets  the  principle  of  non- 
intervention  is  adhered  to  and  insisted  upon  in  the  relations  with  the  non-socialist  world,  39 
but  with  socialist  States,  the  principle  of  'proletarian  internationalism'  is  the  rule.  This  rule 
in  practice  meant  that  Socialist  States  can  intervene  in  any  socialist  State,  whenever 
socialism  is  threatened.  The  Brezhnev  Doctrine  is  a  concrete  example  of  such  an 
interpretation. 
According  to  that  doctrine  'the  sovereignty  of  each  socialist  State  country  cannot  be 
opposed  to  the  interests  of  the  world  of  socialism  and  of  the  world  revolutionary 
movement,,  40  which  means  that  any  antisocialist  move,  even  by  the  legal  Government  let 
alone  by  antiGovernment  forces,  will  be  crushed  mercilessly,  sovereignty  cannot  stop  such 
interventions.  In  this  context,  it  is  stated  that: 
"Naturally  the  Communists  of  the  fraternal  countries  could  not  allow  the  socialist 
States  to  be  inactive  in  the  name  of  an  abstractly  understood  sovereignty,  when  they 
39 
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74 saw  that  the  country  stood  in  the  peril  of  antisocialist  degeneration"41. 
In  other  words,  when  it  comes  to  the  sphere  of  influence,  non-intervention  is  impossible, 
socialism  overrides  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention.  However,  I  think  that  the  need  of  the 
Third  World  countries  for  non-  intervention,  is  more  or  less  genuine,  since  they  are  the  real 
target  of  intervention,  due  to  their  weakness  economically,  and  to  their  social  Problems, 
which  can  be  easily  exploited  by  outside  forces. 
The  second  view,  sees  with  scepticism  any  general  prohibition  of  intervention  in  whatever 
form.  They  see  such  an  approach  as  simplistic  and  unrealistic.  They  argue  for  the 
reformulation  of  the  rule  of  non  -intervention  in  order  to  open  the  door  for  exceptions, 
especially  since  the  premise  upon  which  the  prohibition  of  intervention  was  based,  has  not 
been  concretisised.  They  mention  as  an  example  the  deadlock  in  the  UNSC,  which  paralysed 
the  UN,  in  these  circumstances  they  claim  States  must  act  even  individually  and  intervene 
in  the  affairs  of  other  States. 
However,  I  think  the  central  question  on  the  conceptual  level,  is  whether  it  is  better  for 
international  law  and  the  international  community  of  States  to  have  a  flat  prohibition  of 
intervention  on  the  theoretical  and  normative  levels,  and  live  with  intervention  in  practice, 
where  the  rule  of  non-  intervention  is  breached  daily  on  one  hand,  or  on  the  other  hand 
we  must  open  on  the  normative  level  some  ways  for  legalising  certain  interventions.  This 
real  dilemma  makes  the  subject  of  intervention  a  very  serious  challenge  to  international  law 
and  its  future. 
In  this  context,  some  Western  lawyers,  especially  Americans  from  the  school  of  policy 
oriented  approach,  are  tireless  in  suggesting  that  the  approach  of  classical  and  some  modern 
lawyers,  and  also  the  practice  of  the  UN,  is  very  simplistic,  since  any  general  and  vague 
prohibitions  of  intervention,  is  simply  out  of  date,  since  it  does  not  face  to  what  is  going 
on  the  daily  life  of  States.  It  is  better,  in  their  view,  for  the  cause  of  international  law,  that 
the  treatment  of  the  subject  of  intervention  must  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  sophistication 
of  international  life,  with  all  its  different  phenomenon,  and  the  needs  of  the  international 
order. 
To  me,  the  non-respect  of  the  rule  of  non-  intervention  by  especially  strong  States  in  our 
contemporary  world,  does  not  mean  that  there  is  something  wrong  with  that  rule,  on  the 
contrary  there  must  be  something  wrong  with  the  policies  of  those  who  break  the  rule.  Since 
the  flat  prohibitions  of  intervention  in  all  its  different  forms,  is  very  essential  for  keeping 
a  minimum  world  order,  in  a  society  which  lacks  an  effective  central  institution,  which  has 
the  means  of  suppressing  any  breach  of  the  rule. 
Turning  now  to  some  actual  definitions  of  intervention  which  have  been  advanced  in  the 
era  of  the  Charter,  two  trends  can  be  distinguished,  the  first  advocates  an  extended  notion 
of  activities  considered  to  be  intervention  and  thus  contrary  to  international  law.  This  is  the 
doctrine  held  by  Third  World  and  socialist  States. 
The  second  trend  held  by  especially  some  Western  lawyers  and  by  Western  States  stressed 
that  the  term  is  still  even  in  the  era  of  the  Charter  'ambiguous'  and  maintains  that  the  use 
41  lbid,  p.  191. 
75 or  threat  of  the  use  of  force,  is  still  the  main  condition  of  the  activity  to  be  labelled  as 
intervention,  and  some  of  them  (especially  from  the  school  of  policy  oriented  approach  such 
as  Moore)  even  advocate  that  in  some  circumstances  even  the  use  of  force  or  its  threat 
cannot  be  seen  as  intervention,  hence  illegal  when  undertaken  to  uphold  some  community 
values  such  as  human  rights  and  self-determination. 
An  example  of  the  first  trend,  Soviet  lawyers  advanced  some  definitions,  which  shed  some 
light  on  the  Soviet  view.  Thus  Tunkin  who  maintains  that  the  principle  of  peaceful 
coexistence  presupposes  the  existence  of  other  important  principles  of  international  among 
1.2  them  non  -interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  other  States,  wrote: 
"...  [T]he  principle  of  non  -interference  means  that  no  State  may  interf  re 
authoritatively  in  the  affairs  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  another  State".  4S 
It  seems  here  that  the  definition  is  restricted  by  the  word  'authoritative',  however,  another 
Soviet  scholar  was  very  specific,  to  him  non-  intervention  means: 
"...  [The]  inadmissibility  of  intervention  in  any  form  whatsoever.  Military  diplomatic 
economic  as  well  as  rendering  support  in  any  form  to  forces  waging  as  ruggle  on  the 
territory  of  foreign  State  to  overthrow  the  Government  of  the  latter". 
14 
This  definition,  it  seems,  covers  a  wide  range  of  activity  and  allows  no  exceptions.  A  recent 
Soviet  definition  of  intervention  reads  as  follows: 
"...  [I]ntervention  forcible  interference  by  one  or  several  States  into  the  internal  affairs 
of  another  State  or  States,  directed  against  their  territorial  integrity  or  political 
independence  or  otherwise  incompatible  with  the  aims  and  principles  of  the  UN 
Charter.  There  are  armed  economic  and  diplomatic  intervention  i.  e.  armed 
intervention  or  aggression  is  most  dangerous  to  the  cause  of  peace  and  to  the 
independence  of  a  country  which  has  become  the  object  of  encroachment".  45 
Although  'forcible'  interventions  are  singled  out  as  the  most  dangerous  ones,  other  forms 
of  intervention  are  nevertheless  prohibited.  Soviet  writers  are  keen  to  give  a  detailed 
examples  and  analysis  of  what  constitutes  every  form  of  intervention.  46 
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76 Third  World  countries  in  general  argue  for  a  simple,  flat  and  general  prohibition  of 
intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  any  State.  Intervention  in  their  view  covers  a  wide 
range  of  activities  which  may  compromise  the  political  independence  and  the  territorial 
integrity  of  any  State. 
Latin  American  States  were  as  from  the  19th  century  the  advocates  of  an  absolutist 
approach  to  the  question  of  prohibition  of  intervention  The  Calvo  doctrine  (1868)  and  later 
the  Drago  doctrine  (1902)  were  real  attempts  in  that  direction,  however,  in  the  20th  century 
the  Latin  American  States  succeeded  in  the  introduction  of  non-intervention  clause  in  some 
important  treaties.  The  1933  Montevedeo  Convention,  and  the  1936  Protocol  of  Buenos 
Aires  are  prime  examples. 
The  real  development,  however,  came  after  the  Second  World  War  and  after  the 
emancipation  of  a  large  number  of  African  and  Asian  countries.  The  cries  for  non- 
intervention,  and  the  need  for  a  very  extended  definition  of  the  concept  of  intervention 
were  advocated  forcefully.  The  practice  of  the  OAU,  the  Non-Aligned  movement  in  its 
different  conferences  is  very  rich  in  that  respect. 
For  Western  lawyers  and  Western  States  intervention  even  after  the  Charter  is  still  an 
ambiguous  term.  Thus,  Higgins  notedthat: 
"...  [I]t  is  apparent  that  intervention  can  mean  many  different  things  to  many  47  people"  . 
This  clearly  means  that  there  is  no  accepted  meaning  of  the  term  in  contemporary 
international  law.  The  explanations  for  such  state  of  affairs  lies  in  the  view  of  some 
lawyers,  in  the  fact  that  intervention  is  a  very  complicated  phenomenon,  which  makes  the 
task  of  its  definition  a  very  complicated  exercise.  48  Another  explanation  has  been  advanced 
by  Carty,  who  writes: 
* 
... 
[Non-  intervention]  is  stated  in  remarkably  absolute  terms,  that  no  State  has  any 
right  whatsoever  to  intervene  in  any  way  whatsoever  in  the  affairs  of  other  States. 
Yet  it  is  a  well-known  fact  interventions  are  a  persistent  feature  of  international 
relationS".  49 
In  other  words,  the  rift  between  the  principle  and  the  practice  of  States  in  the  domain  of 
intervention  stands  in  the  way  of  clarifying  the  real  meaning  and  limits  of  non-  intervention. 
Despite  the  above  observations  some  Western  lawyers  were  ready  to  advance  some 
definitions  of  intervention.  The  acts  mentioned  in  those  definitions  are  in  their  view  the 
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77 only  ones  covered  by  the  principle  of  non  -intervention. 
In  this  context,  a  very  important  number  of  lawyers  (Western)  still  follow  the  traditional 
view,  which  characterises  as  intervention  only  acts  which  involve  the  use  or  threat  of  the 
use  of  force.  Thus,  Brierly  stated  before  the  ILC  in  1949  that: 
"...  [H]e  felt  that  an  act  of  intervention  was  an  act  of  dictation  by  one  State  to  another 
with  regard  to  its  internal  or  external  policy  backed  by  the  use  or  threat  of  force, 
50  express  or  implied". 
He  then  emphasised  that  where  there  was  no  force  or  threat  of  force  any  action,  however, 
improper  or  unfriendly  could  not  be  qualified  as  intervention.  51 
Sanders  on  the  other  hand,  stressed  that: 
Wthough  international  law  does  not  provide  a  complete  answer  to  the  questions  of 
the  exact  scope  of  intervention,  there  appears  to  be  general  agreement  among 
publicists  that  intervention  is  dictatorial  or  arbitrary  interference  of  a  State,  acting 
on  its  own  individual  judgement,  in  the  affairs  of  another  State  for  the  Pvrpose  of 
maintaining  or  altering  the  actual  condition  of  things  in  the  latter  State.  ""' 
Similarly,  Lauterpacht  reached  the  conclusion  that: 
"['Intervene'  as  used  in  Article  2/7] 
...  can  only  be  taken  in  its  accepted  technical 
meaning,  as  denoting  dictational  mandatory  interference  intended  to  exercise  direct 
pressure  upon  the  State  concerned  but  not  action  by  way  of  discussion,  study,  inquiry 
and  recommendation  falling  short  of  intervention  proper".  53 
This  definition  largely  confirms  the  practice  of  the  UN,  it  relates  to  the  meaning  of 
intervention  between  the  organisation  and  its  members  but  it  seems  that  Lauterpacht  still 
adheres  to  the  view  that  in  relations  between  the  States  themselves,  intervention  must  be 
dictatorial  and  mandatory  in  order  to  be  prohibited. 
To  me,  all  these  views  reflect  the  position  of  the  stronger  unity  of  the  international 
society,  which  want  to  keep  a  large  number  of  activities  outside  the  scope  of  the  prohibition 
of  intervention.  Moreover,  the  adherents  to  the  policy-oriented  approach,  are  generally 
sceptical  about  strict  definitions  and  flat  prohibitions  of  the  phenomenon  of  intervention. 
Their  reason  is  that  any  such  exercise  would  be  unrealistic. 
Thus,  Falk  after  defining  intervention  as  a  term  which  is  used  'to  identify  any 
consequential  impact  that  the  actions  of  one  State  have  upon  the  events  in  another'.  54  This 
is,  in  fact,  a  broad  definition  of  intervention,  however,  Falk  insists  that  'it  is  highly 
doubtful  whether  it  is  desirable  to  commit  international  law  to  a  maximum  principle  of 
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whitemann,  OP.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1,  n.  8,  Vot.  5,  (1965).  p.  329. 
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cit.,  supra.  n.  20,  p.  237. 
54R.  Fatk:  United  States  Practice  and  the  Doctrine  of  Non-Intervention  in  the  Internat  Affairs  of 
Sovereign  States,  supra.  n.  48,  p.  156. 
78 non-intervention'. 
55  He  cites  instance  where  intervention  was,  in  his  words: 
;...  '[P]rompted  by  humanitarian  considerati  ns  that  one  can  condemn  only  by  waving 
SS6  oo  vigorously  the  banners  of  sovereignty  . 
It  is  obvious  that  here,  he  is  speaking  about  humanitarian  intervention  as  a  possible 
exception  to  the  rule  of  non-  intervention.  Sadly  humanitarian  intervention  has  never  been 
used  for  absolute  humanitarian  motives,  also  it  is  always  used  by  the  strong  against  the  weak 
and  never  the  opposite.  On  the  other  hand,  Higgins  notes  that: 
"The  purpose  of  the  international  law  doctrine  of  intervention  is,...  to  provide  an 
acceptable  balance  between  the  sovereign  equality  and  independence  of  States  on  the 
one  hand  and  the  reality  of  an  interdependent  world  and  the  international  law 
57  commitment  to  human  dignity  on  the  other"  . 
She  maintains  that  it  is  not  profitable  to  seek  a  definition  of  intervention.  She  gives  two 
reasons  for  that.  Firstly,  as  she  put  it: 
"...  [O]ne  cannot  indicate  a  particular  part  along  the  spectrum  and  assert  that 
everything  from  there  onwards  is  an  unlawful  intervention  and  everything  prior  to 
that  point  is  tolerable  interference,  and  one  of  the  things  we  put  up  with  in  an 
interdependent  world  1.58 
Thus,  she  is  using  the  usual  argument  that  certain  cases  and  instances  of  intervention  are 
quite  normal  exercises  in  the  daily  intercourse  of  nations,  and  sovereignty  has  to  be  limited 
in  order  to  absorb  these  interventions  and  accept  them  as  a  necessary  consequence  of  living 
in  the  world  today.  Secondly,  she  stresses  that: 
"...  [T]he  term  intervention  only  has  a  meaning  measured  against  the  question 
'intervention  against  what?  '  and  the  answer  has  to  be  'intervention  against  a  State 
domestic  jurisdiction".  That  is  intrusion  upon  that  which  is  for  a  State  alone".  59 
However,  since  the  constituent  elements  of  'domestic  jurisdiction'  is  a  relative  matter  as 
the  PCIJ  has  indicated  in  the  Tunisia  and  Morocco  Nationality  Decrees  Advisory  ODInlon. 
This  will  mean  that  the  area  of  unlawful  and  lawful  intervention,  and  also  what  constitutes 
intervention,  are  questions  which  are  changing  with  the  development  of  international  law 
and  international  relations,  which  indicates  that  there  is  a  real  impossibility  of  giving  a  clear 
definition  of  intervention,  and  by  consequence  any  attempt  toward  such  definition  is 
unrealistic. 
The  practice  of  Western  Governments  in  general  is  against  extended  definition  of 
intervention  and  its  flat  condemnation.  Thus  those  States  were  generally  hostile  to  the 
550P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  48,  p.  160. 
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79 approach  of  the  Friendly  Resolution  to  intervention,  that  resolution  in  fact,  states  that: 
"No  State  or  group  of  States  has  the  right  to  intervene  directly  or  indirectly  for  any 
reason  whatsoever,  in  the  internal  or  external  affairs  of  any  other  State". 
In  their  (Western  States)  view,  such  approach  is  very  rigid  since,  it  condemns 
indiscriminently  even  innocent  actions  of  States,  and  turns  any  gesture  into  'intervention'. 
Thus,  in  the  last  meeting  (I  14th)  of  the  1970  Friendly  Relations  Special  Committee,  Sir  Ian 
Sinclair,  the  UK  representative  stated  the  prevailing  view  of  the  Western  delegates.  He 
noted: 
"In  considering  the  scope  of  'intervention'  it  should  be  Tecognised  that  in  an 
interdependent  world,  it  is  inevitable  and  desirable  that  States  will  be  concerned  with 
and  will  seek  to  influence  the  actions  and  policies  of  other  States,  and  that  the 
objective  of  international  law  is  not  to  prevent  such  activity  but  rather  to  ensure  that 
,,  60  it  is  compatible  with  the  sovereign  equality  and  self-determination  of  their  peoples. 
Similarly,  Sir  Kenneth  Baily  attacked  Resolution  2131  on  non  -intervention  in  the  following 
terms: 
"The  language  of  that  resolution  was  so  wide  that,  in  its  ordinary  meaning,  it  would 
prohibit  not  only  all  normal  practice  of  diplomacy  but  every  type  of  endeavour  to 
influence  other  Governments  by  negotiation:  and  we  thought  to  be  dangerous  as  well 
as  silly".  61 
To  me,  this  is  the  view  of  the  strong  powers,  who  possess  the  real  means  of  influencing  the 
actions  and  policies  of  other  States,  but  for  the  weak  members  of  the  international 
community  extended  definition  and  flat  prohibitions  of  intervention  are  better.  They  will 
benefit  from  them  at  least  in  the  war  of  rhetoric  for  the  hearts  and  minds  of  the  public 
opinion,  which  can  in  some  cases  deter  the  stronger  States  from  engaging  in  certain 
interventions. 
The  conclusion  is  that  there  is  a  general  consensus  that  non-intervention  is  a  fundamental 
pillar  of  international  relations,  and  it  is  the  natural  consequence  of  State  sovereignty. 
The  difference  of  opinion,  it  seems,  lies  in  what  constitutes  intervention  and  whether 
there  are  any  limits  or  exceptions  to  the  principle.  Western  doctrine  and  State  practice  in 
the  name  of  realism,  stresses  that  it  is  impossible  to  include  everything  in  the  definition  of 
intervention.  Some  instances  of  intervention  are  either  part  of  the  daily  practice  of  States 
or  are  desirable  in  some  instances  such  as  humanitarian  intervention.  In  this  way  they  are 
relativists  in  their  approach  to  the  problem  of  definition  and  prohibition  of  intervention. 
On  the  other  hand,  Third  World  and  Socialist  States  seem  to  advocate  an  absolutist  stand 
to  them  interventions  must  be  defined  in  a  very  broad  way  to  include  all  acts  that  might 
endanger  directly  or  indirectly  the  political  independence,  security  and  the  territorial 
integrity  of  States. 
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80 Section  III:  Intervention  In  Civil  Wars 
In  the  last  section,  I  dealt  with  the  concept  of  non-  intervention  in  general  its  meaning  and 
limits.  In  this  section,  I  will  concentrate  on  the  very  important  question  of  intervention  in 
civil  wars.  It  must  be  stressed  that  internal  upheavals,  among  them  civil  wars  '...  ont  W  la 
cause  ou  au  moins  le  pretexte  de  presque  toutes  les  intervention  enregisterdes  par 
I'histoire'62  as  Rougier  notes.  In  fact,  the  situation  is  still  the  same  even  in  our 
contemporary  world. 
A.  The  Position  In  Traditional  International  Law 
In  general,  traditional  international  law  places  respect  for  the  sovereignty  of  State  as  its 
most  important  task.  Consequently,  it  favoured  and  guaranteed  the  status  quo  inside  the 
State.  The  golden  rule  was  that  assistance  to  the  established  Government  is  legal,  whereas 
any  aid  to  the  insurgents  is  illegal. 
However  when  the  recognition  of  belligerency  is  established,  the  rules  of  neutrality  apply 
in  the  relation  between  the  two  belligerent  and  third  States.  The  latter  has  to  abstain  from 
any  direct  or  indirect  assistance  to  either  party  in  the  civil  war.  The  1928  Havana  treaty  on 
rights  and  duties  of  States  in  the  event  of  civil  strife  is  seen  as  a  correct  codification  of 
customary  international  law  on  the  subject,  Article  1/3  stipulates: 
"...  [T]o  forbid  the  traffic  in  army  and  war  material  except  when  Intended  for  the 
Government,  while  the  belligerency  of  the  rebels  has  not  been  recognised,  in  which 
latter  case  the  rules  of  neutrality  applied.  "63 
Likewise,  the  ILA  at  its  1900  session  at  Neuchatel  emphasised  in  Article  2/2  of  its 
'r6glement'  that: 
"Elle  [tierce  puissance]  est  astreint  A  ne  fournir  aux  insurg6s  ni  armes,  ni  munitions, 
ni  effects  militaires,  ni  subsideS".  64 
Although,  State  practice  is  not  always  consistent,  since  politics  and  interests  play  a  major 
element  in  their  calculations,  reveals  many  instances  of  interventions  of  third  States  on  the 
side  of  the  established  Government  and  a  denial  of  assistance  to  insurgents.  Thus,  in  1912 
and  1922  the  US  Congress  enacted  resolutions  which  allowed  the  President  to  impose 
embargoes  on  the  shipment  of  arms  from  the  US  to  Latin  America  and  China,  whenever  he 
has  reason  to  believe  that  they  are  likely  to  be  used  to  promote  domestic  violence. 
Borchard  observes  that  the  US  has  respected  the  rule  during  the  Cuban  Insurrections 
(1868-1878  and  1895-1898)  and  emphasises  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  American  Civil 
War,  several  of  the  important  arsenals  were  located  in  the  South  '...  had  England  or  any  other 
foreign  country  undertaken  to  embargo  arms  to  both  the  North  and  South,  the  North  might 
62A. 
Rougier:  Les  querres  civites  at  te  drolt  des  gens.  L.  Larose,  Paris,  1903,  p.  350. 
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D.  Schindter  and  J.  Toman  (eds.  ):  The  Laws  of  Armed  ConfLicts.  2rd  ed.  rev.  &  compLeted.  Slithoff 
&  Moordhoff,  Atphen  aan  den  Rigin,  1981,  pp.  805-806. 
64  Cited  by  D.  Schindter  In  his  Rapport  provisoire:  Le  principe  de  non-intervention  dans  tes  guerres 
civftes.  55  AIDI,  1973,  p.  477. 
81 65 
easily  have  lost  the  Civil  War'. 
Simirlarly,  during  the  19th  century  Britain  assisted  the  Portuguese  throne  when  it  was 
challenged.  Europe  sided  with  the  Ottoman  Sultan  against  the  Egyptian  Revolt  in  1840,  also 
France,  Russia,  Prussia  and  Austria  responded  to  the  appeal  of  the  King  of  the  Netherlands, 
whose  Belgian  subjects  had  declared  themselves  independent.  66 
During  the  Spanish  Civil  War  the  assistance  given  by  Germany,  Italy  and  to  a  lesser 
extent  by  Portugal  to  the  rebel  forces,  has  been  generally  seen  by  international  lawyers  as 
against  international  law.  Garner  argued  in  1937  that: 
"...  [T]he  Government  of  Spain,  for  the  overthrow  of  which  this  aid  was  intended  was  the 
established  legitimate  overnment  of  the  country  whatever  might  be  said  in  criticism  of  its 
character  or  policies" 
He  then  adds: 
"Juridically,  therefore,  the  aid  furnished  by  the  three  powers  mentioned  to  the  rebels 
arrayed  against  the  Spanish  Government  was  an  act  of  intervention  of  the  kind  which 
cannot  be  justified  on  the  ground  of  self-preservation,  protection  of  nationals  or  any 
other  reasons  commonly  recognised  as  justifying  intervention  by  one  State  in  the 
"68  internal  affairs  of  another  State. 
Indeed,  the  whole  policy  of  non-  intervention  instituted  after  the  outbreak  of  the  Spanish 
Civil  War  (for  some  obvious  political  and  ideological  reasons  by  France  and  Britain  and 
many  other  countries),  was  never  accepted  by  the  Spanish  Government  as  reflecting  the  true 
stand  of  international  law  on  the  question,  and  it  always  insisted  on  its  right  under  that  law 
to  request  and  receive  aid  alone,  since  it  is  the  only  legal  Government.  69 
In  my  view,  the  traditional  rule  was  in  effect  a  logical  consequence  of  the  principle  of 
sovereignty.  The  latter  gives  the  established  Government  the  right  to  exercise  in  full  its 
sovereign  powers,  and  among  them  without  any  doubt  to  request  assistance  from  third  States 
65  E.  Borchard:  Neutratity  and  Civit  War.  31  AJIL,  1937,  p.  306. 
66  See  Ch.  Zorgbib6:  La  guerre  civiLe.  PUF,  1975,  p.  64. 
67j  W.  Garner:  Questions  of  Internationat  Law  in  the  Spanish  Civit  War.  31  AJIL,  1937,  p.  67.  The 
writer  defines  the  term  Itegitimate  government'  as  'one  which  had  been  set  up  in  conformity  with  the 
constitution  and  the  taws  of  the  country  and  as  a  resutt  of  the  free  potiticat  etections'.  (p.  67). 
68  Ibid. 
69  Thus,  on  May  13th,  1938,  when  the  Spanish  Question  was  discussed  by  the  Councit  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  the  Foreign  Minister  of  Spain  addressed  the  British  and  French  deLegates  in  these  terms: 
"  ...  (11f  irrespective  of  the  AngLo-ItaLian  agreement,  Italy  and  Germany  continue  to  intervene 
in  Spain,  and  neither  France  nor  UK  undertake  to  prevent  this  continued  intervention,  in  the 
rk-ww  of  what  morality  and  justice  can  you  go  on  depriving  the  legal  Spanish  Government  of  its 
rights  under  international  law". 
Spain  in  fact  submitted  to  that  meeting  a  Draft  Resotution  which  wouLd  invite  the  League  member 
States: 
"...  ET)o  envisage  as  from  the  moment  the  end  of  the  policy  of  non-intervention". 
The  Resotution  was,  however.  rejected  by  the  Councit  of  the  League  of  Nations.  Keesing's,  1937-40, 
May  15,1938,  p.  3467. 
82 when  its  survival  is  at  stake. 
However,  it  must  be  mentioned  that  even  in  the  era  of  the  UN  Charter  the  classical  rule 
has  been  invoked  and  used  by  States,  indeed  most  of  the  interventions  after  the  UN  Charter 
in  cases  of  civil  wars  or  internal  disorders  have  been  justified  on  the  ground  of  the  request 
of  the  legal  Government.  Brownlie  noted  in  this  respect  that: 
"...  [T]here  can  be  little  doubt  that  this  type  of  intervention  (intervention  by  request 
or  consent)  is  compatible  with  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations.  The  provisions,  of 
the  Charter  do  not  contain  any  provisions  related  to  the  question  and  the  legality  of 
such  intervention  flows  from  major  principles  of  general  international  law:  the 
principle  of  consent  and  the  legal  personality  of  the  State  producing  the  request  for, 
70  or  consent  to  intervention". 
In  this  context,  Britain  justified  its  interventions  in  Jordan  in  19587,  in  Muscat  and  Oman 
in  195772  on  the  ground  of  request  by  the  established  Government,  France  did  the  same  in 
its  frequent  interventions  in  Black  Africa  and  the  US  in  its  many  interventions  in  Latin 
America  (Guatemala  1960,  Dominican  Republic  1961,  Nicaragua  1960  and  now  in  El- 
Salvador).  73  Also  in  Lebanon  in  1959  and  especially  in  Vietnam  in  the  1960s.  74  The  Soviet 
Union  has  done  the  same  in  Hungary  in  195675  and  lately  in  Afghanistan.  76 
70  1.  Brownlie:  The  UN  Charter  and  the  Use  of  Force,  in  A.  Cassesse,  (ed.  ),  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter 
1,  n.  195,  p.  501. 
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Thus,  on  July  17th,  1958  the  British  PM,  H.  Macmillan  informed  the  House  of  Commons  that  HM 
Government,  has  on  July  16th,  1958  received  a  request  from  the  King  of  Jordan  and  his  PM  for  immediate 
dispatch  of  British  Forces  to  Jordan  since  their  country  was  faced  with  an  imminent  attempt  by  the 
United  Arab  Republic  to  create  internal  disorder  and  overthrow  the  existing  regime.  The  British  PM 
stressed  that  his  Government  has  accepted  the  offer  to  send  troops  to  Jordan.  He  added  that  the 
purpose  of  this  military  assistance  was  'to  stabitise  the  situation  In  Jordan  by  helping  the  Jordanian 
Government  to  resist  aggression  and  threats  to  the  integrity  and  independence  of  their  country'. 
Supra.  n.  50,  p.  517. 
72 
Thus,  in  HM  Queen  Elizabeth  It  speech  on  January  Ist,  1957,  the  Parliament  that  in  view  of  the 
tong-standing  ties  of  friendship  between  Muscat  and  Oman  and  the  UK,  my  Government  took  prompt  actf  on 
in  response  to  a  request  from  the  Suttan  for  armed  assistance  In  quelling  rebellion  in  his  Dominions, 
etc.,.  Supra.  n.  50,  p.  517. 
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op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  50,  pp.  534-5. 
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Thus,  the  Memorandum  of  the  US  Dept.  of  State  on  the  Legal  basis  for  US  actions  against  North 
Vietnam  of  March  8th,  1965  states: 
"We  had  been  providing  Vietnam  since  1950-51  with  both  economic  and  military  aid.  This 
assistance  was  continued  after  the  conclusion  of  the  1954  Geneva  Accords,  within  Limitations 
prescribed  by  those  agreements.  It  had  become  apparent,  however,  by  1961  that  this  limited 
assistance  was  not  sufficient  to  meet  the  growing  Communist  threat.  Consequently  in  1961,  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  requested  additional  aid  from  the  US.  The  US  responded 
with  increased  supplies  and  with  a  larger  numbers  of  training  and  advisory  personeL  to  assist 
the  Vietnamese  Forces  In  prosecuting  the  war  against  the  Viet  Cong.  This  response  was 
proportionate  with  the  design  of  sustaining  Vietnam  in  its  defense  against  aggression  without 
extending  the  conflict  beyond  the  borders  of  the  country". 
US  Senators  Ernest  Grevening  and  Herbert  Witton  Beaser:  Vietnam  Folty,  The  Nationat  Press  Inc., 
Washington  D.  C.,  1968,  pp.  570-571. 
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In  this  case,  the  USSR  always  claims  that  its  assistance  was  requested  by  the  legaL  Government  in 
conformity  with  the  Warsaw  Treaty  of  1955.  For  further  details,  see  supra.  n.  50,  pp.  667-76. 
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In  this  context,  on  December  28th,  1979,  the  Afghan  Government  issued  a  statement  which  read  as 
foltows: 
83 B.  Evaluation  of  the  Traditional  Rule 
Three  schools  of  thought  are  against  the  traditional  rule,  to  some  it  simply  does  not 
represent  a  true  statement  of  State  practice  and  that  on  the  theoretical  level  it  is  in  flagrant 
contradictions  with  the  spirit  of  the  principle  of  non-  intervention. 
To  others  the  rule  is  not  just,  since  justice  implies  that  both  sides  must  be  treated  alike 
and  third  States  should  be  free  to  choose  to  which  side  their  assistance  will  go  to,  and 
finally  a  third  school  stress  that  the  search  for  a  single  norm  to  regulate  the  complex  issue 
of  intervention  in  civil  wars  is  simply  a  meaningless  exercise. 
1.  The  First  School:  the  Absolutist  School 
This  school  advocates  a  strict  adherence  to  the  rule  of  non-intervention,  the  rule  in  their 
view  is  against  unilateral  intervention  on  any  side,  the  legal  Government  included. 
According  to  this  view  the  legal  Government  is  entitled  to  request  and  receive  assistance 
from  third  parties  in  times  of  peace  only,  however,  in  times  of  internal  disorders  the 
Government  has  to  be  let  alone  to  deal  with  the  situation. 
The  reasons  advanced  to  justify  this  stand,  differ  from  lawyer  to  lawyer,  however, 
examples  include: 
1.  The  absence  of  effective  control  by  the  established  Government  over  its  territory  and 
population. 
2.  Lack  of  legitimacy  of  the  established  Government. 
3.  Its  lack  of  representativity. 
4.  Assistance  is  against  the  right  to  self-determination  and  social  change  and  lastly  the 
uncertainty  of  the  outcome. 
Hall  was  the  first  lawyer  who  advocated  such  an  absolutist  view,  he  exposed  his  opinion 
in  a  well-known  passage: 
"Supposing  to  be  directed  against  the  existing  Government,  independence  is  violated 
by  an  attempt  to  prevent  the  regular  organs  of  the  State  from  managing  the  State 
affairs  in  its  own  way.  Supposing  on  the  other  hand,  to  be  directed  against  the  rebels, 
the  fact  that  it  has  been  necessary  to  call  in  foreign  help  is  enough  to  show  that  the 
issue  of  the  conflict  would  without  it  be  uncertain,  and  consequently  that  there  is  a 
doubt  as  to  which  side  would  ultimately  establish  itself  as  the  legal  representative  of 
"The  government  of  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Afghanistan  taking  into  account  the  continuing 
and  broadening  interference  and  provocations  of  external  enemies  of  Afghanistan,  and  with  a 
view  to  defending  the  gains  of  the  April  Revolution  [of  19783,  territorial  integrity  and 
national  Independence,  and  maintaining  peace  and  security,  proceeding  from  the  treaty  of 
Friendship,  Good-  Nei  ghbour  t  iness  and  Cooperation  of  December  5th,  1978,  has  approached  the  USSR 
with  the  insistent  request  to  give  urgent  political,  moral  and  economic  aid,  Including  military 
aid,  which  the  Government  of  the  Democratic  of  the  Republic  of  Afghanistan  repeatedly  requested 
from  the  Government  of  the  Soviet  Union.  The  Government  of  the  Soviet  Union  has  met  the  request 
of  the  Afghan  side". 
Moreover,  in  a  statement  published  by  Pravda,  President  Brezhnev  stressed  that: 
Me  increasing  armed  intervention,  the  wett-advanced  ptot  by  externat  forces  of  reaction, 
created  a  reat  threat  that  Afghanistan  woutd  toose  its  independence  and  be  turned  into  an 
faiperiatfst  miLftarybrfdgeheadonour  country's  southernborder.  Inother  words,  the  time  came 
when  we  coutd  not  but  respond  to  the  request  of  the  Government  of  friendty  Afghanistan.  To  have 
acted  otherwise  woutd  have  meant  leaving  Afghanistan  a  prey  to  imperiaLism,  etc.  @, 
26  Keesing's,  1980,  pp.  30229-30236. 
84 the  State".  77 
He  then  adds: 
"If  intervention  is  based  upon  an  opinion  as  to  the  merits  of  the  question  at  issue  the 
intervening  State  takes  upon  itself  to  pass  judgement  on  a  matter  which  having 
nothing  to  do  with  the  relations  of  States,  must  be  regarded  as  being  for  legal 
purposes  beyond  the  range  of  its  visionm.  78 
It  is  clear  that  Hall,  advocates  an  absolutist  non-  intervention  rule,  as  from  the  moment  the 
insurrection  began  and  here  he  differs  from  the  traditional  view,  which  institutes  neutrality 
only  from  the  moment  of  the  recognition  of  belligerency.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  some 
distinguished  international  lawyers  still  even  in  the  era  of  the  Charter  advocate  Hall's  view, 
among  them  Wright,  Chaumont  and  Friedmann. 
In  this  context,  Wright  after  observing  that  Hall's  view  is  the  predominant  one,  which 
implies  that  he  does  not  consider  the  traditional  rule  as  the  correct  statement  of  customary 
law,  develops  another  argument  to  justify  his  position  in  advocating  abstention  of  assistance 
to  either  side,  he  states: 
"It  clearly  belongs  to  the  sovereignty  of  a  State,  as  recognised  by  the  Charter,  to  ask 
for  help,  but  it  must  be  emphasised  that  sovereignty  belongs  to  the  State  and  not  to 
the  Government  and  a  Government  beset  by  internal  revolt  of  such  magnitude  that 
the  result  is  uncertain  is  not  in  the  position  to  speak  for  the  State".  79 
Thus,  the  criteria  of  the  lack  of  representative  coupled  with  the  uncertainty  of  the  result 
of  the  context  are  the  prime  reasons  for  pursuing  a  full  policy  of  non  -intervention. 
Chaumont  on  the  other  hand  develops  the  argument  of  self-determination  as  basis  for 
non-  intervention  on  either  side  in  civil  wars,  80  whereas  Friedmann  after  reviewing  the 
77  W.  E.  Hatt:  A  Treatise  on  International  Law.  8th  ed..  Oxford,  1924,  p.  347. 
781bid. 
79.0. 
Wright:  US  Intervention  in  Lebanon.  53  AJIL,  1959,  p.  122.  SfmiLarly,  in  another  article,  he 
stressed  that: 
W.  -  JT3he  handling  of  insurection,  rebellion,  cIvf  I  strife,  or  other  forms  of  Internal  violence 
Is  presumed  to  be  within  the  domestic  jurisdictions  of  the  State,  and  that  neither  a  foreign 
State  nor  the  UN  can  intervene  to  suppress  It,  even  on  the  invitation  of  the  Government,  in 
case  the  revolution  is  so  serious  that  the  result  Is  uncertain,  etc". 
op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  50,  p.  462. 
BoHe 
writes: 
"  lie  droit  d'un  Etat  de  choisir  son  systbmelentraine  dans  te  droit  international 
conteffporain,  Pobtigation  pour  tes  tiers  de  taisser  te  people  de  cet  Etat  rigter  tui-ff&*  tes 
qui  s4t6vent  en  son  sein  en  ce  sens  que  ta  position  du  gouvernement  6tablie 
West  jý-r-Gi-icp7iýent  ni  memeure.  ni  plus  mauvalse,  vis-h-vis  des  tiers,  que  ceLLe  des 
insurg6s". 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1,  n.  48,  p.  406.  Moreover,  in  his  observations  on  the  Rapport  provisoire, 
"Concerning  Non-Intervention  in  Civil,  Wars"  prepared  by  SchindLer,  Chaumont  stated  that: 
"Soutenir  de  tlext6rfeur  un  governement  contest6  par  ta  vlotence  revient  tout  come  te  soutien 
des  insurgis  &  prendre  parti  clans  cette  contestation  et  par  suite  estimer  ing6rence  dans  tes 
affafres  Intdrfeures  d'un  Etat". 
85 different  attitudes  towards  intervention  in  civil  wars  makes  the  statement  that  "what  on 
balance  favours  the  view  that  in  civil  war  the  two  sides  are  to  be  treated  on  a  par,  is  the 
consideration  that  international  law  should  not  be  used  to  prevent  social  change.  "81 
Implicitly  then,  the  proposition  is  if  social  change  has  to  take  place  and  pursue  its  natural 
course,  abstentions  from  assisting  any  side  is  the  correct  measure  to  follow  for  third  States. 
However,  the  main  criticism  of  the  neutrality  argument,  is  that  it  is  very  idealistic,  since 
it  is  very  hard  to  be  concreticised  in  practice.  The  Spanish  Civil  War  is  a  case  in  point,  since 
the  policy  of  non-  intervention  has  been  violated  systematically  by  even  the  signatories  of 
the  non-  intervention  treaty.  82 
Similarly,  the  doctrine  can  be  said  to  go  against  the  spirit  of  the  system  of  international 
law,  which  favours  established  Government,  indeed  the  principle  of  sovereignty  goes  in  that 
direction.  Also  it  is  in  a  way  against  the  stand  of  the  UN,  which  does  not  prohibit  assistance 
to  peoples  struggling  for  self-determination  in  colonial,  racist  and  alien  domination 
situations.  83 
2.  The  Second  School:  Assistance  to  Both  Parties 
This  school  advocates  assistance  to  both  parties  of  the  internal  conflict,  States  are  free  to 
choose  which  party  their  assistance  is  to  go.  Vattel,  it  seems  is  the  father  of  such  stand,  he 
states: 
"Toutes  les  fois  donc  que  les  choses  en  viennent  &  une  guerre  civile,  les  puissances 
dtrangýres  peuvent  assister  celui  des  deux  parties,  qui  leur  parait  fond6  en  justice".  84 
It  is  the  justice  of  the  cause  of  the  internal  war  which  is  the  essential  element,  which  States 
have  to  take  into  account  when  giving  their  assistance.  However,  it  must  be  noted  that 
Vattel  who  champions  the  rule  of  non-  intervention  in  relations  between  States,  advocates 
such  a  stand,  because  to  him  civil  war  breaks  the  State  into  two  distinct  units,  which  for  all 
purposes  are  similar  to  two  States  and  thus  the  war  is  like  a  war  between  States,  and  third 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  64,  p.  530. 
81 
Friedmann,  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1,  n.  129,  p.  267. 
82 
Also,  in  the  Russian  Civil  War,  Britain  proclaimed  that  the  contest  was  a  purely  domestic  affair, 
whereas  in  practice  it  was  very  active  in  assisting  the  rebels.  See  for  det  a  its,  W.  P.  Coates  and  Zelda 
K.  Coates:  Armed  Interventf  on  fn  Russia  1918-1922.  London,  Victor  Got  lancz  Ltd.,  1935.  See  especial  ty, 
pp.  94-95  and  210. 
83 
In  this  context,  Shupinder  Singh  Chimni  criticised  the  absolutist  doctrine*  on  the  fol  Lowing  basis: 
"But  the  norm  (absolutist  norm)  has  been  set  out  in  a  mechanical  manner.  It  assumes  a  priori 
in  that  intervention  necessarily  interferes,  say,  with  the  right  of  self-determination.  This 
does  not  happen  to  be  true.  Moreover,  ft  overlooks  the  fact  that,  in  some  contexts  unf  lateral 
intervention  is  considered  permissible  by  the  international  community.  It  can  be  mentioned  that 
the  international  community  today  permits  assistance  to  peoples  struggling  for  self- 
determination  in  a  war  of  national  Liberation"  and  then  he  added  "therefore  the  presumption 
would  impair  the  legitimate  claims  of  people  struggling  for  self-determination.  The  absolute 
non-interventfonist  policy  demonstrates  thereby  an  adequate  understanding  of  the  value 
preferences  of  the  contemporary  international  community". 
Towards  a  Third  World  Approach  to  Non-Intervention  through  the  Labyrinths  of  Western  Doctrine,  20 
IJIL,  1980,  p.  248. 
84 
Vattet,  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1,  n.  9,  p.  299. 
86 parties  may  assist  the  party  which  has  a  just  cause  on  his  side. 
Vattel  introduces  the  elements  of  resisting  tyranny  and  the  struggle  for  liberty  as  the  real 
criteria  of  the  justice  of  the  cause  in  internal  wars,  hence  it  is  ideology  rather  than  legal 
rules  which  govern  the  question  of  assistance. 
This  situation  led  Cutler  to  state  that: 
"Vattel's  rules  would  have  suited  the  Reagan  Administration  view  of  the  world  to 
perfection.  These  rules  would  support  the  legality  of  military  aid  to  the  Duarte 
Government,  the  Nicaraguan  Contras  and  the  Afghan  freedom  fighters.  They  would 
provide  no  legal  comfort  for  the  Soviet  invasions  of  Czechoslovakia  and 
Afghanistan 
... 
Aid  to  democratic  forces  in  or  out  of  power  would  be  lawful,  aid  to 
tyrants  or  would  be  tyrants,  would  not".  85 
In  practice,  Vattel's  stand  would  mean  that  there  is  no  strict  rules  of  non-intervention, 
everything  will  depend  on  the  rhetoric  of  the  warring  factions  in  the  civil  war,  and  the 
interpretations  given  by  tlýird  parties  to  that  rhetoric. 
However,  even  in  era  after  the  UN  Charter,  some  international  lawyers  argue  for 
assistance  to  be  given  to  either  party  to  the  civil  war,  the  established  Government  must  not 
have  the  monopoly  of  receiving  aid  and  assistance.  The  arguments  advanced  to  justify  that 
attitude  differ  from  those  of  Vattel. 
In  this  respect,  Falk  observes  that: 
"...  [T]he  facts  of  participation  contradict  the  norms  of  non-intervention.  Behaviour 
does  not  conform  to  the  claims  of  traditional  legal  order.  "86 
In  other  words,  the  traditional  rules  are  no  longer  valid  in  our  world. 
In  his  view  whenever  the  insurgents  succeeded  in  establishing  themselves  as  the  de  facto 
Government  over  a  substantial  part  of  the  contested  territory,  third  States  are  legally 
entitled  to  deal  with  the  insurgents  as  with  the  established  Government.  "  On  the  other 
hand,  he  conditionally  justifies  intervention  on  the  side  of  the  legal  Government.  He  writes: 
*If  substantial  participation  on  behalf  of  the  insurgents  is  identified  by  the 
incumbent,  then  it  provokes  notes  of  protest  and  perhaps  a  proportionate  response 
especially  an  appeal  for  help  to  third  States  in  order  to  neutralise  the  insurgents 
strength  that  is  claimed  to  be  attributable  to  external  sources".  88 
The  result  is  that  both  sides  to  the  internal  conflict  can  receive  assistance  from  third  parties 
without  a  real  difficulty,  89  especially  in  real  situations  of  civil  wars,  when  the  two  sides  of 
85 
L.  N.  Cutter:  The  Right  to  Intervene.  64  Foreign  Affairs,  1985,  p.  97. 
86 
op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  5,  p.  235. 
87 
See  R.  Falk:  Vietnam  War  and  International  Low.  Vol.  2,  PUP,  Princeton,  1968,  p.  238. 
as 
op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  5,  p.  237. 
89  In  fact,  Falk  seems  to  suggest  that  international  taw  is  beginning  to  adjust  itself  to  the  claim 
that  both  parties  to  a  civil  war  can  receive  assistance  on  an  equat.  footing  from  foreign  States.  He 
states: 
UThis  continuing  tolerance  by  the  legal  system  of  participation  on  the  side  of  one's  choice 
in  an  internal  war  gradually  assumes  a  place  in  the  horizontal,  self-detimiting  portion  of 
87 the  conflict  hold  and  struggle  for  different  kinds  of  society,  in  other  words  when  the  two 
parties  champion  different  ideologies. 
Pinto  on  the  other  hand,  bases  his  argument  for  assisting  either  party  in  the  civil  war,  on 
the  question  of  'effectivity'.  Thus,  once  the  insurgents  establish  their  military  and  civil 
organisation,  and  exercise  full  jurisdiction  over  the  population  and  the  territory,  they  are 
entitled  to  request  foreign  assistance.  In  this  context,  Pinto  writes: 
"Sa  qualit6  d'autorit6  de  fait  I'autorise  i  demander  et  obtenir  une  assistance  dtrangýre 
sans  que  soit  par  la  viol6s  les  droits  du  gouvernement  legal  dont  1'effictivit6  est 
limit6e  par  son  existence  et  son  action".  90 
It  seems  to  me  that  such  views  may  be  in  the  end  exploited  by  the  big  powers. 
Moreover.  the  views  which  try  to  justify  assistance  to  both  sides  in  civil  wars,  are  in 
flagrant  contradiction  with  the  law  of  the  UN  Charter  especially  Article  2/4,  since  they 
open  the  way  for  the  use  of  force  in  the  form  of  military  interventions  against  the  political 
independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  States  engaged  in  civil  wars. 
Furthermore,  State  practice  at  least  in  the  form  of  statements  by  decision  makers, 
supports  the  stand  of  non-intervention  in  civil  wars,  rather  than  interventions  on  the  side 
of  one's  choice.  91 
They  can  assist  the  faction  which  is  in  line  with  their  strategic  conceptions,  be  it  the 
Government  or  its  opponents.  Thus,  instead  of  diminishing  the  illegal  activity  of  inventions 
these  views  will  lead  to  its  escalation,  by  offering  legal  justification.  This  in  my  view  will 
not  serve  the  course  of  international  law. 
3.  The  Third  School.  The  Policy-  Orientated  Approach 
According  to  this  school,  any  search  for  a  single  norm  which  can  regulate  intervention  in 
civil  wars  is  a  useless  and  unscientific  exercise.  The  reason  is  that  situations  of  civil  strife 
differ,  community  policies  at  stake  in  such  conflicts  are  also  different,  values  struggled  for 
also  differ.  and  finally,  the  number  of  participants  in  such  conflicts  and  those  who  may 
help  them  vary.  Thus,  any  attempt  to  go  for  a  single  norm  would  be  illogical  and 
irresponsive  to  the  situations  involved. 
The  traditional  and  the  neutrality  doctrines  were  attacked  by  adherents  of  the  school  of 
international  low". 
Op.  cft.,  supra.  n.  5,  p.  237. 
90 
R.  Pinto:  Les  r6gtes  du  droit  International,  concernant  ta  querre  civite.  RCADI,  1965/1,  p.  482. 
91 
Thus,  many  statements  Issued  by  States  either  individuatly  or  cottectivety  support  the  stand  of  non- 
intervention,  e.  g..  in  the  context  of  the  Chinese  Civit  War.  the  foreign  Ministers  of  the  UK,  USSR 
and  the  US  meeting  at  Moscow  on  Dec.  27th,  1945  issued  a  statement  part  of  which  read  as  fottows: 
"The  three  foreign  secretaries  exchanged  views  with  regard  to  the  situation  in  China.  They  were 
in  agreement  as  to  the  need  for  a  unified  and  democratic  China  under  the  nationat  Government, 
for  broad  participation  by  democratic  eLements  in  at  L  branches  of  the  nationat,  Government,  and 
for  a  cessation  of  civiL  strife.  They  reaffirm  their  adherence  to  the  poLicy  of  non- 
intervention  in  the  Internal,  affairs  of  China". 
Op.  cit..  supra.  n.  50,  p.  599.  See  atso  the  same  reference  for  further  exavlptes  of  State  practice, 
especlatty  pp.  460-462. 
88 policy  orientated  approach,  because  the  first  (the  traditional  rule)  could  be  used  as  shield 
against  any  kind  of  reform  and  would  encourage  totalitarian  regimes92  whereas  the  second 
would  not  cover  all  forms  of  interventions  especially  covert  actions.  93 
The  search  in  this  school  is  for  different  rules  to  different  situations,  the  whole  effort  of 
the  school  in  my  view  is  to  find  sophisticated  ways  of  interventions  and  their  necessary 
legal  justifications,  in  order  to  suit  the  necessities  of  the  war  against  Communism.  Since 
Communists  can  be  sometimes  in  power  in  countries  plagued  by  civil  war,  and  sometimes 
they  could  be  insurgents  fighting  a  friendly  pro-Western  Government;  in  this  atmosphere 
any  single  norm  will  not  be  in  the  interest  of  a  big  power  such  as  the  US. 
In  this  context,  Falk  maintains  that  the  situation  in  our  world  differs  fundamentally  from 
the  situation  in  which  the  traditional  rule  prevailed,  thus  the  conditions  of  the 
interdependence  of  internal  and  international  conflicts,  the  attitudes  of  Communist  and 
Third  World  countries  towards  the  outcome  of  internal  wars  conducted  for  political  reasons 
and  the  danger  of  escalation  to  nuclear  war.  These  factors  impose  that: 
"The  rules  and  processes  of  law  must  be  revised  to  take  appropriate  account  of  these 
extra-legal  developmentS.  "94 
In  accordance  with  this  philosophy,  he  advances  that  whenever  community  institutions, 
chiefly  the  UN: 
"...  [F]ail  to  perform  in  a  situation  where  an  internal  war  is  an  arena  within  which  third 
powers  seek  to  extend  their  national  domain  of  political  influence.  Then  it  is  essential  to 
authorise  neutralizing  participation".  95 
In  his  view,  the  rules  of  non-intervention  in  internal  conflicts  will  be  suspended  in  the 
event  of  their  violation  by  a  major  international  actor  in  other  words  counter  intervention 
would  be  legalised,  either  on  the  side  of  the  established  Government  or  the  insurgents. 
However.  among  adherents  to  the  school  (Policy-orientated)  it  is  Moore  who  devoted 
much  effort  to  the  study  of  intervention  activity.  Thus,  he  classifies  six  situations  in  which 
claims  of  intervention  ma  y  arise  'together  these  six  situations  make  up  an  intervention  in 
92  In  this  context,  Moore  attacks  the  traditional  rule  in  these  terms: 
"ET3he  principat.  dangers  of  the  traditionat.  rute  are  that  it  may  serve  as  a  Maginot  Line  for 
vested  priviteges,  deterring  necessary  reforms  in  feudat  or  totatitarfan  societies,  and  that 
it  may  be  invoked  by  recognising  a  puppet  Government  as  in  the  Soviet-Finfsh  War  or  the  Soviet 
Intervention  in  the  1956  Hungarian  Uprising". 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  4,  p.  88.  However,  he  did  not  add  that  the  US  also  used  the  traditional  rule  to 
justify  many  of  its  interventions  in  Latin  America  and  Vietnam. 
93Simitarly, 
Moore  maintains  that: 
"The  principal  danger  of  the  newer  'neutral  rule'  is  that  by  focusing  normative  weight  on  the 
more  visible  overt  response  it  may  provide  a  shield  for  aggressive  take  over  through  covert 
attack". 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  4,  p.  88. 
94 
op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  5,  p.  209. 
95  Ibid. 
89 internal  conflict  spectrum". 
96  Those  situations  are  as  follows: 
1.  Situations,  claims  not  relating  to  authority  structures. 
2.  Situations,  claims  relating  to  anti-colonial  wars. 
3.  Situations,  claims  relating  to  wars  of  secession. 
4.  Situations,  claims  relating  to  indigenous  conflict  for  control  of  internal  authority 
structures. 
5.  Situations,  claims  relating  to  cold  war  divided  nations  conflicts. 
6.  Situations,  claims  relating  to  authority  structures.  97 
After  an  exhaustive  study  of  the  above  situations,  he  recommended  the  rules  which  should 
govern  intervention  in  civil  wars: 
A.  Intervention  is  permissible  if  authorised  by  the  UN,  and  it  is  impermissible  once  the 
UN  calls  for  its  cessation. 
B.  It  is  impermissible  to  assist  a  faction  engaged  in  any  type  of  authority-oriented  internal 
conflict  or  to  use  the  military  instrument  in  the  territory  of  another  State  for  the  purpose 
of  maintaining  or  altering  authority  structures. 
However,  this  attractive  proposition  would  be  subjected  to  three  qualifications,  which  in 
effect  devoid  it  from  any  real  sense  in  practice.  The  qualifications  are: 
1.  Assistance  to  the  recognised  Government  is  permissible  prior  to  insurgency,  when  the 
conflict  becomes  an  insurgency  the  assistance  to  the  recognised  Government  can  continue, 
however,  it  has  to  be  maintained  at  preinsurgency  level,  in  other  words  the  assistance  must 
be  maintained  at  the  preinsurgency  level,  and  must  not  be  increased. 
In  my  view,  this  is  a  highly  impractical  suggestion.  First,  it  is  very  difficult  to  State  when 
the  internal  disorder  has  attained  the  insurgency  level,  secondly  third  Governments  may 
very  well  increase  their  assistance  in  order  that  the  insurgents  will  lose  any  real  hope  of 
attaining  insurgency  level,  and  finally  it  is  very  hard  to  prove  the  assistance  to  the 
recognised  Government  has  remained  at  its  preinsurgency  level,  in  cases  of  the  recognition 
that  the  insurgents  have  reached  insurgency. 
2.  Assistance  to  a  widely  recognised  Government  is  permissible  when  it  is  an  answer  to 
impermissible  assistance  to  insurgents.  If  assistance  to  insurgents  or  the  use  of  military 
instruments  against  another  State  amounts  to  an  armed  attack,  within  the  meaning  of  Article 
51  of  the  UN  Charter,  it  is  permissible  to  reply  proportionally  against  the  territory  of  the 
attacking  State. 
This  last  point  has  been  developed  by  Moore  who  advanced  a  very  wide  and  dangerous 
interpretation  of  Article  51  of  the  Charter,  Judge  Schwebel  also  used  the  same  argument  in 
his  Dissenting  Opinion  in  the  Nicaragua  Case  (1986).  However,  the  ICJ  refuted  their 
opinions  as  not  reflecting  the  proper  interpretation  of  Article  5  1,  as  I  will  show  later  in  the 
sections  dealing  with  the  impact  of  the  ICJ  decision  on  the  law  of  intervention  in  civil  war. 
3.  The  use  of  military  force  in  the  territory  of  another  State  for  the  purpose  of  restoring 
orderly  processes  of  self-determination  in  authority  oriented  conflict  involving  a  sudden 
96 
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90 breakdown  of  order  is  permissible,  however,  according  to  certain  conditions.  98 
This  is  another  dangerous  proposition,  since  it  is  not  difficult  for  especially  the 
superpowers  to  'engineer'  an  invitation  from  the  'widely  recognised  Government'.  Also,  it 
is  very  difficult  to  imagine  a  power  who  intervenes  just  for  the  sake  of  self-determination, 
bearing  in  mind  that  there  is  a  wide  disagreement  between  Governments  especially  the 
superpowers  on  the  exact  meaning  of  self-determination. 
On  the  other  hand,  Reisman  has  endeavoured  to  develop  the  idea  of  intervention  by 
military  force  to  overthrow  Governments  which  are  assisted  by  foreign  States  and  which 
violate  the  right  of  self-determination  of  the  population,  to  him  such  kind  of  interventions 
would  'increase  the  probability  of  the  free  choice  of  peoples  about  their  Government  and 
political  structure'99  in  fact  he  advocates  assistance  to  insurgents,  whenever  a  'pro- 
democratic  Government'  has  been  ousted,  in  other  words  intervention  can  be  legal, 
whenever  it  is  used  against  Communist  or  left-wing  Governments  who  ousted  a  pro-Western 
Government. 
Schachter  rightly  attacks  Reisman's  argument  in  these  terms: 
*The  difficulty  with  Reisman's  argument  is  not  merely  that  it  lacks  support  in  the 
text  of  the  Charter  or  in  the  interpretation  that  States  have  given  Article  2  (4)  in  the 
past  decades.  It  would  introduce  a  new  normative  basis  for  recourse  to  war  that  would 
give  powerful  States  an  almost  unlimited  right  to  overthrow  Governments  alleged  to 
be  irresponsive  to  the  popular  will  or  the  goal  of  self-determination".  100 
Moreover,  it  seems  to  me  that  Reisman  implicitly  advocates  a  Western  'Brezhnev  doctrine' 
in  other  words,  whenever  a  pro-Western  Government  is  unseated,  Western  Governments  and 
especially  the  US  should  intervene  in  order  to  reinstall  the  ousted  Government  and  the 
former  constitutional  and  ideological  order. 
Cutler  advocates  the  return  to  Vattel's  standards  in  deciding  on  what  side  to  intervene  in 
civil  wars.  In  this  context,  he  writes: 
'"The  most  significant  thing  about  how  modern  international  law  treats  interventions 
is  that  Vattel's  standards  of  oppression  and  justice  are  not  even  mentioned.  The  law 
as  now  formulated,  appears  to  treat  the  democratic  or  dictatorial  nature  of 
government  as  wholly  irrelevant".  101 
He  insists  that  Vattel's  ideas  can  be  reconciled  with  Article  2/4.  He  adds: 
*1  would  therefore  interpret  Article  2/4  as  permitting  third  States  to  intervene  only 
98 
The  conditions  are:  (f)  A  genuine  Invitation  by  the  widely  recognised  Goverment,  and  if  there  is 
none  by  a  major  faction.  (ii)  ReLative  neutratity  among  factions  especiaLLy  neutraLlty  in  miLitary 
operations.  (III)  Immediate  Initiation  of  and  compliance  with  the  decision  machinery  of  appropriate 
regionat  organisation.  (iv)  Immediate  fuLL  reporting  to  the  UNSC.  (v)  A  prompt  disengagement, 
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91 when  two  conditions  exist-  first  an  indigenous  pro-democratic  insurgency  is  engaged 
in  civil  war  with  the  repressive  regime,  and  second  ýome  other  third  States  has  been 
giving  military  assistance  to  the  repressive  regime".  102 
Obviously,  democracy  to  him  means  what  the  West  understands  it  to  be,  thus  insurgents 
waging  a  civil  war  and  holding  'democratic  ideas'  can  expect  aid  from  the  West,  also 
implicitly  a  'democratic  regime'  which  is involved  in  a  civil  war  against  'Anti  -  Democratic 
insurgents'  can  receive  the  necessary  assistance  from  the  West,  however,  on  the  condition 
that  the  insurgents  are  receiving  help  from  outside. 
The  heart  of  the  argument  then,  is  for  a  right  of  counter-intervention  on  either  side  of 
the  internal  conflict  (Government  or  insurgents).  The  crucial  element  of  making  the 
decision  of  assistance  for  third  States,  is  which  side  uphold  the  democratic  ideals  as 
understood  in  the  Western  liberal  tradition. 
This  right  of  counter-intervention  in  Cutler's  opinion: 
"...  [H]as  solid  toots  in  the  principles  of  the  eighteenth  century  enlightenment  that 
inspired  the  democratic  ideal  and  remain  valid  today.  It  gives  meaning  to  the 
reaffirmation  of  this  ideal  in  Article  I  of  the  Charter.  It  does  so  without  emasculating 
the  principle  of  non-  intervention  set  out  in  Article  2/4.  "103 
In  my  view,  this  kind  of  argument  which  in  practice  would  satisfy  the  necessities  of 
American  interventions,  is  first  inconsistent  with  the  UN  Charter,  because  there  is  nothing 
in  Article  2/4  which  indicates  that  counte  r-  intervention  is  allowed,  also  to  hold  that  Article 
I  of  the  Charter  upholds  the  ideas  of  the  Western  liberal  tradition  is  not  true,  at  least  the 
majority  of  the  UN  members  would  not  support  such  an  assertion.  Secondly  the  argument 
supposes  from  the  start  that  the  UN  can  do  nothing  in  the  face  of  interventions,  which  is 
not  wholly  true.  Thirdly,  the  introduction  of  highly  controversial  elements  of  'Democracy- 
justice-  oppression'  would  not  support  and  serve  the  cause  of  peace  and  international  law. 
Farer,  on  the  other  hand,  maintains  that  the  traditional  rule: 
"...  [A]side  from  the  dangerous  ambiguity  of  just  when  the  insurgency  has  achieved 
sufficient  status  to  require  equal  treatment,  the  norm  simply  is  not  respected.  It  is 
wholly  out  of  joint  with  actual  practice".  104 
He  regards  any  flat  prohibition  of  intervention  would  be  unenforceable  and  unacceptable 
since  'the  sheer  problem  of  definition  would  seriously  jeopardise  effective  application'.  105 
Then  economic  aid  the  training  of  personnel  and  when  the  norm  becomes  operative-are 
thorny  problems  to  solve  in  practice,  different  interpretations  would  confuse  the  matter. 
Besides,  he  stresses  that: 
*Even  if  States  could  agree  on  a  definition  of  non-  participation,  I  cannot  conceive 
102  Jbid,  p.  106. 
103  Op.  cft.,  supra.  n.  89,  p.  107. 
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92 of  one  which  would  be  generally  acceptable  as  the  substance  of  a  norm  -  ideological 
passion  has  made  trust  a  rare  possession.  "106 
In  this  context,  Farer  proposes  another  approach.  He  writes: 
"A  more  realistic  possibility  is  a  flat  prohibition  in  tactical  operations  either  openly 
or  through  a  medium  of  advisers  or  volunteers,  in  more  concrete  this  means  that  a 
country  could  not  send  its  own  forces  on  patrol  in  support  of  indigenous  military 
unj  s.  .  107 
Under  this  proposed  norm  then,  third  States  would  be  allowed  to  send  any  type  of  quantity 
or  aid  other  than  direct  military  involvement  to  the  established  Government  and  also  to  the 
insurgents,  in  fact  assistance  to  insurgents  would  not  constitute  an  act  of  aggression  against 
the  country  in  which  the  civil  war  is  raging. 
In  my  view,  this  is  an  attempt  to  make  the  Charter  of  the  UN,  and  the  whole  legal 
developments  which  limit  the  use  of  force  including  intervention  as  irrelevant.  Also 
although  the  intention  of  Farer  is  to  limit  the  activity  of  intervention,  in  practice,  his 
suggested  norm  would  in  fact  increase  that  activity,  since  the  intervening  States  and 
especially  superpowers  because  of  the  world  public  opinion  which  is  against  direct  military 
intervention  prefer  a  norm  along  Farer  line,  that  rule  would  save  them  the  embarrassment 
before  world  public  opinion. 
To  conclude,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  many  of  the  opinions  expressed  in  the  above  school 
(policy  orientated  approach)  enter  in  the  vision  of  the  confrontation  which  is  taking  place 
between  the  Communist  block  and  the  Western  one.  These  opinions  are  the  reflection  in  the 
legal  field  of  that  confrontation.  The  Communists  are  convinced  that  social  revolutions  will 
sweep  the  world,  and  indeed  the  conditions  of  explosion  are  ready  in  many  parts  of  the 
world  especially  in  the  Third  World.  The  West  see  the  Communist  hand  in  every  internal 
upheaval  and  reacts  by  interventions  and  counter-  interventions  as  the  particular  situation 
dictates. 
However,  in  many  instances  local  conditions  are  the  primary  causes  of  revolution  and 
internal  strife,  but  the  superpowers  see  things  in  absolute  terms.  They  interpret  situations 
of  civil  wars  according  to  their  global  strategies,  in  this  atmosphere  interventions  and 
counter-  interventions,  will  take  place  and  the  rule  of  non  -intervention  will  have  no  effect 
on  their  actions. 
This  attitude  in  my  view  is  against  the  moral  foundation  of  international  law,  which  is 
based  on  diversity  and  pluralism,  and  hence  in  non  -intervention.  Thus  any  attempt  to  shape 
the  world  (through  intervention)  according  to  a  specific  need  of  a  philosophical  or  religious 
conception,  would  only  lead  to  more  violence,  and  hence  would  not  serve  the  cause  of 
international  law  and  peace  in  the  world.  108 
106  Ibid,  p.  518. 
107  Ibid. 
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"It  is  one  of  the  greatest  achievements  of  European  International  taw  that  it  acknowledged  the 
claims  of  pluralism.  it  reflected  an  appreciation  of  the  fact  that  the  most  likely  consequence 
93 Section  IV:  The  Non-Intervention  Norm  In  State  Practice 
This  section  will  concentrate  on  the  place  of  the  principle  of  non-intervention  in  the 
practice  of  States.  The  proposition  is  that  since  at  least  the  advent  of  the  UN  Charter,  there 
has  been  a  continuing  adherence  to  the  principle,  despite  the  frequency  of  its  breach. 
In  my  view,  violation  does  not  force  us  to  abandon  the  principle  in  the  name  of  realism, 
instead  it  strengthens  our  insistence  that  the  rule  should  be  upheld.  This  stand  would  be 
beneficial  in  the  long  run,  since  the  public  opinion  and  probably  the  UN  under  the  pressure 
of  that  public  opinion,  would  grow  more  and  more  sensitive  to  interventions,  and 
intervening  States,  especially  stronger  nations,  may  find  it  better  not  to  intervene,  since  any 
contrary  option  can  be  very  costly  politically,  internally  and  externally. 
However,  it  must  be  stressed  that  references  to  the  principle  of  non-  intervention  in 
treaties,  statements  and  resolutions  must  be  taken  to  include  intervention  in  civil  wars 
because  the  latter  are  fought  primarily  for  the  control  of  political  power  within  the  State, 
which  is  essentially  the  heart  of  the  internal  affairs  of  States,  against  which  intervention  is 
prohibited. 
A.  Non-Intervention  In  Bilateral  Treaties 
In  important  bilateral  treaties,  it  is  very  common  to  insert  a  provision  on  non-intervention, 
either  on  the  preamble  or  in  the  first  Articles.  This  means  that  States  prefer  always  to  build 
new  relationships  with  other  States  on  strict  basis  of  non  -intervention.  They  view  it  as  an 
essential  ingredient  of  any  lasting  and  serious  relationships. 
In  this  context,  the  Soviet  practice  offers  a  good  example.  Thus  one  of  the  first  treaties 
of  the  new  regime  of  Russia  after  the  1917  Revolution,  the  Treaty  of  Friendship  between 
Persia  and  the  Russian  Soviet  Republic  of  February  26th,  1921  stipulates  in  Article  4  that: 
'In  consideration  of  the  fact  that  each  nation  has  the  right  to  determine  freely  its 
political  destiny,  each  of  the  two  contracting  parties  formally  express  its  desire  to 
abstain  from  any  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  other.  "109 
This  treaty  has  been  concluded  in  the  time  of  the  fierce  civil  war,  which  was  raging  in 
Russia,  hence  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  non  -intervention  clause  specifically  includes  total 
abstention  of  intervention  in  the  civil  war.  However,  there  is  no  specification  whether  the 
attitude  of  withholding  assistance  applies  also  to  the  established  Government.  Also,  many 
'Treaties  of  Friendship,  Cooperation  and  Mutual  Assistance'  which  have  been  concluded 
between  the  USSR  and  many  other  countries,  always  include  a  reference  to  'non- 
interference  in  the  internal  affairs'. 
However,  if  reference  to  'mutual  assistance'  in  these  treaties  may  be  taken  to  mean 
assistance  in  times  of  peace.  reference  to  'Principles  of  Socialist  Internationalism'  in  treaties 
with  Eastern  Block  countries  may  indicate  that  if  there  is  any  internal  conflict  in  any 
of  attempts  to  shape  international  society,  according  to  some  particular  Ideal  conception  of 
religious  truth.  political  legitimacy  or  human  good  would  be  perpetual  war  or  universal 
tyrany". 
Law,  morality  and  the  Relations  of  States.  PUP,  Princeton,  190,  p.  55. 
1099  League  of  Nations  Treaty  Series.  1922,  No.  268.  p.  403. 
94 socialist  country,  other  sister  States  would  have  the  right  to  intervene  to  save  'Socialism'. 
The  Brezhnev  Doctrine  is,  in  fact,  a  codification  of  that  stand.  Thus,  if  nearly  all  the 
treaties  between  socialist  countries  contain  a  mixture  of  references  to  'mutual  assistance, 
socialist  internationalism  and  non-interference  in  the  internal  affairs',  110  it  seems  that  the 
principle  of  'socialist  internationism'  overrides  the  other  principles,  which  in  practice 
empties  the  principle  of  non-  intervention  especially  from  any  real  meaning. 
It  must  be  stressed  that  in  practice  the  Soviets  have  never  intervened  in  situations  of 
internal  disorders  in  other  countries  without  first  establishing  that  they  acted  under  a 
formal  request  by  the  established  Government  of  the  country.  This  happened  in  Hungary 
1956  and  Afghanistan  1979,  which  means  that  the  Soviets  cling  to  the  traditional  rule  which 
allows  assistance  to  legal  Governments  only. 
That  stand  it  seems  is  confirmed  also  in  the  bilateral  treaties  concluded  by  the  USSR  with 
non-Communist  States,  and  especially  Non-Aligned  States.  Thus,  the  first  Article  of  the 
important  Treaty  of  Peace,  Friendship  and  Cooperation  between  USSR  and  India,  stipulates 
that: 
*Each  party  shall  respect  the  independence,  sovereignty  and  territorial  integity  of 
the  other  party  and  refrain  from  interfering  in  the  others'  internal  affairs".  1 
However,  the  consistent  Soviet  condemnation  of  the  US,  China  and  Pakistan  for  their 
alleged  assistance  to  rebel  groups  in  some  States  of  the  Indian  Federation,  and  the  support 
given  to  the  legal  Indian  Government  in  all  fields,  suggest  that  the  Soviet  Union  does  not 
see  its  assistance  to  Indian  Government  as  infringement  of  the  principle  of  non- 
intervention. 
Similarly,  the  Treaty  of  Friendship  between  the  USSR  and  Angola  of  November  II  th, 
1976  stipulates  in  its  first  Article  that: 
"Respect  for  sovIrSignty  and  territorial  integrity,  non  -interference  in  one  another's  internal  affairs".  I 
This  treaty  was  signed  in  circumstances  of  a  violent  civil  war,  which  is  going  till  now,  it 
(the  treaty)  was  never  seen  by  the  USSR  as  a  legal  barrier  against  its  important  assistance 
in  all  fields  to  the  established  Angolan  Government.  The  USSR  views  itself  as  acting 
lawfully,  whereas  those  who  assist  the  rebel  UNITA  especially  South  Africa  and  the  US, 
are  acting  against  international  law  and  the  character  of  the  UN. 
In  this  context,  the  Treaty  of  Friendship  between  the  USSR  and  Poland  of  April  21st,  1965 
stipulates  in  Its  first  Article  that: 
"The  High  Contracting  Parties  shall  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  Socialist 
internationalism  strengthen  their  Internal  and  unshakeabLe  friendship.  develop  all  round  co- 
operation  and  render  each  other  assistance  on  the  basis  of  equality  of  rights,  respect  for 
sovereignty  and  non-fnterference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  other  party". 
540  UWTS,  1965,  Wo.  7845,  p.  106. 
ill  10  ILM,  1971,  p.  905. 
112 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1.  n.  87.  p.  485. 
95 This  means  that  the  traditional  rule  still  find  a  very  strong  friend  in  the  era  of  the  Charter. 
However,  it  must  be  stressed  that  the  Soviets  are  not  alone  in  that  respect,  France  especially 
i5jean  toward  the  traditional  view,  since  in  many  respects  and  the  Third  World  seem  also  !h 
it  favours  the  status  quo. 
In  this  respect,  France  concluded  many  agreements  with  the  former  French  colonies  in 
Black  Africa,  which  always  includes  a  reference  to  the  principle  of  non-  intervention. 
However.  when  the  legal  Governments  faced  some  internal  troubles,  which  vary  from  a 
full  scale  civil  war  to  mere  riots,  the  French  intervened  on  the  side  of  the  Government,  and 
always  see  themselves  as  acting  lawfully.  Thus  they  intervened  in  Zaire  in  1977  and  in  Chad 
especially  from  1968  up  till  the  present  day. 
In  this  context,  the  General  Agreement  between  the  Government  of  the  French  Republic 
and  the  Republic  of  Dahomey  (now  Benin)  of  February  27th,  1965,  stipulates  in  its 
preamble  that: 
W 
... 
Desiring  to  strengthen  their  friendly  relations  on  the  basis  of  respect  for  each 
other's  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity,  the  equality  of  States  and  non- 
interference  in  their  internal  affairs  in  accordance  with  international  law  and  the 
obligations  arising  therefrom".  113 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  agreement  speaks  of  'non-  intervention  in  accordance  with 
international  law'  which  means  that  the  two  parties  take  non'-  intervention  as  a  legally 
binding  principle,  and  above  all  that  it  does  not  contradict  with  assisting  the  legal 
Government  facing  a  civil  war.  This  interpretation  is  confirmed  by  Kiss  who  writes: 
011  est  admis  que  les  Etats  itrangers  peuvent  aider  le  Rouvernement  legal  d'un  Etat 
en  guerre  civile  dans  l'accomplissement  de  sa  täche.  m1T4 
Also  the  accord  of  non-aggression  'The  Accord  of  Nkomati,  signed  on  16th  of  March  1984 
between  the  Republic  of  South  Africa  and  Mozambique  provides  in  its  first  Article  that: 
"The  High  Contracting  Parties  undertake  to  respect  each  other's  sovereignty  and 
independence  and,  in  fulfilment  of  this  fund  mental  obligation,  to  refrain  from 
interfering  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  other"115 
Article  3  of  the  same  agreement  lists  with  a  great  detail  the  practical  application  of  the 
principle  of  non-inteTvention  in  the  Circumstances  of  the  civil  war  which  is  going  on  in 
Mozambique,  where  the  insurgents,  the  Movement  of  National  Resistance  (MNR)  are 
heavily  assisted  by  the  Government  of  South  Africa,  and  also  the  duty  of  Mozambique  to 
refrain  from  giving  assistance  in  whatever  form  to  ANC  of  South  Africa.  However,  the 
agreement  is  silent  on  the  question  of  the  legality  of  assistance  to  the  established 
Governments. 
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96 On  the  other  hand,  there  is  strong  evidence  in  the  practice  of  States,  that  when  third 
countries  are  blamed  for  intervention  in  civil  war  on  the  side  of  the  insurgents,  their  usual 
answer  is  the  rejection  of  the  blame  and  the  claiming  of  innocence,  which  indicates  that 
there  is  a  general  agreement  between  States  that  assistance  to  insurgents  is  always  illegal. 
Thus,  when  Nicaragua  protested  against  the  Honduran  help  to  the  Contras,  the 
representative  of  Honduras  in  the  UN  wrote  to  the  President  of  the  UNSC  a  note  of 
protest,  part  of  which  reads  as  folows: 
"...  In  rejecting  as  unfounded  the  aforementioned  protest,  I  wish  to  inform  you  again 
that  the  Government  of  Honduras  is  not  intervening,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  in 
the  armed  conflict  besetting  Nicaragua".  116 
Moreover,  when  Sudan  accused  Libya  of  conspiracy,  plotting  and  financing  all  kinds  of 
sabotage  against  its  security  and  independence,  '"  and  in  this  violation  of  all  international 
and  regional  charters  and  customs,  which  prescribe  non-intervention,  the  Secretary  of  the 
People's  Committee  of  the  People's  Bureau  for  Foreign  Liaison  of  the  Libyan  Arab 
Jamahiriya  stated  in  a  letter  to  the  Secretary-  General  that: 
*The  Sudan  has,  for  a  number  of  years,  been  experiencing  continuous  revolutions  and 
disturbances  by  force,  using  the  ugliest  means  it  is  trying  to  find  external 
justifications  through  empt  accusations  against  the  States  neighbouring  on  the  Sudan, 
among  them  my  country".  lyg 
Implicitly.  then,  Libya  does  not  view  intervention  on  the  side  of  insurgents  as  legally 
justified  at  least  in  its  rhetoric. 
However,  Governments  engaging  in  civil  wars,  are  not  ashamed  of  acknowledging  their 
receipt  of  foreign  assistance  in  fighting  their  opponents,  or  even  publicly  asking  for 
assistance  in  order  to  be  able  to  fight  effectively  and  protect  their  sovereignty.  119 
To  conclude  we  can  say,  that  States  accord  a  very  important  place  to  the  principle  of  non- 
intervention  and  view  it  as  an  important  element  of  any  solid  relationships.  Practice 
1161bid, 
UN  Doc  S/16365,  p.  71.  See  atso  UN  Doc  S/16413,  p.  97. 
1171bid,  UN  Doc  S/16419  (tetter  of  the  Sudanese  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  the  Secretary  Generat 
of  the  UN).  (March  17th,  1984),  pp.  100-102. 
1181bid,  UN  Doc  S/16421  (tetter  of  March  19th,  1984),  p.  102. 
119  Thus,  in  a  statement  by  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Democratic  RepubLic  of  Afghanistan 
(ApriL  22rd,  1984),  it  is  stated  that: 
0  It  Is  well  known  to  sit  that  the  limited  Soviet  contingency  have  been  invited  by  the  legal 
Government  of  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Afghanistan  in  order  to  help  our  people  defend  their 
freedom  and  independence  against  external  dangers  and  aggressions  and  against  attempts  to 
reimpose  on  the  country  a  system  suitable  to  imperialism  and  reaction". 
I  bid  UN  Doc  S/16445,  p.  121.  On  the  other  hand,  in  an  off  fci  at  comiunfqu6  issued  by  the  governing  Junta 
of  mationat  Reconstruction  on  March  26th,  1984  It  is  pLainty  stated  that: 
"-  Mhe  Government  of  Nicaragua  has  felt  obliged  to  call  upon  the  governments  of  the  World 
to  provide  it  with  the  technical  andmititary  assistance  necessary  for  defending  Itself  against 
the  State  terrorism  practised  by  the  United  States  Government  against  the  people  of  Nicaragua". 
Ibld,  UN  Doc  S/16440,  p.  118. 
97 establishes  that.  within  States  party  to  treaties  with  non-  intervention  clauses,  should  a  civil 
war  ensue  in  one  of  the  party  States,  assistance  given  to  the  established  Government  has 
never  been  seen  as  an  infringement  of  that  non-interventionary  principle.  Whereas  any 
assistance  to  insurgents  is  always  seen  as  a  breach  of  the  principle,  this  is  a  codification  of 
the  traditional  rule  in  the  era  of  the  Charter. 
B.  Non-Intervention  In  Multilateral  Treaties 
1.  The  UN  Charter 
There  is  no  straightforward  statement  concerning  non-intervention  in  the  UN  Charter, 
Article  2/7  being  primarily  concerned  with  the  relations  between  the  organisation  of  the 
UN  on  one  hand,  and  its  members  on  the  other.  However,  the  rule  can  be  deduced  easily 
from  other  principles  of  the  Charter,  such  as  respect  for  sovereign  equality,  and  the 
prohibition  of  the  use  of  force  or  its  threat  in  the  relations  between  States.  In  this  respect, 
Arangio-Ruiz  rightly  argues  that: 
"...  [A]  sweeping  prohibition  such  as  that  of  Article  2  (4)  w?  s  found  to  cover  at  least 
some  problems  met  by  the  principle  of  non-intervention".  '20 
Likewise,  Chaumont  stresses  that: 
"On  peut  admettre  en  effet  que  l'Article  2  (4)  en  visant  ä  prot6ger  Tind8pendance 
politique  de  tout  Etat'  contient  l'obligation  de  non-intervention".  121 
However,  Shaw  maintains  that: 
*The  United  Nations  Charter  does  not  provide  any  guidance  as  to  the  legitimacy  of 
intervention  in  internal  conflicts,  being  primarily  concerned  with  in  r-State  armed 
aggression  and  the  corollary  of  the  right  of  States  to  self-defence".  Ils 
In  other  words,  the  UN  Charter  has  left  the  question  of  intervention  in  civil  wars 
unresolved. 
In  my  view,  the  situation  has  been  clarified  in  the  subsequent  practice  of  the  UN.  A  very 
important  range  of  declarations  and  resolutions  have  dealt  with  the  principle  of  non- 
interventions  in  general,  and  stressed  that  non-  intervention  in  civil  wars  is  a  very  important 
component  of  the  principle.  Among  the  most  important  resolutions  dealing  the  subject; 
Resolution  2131  (XX)  1965  on  the  inadminissibility  of  intervention-  Resolution 
ý625 
(XXV) 
1970  the  Friendly  Relations  Declaration.  The  Charter  of  Economic  Rights  and  Duties  of 
States  Resolution  3281  (XIX)  1974.  The  definition  of  aggression  and  the  very  important 
declaration  on  non-intervention  contained  in  UNGA  Resolution  36/103  of  September  12, 
1981. 
It  seems  to  me  and  without  entering  the  great  discussion  on  the  legal  force  of  UNGA 
120  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  60,  p.  120. 
121  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  80.  p.  406. 
122M.  Shaw:  International.  Law  and  Intervention  in  Africa.  8  Journal,  of  Internationat  Retations,  1985, 
(David  Davies  Memorial,  Institute  of  International,  Studies),  p.  341. 
98 resolutions,  one  may  advance  safely,  that  non  -intervention  is  established  as  one  of  the 
fundamental  elements  of  the  actual  legal  order.  The  principle  also  is  seen  as  a  legally 
123  binding  principle,  or  even  a  rule  of  jus  cogens. 
Moreover,  it  must  be  stressed  again  that  the  practice  of  the  UN,  has  upheld  the  legality 
of  assistance  to  insurgents  waging  war  against  colonialism,  racism  and  alien  domination. 
Thus,  the  UNGA  has  affirmed  the  right  to  rebel  in  respect  of  the  said  situations  in  its 
Resolution  2728  (XXVI)  1971  which  'confirms  the  legality  of  the  people's  struggle  for  self  - 
determination  from  colonial  rule  and  foreign  domination  and  alien  subjugation  ... 
by  all 
124  means  consistent  with  the  Charter'.  Also  the  UNGA  made  assistance  to  those  peoples  a 
legal  duty  Resolution  2621  (XXV),  in  fact,  it  stipulates  that: 
"Member  States  shall  render  all  necessary  moral  and  material  assistance  to  the  peoples 
of  colonial  territories  in  their  struggle  to  attain  freedom  and  independence".  125 
The  Friendly  Relations  Declaration  2625  (XXV)  further  confirms  that  in  the  folowing 
terms: 
*In  their  actions  against  and  resistance  to  such  forcible  action  in  the  exercise  of  their 
right  to  self-determination,  such  peoples  are  entitled  to  seek  Pnd  receive  support  in 
accordance  with  the  purposes  and  principles  of  the  Charter".  126 
And  lastly,  the  latest  declaration  on  non  -intervention  indicates  in  its  Part  III/b: 
"The  right  and  duty  of  States  fully  to  support  the  right  to  self-determination  and 
independence  of  peoples  under  colonial  domination,  foreign  occupation  and  racist 
legimes  as  well  as  the  right  of  these  people  to  waýj  both  political  and  armed  struggle 
27  in  accordance  with  the  purposes  of  the  Charter" 
. 
123 
In  fact,  even  the  US  seems  to  agree  that  the  principle  of  non-  intervention  has  attained  the  status 
of  a  jus  cogens;  rule.  Thus,  in  a  memorandum  dated  December  29th,  1979  to  the  acting  Secretary  of  State 
Warren  Christopher,  the  Legal  Adviser  of  the  US  State  Dept.  and  concerning  the  legality  of  the  Soviet 
intervention  in  Afghanistan  It  is  stressed  that  the  Soviet  action  violated  Article  2/4  and  Article 
1/2  of  the  UN  Charter  and  the  Friendly  Relations  Declaration  principles  forbidding  the  use  of  force 
and  non-interventfon  and  specifically  it  was  stated  that: 
"3-No  treaty  between  the  USSR  and  Afghanistan  can  overcome  these  Charter  obligations  of  the 
USSR,  etc. 
4-Nor  is  it  clear  that  the  treaty  between  the  USSR  and  Afghanistan  concluded  in  1979  between 
the  Revolutionary  Taraki  government  and  the  USSR,  is  valid,  if  it  actually  does  tend  itself 
to  support  of  Soviet  intervention  of  the  type  in  question  in  Afghanistan,  It  would  be  void 
under  contemporary  principles  of  international  taw,  since  it  would  conflict  with  what  the 
Vienna  Convention  of  the  Law  of  the  Treaties  describes  as  a  $peremptory  norm  of  general 
internatinal  law  (Article  53)  namely  that  contained  in  Article  2,  paragraph  4  of  the  Charter'$. 
And  then  he  adds: 
"...  Mhile  agreement  on  precitsety  are  what  the  peremptory  norms  of  international  taw  is  not 
broad,  there  is  a  universal  agreement  that  the  exemplary  illustration  of  a  peremptory  norm  is 
Article  2,  paragraph  4". 
M.  L.  Wash:  Digest  of  United  States  Practice  in  international  Law,  1979.  US  Dept.  of  State,  1983,  P.  35. 
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Djonovich,  (ed.  ),  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1,  n.  79,  Vol.  13,  p.  439. 
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Ibid,  p.  218. 
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Ibid,  p.  340. 
12735  UNY.  1981,  p.  148. 
99 It  is  clear  here  therý_the  UNGA  does  not  see  assistance  to  insurgents  as  a  violation  of  the 
principle  of  non  -intervention,  and  also  there  is  no  contradiction  between  the  principle  of 
non-  intervention  and  the  principle  of  self-determination. 
However,  some  Western  lawyers  and  Governments  see  in  the  pronouncements  of  the 
UNGA  in  the  context  of  assistance  to  insurgents,  a  total  confusion  of  the  exact  relationship 
between  the  principles  contained  in  the  Charter.  In  this  respect,  Pomerance  notes  that: 
"The  impression  gathered  from  a  review  of  relevant  Assembly  declarations  and 
pronouncements  is  that  of  a  shopping  or  sales  catalogue.  A  package  of  principles, 
inherently  conflicting  is  presented  without  any  indication  of  how  a  desirable  balance 
might  be  struck  between  them".  128 
Although  the  observation  is  general  it  was  essentially  directed  at  the  relationship  between 
the  principles  of  non-  intervention  and  self-determination. 
Hasbi  insists  that  there  is  no  contradiction  between  the  two  principles.  he  Tightly  writes: 
"La  question  qui  se  pose,  clest  de  savoir  si  la  16gitimation  de  I'aide  aux  peuples  et  leur 
mouvements  de  libdration  signifie,  comme  d'aucuns  le  pr6tendent,  le  recul  du 
principe  de  non-  intervention  au  profit  du  droit  des  peuples  i  disposer  d'eux  rnýrnes? 
S'il  ya  eu  recul,  celui-ci  ne  s'est  pas  fait  au  profit  de  Wimporte  quel  droit  des 
peuples  A  disposer  d'eux  mernes.  11  sagit  d'une  remise  en  cause  du  principe  de  non- 
intervention  qui  ne  touche  en  rien  I'Etat  en  tant  que  tel.  Car  si  le  principe  de 
l'intervention  aW  tol&6,  il  I'a  W  en  faveur  de  situations  internationales, 
potentiellement  itatique,  dans  la  m6sure  oii  la  prise  en  considdration  des  peuples  et 
des  mouvements  de  lib6ration  par  la  sociw  inter-dtatique  s'est  faite  sur  la  base  de 
la  vocation  dtatique  des  entitds  reconnues".  129 
The  heart  of  the  argument  is  that  since  'the  peoples'  struggling  for  self-determination,  have 
been  recognised  as  possessing  international  personality,  then  assistance  to  them  by  third 
parties  does  not  offend  the  principle  of  non  -intervention,  since  it  is  in  the  end  an  assistance 
to  a  'legal  Government'.  Moreover,  we  can  say,  that  Article  1/4  of  the  first  Protocol  which 
made  wars  of  national  liberation  international  conflicts  has  confirmed  that  national 
liberation  movements  possess  international  personality  at  least  in  connection  with 
humanitarian  law,  hence  assistance  to  them  does  not  offend  the  principle  of  non- 
intervention. 
Apart  from  self-determination  conflicts,  the  UN  practice  as  reflected  in  its  resolutions, 
seems  to  establish  non-  intervention  as  the  rule  which  must  be  adhered  to  in  non- 
international  conflicts. 
Thus,  in  civil  wars  stricto  sensu,  assistance  to  insurgents  in  all  forms  is  made  very  clearly 
illegal,  whereas  there  is  a  total  silence  concerning  assistance  to  the  established  Government 
against  whom  an  internal  conflict  is  fought.  Thus,  the  ILC,  in  its  Draft  Code  of  Offences 
Against  the  Peace  and  Security  of  Mankind,  considered  in  its  Article  2/4  as  acts  against 
peace  and  security  of  mankind: 
"4-  The  Organisation,  or  the  encouragement  of  the  Organisation  by  the  authorities  of 
a  State.  of  armed  bands  within  its  territory  for  incursions  into  the  territory  of  another 
128  Pomerance,  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1,  n.  182,  p.  46. 
1  29 
A.  Hasbi:  Les  mouvements  de  tib6ration  nationate  et  te  drolt  international  public.  LGDJ,  Rabat, 
Morocco,  1981,  p.  352. 
100 State,  or  the  toleration  of  the  organisations  of  such  bands  in  its  own  territory  as  a 
base  of  operation  or  as  a  part  of  departure  for  incursions  into  the  territory  of  another 
State,  as  well  as  direct  participation  in  or  support  of  such  incursions".  '" 
However,  the  UNGA  in  its  Resolution  2131  (XX)  on  Inadmissibility  of  Intervention  of  1965 
listed  in  a  clear  way  the  acts  considered  to  constitute  intervention  in  civil  wars,  and 
prohibited  their  commission  by  third  States.  Article  2  of  that  declaration  stipulates  that: 
"No  State  shall  organise,  assist,  foment,  finance,  incite  or  tolerate  subversive,  terrorist 
or  armed  activities,  directed  towards  the  violent  overthrow  of  the  regime  of  another 
State".  131 
The  Friendly  Relations  Declaration  made  it  a  duty  not  to  commit  any  subversive  acts  against 
established  Governments,  it  stressed  that: 
"Every  State  has  the  duty  to  refrain  from  organising  or  encouraging  the  organisation 
of  irregular  forces  or  armed  bands,  including  mercenaries,  for  incursions  into  the 
territory  of  another  State".  132 
It  then  adds  that: 
"Every  State  has  the  duty  to  refrain  from  organising,  instigating  or  participating  in 
acts  of  civil  strife  or  terrorist  acts  in  another  State  or  acquiescing  in  organised 
activities  within  its  territory  directed  towards  the  commission  of  such  acts,  when  the 
acts  referred  to  in  the  present  paragraph  involve  a  threat  or  use  of  force.  "  133 
It  is  clear  here  that  there  is  a  consensus  in  the  international  community  that  apart  from 
assistance  to  insurgents  in  wars  of  self-determination,  the  priority  is  to  the  respect  of  the 
sovereignty  of  the  State  and  the  preservation  of  the  status  quo.  In  fact  the  1981  Declaration 
on  Non-  Intervention  is  very  explicit  in  that  respect.  It  states  that: 
"The  Duty  of  a  State  to  refrain  from  the  promotion  encouragement  or  support,  direct 
or  indirect,  of  rebellious  or  secessionist  activities  within  other  States  under  any 
pretext  whatsoever  or  any  action  which  seeks 
1140 
disrupt  the  unity  or  to  undermine 
or  subvert  the  political  order  of  other  States". 
The  Declaration  reflects  in  effect  the  real  concerns  of  the  Third  World  countries  since  it 
speaks  about  secessionist  activities  and  the  need  to  preserve  the  unity  and  political  order  of 
States. 
130 
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cit.,  supra.  n.  127.  p.  148. 
101 The  Declaration  was  in  the  eyes  of  the  Third  World  countries  as  the  representative  of 
Guyana  said  'a  shield  to  be  used  by  all  States  rather  than  a  sword'135  and  the  representative 
of  Yugoslavia  stressed  that: 
"The  Declaration  contained  precise  definitions  of  all  unlawful  acts  of  intervention  and 
should  serve  as  standard  for  assessing  such  behaviour  from  whatever  quater  it  might 
corne*.  136 
On  the  whole  the  UN  practice  on  the  normative  level  as  the  resolutions  and  declarations 
cited  demonstrate,  uphold  the  principle  of  non-  intervention  as  containing  a  prohibition  on 
all  forms  of  assistance  and  aid  to  insurgents  waging  war  against  their  legal  Government, 
however,  nothing  is  said  explicitly  concerning  the  legality  of  assistance  to  the  Government 
in  power.  The  UN  itself,  is  banned  from  intervention  according  to  Article  2/7,  but  in  the 
event  of  the  situation  becoming  a  threat  to  peace  and  security,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent 
the  organisation  from  intervention. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  that  States  act  on  the  basis  that  the  UN  prohibition  of 
intervention  in  civil  wars,  does  not  apply  to  assistance  to  established  Governments.  Thus 
even  India,  which  is  a  traditional  champion  of  non-  intervention,  did  not  hesitate  to  sign  a 
treaty  with  Sri-Lanka  which  specifically  states  in  Article  2/16/A  that: 
"India  will  take  all  necessary  steps  to  ensure  that  Indian  territory  is  n  used  for 
activities  prejudicial  to  the  unity,  integrity  and  security  of  Sri-Lanka".  13ý 
In  other  words  India  admits  the  illegality  of  any  assistance  to  insurgents,  however, 
concerning  the  position  towards  the  established  Government  of  Sri-Lanka  the  situation  is 
different  the  same  Treaty  (of  July  29th,  1987)  stipulates  in  Article  2/16/C  that: 
"In  the  event  that  the  Government  of  Sri-Lanka  requests  the  Government  of  India 
to  afford  military  assistance  to  implement  these  proposals  the  Government  of  India 
will  cooperate  by  giviný  to  the  Government  of  Sri-Lanka  such  military  assistance 
as  and  when  requested".  38 
A  more  revealing  case  on  the  intention  of  States  concerning  assistance  to  legal  Government 
in  cases  of  civil  wars,  can  be  seen  in  the  discussions  which  took  place  in  the  UNSC  (26- 
31  March  1976)  concerning  the  Angolan  Civil  War.  Thus,  the  Angolan  representative 
stressed  that: 
"...  In  reality  Angola  was  exercising  its  sovereignty  by  asking  assistance  from  those 
1351bid, 
p.  146.  In  fact,  the  Dectaration  was  adopted  by  120  votes  for,  22  against  and  6  abstentions, 
among  the  dissenting  States  were:  the  US,  UK,  France.  Germany  and  Japan.  The  US  stated: 
"The  text  defined  rights  and  duties  in  vague  and  sometimes  imbatanced  language". 
Ibid. 
1361bid, 
p.  147. 
1376  ILK,  1987.  p.  1181,  (India/Sri-Lanka:  Agreement  to  Establish  Peace  and  Wormality  in  Sri-Lanka, 
July  29th,  1987). 
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Ibid. 
102 that  from  the  beginning  had  a  clear  understanding  of  the  Angolan  struggle.  It  was 
Angola's  right  to  appeal  to  any  country  for  help  when  necessary.  Any  concern  of  that 
kind  ab9ut  Angola  was  unquestionably  an  unjustified  interference  in  its  internal 
affairs".  '  39 
The  majority  of  those  intervening  were  in  support  of  Angolan  view.  Pakistan  in  particular 
was  very  clear,  concerning  the  extent  of  the  right  of  a  sovereign  State  to  request  assistance, 
its  representative  stated  that: 
"The  representative  of  Angola  was  within  his  Tight  in  suggesting  that  Angola,  as 
sovereign  and  independent  country  might  choose  to  seek  help  where  it  wished,  even 
to  invite  and  retain  within  its  borders  the  military  forces  Of  foreign  countries  that  it 
considered  friendly  to  its  cause  and  whose  assistance  it  felt  it  needed".  140 
The  African  countries  in  the  Council  (The  Congo,  Guinea-Bissau  and  Mali)  stressed  in 
substance  that  the  socialist  States  assistance  to  Angola  needed  no  justification 
whatsoever.  141.  Only  the  UK  and  the  US  were  against  Angola's  plea,  142  they  implied  in 
their  statements  that  the  policy  of  non-intervention,  should  be  applied  to  the  two  sides  of 
conflicts.  On  balance,  it  seems  again  that  the  traditional  rule,  is  still  a  suitable  to  the 
international  community,  which  is  still  based  essentially  on  distinct  independent  territorial 
units. 
2.  Regional  Organisations 
2.1.  The  OAU 
The  OAU  Charter  states  among  the  principles  of  the  organisation  in  Article  111/2  that: 
"Non-  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  States".  143 
At  the  same  time  the  organisation  is  dictated  to  the  eradication  of  colonialism  in  all  its 
aspects.  For  that  reason  a  liberation  committee  was  created  to  coordinate  assistance  in  all 
aspects  (financial,  training  and  educational  matters)  to  liberation  movements.  This  assistance 
has  never  been  seen  as  a  violation  of  Article  111/2  of  the  UN  Charter. 
However,  the  principle  of  non-intervention  has  been  upheld  strongly  in  the  post-colonial 
era  (Biafra,  The  Congo,  Eritrea,  etc.  )  in  those  cases  the  OAU  was  swift  in  condemning 
foreign  interference  on  the  side  of  the  insurgents  but  concerning  assistance  to  the 
13930 
UNY,  1976,  p.  173. 
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Ibid.  p.  175. 
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The  us  representative  In  fact,  appeated  for  a  comptete  non-Intervention  poticy.  He  stated: 
"Just  as  the  end  of  South  Africa's  wrongful  intervention  was  very  welcome  ...  so  the 
continuing  Cuban  and  USSR  interventions  was  wrong,  because  it  deprived  the  Angolan 
people  of  the  ability  to  exercise  self-determination  freely  and  because  of  its  size". 
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OP.  cit..  supra.  chapter  1.  n.  85,  p.  74. 
103 established  Governments,  it  seems  that  the  organisation  does  not  see  it  as  a  violation  of  the 
Charter.  In  fact,  in  a  1978  resolution  the  OAU  Ministerial  Council  emphasised  that  by 
virtue  of  its  sovereignty  each  country  had  the  right  to  call  foreign  aid  when  it  sees  that  its 
independence  is  in  danger. 
In  my  view  this  is  a  natural  stand,  in  the  circumstances  of  Africa,  where  the  objective 
conditions  of  revolt  exist  in  many  countries  because,  among  other  things,  of  ethnic,  social 
and  economic  problems.  Hence,  the  organisation,  which  is  after  all  an  organisation  of  States, 
must  appear  as  favouring  the  status  quo  and  the  existing  political  orders.  In  this  context, 
any  attempt  to  table  assistance  to  legal  Governments  as  illegal,  would  be  seen  as  an 
encouragement  to  violence  and  secession. 
2.2.  The  OAS 
Latin  America  has  historically  been  a  fertile  ground  for  interventions,  especially  US 
interventions,  but  at  the  same  time  it  was  the  place  where  struggle  for  non-intervention  has 
never  diminished.  The  Charter  of  the  OAS  in  its  Article  18  provides  that: 
"No  State  or  group  of  States  has  the  right  to  intervene,  directly  or  indirectly,  for  any 
reason  whatsoever  in  the  internal  or  external  affairs  of  any  other  State.  The  foregoing 
principle  prohibits  not  only  armed  force  but  also  any  other  form  of  interference  or 
attempted  threat  against  the  personality  of  the  State  or  against  its  political,  economic 
and  cultural  elements".  144 
However,  despite  this  far  reaching  prohibition,  it  seems  that  the  practice  seems  to  go  in  line 
with  the  traditional  rule,  concerning  civil  wars,  in  that  respect  Havana  treaty  of  1928  is 
still  valid.  Thus,  on  January  7th,  1960  following  almost  simultaneous  armed  disturbances 
in  Guatemala  and  Nicaragua  the  American  President  (Eisenhower)  issued  a  statement  in 
which  he  indicates  the  readiness  of  the  American  Navy  to  intervene  following  the  requests 
of  the  two  Governments.  On  the  same  day  the  Department  of  State  issued  a  statement 
clarifying  the  legal  basis  upon  which  the  US  would  provide  its  assistance.  It  reads  as  follows: 
"Any  assistance  which  may  be  given  in  conformity  with  the  president's  announcement 
will  be  in  response  to  a  request  which  the  respective  Government  concerned  have 
every  right  in  their  sovereign  capacity  to  make  and  which  the  United  States  in  its 
sovereign  capacity  has  a  right  to  provide.  It  would  be  carried  out  within  the  national 
jurisdiction  of  the  requesting  Governments".  145 
Here  again  the  traditional  rule  is  upheld  strongly,  only  established  Government  can  benefit 
from  assistance. 
2.3.  The  Pact  of  the  League  of  Arab  States 
This  Pact  which  was  concluded  on  May  10th,  1945  states  in  its  Article  8  that: 
*Every  member  State  of  the  League  shall  respect  the  form  of  Government  obtaining 
in  the  other  States  of  the  league  and  shall  recognise  the  form  of  Government 
obtaining  as  one  of  the  rights  of  those  States,  and  shall  pledge  itself  not  to  take  any 
144 
Article  15  Of  the  original  Charter  became  Article  18.721  UNTS,  1970,  p.  328. 
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104 action  tending  to  change  that  form".  146 
This  means  implicitly  that  any  intervention  on  the  side  of  insurgents  seeking  to  change  the 
form  of  Government  of  member  States  is  a  clear  violation  of  Article  8  of  the  Pact. 
However,  assistance  to  keep  the  legal  Government  in  power  seems  to  be  perfectly  legal. 
Thus,  the  intervention  of  Egypt  for  many  years  on  the  side  of  the  Republican  Government 
in  the  civil  war  in  Yemen,  has  never  been  labled  as  illegal  by  the  league. 
2.4.  Other  Cases 
Many  important  multilateral  agreements  stress  the  principle  of  non-intervention,  examples 
include: 
First,  the  Treaty  of  Amity  and  Cooperation  in  South-East  Asia  of  February  24th,  1976 
between  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  The  Philippines,  Singapore  and  Thailand.  Its  Article  2/3 
speaks  of  non-intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  one  another.  147  The  aim  of  the  treaty 
was  essentially  to  protect  the  political  orders  of  the  contracting  parties  against  Communist 
insurgencies,  and  by  consequence  non-intervention  does  not  apply  to  mutual  assistance 
between  the  legal  Governments,  in  combating  any  threat  of  Communist  Revolts. 
Second,  the  Charter  of  the  Islamic  Conference  includes  among  its  principles  (Article  IT/  13 
2-Respect  for  the  right  of  self-determination  and  non  -interference  in  the  domestic  affairs 
of  member  States).  However,  it  seems  that  in  the  instance  of  the  Afghan  Civil  War,  the 
Conference  was  essentially  hostile  to  the  Soviet  intervention,  '  48  because  it  denied  the 
Afghan  people  their  right  to  determine  their  destiny  freely.  In  fact  the  Afghan  insurgents 
received  openly  substantial  amounts  of  assistance  from  Pakistan,  Saudi  Arabia  and  Egypt. 
Third,  the  Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe  in  its  Final  Act  on  August 
Ist,  1975  under  Part  VI  states  that: 
"They  [the  Contracting  Parties]  will,  Inter  alla,  refrain  from  direct  or  indirect 
assistance  to  terrorist  activities,  or  to  subversive  or  other  activities  directed  towards 
the  violent  overthrow  of  the  regime  of  another  participating  State".  149 
Thus,  there  is  a  clear  reference  to  the  prohibition  of  any  assistance  to  those  seeking  to 
overthrow  violently  the  political  regime  of  their  States,  and  an  absence  of  any  reference  to 
the  legality  of  assistance  of  established  Governments,  however,  it  must  be  stressed  that  the 
Warsaw  Pact  and  the  NATO  arrangements  were  created,  among  other  things,  to  protect  the 
political  regimes  of  member  States,  and  by  consequence  their  primary  object  is  to  assist  any 
Government  which  is  threatened  by  violence  and  revolt. 
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105 The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  practice  of  States,  is  that  the  principle  of  non- 
intervention  is  declared  as  essential  to  any  bilateral  or  multilateral  understanding.  Also, 
there  is  a  general  consensus  that  non-  intervention  in  civil  wars  is  a  very  important 
component  of  the  principle.  However,  'non-intervention  in  civil  wars'  applies  essentially 
to  insurgents,  third  States  are  explicitly  prohibited  from  assisting  such  insurgents  on 
whatever  groud.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  some  toleration  of  the  legality  of  assistance  to 
the  legal  Government,  which  means  that  the  traditional  rule  is  with  us  for  some  time,  if  not 
forever. 
This  result  in  my  view  is  not  strange,  since  established  Governments  would  like  to  keep 
the  monopoly  of  receiving  assistance  and  aid,  for  themselves  and  deny  their  opponents  any 
such  right.  This  is  the  logic  of  an  international  system  which  is  based  upon  States  and  the 
traditional  rule  serves  it  well. 
Further,  the  fertile  ground  of  revolution  is  the  Third  World,  and  the  reality  is  that  few 
Governments  in  this  world,  would  survive  any  armed  resistance  to  their  rule,  without 
external  aid.  This  means  that  on  the  legal  field,  the  traditional  rule  has  no  lack  of 
supporters. 
C.  Non-Interiention  in  the  Context  of  Protocol  11  of  1977 
From  the  very  start  of  the  efforts  to  codify  an  instrument  relating  to  internal  conflicts. 
The  question  of  intervention  occupied  a  central  position  in  all  the  discussions  which  took 
place.  In  fact  foreign  assistance  has  been  seen  as  having  the  effect  at  least  in  some  cases, 
of  encouraging  the  internal  conflict  or  even  of  creating  it,  and  even  the  ICRC  which  is  very 
reluctant  to  voice  its  opinion,  admitted  that  its  experience  in  the  field  has  taught  it  that 
unless  aid  is  humanitarian  "it  will  always  give  a  greater  scope  to  the  conflict  and 
consequently  increase  the  number  of  victims".  150  This  proves  that  the  question  of 
intervention  is  not  only  a  theoretical  problem,  in  reality  it  has  a  direct  impact  on  the 
application  of  humanitarian  law. 
In  this  respect  the  majority  experts  of  the  ICRC  were  of  the  opinion  that  when  assistance 
by  third  States  to  either  party  of  the  internal  conflict  takes  the  form  of  the  dispatch  of 
armed  forces  taking  regular  part  in  the  hostilities,  or  when  these  forces  are  sufficiently 
large  to  modify  the  balance  of  the  warring  factions,  in  that  case  the  nature  of  the  conflict 
will  be  modified.  The  internal  conflict  becomes  an  international  one,  151  with  the 
consequence  that  all  humanitarian  rules  would  be  applicable  to  the  conflict. 
It  must  be  noted  here  that  the  experts  did  not  distinguish  between  assistance  given  to  the 
legal  Government  or  the  insurgents,  the  two  parties  were  treated  alike,  and  it  seems  that  is 
the  reason  why  their  opinion  had  no  real  impact  on  Government  experts  and  later  on  the 
draft  Protocol  11  submitted  by  the  ICRC  to  the  DCDHL.  In  fact,  their  opinion  gave  priority 
to  humanitarian  motives  rather  than  to  demands  of  sovereignty. 
At  the  CGEDHL  (of  1972),  some  experts,  especially  from  the  Third  World  insisted  on 
150  CGEDHL,  (Geneva  24  May-12  June  1971:  V.  Protection  of  Victims  of  Non-Internationat  Armed 
confticts).  Submitted  by  the  ICRC.  p.  18. 
1511bid, 
p.  19. 
106 including  a  reference  to  the  princiPle  of  non-  intervention  and  sovereignty152  in  the 
Preamble  of  the  Draft  Protocol  IT.  Also,  it  has  been  stressed  that: 
"The  prerequisite  for  the  satisfactory  implementation  of  Protocol  Il  should  be  the 
non-  intervention  of  any  State  in  the  affairs  of  another".  153 
This,  in  fact,  expresses  the  fear  of  Third  World  States  that  humanitarian  law  might  be  a 
vehicle  for  foreign  intervention 
' 
hence  it  was  necessary  to  make  it  clear  that  all  its 
application  closely  connected  with  a  total  adherence  to  the  principle  of  non-  intervention. 
It  must  be  noted  that  the  discussions  did  not  touch  directly  on  the  question  of  the 
legitimacy  of  aid  to  established  Government,  although  the  recurrent  insistence  upon  the 
right  of  the  Government  to  build  up  its  own  political  system  and  its  right  to  defend  that 
system  in  events  of  a  conflict  arising  between  the  authority  and  insurgents,  may  implicitly 
include  the  right  of  that  Government  to  ask  for  foreign  help. 
The  ICRC  Draft  Protocol  11  submitted  to  the  DCDHL  a  provision  (Article  4:  Non- 
Intervention)  which  reads  as  gollows: 
"Nothing  in  the  present  Protocol  shall  be  interpreted  as  affecting  the  sovereignty  of 
States  or  as  authorising  third  States  to  intervene  in  the  armed  conflict".  154 
It  must  be  noted  that  at  the  very  start  of  the  DCDHL,  some  delegations  especially  from  the 
Third  World  let  it  be  known  that  their  attitude  to  the  Protocol  11  as  a  whole  will  depend  on 
how  foreign  interference  can  be  precluded  by  the  Protocol.  In  that  respect  the  Mexican 
representative  stressed  that  his  delegation: 
"...  [C]onsidered  it  essential  that  Protocol  11  should  safeguard  the  sovereign  rights  of 
States.  In  the  past  and  even  very  recently  the  protection  of  actual  or_Possible  victims 
of  internal  conflict  has  been  the  pretext  for  external  intervention.  '  5'  ' 
Moreover,  Abi-Saab,  the  Egyptian  delegate  expressed  the  feelings  of  the  Third  World  States 
in  these  terms: 
"Several  delegations  from  the  Third  World  had  expressed  legitimate  anxiety,  however, 
about  the  possibility  of  Protocol  11  being  used  as  a  justification  for  intervention.  In 
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of  Protocol  11,  CE/COM  11/87,  Vot.  2.  CGEDHL  (2nd  Session  Geneva  3  May-3  June  1973.  Report  on  the  Work 
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lbid,  VoL.  8,  CDDH/l/SR.  24,  para.  14,  p.  231.  The  Mexican  representative  then  added: 
"Mis  detegation's  attitude  to  the  Protocot  as  a  whote  woutc!  depend  on  the  extent  to  which 
Artictes  3  and  4  (cleating  respectivety  with  the  tegat  status  of  the  parties  to  the  conftict 
nd  non-  intervention)  prectuded  the  possibitity  of  externat  intervention  in  the  domestic 
ffairs  of  States  on  any  ground  whatsoever". 
Para.  15,  p.  232. 
107 a  world  in  which  threat  as  well  as  acts  of  intervention,  military  or  otherwise,  were 
common,  it  was  important  that  those  misgivings  be  taken  into  cons  ideration.  "I  56 
He  then  suggested  that: 
"The  Conference  should  try  to  meet  that  anxiety  to  a  greater  extent  and  should  keep 
it  in  mind  in  drafting  each  of  the  Articles  of  Protocol  11".  157 
Thus,  the  Third  World  sees  behind  every  humanitarian  rule  a  possibility  of  intervention. 
This  reaction  is  sometimes  understandable,  taking  into  account  the  history  of  those  nations 
with  the  developed  world.  In  this  respect,  during  the  discussions  of  Draft  Article  4,  two 
important  amendments  were  advanced,  both  with  the  aim  of  reducing  the  possibility  of 
interventions  to  none.  The  first  was  tabled  by  Nigeria  and  co-sponsored  by  Iraq  and 
Venezuela  and  suggested  the  deletion  of  the  words  'by  other  States',  at  the  beginning  of 
paragraph  2  of  Article  2  as  adopted  by  Working  Group  B.  158  The  intention  of  the 
amendment  was  to  make  unlawful  all  interventions  either  by  States  or  other  organisations 
and  bodies  in  the  international  conflict. 
This  amendment  was  accepted,  but  on  the  clear  understanding  that  it  does  not  prohibit  the 
UN  from  performing  its  functions  in  relations  to  the  questions  of  the  protection  of  human 
rights  and  in  keeping  peace  and  security,  159  once  the  internal  conflict  threatens 
international  order. 
The  second  amendment  to  Article  4/2  was  submitted  by  India.  It  suggested  the  inclusion 
of  a  third  paragraph  to  Article  2  which  reads  as  follows: 
"3.  Despite  the  foregoing,  any  external  interference  in  a  non-  international  conflict 
as  defined  in  Article  I  of  the  present  Protocol,  shall  be  considered  a  violation  of  the 
present  Protocol,  which  will  cease  to  apply  till  such  time  as  external  interference  is 
removed".  160 
1561bid,  CDDH/I/SR.  24,  para.  28,  p.  234. 
1571bid. 
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Articte  4/2  as  adopted  on  4  and  5  March  1975  stiputates  that: 
"Nothing  in  the  present  Protocol  shall  be  invoked  by  other  States  as  a  justification  for 
intervening,  directly  or  indirectly  for  any  reason  whatever,  in  the  armed  conflict  or  in  the 
internal  or  external  affairs  of  the  High  Contracting  Party  in  the  territory  of  which  that 
conflict  occurs". 
10  ORDCHL.  MDH/1/238/Rev.,  p.  99. 
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See  In  this  regard  the  comments  made  by  Mr.  Obradovic  (Yugostavia),  Chairman  of  Group  8,  op.  cit., 
supra.  n.  155,  CDDH/l/SR.  29,  para.  50,  p.  295  and  especiatty  the  comments  of  the  Itatlan  detegate.  The 
tatter  stressed  that: 
0...  [He  woutd]  raise  no  objections  to  amendment  MDH/l/239  with  the  proviso,  however,  that  it 
couid  not  be  interpreted  as  preventing  the  UN  and  its  speciaLlsed  agencies,  or  for  that  matter 
any  other  organisations  dedicated  to  the  protection  of  human  rights  since  that  was  one  of  their 
basic  tasks". 
Op.  cit.,  supre.  n.  155,  MDH/I/SR  30,  para.  B.  p.  301. 
160  4  ORDCHL,  CDDH/l/240,  P.  16. 
108 The  Indian  delegate  explained  -that  subversive  activities  might  be  financed,  backed  with 
equipment  or  even  directed  from  abroad,  hence,  it  is  in  his  opinion  very  appropriate  to 
State  that  it  at  any  time  external  interference  occurs  Protocol  11  would  cease  to  apply.  Thus, 
the  Indian  amendment  was  envisaged  as  a  sanction  against  the  breach  of  the  Article  banning 
intervention. 
The  amendment  was  not  accepted,  and  was  attacked  by  many  delegations,  that  it  would 
lead  to  a  situation  where  the  victims  of  internal  conflicts  would  find  no  protection.  Also, 
it  has  been  argued  that  the  adoption  of  the  Indian  amendment  would  weaken  the  application 
of  Protocol  11,  since  everything  would  depend  on  the  subjective  assessment  of  the  parties 
to  the  confliCt.  161 
The  discussions,  however,  revealed  that  there  is  some  consensus  between  States  that  even 
in  cases  of  foreign  interventions  in  internal  wars,  the  basic  humanitarian  considerations 
contained  in  Protocol  II  will  continue  to  have  effect.  This  is  a  very  encouraging  result  for 
the  real  victims  of  civil  wars. 
Article  3/2  in  the  final  version  of  Protocol  11  stipulates  that: 
"Nothing  in  this  Protocol  shall  be  invoked  as  a  justification  for  intervening,  directly 
or  indirectly,  for  any  reason  whatever  in  the  armed  conflict  or  in  the  internal  or 
external  affairs  of  the  high  contracting  party  in  the  territory  of  which  that  conflict 
occurs".  162 
This  is  the  first  Article  in  the  era  of  the  Charter  dealing  specifically  with  the  question  of 
non  -intervention,  in  the  first  international  instrument  dealing  with  application  of 
humanitarian  law  in  the  said  conflicts.  The  Article  on  the  surface  seems  to  prohibit 
intervention  to  both  sides  of  the  internal  conflicts. 
The  travaux  prkparatolres  show  that  Third  World  States  especially  concentrated  their 
efforts  on  making  sure  that  insurgents  will  find  no  legal  ground  for  getting  any  assistance. 
Thus,  it  is  clear  any, 
(assistance 
to  insurgents  is  a  clear  't  hat`ý  violation  of  Article  3/2  of 
Protocol  11. 
On  the  other  hand,  Article  3  read  together  with  Article  I  of  the  Protocol  11  (the  latter 
defines  the  scope  of  the  application  of  the  Protocol  II)  will  lead  to  the  conclusion  that 
established  Governments,  would  easily  find  a  legal  justification  for  getting  assistance  from 
outside  sources,  simply  by  arguing  that  the  conflict  had  not  attained  the  character  of  a  non- 
international  conflict  as  defined  by  Article  1.  However,  whenever  Protocol  11  is  said  to  be 
applicable  to  the  internal  conflict,  the  room  for  manoevering  by  the  legal  Government  to 
get  foreign  assistance  is  severely  restricted,  if  not  totally  closed. 
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See  the  comments  of  the  Canadian  deLegate,  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  155,  CDDH/I/SR.  30,  para.  6,  p.  300. 
Moreover,  the  Austrian  deLegate  invoked  another  ground  for  rejecting  the  Indian  amendment: 
U  ...  (61  ecause  in  at  t  conf  I  icts  that  had  occurred  over  the  tast  two  centuries,  governments  had 
atways  stated  that  there  was  outside  interference,  the  new  paragraph  3  ...  might  serve  as  a 
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there  had  been  outside  interference". 
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109 D.  The  ICJ  Decision  in  Nicaragua  Case  and  Its  Impact  on  Intervention  in  Civil  Wars 
The  decision  in  this  case  is  very  important,  since  it  addresses  a  couple  of  very  important 
questions  concerning  especially  questions  relating  to  the  use  of  force,  such  as  intervention 
and  self-defence. 
Before  embarking  on  analysing  the  judgement  and  its  impact  especially  on  the  law 
governing  intervention  in  civil  strife,  it  is  important  to  say  that  the  present  Court  had  in 
Corfu  Channel  Case  condemned  intervention  as  contrary  to  international  law.  It  stressed 
that: 
"The  Court  can  only  regard  the  alleged  right  of  intervention  as  the  manifestation  of 
a  policy  of  force,  such  as  has  in  the  past,  given  use  to  most  serious  abuses  and  as 
cannot,  whatever  be  the  present  defect  of  international  organisation  find  a  place  in 
international  law".  163 
In  this  respect,  Brownlie  comments  'the  value  of  the  pronouncement  is  decreased  by  its 
generality  and  ambiguity,  its  character  as  obiter  dictum,  and  absence  of  any  reference  to 
the  provisions  of  the  Charter'.  164  Despite  these  misgivings,  the  statement  is  important  since 
it  is  the  first  explicit  condemnation  of  intervention  in  the  history  of  international  Courts.  165 
In  the  Nicaragua  Case,  the  Court  addressed  many  important  facts  of  the  question  of 
intervention,  and  clarified  the  legal  position  especially  concerning  intervention  in  civil  wars. 
However,  it  is  important  to  analyse  the  content  of  the  judgement  concerning  all  questions 
relating  to  intervention,  because  they  are  closely  connected  with  each  other. 
1.  The  Status  of  Intervention  In  General  International  Law 
In  the  above  case,  the  Court  stressed  first  that  there  is  in  customary  international  law  a 
principle  of  non-  intervention.  It  held: 
*...  [T]hough  examples  of  trespass  against  this  principle  (of  non  -intervention)  are  not  infrequent  the  Court  considers  that  it  is  part  and  parcel  of  customary  law.  "166 
This  means  frequent  violation  of  the  principle  does  not  undermine  its  legitimacy  and  its 
claim  to  be  an  important  principle  of  international  law. 
The  Court  stressed  the  existence  of  the  principle  in  the  Charter  despite  the  absence  of  its 
explicit  stipulation,  it  explained  that  in  this  way  'it  was  never  intended  that  the  Charter 
should  embody  written  confirmation  of  every  essential  principle  of  international  law  in 
force'.  167  Then,  it  added: 
163COrfu 
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110 "The  existence  in  the  gpinioLi  .  uris  of  States  of  the  principle  of  non-intervention  is 
-L  .  168 
backed  by  established  i_nd7ýbstantial  practice. 
The  Court  invoked  different  resolutions  of  the  UNGA  relating  to  non-intervention,  as 
revealing  that  opinio  juris.  the  Court  then,  made  a  very  important  statement  concerning  the 
legal  force  of  those  resolutions,  among  them  the  Friendly  Relations  Declaration  (Resolution 
2625  XXV).  In  this  context,  the  Court  held: 
"The  effect  of  consent  to  the  text  of  such  resolutions  cannot  be  understood  as  merely 
of  'reiteration  or  elucidation'  of  the  treaty  commitment  undertaken  in  the  Charter. 
On  the  contrary  it  may  be  understood  as  an  acceptance  of  the  validity  of  the  rule  or 
set  of  rules  declared  by  the  resolutions  themselves".  169 
This  means  that  the  Court  treated  these  UN  resolutions  as  having  a  legal  force  by 
themselves,  this  is  true  especially  to  member  States  who  expressed  their  consent  to  those 
resolutions,  hence  the  Friendly  Relations  Declaration  which  was  adopted  by  consensus  must 
be  treated  as  having  an  independent  legal  force,  and  not  merely  as  an  authoritative 
interpretation  of  the  Charter. 
2.  The  Content  of  the  Principle  of  Non  -Intervention 
The  Court  states  in  general  that: 
"The  principle  of  non-  intervention  involves  the  right  of  every  sovereign  State  to 
conduct  its  affairs  without  outside  interference".  170 
Thus,  non-intervention  is  seen  as  the  other  face  of  sovereignty,  they  are  closely  connected. 
The  Court  indicated  that  the  principle  includes  among  other  things  : 
*The  principle  forbids  all  States  or  group  of  States  to  intervene  directly  or  indirectly 
in  international  or  external  affairs  of  other  States 
...  a  prohibited  intervention  must 
accordingly  be  one  bearing  on  matters  in  which  each  State  is  permitted  by  the 
principle  of  State  sovereignty,  to  decide  freely,  one  of  these  is  the  choice  of  a 
political  economic  social  and  cultural  system,  and  the  formulation  of  foreign 
policy".  171 
What  we  notice  here  is  that  the  Court  did  not  insist  on  the  'dictatorial'  character  of 
intervention,  which  was  advocated  for  a  long  time  (especially  by  the  Western  Doctrine)  as 
the  real  criteria  for  a  prohibited  interventions.  This  means  at  least  implicitly,  that  all 
intervention  which  have  the  aim  of  interfering  with  the  free  exercise  of  all  the  components 
of  the  principle  of  sovereignty,  are  prohibited,  whatever  their  character  may  be. 
The  Court  also  treated  the  delicate  question  of  'humanitarian  assistance',  in  its  opinion  to 
escape  the  condemnation  as  a  form  of  intervention.  This  form  of  assistance  must  be  given 
168 
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III 'without  discrimination  of  any  kind,.  This  means  that  it  must  be  given  to  all  parties  in  the 
internal  conflict,  especially  to  those  who  need  it  most,  who  are  under  the  control  of  both 
parties  to  the  internal  conflict.  The  Court  emphasised  the  following: 
"in  view  of  the  Court  if  the  provision  of  humanitarian  assistance  is  to  escape 
condemnation  as  an  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Nicaragua,  not  only  must 
it  be  limited  to  the  purposes  hallowed  in  the  practice  of  the  Red  Cross  namely  "to 
prevent  and  alleviate  human  suffering'  and  'protect  life  and  health  and  to  ensure 
respect  for  human  sufferings'  it  must  also  above  all  be  given  without  discrimination 
to  all  in  need  in  Nicaragua  not  merely  to  the  contras  and  their  dependents".  172 
This  is  a  very  important  statement,  since  first  humanitarian  assistance  may  be  used  for 
political  purposes  by  favouring  a  certain  faction  in  the  civil  war,  secondly  even  when  it  is 
given  on  purely  humanitarian  motives  to  one  faction  it  will  be  inevitably  interpreted  by  the 
other  faction  as  an  involvement  in  the  internal  strife.  Thus,  the  criteria  set  by  the  Court  are 
very  valuable  in  assessing  the  legality  of  such  kind  of  assistance,  also  when  acted  upon  in 
practice,  they  will  really  mitigate  the  sufferings  of  the  civilians  on  both  sides. 
On  the  question  of  whether  cessation  of  economic  aid  and  reduction  of  90%  of  sugar 
imports,  which  the  US  has  decided  against  Nicaragua,  constitute  intervention  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  the  latter,  the  Court  contended  by  pointing  out  that: 
"The  Court  has  merely  to  say  that  it  is  unable  to  regard  such  actions  on  the  economic 
plane  as  is  h  re  complained  of  as  a  breach  of  the  customary  principle  of  non- 
intervention.  "M 
It  is  clear  her  that  the  Court  has  abstained  from  evaluating  the  legality  of  the  above 
mentioned  acts  under  contemporary  international  law,  especially  under  the  ever  growing 
numbers  of  the  UN  resolutions  condemning  economic  intervention  in  its  different  forms. 
3.  Assistance  to  Insurgents-its  Legality  under  International  Law 
The  Court  observed  in  the  first  place  the  frequency  of  foreign  interventions  on  the  side  of 
the  insurgents,  who  are  fighting  their  own  Governments.  However,  it  did  not  include 
assistance  given  to  forces  fighting  for  self-determination  in  that  category,  in  fact  it  states 
that: 
"...  Vt  was]  not  here  concerned  wilh  the  process  of  decolonisation.  This  questions  is 
not  in  issue  in  the  present  case".  14 
This  means  that  the  Court  excludes  intervention  on  the  side  of  the  insurgents  fighting  for 
self-determination  as  understood  in  the  practice  of  the  UN  from  being  as  an  example  of  the 
prohibited  intervention. 
In  his  Dissenting  Opinion,  Judge  Schwebel  commented  on  the  passage  just  cluoted  by 
emphasising  that: 
1721bid, 
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112 *Yet  the  implication,  or  surely  a  possible  implication,  of  the  juxtaposition  of  the 
Court's  statements  is  that  the  Court  is  of  the  view  that  there  is  or  may  be  not  a 
general  but  a  particular  right  of  intervention  provided  that  it  is  in  the  furtherance 
of  the  'process  of  decolonization,  that  is  to  say  by  these  statements,  the  Court  may 
be  understood  as  inferentially  endorsing  an  exception  to  the  prohibition  against 
interventions  in  favour  of  the  legality  of  interventions  in  the  promotion  of  the  so- 
called  "wars  of  liberation'  or  at  ang  rather,  some  such  wars,  while  condemning 
intervention  of  another  character.  "' 
Obviously  Judge  Schwebel  is  not  happy  with  these  implications  of  the  Court's  statements, 
but  there  is  no  doubt  they  translate  faithfully  the  legal  developments  which  were  taking 
place  since  at  least  the  beginning  of  1960s. 
However,  apart  from  that,  the  Court  considered  that  intervention  on  the  side  of  the 
opposition  whether  directly  or  indirectly.  with  or  without  armed  forces  by  third  States  who 
share  the  political  and  moral  values  of  the  insurgents,  is  not  a  right  in  international  law: 
"...  [F]or  such  a  general  right  to  come  into  existence  would  involve  a  fundamental 
modification  of  the  customary  principle  of  non-intervention".  176 
In  other  words,  the  traditional  rule  which  prohibits  any  assistance  to  the  insurgents  is  still 
seen  by  the  Court  as  the  governing  rule. 
In  fact,  the  Court  found  that  even  the  intervening  States  on  the  side  of  opposition  did  not 
justify  their  actions  by  reference  to  a  'new  right  of  intervention  or  a  new  exception  to  the 
principle  of  its  prohibition'.  '  77  The  US  for  instance  justified  its  conduct  against  Nicaragua 
on  the  grounds  of  the  domestic  policies  of  the  Government,  its  ideology,  the  level  of  its 
armaments  and  the  direction  of  its  foreign  policy.  In  this  regard,  the  Court  noted  that: 
* 
... 
But  these  were  statements  of  international  policy,  and  not  an  assertion  of  rules  of 
existing  international  law.  "178 
After  that,  the  Court  stated  the  position  of  international  law  vis-i-vis  assistance  to 
insurgents  in  the  following  terms: 
"...  the  Court  therefore  finds  that  no  such  general  rule  of  intervention  in  support  of 
an  opposition  within  another  State  exists  in  contemporary  international  law".  179 
The  Court  also  stressed  that  acts  which  directly  or  indirectly  involve  the  use  of  force  and 
which  constitute  a  breach  of  the  customary  principle  of  non-intervention,  will  also 
constitute  a  breach  of  the  principle  of  the  prohibition  of  the  use  of  force  in  international 
relations.  The  implication  is  very  clear  assistance  to  insurgents  in  all  forms  can  be 
considered  as  a  breach  of  Article  2/4  of  the  Charter,  with  the  further  implication  in  that 
1751bld, 
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113 case  the  UN  may  intervene  to  stop  such  assistance  under  Chapter  IIV  of  the  UN  Charter. 
Moreover,  The  Court  emphasised  also  that  insurgents  are  not  in  a  position  to  request  aid 
from  outside  States,  it  considered  that  the  principle  of  non-  intervention: 
"...  [W]ould  certainly  lose  its  effectiveness  as  a  principle  of  law  if  intervention  were  to  be 
justified  by  a  mere  request  for  assistance  made  by  an  opposition  group  in  another  State".  180 
This  means  that  the  Court  has  pursued  a  status  quo  oriented  approach,  where  the  protection 
of  sovereignty  is  the  corner  stone  of  international  order.  Social  change  and  revolutions  are 
not  however,  prohibited  but  they  must  be  made  without  any  help  from  outside. 
Thus,  the  Court  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  suggestions  for  opening  the  door  for  exceptions  to 
the  principle  of  non-intervention,  in  order  to  assist  insurgents  especially  those  who  meet 
certain  conditions  (such  as:  effective  control  over  a  substantial  part  of  the  territory,  wide- 
spread  support  from  the  population,  organised  military  command,  etc.  ). 
4.  Aid  to  Established  Government 
The  Court  it  seems  has  upheld  the  legality  of  assistance  to  the  established  Government,  it 
stressed  it  in  the  followinfterms: 
*  ...  [I]ndeed  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  would  remain  of  the  principle  of  non- 
intervention  in  international  law,  if  intervention,  which  is  already  allowable  at  the 
request  of  the  Government  of  the  State,  were  also  allowed  at  the  request  of  the 
opposition".  181 
This  is  an  express  recognition  of  the  right  of  the  established  Government  to  seek  and 
receive  aid  from  third  States  in  the  event  of  civil  wars,  even  in  the  era  of  the  Charter.  182 
Thus,  the  Court  in  effect  confirmed  the  relevance  of  the  traditional  rule  in  our 
contemporary  era. 
S.  Self-Defence  as  an  Answer  to  Intervention 
The  US  tried  to  justify  its  actions  against  Nicaragua  (these  actions  include  a  substantial 
involvement  on  the  side  of  the  Contras  who  are  fighting  the  established  Government)  on 
the  ground  of  collective  self-defence  with  EI-Salvador,  which  in  its  opinion  was  the  object 
of  a  campaign  of  destabilisation  by  Nicaragua,  which  assisted  heavily  the  insurgents  who 
are  fighting  the  Salvadorian  Government.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  US  did  not  try 
to  justify  its  actions  on  grounds  of  counter-intervention,  which  indicates  they  do  not  offer 
1801bid, 
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182  The  Court  noted  that  international  law  does  not  prohibit  intervention  on  the  side  of  the 
established  Goverment  upon  its  request.  It  only  does  not  accept  intervention  on  the  request  of 
insurgents,  since  in  its  view  intervention  is  accepted  on  the  request  of  the  two  sides  Of  civil  war. 
It  held: 
"This  wouLd  permit  any  State  to  Intervene  in  the  Internat.  affairs  of  another  State,  whether 
at  the  request  of  the  Government  or  at  the  request  of  its  opposition  such  a  situation  does  not 
in  the  court's  view  correspond  to  the  present  State  of  International,  Law". 
Ibid. 
114 a  solid  legal  ground. 
Moore  has  in  fact,  advocated  that  'collective  self-defence'  as  an  answer  to  substantial 
involvement  by  third  parties  on  the  side  of  the  insurgents,  who  are  fighting  a  friendly 
regime.  He  considered  those  efforts  of  destabilisation  as  'a  secret  war'  which  Article  51  of 
the  UN  Charter  applies  to  them.  183  In  this  context,  the  massive  support  and  assistance  to 
the  insurgents  in  El-Salvador  given  by  Nicaragua  and  Cuba  constitutes  in  his  opinion  an 
'armed  attack'  in  the  meaning  of  the  UN  Charter's  Articles  3  and  53  of  the  Rio  Treaty, 
which  justifies  the  use  of  force  in  the  form  of  self-defence. 
He  gave  a  new  interpretation  to  the  phrase  'armed  attack'  which  in  his  opinion  means 
neither  armed  nor  "armed  aggression  is  limited  by  any  language  such  as  'direct'  which  could 
have  been  expected  if  the  draftsmen  had  intended  to  exclude  indirect  attack.  "184 
The  main  criteria  of  this  'secret  war'  is  according  to  Moore,  when  it  is: 
"...  [Clonducted  through  assistance  in  organising  Marxist-Leninist  controlled 
insurgencies,  the  financing  of  such  insurgencies,  the  provision  and  the  shipment  to 
them  of  arms  and  ammunition,  training  the  insurgents;  assistance  in  command  and 
control,  intelligence  military  and  logistic  activities,  and  extensive  political  support. 
085 
Furthermore,  that  war  includes  terrorist  attacks  and  subversive  activities  preliminary  to  and 
supportive  of  all  out  covert  attack.  To  him,  those  actions  are  a  real  danger  to  world  order. 
They  are  a  very  clear  violation  of  the  vision  and  intentions  of  the  founding  fathers  of  the 
UN  and  OAS  Charters.  He  then  suggests  that: 
"...  [A]t  the  minimum,  it  must  be  understood  that  an  attacked  State  and  those  acting 
on  its  behalf  are  entitled  to  a  rijqht  of  effective  defence  to  end  the  attack  promptly 
and  protect  self-  determi  nation"ý  86 
In  his  view,  State  practice  affords  many  examples  which  justifies  his  above  assertion.  187 
Judge  Schwebel  in  his  Dissenting  Opinion  in  the  Nicaragua  Case,  has  developed  an 
argument  which  does  not  differ  substantially  from  Moore's  view,  188  he  concentrated  on 
proving  that  the  US  actions  in  supporting  the  countries 
' 
in  Nicaragua  were  necessary  and 
proportionate  acts  of  self-defence,  in  response  to  Nicaraguan  support  to  Salvadorian  rebels. 
The  Court,  however,  refuted  such  a  stand.  It  held: 
183me 
maintains  in  this  respect: 
"The  right  of  individual  and  cottective  setf-defence  embodied  in  Artfcte  51  of  the 
Charter  to  appty  to  secret  indirect  armed  attack  as  wett  as  to  open  invasion". 
The  Secret  War  in  Latin  America  and  the  Future  of  World  Order,  80  AJIL,  1986,  p.  83. 
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me  cites  the  examples  of  the  Us  who  considered  the  substanclat  assistance  to  Insurgents  in  Greece 
in  1947  by  Bulgaria,  Albania  and  Yugoslavia  as  an  armed  attack.  Similarly,  France  regarded  assistance 
to  Algerian  rebels  from  the  Tunisian  base  of  Sakiet-Sfdi-.  Youssef  as  an  act  Justifying  self-defence. 
188 
For  a  critical  position  vis-h-vis  Moore's  stand,  see  J.  P.  Rowtes:  Setf-Defence  and  the  Charter- 
A  Reply  to  Professdr  Moore.  80  AJIL,  1986.  pp.  568-583. 
115 "...  [T]he  Court  does  not  believe  that  the  concept  of  'armed  attack'  includes  not  only 
acts  by  armed  bands  where  such  acts  occur  on  a  significant  scale  but  also  assistance 
to  rebels  in  the  form  of  provisions  of  weapons  or  logistical  or  other  support".  189 
In  the  opinion  of  the  Court  then,  the  expression  of  'armed  attack'  in  Article  51  of  the 
Charter  does  not  include  assistance  to  insurgents.  It  considered  that  such  assistance  may  be 
regarded  as  a  threat  or  use  of  force,  or  amount  to  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
other  States.  190 
Judge  Schwebel,  it  must  be  stressed  criticised  bitterly  the  Court's  stand  (on  the  question 
of  whether  aid  to  irregular's  may  be  tantamount  to  armed  attack)  he  believed  that  the 
Court's  interpretation  of  the  expression  'armed  attack'  departs  from  accepted  and  desirable 
law.  191  He  maintained  that  the  judgement  of  the  Court  will  not  contribute  to  the  progressive 
development  of  international  law,  because  it"failed  to  take  into  account  the  realities  of  the 
use  of  force  in  international  relations. 
Moreover,  Judge  Schwebel  made  it  clear  that  the  Court  has  sided  with  Third  World 
position  on  the  above  subject,  that  position  was  stated  in  the  thirteen  powers  draft 
submitted  during  the  discussions  on  the  definition  of  aggression.  192  Judge  Schwebel  stressed 
that  he  agrees  with  Stone  who  thought  that  the  Third  World  proposals  were  at  odds  with  the 
Charter  and  general  international  law.  However,  I  think  that  despite  these  criticisms  the 
judgement  of  the  Court  in  that  respect,  is  well-founded,  it  is  in  line  with  the  letter  and 
spirit  of  the  Charter,  since  any  enlargement  of  the  scope  of  'armed  attack'  will  not  serve  the 
purpose  of  the  Charter  in  keeping  peace  and  security  in  the  world. 
Also,  even  if  we  agree  with  Moore  and  Judge  Schwebel  that  substantial  assistance  to  the 
insurgents  may  constitute  an  armed  attack,  the  important  question,  is  who  is  entitled  to 
determine  that  the  assistance  has  reached  a  level  where  it  can  be  considered  as  substantial, 
and  what  are  the  elements  or  criteria  of  substantial  assistance. 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  Court  has  rejected  the  claim  of  collective  self-defence  on 
another  ground  in  the  following  terms: 
"...  [Namely]  there  is  no  rule  of  customary  international  law  permitting  another  State 
to  exercise  the  right  of  collective  self-defence  on  the  basis  of  its  own  assessment  of 
the  situation-where  collective  self-defence  is  invoked,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  the 
State  for  whose  benefit  this  right  is  used  will  have  declared  itself  to  be  the  victim  of 
'890p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  166,  para.  195,  p.  1068. 
1901bid. 
1911bid, 
para.  155,  p.  1182. 
192  The  Thirteen  Powers  Draft  on  the  definition  of  aggression,  submitted  by  Third  WorLd  States, 
specificaLty  stated: 
"When  a  State  is  a  victim  in  Its  own  territory  of  subversive  and/or  terrorist  acts  by 
Irregutar,  votunteer  or  armed  bards  organised  or  supported  by  another  State,  It  may  take  alt 
reasonabte  and  adequate  steps  to  safeguard  its  existence  and  its  institutions,  without  having 
recourse  to  the  right  of  individuat  or  cottective  setf-defence  against  the  other  State  under 
Articte  51  of  the  Charter". 
ibid,  para.  162,  p.  1187. 
116 an  armed  attack.  "  193 
Those  elements  in  fact  were  absent,  since  EI.  Salvador  did  not  declare  itself  to  be  an  object 
of  an  armed  attack  and  did  not  request  the  US  to  intervene  in  collective  self-defence. 
6.  Evaluation  of  the  Decision  of  the  ICJ 
The  US  representative  to  the  UN  commented  on  the  ICJ  decision  in  the  Nicaragua  Case  in 
a  meeting  of  the  UNSC  on  July  29th,  1986  by  making  it  clear  that: 
"We  [the  US]  believe  the  Court  has  fundamentally  misperceived  the  situation  in 
Central  America.  It  is  simply  wrong  on  many  of  its  facts,  and  the  Court's  conception 
of  the  relevant  international  law  is  seriously  flawed  in  important  aspects.  "  194 
This  is  the  US  official  position.  Moore  went  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  'the  decision  itself,  is 
a  tragedy  for  world  order  and  for  hopes  to  strengthen  international  adjudication'.  195  The 
focus  of  the  attack  is  the  ICJ  explanation  of  the  important  questions  of  the  use  of  force, 
intervention  and  armed  attack  and  the  relevant  legal  standards. 
In  my  view  the  Court's  judgement  is  a  very  important  contribution  to  the  development 
of  a  world  ruled  by  law.  196  It  attempted  to  restrict  and  not  enlarge  the  spectrum  of  the 
situation  in  which  the  use  of  force  and  intervention  are  allowed.  The  vital  question  of 
assistance  to  rebels,  on  which  scholarly  controversy  has  raged  for  a  very  long  time,  has  been 
settled  in  a  very  clear  way,  and  if  especially  strong  States  adhere  to  the  ICJ  standards,  the 
interventionary  activity  would  be  significantly  curtailed  in  a  very  significant  manner. 
1931bid, 
para.  195,  p.  1068. 
194SCOR,  39th  year,  Special  Supplement. 
195j.  N.  Moore:  The  Nicaragua  Case  and  the  Deterioration  of  World  Order,  81  AJIL,  1987,  P.  152. 
196For 
a  sympathetic  aprraiset  of  the  ICPs  decision,  see  R.  Falk:  The  World  Court's  Achievement,  81 
AJIL,  1987,  p.  112-116,  and  T.  Farer:  Drawing  the  Line,  81  AJIL,  1987,  p.  112-116. 
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DEFINITION  AND  DELIMITATION  OF  THE  SCOPE  OF  CIVIL  WARS 
1.  Introduction 
The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  reveal  the  extent  to  which  the  concepts  of  sovereignty  and 
non-intervention,  have  influenced  attempts  to  define  civil  wars.  States,  in  general,  are 
reluctant  to  accept  limitations  on  their  'sovereign  power'  to  qualify  the  nature  of  the 
conflicts  which  may  take  place  in  their  territories.  The  argument  of  non-  intervention,  will 
be  used  to  deny  the  capacity  of  any  third  party  to  determine  the  existence  of  such  conflicts 
in  their  territory,  and  the  argument  of  sovereignty  will  be  used  to  defend  their  freedom 
of  action,  in  such  cases  of  extreme  crisis. 
In  situations  of  upheveals,  States  want  to  retain  their  full  sovereignty,  in  order  to  combat 
their  internal  enemies,  without  any  fear  that  the  latter  may  claim  any  special  legal  status. 
In  my  view,  States  have  always  resisted  the  creation  of  international  norms  concerning  the 
conduct  of  civil  wars,  because  such  an  exercise  will  inevitably  result,  in  their  view,  in  the 
opening  of  the  door  to  intervention  by  other  States  in  their  internal  affairs,  and  in 
consequences  affect  their  sovereignty. 
In  my  opinion,  it  is  the  influence  of  these  two  concepts  (sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention)  which  made  international  law  very  slow  in  responding  to  the  problems  raised 
by  internal  conflicts.  States  will  not  easily  accept  restrictions  to  their  power  to  deal  with 
those  who  are  under  municipal  law  and  have  committed  the  most  heinous  of  crimes,  namely 
high  treason. 
2.  The  Importance  of  Defining  Civil  Wars 
The  most  important  reason  is  that  the  application  of  humanitarian  rules  will  depend 
essentially  upon  the  characterization  of  the  conflict.  Higgins  correctly  pointed  out  that: 
"...  [T]he  identification  of  a  major  conflict  as  either  civil  or  international  war  is 
essential  to  the  correct  application  of  the  relevant  legal  norms"'. 
This  means  that  in  the  absence  of  such  identification,  the  violent  situation  will  be  governed 
by  national  law,  which  is  very  harsh  towards  rebels  and  their  supporters,  it  means  also  that 
even  humanitarian  organizations  such  as  the  ICRC  will  have  great  difficulty,  if  not  face 
total  prohibition  in  getting  any  assistance  to  the  population  in  need,  since  any  attempt  on 
their  part  will  be  deemed  by  the  established  Government,  as  an  intervention  in  their 
internal  affairs. 
Another  important  reason  for  the  definition  of  civil  wars,  is  that  since  the  elevation  of 
wars  of  national  liberation  to  the  status  of  international  wars  by  virtue  of  Article  1/4  of 
the  first  Protocol  of  1977  (This  category  has  been  the  main  form  of  civil  war  in  the  sixties 
and  seventies)  we  are  left  now  with  the  real  cases  of  civil  wars,  which  occur  inside 
I 
R.  Higgins:  Internal  War  and  International  Law,  in  C.  E.  Black  and  R.  A.  Falk  (eds.  ):  The  Future  of 
the  international  Legal  Order.  Vot.  3:  Conflict  management.  PUP,  Princeton,  1971,  p.  85. 
lis independent  States,  which  have  realised  their  right  to  self-determination. 
These  States  are  mainly  in  the  third  world,  and  because  of  the  frequency  of  outside 
interventions  on  the  side  of  their  internal  enemies,  the  question  of  definition  or  in  other 
words  the  matter  of  the  existence  of  an  internal  conflict  within  their  borders,  has  acquired 
an  enormous  importance.  Those  States  combat  their  internal  opponents,  among  other  things, 
by  denying  the  existence  of  a  situation  which  has  the  characteristics  of  a  civil  war. 
Thus,  in  practice,  States  label  their  opponents,  as  terrorists,  thieves,  mercenaries, 
saboteurs,  etc.,  which  means  that  they  do  not  consider  them  as  other  than  common  law 
criminals. 
In  other  hand,  Nicaragua  labels  the  'contras'  as  'Somozan  MercenarieS,  2.  Further,  in  a 
letter  from  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Nicaragua  to  George  Shultz,  the  US  Secretary 
of  State,  it  is  stated  that: 
"The  announcement  made  yesterday  by  the  terrorist  forces  organized,  financed  and 
directed  by  the  United  States  of  America,  through  the  CIA,  that  the  Port  of  Corinto 
had  been  mined,  etc.  "3  . 
According  to  Nicaragua,  then,  those  elements  have  no  status  and  can  receive  no  protection 
of  humanitarian  law;  because  among  other  things,  they  are  implicitly  the  agents  of  a  foreign 
power  set  to  destroy  the  State. 
Similarly,  in  a  statement  by  the  Foreign  Minister  of  Afghanistan  in  response  to  an  earlier 
announcement  by  the  US  President  Reagan  concerning  the  proclamation  of  an  'Afghan 
Day',  it  is  stated  that: 
"The  pronouncement  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America  on  this  score 
have  nothing  new  about  them,  yet  it  is  surprising  to  see  as  to  how  a  great  demagogic 
and  deceitful  effort  is  made  by  Reagan  to  cover  the  crimes  of  a  handful  of 
executioners  and  !  Zrants,  masquerading  as  'Mujahiddin'  and  the  'fighters  for  the 
cause  of  freedom" 
. 
It  is  clear  from  these  statements  that  the  task  of  applying  humanitarian  law  to  internal 
conflicts,  and  especially  the  task  of  defining  them,  is  by  no  means  an  easy  exercise. 
States  may  very  well  cling  to  their  sovereignty,  by  denying  the  existence  of  a  civil  war, 
and  by  characterising  any  outside  attempt  to  uphold  such  existence  as  an  indesirable 
intervention  in  their  internal  affairs. 
3.  Definition  of  Civil  War:  Some  Terminological  Considerations 
A  host  of  words  are  used  to  denote  the  violent  events  which  take  place  within  a  State  and 
are  of  a  serious  nature.  Among  them  civil  war,  internal  war,  civil  strife,  and  the  most  recent 
notion,  "Armed  Conflict  of  a  non-  international  character'.  These  all  have  something  in 
common.  They  are  internal  as  opposed  to  international  events,  they  are  violent  as  opposed 
2 
UNSCOR,  39th  year,  (Supptement  for  Jan,  Feb  and  March  1984),  UN.  New  York,  1986,  UN  Doc.  S/16343, 
p.  87. 
3 
lbid,  UN  Doc  S/16395  dated  March  7th,  1984,  p.  86. 
41bid,  UN  Doc  S/16445,  p-120. 
119 to  peaceful. 
However,  civil  war  is  the  classical  word  for  the  violent  struggles  within  a  State  which 
involve  the  systematic  use  of  armed  force  and  divide  the  nation  deeply.  It  is  (civil  war) 
the  most  used  word  in  the  literature  of  international  law,  it  is  used  as  the  title  of  one  of  the 
first  and  original  books  on  the  subject  by  Rougier  (Guerres  civiles,  1903),  and  also  by  some 
recent  works  on  the  subject  such  as  Castren  (Civil  War,  1965),  Falk  (International  Law  of 
Civil  War,  1972)  and  Moore  (Law  and  Civil  War  in  the  Modern  World,  1974).  Moreover, 
some  recent  articles  still  use  this  term  such  as  is  the  case  of  Cassess  (La  guerre  civile  et  le 
droit  international,  1986). 
Similarly,  some  Governments  use  the  same  term  in  official  documents.  Thus,  in  a 
communiquk  dated  March  26th,  1984,  the  Government  of  Nicaragua  stated  that: 
"...  [F]urthermore  the  civil  war  in  the  fraternal  nation  of  El  Salvador...  "5. 
In  the  era  of  the  UN  Charter,  the  term  'war'  has  been  out  of  fashion  it  has  been  replaced 
by  the  term  'armed  conflict'  the  reason  being  essentially,  to  end  all  the  legal  and  practical 
controversies  concerning  the  question  of  the  existence  of  a  'state  of  war'  which  plagued  the 
League  of  Nations.  However,  this  change  has  been  made  essentially  in  relation  to 
international  conflicts. 
The  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949  have  in  fact,  extended  this  change  to  internal  conflict 
as  well,  common  Article  3  speaks  of  "armed  conflicts  of  a  non-  international  character'.  The 
word  has  since  been  used  frequently,  by  the  UNGA  and  by  the  UN  Secretary-General,  and 
numerous  resolutions  used  the  term  especially  those  adopted  in  connection  with  the  subject 
of  human  rights  in  armed  conflicts.  Finally,  Protocol  11  of  1977  used  the  same  term,  indeed 
it  designated  the  subject  matter  of  the  whole  Protocol. 
However,  the  word  civil  war  will  be  used  together  with  the  term  'Armed  conflict  of  non- 
international  character'.  Since  the  latter,  has  been  interpreted,  especially  in  Protocol  11  of 
1977  to  mean  the  same  thing  as  'civil  war'  in  classical  international  law,  as  I  will  try  to  show 
in  the  coming  sections. 
After  these  preliminary  remarks,  it  seems  to  me  that  in  order  to  cover  the  subject  of  this 
chapter,  it  is  necessary  to  deal  first,  the  various  distinctions  between  civil  wars  and  other 
forms  of  violence  which  occur  within  States. 
Secondly,  the  legality  of  civil  wars  in  international  law.  Thirdly,  the  definition  of  civil 
wars  under  customary  international  law.  Moreover,  the  views  of  classical  writers  and  the 
influence  of  the  concepts  of  recognition  of  insurgency  and  belligerency  on  the  definition 
of  civil  wars  will  also  be  dealt  with.  Fourthly,  the  definition  of  non-  international  armed 
conflicts  in  the  context  of  Common  Article  3  will  be  examined.  Finally,  the  definition  of 
non-  international  armed  conflicts  under  Protocol  11  will  be  assessed. 
SECTION  1:  Distinctions  between  Civil  Wars  and  other  Forms  of  Violence  which  Occur 
within  the  State 
The  distinction  between  civil  wars  or  non-international  armed  conflicts  and  other  forms  of 
5  Ibid.  UN  Doc  S/16440,  p.  117. 
120 collective  violence  against  the  established  Government,  which  may  break  out  inside  a  given 
State,  such  as  rebellion,  insurrection,  riots  and  internal  tensions,  is  very  important,  since 
humanitarian  rules  may  apply  only  in  situations  of  civil  wars,  that  is  in  situations  which 
attain  a  certain  degree  of  intensity,  duration  and  organisation.  Lesser  forms  of  violence  are 
covered  by  the  national  law  of  the  country. 
However,  the  distinctions  are  by  no  means  easy  to  make,  especially  at  the  beginning  of 
the  violent  events,  since  it  is  in  the  interests  of  the  established  Government  to  leave  the 
situation  ambiguous,  in  order  to  claim  their  full  sovereign  right  to  suppress  the  violence  by 
all  means  at  its  disposal,  without  any  international  legal  restraints. 
Nevertheless,  some  writers  have  tried  to  make  such  distinctions.  Thus,  Rougier  after 
observing  that: 
"Une  grande  confusion  rýgne  dans  la  terminologie  employ6e  pour  ddsigner  les  degr6s 
de  trouble  moindres  que  la  guerre  civile;  les  mots  dmeute,  insurrection,  soulývement, 
rebellion,  s6dition  sont  constamment  employ6s  comme  synonymes"6. 
He  then  tried  to  clarify  the  matter  by  dividing  these  different  kinds  of  troubles,  according 
to  their  gravity  and  importance,  in  the  following  fashion: 
"Au  premier  degr6:  tmeute  ou  insurrection,  au  2ýme  degr6:  souMvement  ou  rebellion, 
au  36me  degrd:  guerre  civile". 
According  to  him,  insurrections  are  characterized  by  their  localization,  usually  they  do  not 
extend  beyond  a  small  region  of  the  national  territory,  they  are  of  very  short  duration, 
however,  they  may  become  civil  wars,  if  they  spread  to  the  whole  territory  and  be 
prolonged.  Essentially  they  are  crimes  under  municipal  law,  as  they  are  not  recognized  by 
international  law. 
Rougier  defines  Tebellion  by  stating  that: 
"D'une  manitre  g6ndrale,  on  peut  dire  qu'il  ya  rebellion  lorsqu'une  partie  de  la 
nation  est  dans  un  dtat  permanent  de  r6sistance  et  de  r6volte  envers  le  souverain  et 
qu'elle  mpifeste  son  hostilit6  par  des  prises  d'armes.  des  violences  Mg6res  et  des 
dmeutes". 
He  then  adds  that: 
"Trop  faible  encore  pour  se  poser  rdsolument  en  adversaire  et  en  rival  du 
gouvernement  assez  fort  pour  lui  faire  tete,  la  partie  insurg6e  essaye  d'agir  par 
menace  et  intimidation"8. 
Riots  and  rebellions  may  lack  organization,  and  develop  to  mere  acts  of  looting  and 
disorder.  They  always  fall  under  the  authority  of  the  local  law. 
6Rougier, 
op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  2,  n.  62,  p.  33. 
71bid, 
p.  38. 
81bid. 
121 Vattel  distinguishes  between  five  different  kinds  of  disorders,  which  may  disrupt  the  State 
and  force  the  sovereign  to  use  armed  forces.  They  are:  (i)  popular  tumult;  (ii)  sedition,  (iii) 
insurrection;  (iv)  rebellion;  and  (v)  civil  wars.  The  classification  is  made  according  to  the 
seriousness  of  the  disorder. 
(i)  Popular  tumult  is: 
"...  [A]  disorderly  gathering  of  people  who  refuse  to  listen  to  the  voice  of  their 
superiors  whether  they  be  disaffected  towards  their  superiors  themselves  or  merely 
towards  certain  private  individuals".  9 
It  seems  that  this  form  of  disorder  is  very  easy  to  contain,  hence  it  does  not  pose  any  real 
difficulty  to  the  authorities,  the  sovereign  is  not  directly  challenged,  local  law  exclusively 
governs  the  situation.  Vattel  then  adds  that: 
"...  If  the  anger  of  the  people  is  directed  particularly  against  the  magistrates  or  other 
officers  invested  with  public  authority,  and  if  it  is  carried  so  far  as  to  result  in 
positive  disobedience  or  acts  of  violence,  the  movement  is  called  sedition"10. 
(ii)  Sedition  may  develop  into  insurrection  which  is  more  serious  when  'the  evil  extends 
and  wins  over  the  majority  of  the  citizens  in  a  town  or  province,  and  gains  strength  that 
the  sovereign  is  no  longer  obeyed"'. 
(iii)  Insurrection  according  to  Vattel  is  essentially  a  local  phenomenon,  in  other  words  it 
is  strong  but  it  is  based  in  a  specific  region  of  the  country  as  opposed  to  the  country  as  a 
whole. 
(iv)  Rebellion  on  the  other  hand  'only  applied  to  an  uprising  against  the  lawful  authority, 
which  is  lacking  in  any  semblance  of  justice'12.  Thus,  it.  is  'the  injustice  of  the  legal 
government'  criteria  which  distinguishes  rebellion,  implying  that  the  uprising  is  serious  and 
is  not  confined  to  a  particular  region  of  the  country. 
(v)  Finally,  rebellion  may  develop  into  full  civil  war,  when  the  rebels  become  sufficiently 
strong  to  make  a  stand  against  him  [the  Sovereign]  and  force  him  to  make  formal  war  upon 
them'13.  According  to  Vattel  then,  only  civil  war,  as  we  will  show  in  the  coming  sections, 
can  draw  the  attention  of  international  law,  because  in  fact,  it  resembles  international  wars 
between  States. 
Implicitly  then,  all  other  forms  rest  exclusively  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  the 
State,  sovereignty  overrides  any  other  considerations.  Padelford  maintains  that  there  is 
something  in  common  between  revolt,  insurrection.  rebellion,  revolution  and  civil  wars. 
They  are  essentially  different  forms  of  the  same  thing  "opposition  to  and  an  endeavour  to 
9  E.  de  Vattet:  The  Law  of  Nations  or  Principles  of  Natural  Law.  'Vot.  3,  translated  by  C.  G.  Fenwick, 
Carnegie  Institution  of  Washington,  1916,  p.  336. 
10  Ibid. 
11  Ibid. 
12  Ibid,  p.  338. 
13  Ibid. 
122 bring  about  an  alteration  of  the  institutions  or  policies  of  an  established  government"14.  He 
then  distinguishes  between  three  important  degrees  of  disorders:  (i)  insurrection,  (ii) 
rebellion  and  (iii)  civil  wars. 
(i)  Insurrection  or  revolt  "...  is  usually  confined  to  a  small  portion  of  a  country,  is  of  a 
relatively  short  duration,  and  is  supported  by  a  minimum  degree  of  organization".  '  5  In  this 
case,  the  legal  Government  will  resort  to  its  armed  forces  to  quell  the  revolt,  police  action 
cannot  cope  with  the  situation. 
(ii)  He  then  adds  that: 
"An  uprising  may  be  said  to  be  rebellion  or  revolution  when  the  opposition  embraces 
a  large  part  of  the  country,  forms  a  responsible  government  assuming  the  functions 
and  powers  of  such  over  the  territory  controlled,  and  places  disciplined  and  organized 
troops  in  the  field  against  the  forces  of  the  established  government"16. 
This  definition  in  practice,  makes  no  difference  between  rebellion  and  civil  war,  since 
rebellion  has  been  defined  as  a  very  serious  event,  involving  a  real  organization  of  the 
insurgents,  with  a  real  occupation  of  a  part  of  the  territory  of  the  State. 
However.  the  classical  statement  on  this  subject  is  contained  in  the  famous  Lieber  Code, 
issued  during  the  American  Civil  War.  Its  Article  149  states  that 
"Insurrection  is  the  rising  of  people  against  their  government,  or  a  portion  of  it,  or 
against  one  or  more  of  its  laws  or  against  an  officer  or  officers  of  the  government. 
It  may  be  confined  to  a  mere  resistence,  or  it  may  have  greater  ends  in  view  m17  - 
This  definition,  it  seems,  concentrates  on  the  targets  against  which  the  uprising  takes  place, 
rather  than  the  means  by  which  the  Government  fights  against  such  uprising.  There  is  no 
precision  on  the  duration  of  the  disorder,  and  no  mention  of  the  local  character  of  the 
revolt.  Moreover,  there  is  no  mention  of  the  relevance  of  international  law  to  the  situation. 
Article  151  defines  rebellion  as  follows: 
*The  term  'rebellion'  is  applied  to  an  insurrection  of  large  extent,  and  is  usually  a  war 
between  the  legitimate  government  of  a  country  and  portions  of  provinces  of  the 
same  who  seek  to  throw  off  their  allegiance  to  it  and  set  up  a  government  of  their 
ow  "18 
. 
Rebellion,  it  seems  is  seen  as  having  a  definite  aim,  it  is  the  setting  up  of  a  new 
Government,  in  a  particular  region  or  regions  of  the  old  united  country,  which  indicates 
that  the  term  is  employed  essentially  to  designate  a  war  of  secession.  Again,  there  is  no 
indication  that  international  law,  has  any  relevance  to  the  situation. 
It  seems  that  there  is  sufficient  evidence  to  the  fact  that,  firstly,  insurrections  and 
14 
N.  J.  Padetford:  International,  Law  and  the  Spanish  ClvR  War,  31  AJIL,  1937,  p.  227. 
15  Ibid. 
16 
Ibid. 
17 
L.  Friedman  (ed.  ):  The  Law  of  War:  A  Documentary  History.  VOLA,  Random  House,  New  York,  1972, 
p.  184. 
18  Ibid. 
123 rebellions  as  forms  of  internal  violence  against  the  Government  in  power,  are  always  seen 
as  less  violent  than  civil  wars.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  Pan  American  Airwavs  v.  Aetna  Casualty 
and  Surety  ComiDanv  Case  (1973),  Judge  Franbel  stated,  in  connection  with  all  risk 
exemption  clauses  in  an  insurance  policy,  that: 
"...  As  the  all  risk  argument  develops,  it  becomes  apparent  that  reliance  here  is 
essentially  upon  the  concept  of  'insurrection'  a  somewhat  less  august  (more  embryonic 
smaller  scale)  attack  upon  a  Government  that  'rebellion',  and  a  less  momentous  and 
organized  conflict  than  a  'civil  war'.  19 
Implicitly  then,  insurrections  and  rebellions  are  left  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  the 
State,  the  Government  can  use  whatever  means  to  suppress  them,  this  leads  directly  to  the 
second  observation,  to  the  effect  that  third  States  have  no  right  to  intervene  in  those 
situations  even  by  protest. 
In  this  context,  in  a  note  from  the  US  Secretary  of  State,  Stimson  to  the  US  Consul  at 
Nogales  in  Mexico  on  April  4th,  1929,  at  the  time  of  an  armed  rebellion  against  the  legal 
Government  of  Mexico,  it  is  stated: 
"The 
...  [US  State]  Department  does  not  perceive  a  legal  basis  upon  which  to  found 
representations  against  bombardment  of  Empalme  by  the  forces  of  the  recognized 
Mexican  government  as  part  of  its  military  campaign,  thus  far  highly  successful,  to 
crush  out  a  rebellion  against  the  authority  of  that  government.  Nor  is  this  government 
in  a  position  to  substitute  its  judgement  for  that  of  the  regularly  constituted  Mexican 
authorities  as  to  the  wisdom,  propriety,  or  effectiveness  of  legitimate  military 
measures  and  gperations  undertaken  by  the  regular  Mexican  forces  to  crush  such 
rebellion,  etc.  "". 
This  statement  shows  clearly  that  in  cases  of  rebellions,  States  accept  the  duty  of  non- 
intervention  and  acknowledge  the  full  right  of  the  established  Government  to  take  all 
measures  necessary  to  halt  and  quell  the  disorder. 
The  conclusion  is  that  there  is  no  unanimity  in  stating  different  criteria  which  distinguish 
different  kinds  of  disorder  which  occur  within  the  State.  However,  the  common 
denominator  between  insurrections,  riots  and  rebellions  and  so  forth,  is  that  they  are 
generally  considered  to  be  within  the  domain  of  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the  State,  and  thus 
sovereignty  and  non-intervention  are  dominant  to  the  exclusion  of  any  international 
concern. 
The  Government  in  power  is  free  to  deal  with  the  situation  in  accordance  with  its  local 
laws,  which  consider  violent  disorders  as  crimes  against  the  security  of  the  State,  hence 
harshly  punishable.  In  this  area,  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention  weigh  against  the 
interests  of  humanity. 
It  must  be  noted  that  even  in  the  era  of  the  UN  Charter,  that  is  in  contemporary 
international  law  as  witnessed  by  common  Article  3  and  the  Protocol  11,  disorders  which  do 
not  attain  the  threshold  of  "non-  international  armed  conflict'  are  within  the  domestic 
jurisdiction  of  the  State. 
19 
Pan  American  World  Airways  v.  Aetna  Casualty  and  Surety  Cow4mny,  (Decision),  12  ILM,  1973,  p.  1466. 
20 
Whiteman,  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1.  n.  8,  VoL.  1,  (1963),  pp.  930-31. 
124 These  disorders,  are  officially  called'internal  disturbances  and  tensions'.  Thus,  Article  1/2 
of  the  Protocol  11  explicitly  states: 
"This  Protocol  shall  not  apply  to  situations  of  internal  disturbances  and  tensions  such 
as  riots,  isolated  and  sporadic  acts  of  violence  and  other  acts  of  similar  nature,  as  not 
being  armed  conflicts". 
This  paragraph  in  fact,  excludes  those  situations  from  the  field  of  application  of  Protocol 
11,  and  also  in  my  opinion  from  the  field  of  application  of  Article  3  since  the  latter  applies 
only  to  non-international  armed  conflict,  which  must  attain  some  degree  of  intensity  and 
duration  and  are  more  serious.  The  ICRC  in  its  documentation  submitted  to  the  first  session 
of  the  CGEDHL  in  1971,  has  defined  the  two  concepts  of  internal  'disturbances'  and 
'tensions'.  The  former  reads  as  follows: 
"...  [I]nvolves  situations  in  which  there  is  no  non-  international  armed  conflicts  as  such, 
but  there  exists  a  confrontation  within  the  country,  which  is  characterized  by  a 
certain  seriousness  or  duration  and  which  involves  acts  of  violence.  These  latter  can 
assume  various  forms,  all  the  way  from  the  spontaneous  generation  of  acts  of  revolt 
to  the  struggle  between  more  or  less  organized  groups  and  the  authorities  in  power. 
In  these  situations  which  do  not  necessarily  degenerate  into  open  struggle,  the 
authorities  in  power  4Zall  upon  extensive  police  forces,  or  even  armed  forces,  to 
restore  internal  order"11. 
However,  internal  tensions  are  defined  as: 
"...  [S]ituat  ions  of  internal  disorder-and  even  more,  those  of  civil  war-often  lead  to 
the  arrest  of  large  numbers  of  persons  because  of  their  acts  or  their  political  attitudes, 
this  phenomenon  is  likewise  found  in  situations  which  are  not  marked  by  acts  of 
violence,  but  which  reflect  internal  tensions  of  a  political,  racial  or  other  nature.  This 
evolution  is  also  due  to  the  fact  that  the  established  Governments  and  their  police 
dispose  of  such  powerful  means  of  repression,  that  an  armed  insurrection  is  often 
practically  impossible.  This  may  give  rise  to  situations  of  internal  tensions  which 
are  characterized  by  the  fact  that  the  Governmental  authorities  keep  full  control  of 
the  events  and  undertake  the  massive  internment  of  persons  they  may  consider 
dangerous  to  their  security..  22. 
Thus,  it  seems  that  in  internal  disturbances,  acts  of  violence  take  place.  which  leads  the 
Government  to  use  force  to  maintain  order,  whereas  in  internal  tensions  there  is  no  resort 
to  violence  by  the  opponent  of  the  regime.  However,  because  of  serious  tensions  force  is 
used  as  a  preventive  measure  to  maintain  law  and  order.  The  use  of  force  in  these  situations 
takes  the  form  of. 
" 
... 
[L]arge  scale  arrests-a  large  number  of  political  prisoners.  The  probable  existence 
of  ill-treatment  or  inhuman  conditions  of  detention;  the  suspension  of  fundamental 
judicial  guarantees,  either  as  part  of  the  promulgations  3f  a  state  of  emergency  or 
.3  simply  as  a  matter  of  fact;  allegations  of  disappearances 
21  CGEDHL,  (Geneva  24  May-  12  June,  1971,  Documentation  submitted  by  the  ICRC:  V.  Protection  Of  Non- 
International  Conflicts),  1971,  p.  79. 
221bld, 
p.  89. 
23Y.  Sandoz,  C.  Swinarski  and  B.  Zimmerman  (eds.  ):  Commentary  on  the  Additional  Protocols  of  8  June 
19T7  to  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  Aug.  12th,  1949.  ICRC,  Martintis  Nijhoff,  Geneva,  1987,  para  4476, 
p.  1355. 
125 Meron  seems  to  include  internal  disturbances  and  tensions  in  one  single  concept,  namely 
'internal  strife'  which  in  his  opinion  may  arise: 
"When  a  government  does  not  recognize  a  situation  involving  collective  violence  to 
be  internal  armed  conflict  but  nevertheless  resorts  to  extraordinary  measures  such  as 
emergency  regulations,  martial  law  or  state  of  emergency,  or  when  a  state  enacts 
legislation  which  permits  such  measures  without  categ?  rizing  them  as  such,  an 
4  internal  strife  situation  may  be  frequently  be  implicated 
However,  whatever  name  is  given  to  such  situations,  one  thing  is  certain,  they  are  not  at 
present  within  the  field  of  application  of  humanitarian  law. 
This  has  not  prevented  ICRC  from  acting  on  an  ad  hoc  basis,  indeed  Pictet  notes  in  this 
respect  that: 
"Au  cours  des  trente  derni6res  arindes,  le  CICR  aW  autoris6  A  visiter  et  assister  plus 
de  300,000  ddtenus  politiques,  dans  plus  de  80  pays.  On  le  voit,  c'est  devenu  l'une  de 
ses  activit6s  majeures.  Dans  la  moitid  des  cas,  environ,  on  se  trouvait  en  pr6sence  de 
troubles  int6rieures  et,  dans  les  autres,  de  tensions  politiques  sans  troubles  int6rieures 
et,  clans  les  autres,  de  tensions  politiques  sans  troubles  caract6risees  "25 
. 
This  indicated  that  the  absence  of  a  clear  legal  basis,  has  not  prevented  the  ICRC  from 
saving  lives  and  reducing  instances  of  inhuman  treatment. 
However,  despite  this  optimism,  Pictet  recognizes  that  : 
"Une  action  du  CICR  en  faveur  des  d6tenus  politiques  slimpose  done  sur  le  plan 
humanitaire,  mais  elle  est  d6licate  et  rencontre  souvent  bien  des  obstacles,  n6s  des 
exigences  de  la  souverainet6  dtaticlue,  de  la  soret6  publique  et  du  principe  de  non- 
6  ingdrence  dans  les  affaires  int6rieures  des  nations"  6. 
Thus,  sovereignty  and  non-intervention  may  very  well  be  used  to  justify  the  denial  of  any 
humanitarian  action  in  favour  of  the  victims  of  such  situations.  Indeed  there  is  nothing 
which  can  prevent  States  from  denying  the  ICRC  access  to  places  of  detention. 
Nevertheless,  it  must  be  stressed  that  situations  of  internal  disturbances  and  tensions  are 
not  cases  of  'no  man's  land'  where  international  law  has  no  relevance.  Human  rights 
instruments  can  play  a  very  useful  role,  since  they  contain  a  hard  core  of  non-derogable 
rights  and  prohibitions,  which  must  be  adhered  to  in  all  circumstances  including  times  of 
emergencies. 
in  this  way,  the  right  to  life,  prohibition  of  torture  and  inhuman  treatment,  the  right  to 
fair  trial  are  mentioned  as  non-degorable  Tights  in  universal  and  regional  human  Tights 
instruments.  In  these  situations,  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  is  limited  by  human  rights  law 
rather  than  humanitarian  law. 
It  must  be  also  stated  that  the  ICRC  and  some  international  lawyers  (especially  Meron) 
24  T.  Meron:  Human  Rights  in  Internal  Strife:  Their  International  Protection.  Cambridge  Grotius  Pub. 
Ltd.,  1987,  p.  103. 
25  J.  Pictet:  Une  institution  unique  de  son  genre:  te  Comit6  Internationat  de  is  Croix-Rouge.  Institut 
Henry-Dunant,  Gen6ve,  ed.  A.  P6done,  Paris,  1985,  p.  93. 
261bid, 
p.  91. 
126 have  inaugurated  a  new  approach  to  deal  with  the  situations  of  internal  disturbances  and 
tensions.  It  is  reported  that  the  intention  of  the  new  approach: 
0  ...  [I]s  not  to  create  a  new  body  of  law  specific  to  these  situations  (internal 
disturbances  and  tensions)  but  rather  to  recall  a  number  of  existing  fundamental  rules 
drawn  from  written  law,  customary  law  and  general  legal  principles,  rules  which  will 
thereby  be  better  applied  in  situations  of  internal  disturbances  and  tensions  and 
which  cannot  be  violated  without  offending  the  universal  conscience  of  mankind".  27 
28 
In  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  this  approach,  Grasser  proposed  a  code  of  conduct  , 
likewise  Meron  suggested  a  Draft  Model  Declaration  on  internal  strife29.  Both  texts 
proposed  that  certain  rules  must  absolutely  be  respected.  They  are: 
"The  right  to  life,  the  inherent  dignity  of  the  human  being,  the  forbidding  of  murder, 
torture  and  other  degrading  forms  of  treatment,  the  taking  of  hostages, 
disappearances  of  persons,  acts  of  terrorism  and  collective  punishment,  recourse  to 
force  out  of  proportion  with  the  objectives  sought,  human  treatment  of  persons 
deprived  of  their  freedom,  the  granting  of  fundamental  legal  guarantees,  the  rights 
of  the  Shild,  protection  of  the  wounded  and  sick  and  the  search  for  missing 
0 0  persons"  0. 
The  general  conclusion  of  this  section  is  that  in  customary  law  the  concepts  of  insurrections 
and  rebellions  were  widely  used  to  describe  situations  of  internal  disorders,  which  are 
exclusively  within  the  reserved  domain  of  national  jurisdiction,  hence  international  law  has 
no  relevance,  indeed  even  civil  wars  before  the  recognition  of  belligerency  are  purely 
internal  matters.  Fenwick  stressed  rightly  that: 
"It  is  well  established  that  civil  wars,  in  the  sense  of  struggles  by  different  factions 
to  obtain  control  of  the  Government  of  the  same  territorial  area,  belong  within  the 
class  of  domestic  questions  which  are  outside  the  control  of  international  law  "31  - 
This  means  to  me  that  in  traditional  international  law,  all  disorders  which  take  place  within 
a  State  whatever  their  intensity  and  duration  and  whatever  their  characterization,  they  are 
prima  facie  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  the  State,  until  the  recognition  of  the 
belligerency  has  been  granted. 
in  contemporary  international  law,  non-  international  conflicts  within  the  meaning  of 
either  Article  3  or  Protocol  11,  have  been  regulated  by  international  humanitarian  law. 
Internal  disturbances  and  tensions,  which  presumably  include  the  old  concepts  of 
insurrection  and  rebellion,  are  still  outside  the  ambit  of  humanitarian  law,  but  actions  of 
the  ICRC,  and  the  influence  of  human  rights,  may  mitigate  their  inhumanity,  and  States 
may  have  to  adjust  their  sovereignty  to  these  demands. 
27  Internal  Disturbances  and  Tensions:  A  New  Humanitarian  Approach.  IRRC,  1988,28th  year,  No.  262, 
p.  6. 
28H.  P.  Gasser:  A  Measure  of  Humanity  in  Internal  Disturbances  and  Tensions:  Proposal  for  a  Code  of 
Conduct.  lbid,  pp.  38-58. 
29T.  Meron:  Draft  Model  Declaration  in  International  Strife.  Ibid,  pp.  59-76. 
301bid, 
p.  6. 
31C.  G.  Fenwick:  Civil  Wars  Under  the  Control  of  International  Law.  32  AJIL,  1938,  p.  538. 
127 SECTION  11:  On  the  Legality  of  Civil  Wars  under  International  Law 
There  is  a  general  agreement  that  international  law  does  not  prohibit  civil  wars,  Pinto 
observes  that: 
"Illigale  dans  l'orde  jUTidique  inteTne,  la  gueTTe  civile  West  pas  interdite  paT  le  dTOit 
inteTnational  general"32. 
He  then  adds  that: 
"Le  gouvernement  l6gal  exerce  librement  sur  son  territoires  les  comp6tences  6tatiques, 
donc  I"emploi  de  la  force  arm6e.  Ses  adversaires  organisds  ni.  sont  pas  tenus,  par  une 
rýgle  de  droit  international  de  lui  en  r6server  le  monopole"  . 
Thus,  resort  to  civil  wars  by  a  section  of  the  population  of  the  State  cannot  be  considered 
as  a  breach  of  international  law. 
Some  writers  inferred  from  the  above  stand,  that  international  law  in  fact  encourages 
recourse  to  civil  wars.  In  this  context,  Padelford  argued  that: 
"International  law  predicts  its  existence  upon  a  system  of  sovereign  states  each  with 
exclusive  jurisdiction  over  its  own  subjects  within  the  national  domain.  Nevertheless, 
it  takes  cognizance  of  civil  disturbances  and  accords  them  an  equivocal  position  in 
its  system.  Uprisings  that  supremely  unlawful  in  municipal  law,  being  attacks  upon 
34  the  personality  of  the  State,  are  not  at  all  unlawful  according  to  international  law" 
. 
He  then  adds: 
"On  the  contrary  it  [international  law]  favours  them  by  advocating  admission  of  insurgents  rights  at  an  early  stage  of  hostilities,  thereby  exempting  the  rebels  from 
the  extreme  rigors  of  their  national  law,  and  makes  their  position  quasi-legal"35. 
Padelford  interprets  then  the  institution  of  the  recognition  of  insurgency,  as  the  evidence 
that  international  law  encourages  civil  wars. 
I  think  that  this  suggestion  goes  too  far,  it  is  true  that  international  law,  does  not  prohibit 
civil  wars.  This  being  so,  exactly  because  it  sees  them  as  internal  affairs  of  the  State  to 
which  international  law  has  no  relevance.  To  infer  that  international  law  encourages  them, 
is  an  untenable  suggestion,  since  it  goes  against  the  very  principle  of  sovereignty,  which  is 
the  main  pillar  on  which  international  law  is  based. 
Concerning  the  claim  that  the  institution  of  recognition  of  insurgency,  as  an  indication 
that  international  law  favours  civil  wars,  it  is  my  view  that  it  is  a  very  weak  argument, 
since  the  institution  itself  is  very  vague  on  its  contents  and  effects,  also  resort  to  it  in 
practice  is  very  rare,  and  in  any  event  it  is  considered  as  obsolete  at  least  after  the  era  of 
the  UN  Charter. 
32 
Pinto,  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  2,  n.  90,  p.  477. 
33 
Ibid. 
34  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  14,  p.  228. 
351bid. 
128 Scelle  on  the  other  hand,  maintains  that  not  only  international  law  but  constitutional  law 
as  well,  legitimizes  recourse  to  civil  war,  he  states: 
"D'une  part  le  droit  p6nal  fait  de  la  rebellion  soit  individuelle,  soit  collective  et  de 
la  s6dition,  des  actes  criminelles.  D"autre  part,  ce  meme  droit  constitutionel  en 
validant,  au  moins  partiellement  les  actes  des  gouvernements  de  fait,  et  le  droit 
international  en  organisant  la  reconnaissance  soit  des  insurgds  bellig6rents,  soit  des 
gouvernements  nouveaux  semblent  bien  admettre  la  16gitimit6  du  recours  A  la  force 
en  vue  de  l'occupation  des  compitences  gouvernementales,  puisqu'ils  font  de  cette 
36  occupation  un  mode  d'investiture  au  moins  plausible  de  ces  comp6tences"  . 
According  to  him,  it  is  impossible  to  prohibit  insurrections  Til  ne  garantit  par  des 
institutions  super-dtatiques  le  libre  jeux  des  constitutions  et  le  respect  de  la  souverainetd 
populaire  937 
. 
In  other  words,  only  when  respect  for  human  rights  is  adhered  to,  can  recourse 
to  rebellion  be  prevented. 
In  fact,  Scelle  argues  that  there  is  in  every  'ordre  juridique'  a  norm  which  authorizes 
resistence  against  tyranny.  He  writes: 
"Nous  pensons  qu'elle  existe  parmi  celles  qui  sont  fondamentales  sans  avoir  besoin 
38  d"etre  formuldes.  Elle  est  postul6e  par  1'existence  meme  de  tout  ordre  juridique" 
. 
It  seems  to  me  that  this  argument  is  not  valid,  since  there  is  no  actual  local  law  which 
permits  the  overthrow  of  the  established  Government  by  force,  also  there  is  no  evidence 
that  even  international  instruments  of  human  rights  contemplate  such  a  course.  It  is  against 
the  logic  of  State  sovereignty. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  argument  of  Scelle  that  'recognition  of  belligerency'  is  an 
indication  of  encouragement  by  international  law  to  civil  war,  seems  to  be  incorrect,  since 
the  institution  relates  primarily  to  the  application  of  the  laws  of  war  to  the  situation  of  civil 
wars,  which  have  been  recognized  as  attaining  the  level  of  belligerency.  It  only  indirectly 
gives  some  very  limited  legal  status  to  the  insurgents,  the  institution  also  has  been  of  rare 
occurrence. 
However,  there  is,  in  my  view,  clear  evidence  that  international  law  although  does  not 
prohibit  civil  wars,  it  nevertheless  does  not  encourage  them.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
international  law  essentially  favours  the  status  quo,  not  change,  within  States.  The  insistence 
that  States  are  absolutely  prohibited  from  giving  aid  and  assistance  to  insurgents  is  a  part 
of  the  answer. 
Rougier  in  fact  maintains  that: 
"...  [A]  son  d6but  la  guerre  vile  est  toujours  ill6gale,  merne  quand  elle  parait  bien 
motivde  et  16gitime  en  fait  9 
He  then  gave  the  legal  rational  behind  such  an  assertion.  He  writes: 
36G.  Scette:  La  guerre  civiLe  Espagnote  et  te  droit  de  gens.  45  RGDIP,  1938,  p.  267. 
37 
lbid,  p.  270. 
381bid, 
p.  267. 
39  Op.  cft.,  supra.  n.  6,  p.  25. 
129 "Non  seulement  elle  West  pas  1'exercise  dun  droit,  mais  elle  viole  les  droits  de  I'Etat 
attaqu6,  auquel  les  insurg6s  6taient  unis  soit  individuellement,  soit  collectivement  par 
un  lien  d'alldgiance,  une  promesse  de  respect  et  d'obeissance"40. 
Rougier  then  arrives  at  an  opposite  conclusion  from  that  of  Scelle.  In  fact,  he  denies  the 
existence  of  a  right  to  revolt,  and  implicitly  thinks  that  civil  war  is  forbidden  because  it 
violates  the  rights  of  States. 
Pinto  maintains  that: 
"Si  le  droit  international  ne  condamne  pas  la  guerre  civile,  il  ne  1'encourage  pas 
I'autorit6  exclusive  du  gouvernement  16gal-  qui  maintaint  lordre  public  sur  le 
territoire  nationale  doit  etre  respect6e  par  les  Etats  tiers".  41 
It  seems  to  me  that  this  is  a  correct  statement  since  it  goes  with  the  logic  of  sovereignty  and 
non-  intervention.  This  logic  in  fact,  stands  against  any  pretended  claim  that  international 
law  supports  and  encourages  the  ousting  of  established  Governments  by  the  use  of  force. 
The  UN  Charter,  although  not  prohibiting  civil  wars,  gives  no  evidence  that  it  encourages 
them.  Shaw  rightly  observes: 
"The  United  Nations  Charter  neither  confirms  nor  denies  a  right  of  rebellion.  It  is 
neutral"42. 
In  my  view,  the  UN  practice  largely  supports  this  contention.  Thus,  whenever  States  facing 
civil  wars  contend  that  third  States  were  behind  their  troubles,  the  typical  reaction  of  the 
UN  is  to  insist  on  non-  interference,  however,  without  pronouncing  any  view  as  to  the 
legitimacy  of  such  conflicts.  Also  States  accused  of  such  interferences  always  deny  such 
allegations,  which  implicitly  means  that  they  accept  that  international  law  and  the  UN 
Charter  do  not  encourage  civil  wars. 
In  this  context,  in  1958,  Lebanon  brought  a  complaint  before  the  UNSC  in  respect  of  the 
intervention  of  the  United  Arab  Republic  in  its  civil  war.  The  latter  rejected  categorically 
any  such  intervention.  The  USSR  during  the  discussion  considered  that: 
"The  settlement  of  questions  regarding  the  Lebanese  Government  was  the  inalienable 
right  of  the  Lebanese  people  and  so  no  other  Government  had  any  right  to 
intervene  "43 
Implicitly  then,  international  law  has  no  relevance  in  these  conflicts.  The  UNSC,  however, 
decided  to  dispatch  an  observer  group  to  'ensure  that  there  is  no  illegal  infiltration  of 
personnel  or  supply  of  arms  or  other  material  across  the  Lebanese  borderS,  44  which  means 
that  the  Council  supports  the  contention  that  civil  wars  must  not  be  encouraged,  because 
40  Ibid. 
41  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  32,  pp.  479-80. 
42  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1,  n.  148,  p.  555. 
43 
UNY,  1958,  p.  37. 
44  Ibid,  p.  37. 
130 they  will  eventually  endanger  peace  and  security  which  the  UN  seeks  to  guard. 
The  UNGA  on  its  third  Emergency  session  devoted  to  the  situation  in  Lebanon,  adopted 
unanimously  a  resolution  which  states: 
"  1.  Welcomes  [the  UNGA]  the  renewed  assurances  given  by  the  Arab  States  to  observe 
the  provisions  of  Article  8  of  the  part  of  the  League  of  Arab  States  that  each  member 
State  shall  respect  the  systems  of  Government  established  in  other  member  States  and 
regards  them  as  exclusive  concerns  of  these  States,  and  that  each  shall  pledge  to 
"45 
abstain  from  any  action  calculated  to  change  established  systems  of  Government. 
Implicitly  the  UN  does  not  see  any  role  for  itself  in  such  situations.  Thus,  change  or  status 
quo,  the  situation  must  remain  within  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  State. 
Similarly,  in  the  case  of  the  invasion  of  Cuba,  in  1960,  by  counter  revolutionaries,  Cuba 
accused  the  US  of  aggression.  The  US  representative  in  the  UN  stressed  that: 
"If  the  Castro  regime  is  overthrown,  it  will  be  overthrown  by  Cubans,  not  by  the 
Americans"46  . 
This  means  that  the  US  believes  that  the  change  of  Government  even  by  force  is  not  a 
matter  of  concern  to  international  law.  In  fact,  the  UNGA  did  not  produce  any  view  as  to 
the  matter  of  changing  Governments  by  force,  it  adopted  a  resolution  which  merely  notes 
that  the  UN  members  should  take  'such  peaceful  actions  as  open  to  them  to  remove 
tensions'47.  In  other  words,  the  main  concern  of  the  UN  is  to  keep  peace  and  security  and 
not  the  promotion  and  encouragement  of  civil  wars,  which  may  very  well  endanger  such 
peace. 
However,  the  practice  of  the  organization  establishes  one  very  important  exception;  in 
regard  to  colonial  situations  and  peoples  under  foreign  domination  and  racist  regimes.  The 
UNGA  especially-  has  established  their  Tight  to  rebel  in  order  to  exercise  their  right  to  self- 
determination,  and  also  their  right  to  receive  external  support.  In  this  respect,  the  Friendly 
Relations  Declaration  2625  (XXV)  provides: 
"Every  State  has  the  duty  to  refrain  from  any  forceable  action  which  deprives  people 
referred  to  above  in  the  elaboration  of  the  present  principle  of  their  right  to  self- 
determination  and  freedom  and  independence.  In  their  actions  against,  and  resistance 
to  such  forcible  action,  in  the  pursuit  of  the  exercise  of  their  right  to  self- 
determination,  such  peoples  are  entitled  to  seek  and  to  receive  support  in  accordance 
with  the  purposes  as  principles  of  the  UN  Charter  "48 
. 
In  later  resolutions  adopted  by  the  UNGA,  the  matter  became  very  clear,  armed  struggle 
is  mentioned  explicitly  as  a  means  of  achieving  self-determination.  Thus,  Resolution  3070 
(XXVIII)  stated  that: 
"2.  Also  reaffirms  the  legitimacy  of  the  peoples'  struggle  for  liberation  from  colonial 
45  Ibid. 
46  Keesing's.  1961,  p.  18155. 
471bid. 
48DIonovich  (ed.  ),  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1,  n.  79,  Vot.  13,  p.  340. 
131 and  for'  iF  domination  and  alien  subjugation  by  all  available  means,  including  armed 
struggleý 
Therefore,  apart  from  these  defined  situations,  the  UN  Charter  does  not  in  any  way 
encourage  civil  wars. 
The  conclusion  is  that  international  law  in  general,  old  and  new,  does  not  in  any  way 
encourage  civil  wars,  although  it  does  not  prohibit  them.  It  treats  them  as  exclusive  matters 
of  domestic  concern,  any  other  course  will  not  be  favoured  by  States,  it  will  be  against  their 
sovereignty. 
In  my  opinion,  this  is  the  best  solution,  since  it  is  well  known  that  international  law  does 
not  favour  any  specific  method  of  Government  above  another.  This  is  confirmed  by  the 
insistence  upon  non  -intervention.  Any  other  course  would  open  the  way  for  open-ended 
policies  of  interventions,  especially  in  our  contemporary  world,  where  two  opposing 
ideologies  are  espoused  by  two  powerful  blocks  and  each  favours  a  particular  method  of 
running  society.  In  this  context,  any  argument  in  favour  of  the  claim  that  international  law 
encourages  civil  wars,  will  in  practice  be  in  favour  of  the  powerful  not  the  weak. 
SECTION  III:  Definition  of  Civil  Wars  In  Traditional  International  Law 
This  section  deals  with  the  question  of  definition  of  civil  wars  in  the  pre-Conventional 
phase  of  1949,  in  other  words,  the  definitions  of  such  conflicts  in  customary  international 
law.  The  aim  of  this  section  is  to  find  out  how  civil  wars  were  defined  in  that  period,  and 
whether  the  concepts  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  have  played  any  role  in  that 
process. 
In  my  view,  the  customary  attitude  towards  the  question  of  definition  can  be  sought  for 
in  two  important  sources.  Firstly,  in  the  opinions  of  classical  international  lawyers  such  as 
Grotius  and  especially  Vattel.  Their  opinions,  it  must  be  conceded,  have  influenced 
subsequent  developments  in  various  fields  of  international  law. 
Secondly,  it  seems  that  the  institutions  of  recognition  of  insurgency  and  belligerency,  were 
real  attempts  in  customary  international  law  to  deal  with  the  phenomenon  of  civil  wars. 
The  conditions  of  their  applications,  constitute  important  indices  of  the  definition  of  civil 
wars  in  that  law  (customary  international  law). 
Moreover,  the  Lieber  Code,  even  if  it  is  an  internal  instrument,  contains  a  definition  of 
civil  wars,  and  thus  shed  some  light  on  what  States  understood  by  civil  war.  Furthermore, 
many  domestic  cases  also  refer  to  such  definition. 
A.  Classical  Writers  and  the  Definition  of  Civil  Wars 
Under  this  heading,  I  will  concentrate  on  two  opinions  of  two  important  writers-of  classical 
international,  namely  Grotius  and  Vattel.  The  reason  for  such  a  choice  resides  in  the  fact 
that  their  approaches  to  the  question  of  civil  wars  differs  widely.  Grotius  is  more  concerned 
with  the  rather  philosophical  question  of  whether  the  population  has  the  right  to  rebel 
against  their  sovereign,  rather  than  the  question  of  actual  definitions  of  such  wars. 
49  Ibid,  Vot.  14,  p.  448.  See  also  Resolution  3032  (XXVI),  fbid,  p.  353,  also  Resolution  3103,  !  bid, 
P.  512. 
132 On  the  other  hand,  Vattel  is  more  positive,  he  addresses  the  issue  of  definition  directly 
and  he  argued  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  international  law  that  whenever  the 
elements  of  such  definition  are  present  in  the  internal  conflict,  the  whole  body  of  laws  of 
war  must  be  applied. 
1.  Grotius's  Opinion 
Grotius  argued  for  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo,  he  is  in  principle  against  the  right 
to  rebel,  since  the  advantages  of  the  former  are  far  better  than  the  latter.  He  quotes  with 
approval  Favonius  who  'used  to  say  civil  war  is  worse  than  evil'50  and  also  Cicero  who 
'declared  that  peace  on  any  terms  between  citizens  seems  more  advantageous  than  civil 
war'51.  This  position  of  principle,  prevented  him  from  making  a  detailed  study  of  the 
characteristics  of  civil  wars,  the  difference  between  them  and  other  forms  of  violence, 
which  may  take  place  within  the  borders  of  the  State.  Most  important,  he  avoided  the 
fundamental  question  of  whether  the  laws  of  war  apply  to  such  conflicts. 
According  to  him,  civil  wars,  which  he  labels  as  'rebellion'  are,  as  a  general  rule,  not 
permitted  by  the  law  of  nature.  His  reason  is  that: 
"By  nature  all  men  have  the  right  of  resisting  in  order  to  ward  off  injury,  as  we  have 
said  above,  but  as  civil  society  was  instituted  in  order  to  maintain  public  tranquillity 
the  State  forthwith  acquires  over  us  and  our  possessions  a  greater  right  to  the  extent 
necessary  to  accomplish  this  end"52. 
He  then  adds  that: 
"The  state  therefore,  in  the  interest  of  public  peace  and  order  can  limit  that  common 
right  of  resistence-that  such  was  the  purpose  of  the  state  we  cannot  doubt  since  it 
could  not  in  any  other  way  achieve  its  end.  If  in  fact,  the  right  of  resistence  shogld 
remain  without  restraint  there  will  no  longer  be  a  state  but  only  a  non-social  hold  "  3. 
Consequently,  according  to  him,  the  State  as  a  form  of  the  organization  of  the  society,  is 
better  than  the  State  of  nature,  so  in  order  to  make  the  machine  of  the  State  work 
effectively  the  right  of  resistence  must  be  taken  away.  It  is  clear  that  he  has  a  Hobsian  point 
of  view  of  the  situation  in  the  primitive  state  of  nature,  where  only  the  strong  survives. 
As  a  result,  it  seems  that  he  maintains  that  any  pretended  right  of  resistence,  will  result 
in  a  turbulent  state  of  affairs,  which  nobody  wishes  to  experience.  Submission  to  the  will 
of  a  tyrant  is  'remedy  against  the  dangers  of  lawlessness'.  However,  Grotius  allowed  the 
right  of  resistence  in  very  restricted  cases  54 
. 
50 
H.  Grotius:  De  Jura  Belli  Ac  Pacfs  Libri  Tres.  J.  Brown  Scot  (ed.  ),  Vot.  2,  Clarendon  Press  Oxford, 
1925,  p.  161. 
511  bid. 
521bfd, 
p.  139. 
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54  Grotius  allowed  resisting  the  sovereign  in  the  following  cases: 
A.  The  right  to  make  war  may  be  conceded  against  him  who  has  the  chief  authority  among  free  people. 
B.  The  right  to  make  war  may  be  conceded  against  a  king  who  has  abdicated  the  sovereign  power. 
C.  The  right  to  make  war  may  be  conceded  against  a  king  who  abdicates  his  kingdom,  but  only  so  far 
133 The  conclusion  is  that  in  general,  Grotius  seems  to  see  resort  to  rebellion  against  the 
sovereign  as  unjust,  obedience  is  better  than  revolution,  the  latter  will  weaken  the  sovereign 
power  and  leads  to  anarchy.  To  me,  Grotius  sees  sovereignty  as  basically  a  good  thing,  since 
it  brings  peace  and  stability. 
2.  Vattel's  View 
Vattel's  opinion  is  very  interesting.  He  is  the  first  classical  writer  who  attempted  a  serious 
study  of  the  phenomenon  of  civil  wars.  He  explained  what  civil  wars  are,  he  also  argued 
for  the  application  of  the  laws  and  customs  of  war  to  such  conflicts,  in  this  he  is  innovative. 
He  distinguishes  between  different  forms  of  violence,  which  may  take  place  in  the  State. 
He.  in  fact,  reserves  "civil  war'  for  the  most  extreme  form  of  such  events.  He  writes: 
"Custom  applies  the  name  of  civil  war  to  every  war  between  the  members  of  the  same 
political  society,  if  the  war  is  between  a  body  of  the  citizens  on  one  hand  and  the 
55  sovereign  with  those  loyal  to  him  on  the  other" 
According  to  him,  civil  war  is  a  contest  between  he,  who  holds  power,  and  a  body  of 
citizens,  or  between  two  claimants  to  the  same  throne.  He  then  develops  the  idea  that  civil 
wars  are  of  such  intensity  that  in  fact  they  divide  the  nation  into  two  distinct  nations.  He 
indicates  that: 
"...  [C]ivil  war  breaks  the  bonds  of  society  and  of  government  or  at  least  suspends  the 
force  and  effect  of  them;  it  gives  rise  within  the  nation  to  two  independent  parties 
who  regard  each  other  as  enemies  and  acknowledge  no  common  judge  of  necessity, 
therefore,  these  two  parties  must  be  regarded  as  forming  thenceforth  for  a  time  at 
least,  two  separate  bodies  politically,  two  distinct  nations.  "56 
Implicitly  then,  the  rift  between  the  sovereign  and  his  opponents  must  be  very  deep,  that 
no  reconciliation  is  possible.  In  these  circumstances,  then  the  conflict  must  be  of  a  very 
high  intensity  and  must  not  be  confined  to  only  a  part  of  the  country.  The  forces  used  must 
presumably  be  of  near  of  equal  strength. 
Moreover,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  Vattel  did  not  pay  any  attention  to  the  justice  of 
cause  of  the  civil  war,  he  is  concerned  with  the  factual  situation  only.  It  is  the  latter  which 
reveals  whether  civil  war  is  present.  The  justice  of  the  cause  for  which  the  people  resort 
to  rebellion  is  irrelevant. 
as  to  prevent  the  transfer. 
D.  The  right  to  make  war  may  be  concede  against  a  king  who  has  Lost  his  kingdom  in  consequence  of  a 
commissory  taw. 
E.  The  right  to  make  war  may  be  conceded  against  a  king  who  openly  shows  himself  the  enemy  of  the 
people. 
F.  The  right  to  make  war  may  be  conceded  against  a  king  who,  possing  only  a  part  of  the  sovereign 
power,  seeks  to  possess  himself  of  the  part  that  does  not  belong  to  him. 
G.  The  right  to  make  war  is  conceded  against  a  king  In  case  liberty  to  offer  resistence  has  in  certain 
cases  been  reserved. 
H.  Resistence  by  force  may  be  used  against  a  usurper  by  virtue  of  a  right  of  war  still  continuing. 
1.  Resistence  by  force  may  be  used  against  a  usurper  of  a  mandate  of  one  possessing  power  (ibid, 
pp.  156-161). 
55op. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  9,  p.  338. 
56  Ibid. 
134 This  position  of  principle  in  my  opinion,  constitutes  the  legal  rational  behind  Vattel's 
revolutionary  view  that  the  laws  and  customs  of  war  should  be  applied  to  civil  war,  57  in 
other  words  it  is  the  factual  situation  in  a  given  country  torn  by  civil  war  and  not  the 
justice  of  the  context  which  determines  the  application  of  the  laws  of  war. 
In  fact,  his  non-interest  in  the  notion  of  just  war  at  the  international  level,  has  been 
extended  to  civil  wars.  Thus,  practical  problems  needed  a  practical  solutions  and  not 
philosophical  conceptual  izat  ion. 
But,  the  important  question  is;  how  to  reconcile  Vattel's  views  on  civil  wars,  with  the 
concepts  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention,  both  of  which  he  supports.  It  seems  to  me 
that  in  Vattel's  view  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  are  the  pillars  of  international  law 
and  international  relations.  However,  the  sovereign,  in  order  to  claim  the  benefit  of  such 
principles  must  be  in  control  of  situation  within  his  State. 
Thus,  whenever  he  loses  such  effective  control,  he  can  no  longer  prevent  other  States 
from  aiding  the  insurgents.  In  fact,  Vattel  gave  States  the  right  to  choose  whether  to 
intervene  or  not  in  a  civil  war,  and  also  the  right  to  decide  which  side  will  receive  their 
help.  In  doing  so,  they  are  not  infringing  any  rule  of  international  law.  In  this  way, 
sovereignty  and  non-intervention  are  intimately  linked  to  effectivity  and  not  to  legitimacy. 
This  advanced  position,  has  implicitly  gained  certain  success  in  customary  international 
law,  in  my  view  the  concept  of  recognition  of  belligerency  attests  to  that  effect.  Since  in 
order  to  apply  the  laws  of  war,  the  internal  conflict  must  attain  certain  degree  of  intensity, 
duration  and  discipline,  which  in  practice  means  that  the  nation  has  been  divided  into  two 
separate  States.  This  is  not  far  from  Vattel's  view. 
Apart  from  this  case,  Vattel's  views  have  never  gained  a  wide  acceptance  in  the  practice 
of  States.  Thus,  the  proposal  of  the  ICRC  to  apply  all  the  provisions  of  the  Geneva 
Conventions  of  1949  to  internal  conflicts,  was  not  successful  as  I  will  show  in  the  section 
dealing  with  common  Article  3.  Protocol  II  of  1977  also  has  not  changed  that  attitude. 
B.  Definition  of  Civil  Wars  and  Recognition  of  Belligerency  and  Insurgency 
There  is  no  international  instrument  which  defines  civil  war.  in  customary  international  law. 
The  only  international  instrument  dealing  with  that  subject  (civil  wars),  the  Havana  Treaty 
of  1928  contains  no  definition. 
However,  elements  of  such  definition  can  be  found  in  the  Lieber  Code,  which  is  a 
national  instrument,  also  in  some  cases  brought  before  national  courts,  and  especially  in  the 
concepts  of  recognition  of  insurgency  and  belligerency,  which  were  in  essence  the  legal 
response  of  customary  international  law,  to  different  problems  raised  by  civil  wars  such  as 
intervention,  international  responsibility  for  damages  to  foreign  persons  and  properties  in 
such  conflict,  and  also  the  question  of  application  of  the  laws  of  war  to  internal  conflicts. 
Before  analyzing  the  definitions  contained  in  those  instruments,  it  is  interesting  to  note 
that  civil  wars,  which  were  the  concern  of  customary  international  law,  were  those  which 
occur  in  'civilized  nations'.  'Savage'  and  'semi-savage  peoples'  were  not  recognized  either 
as  international  belligerents  (as  States)  or  as  belligerent  in  the  meaning  of  the  recognition 
57  Ibid.  For  a  futL  quotation,  see  infra  chapter  4,  n.  89  and  accompanying  comments. 
135 of  belligerency  (that  is  as  insurgents  in  a  civil  war).  As  a  result,  they  were  completely 
banned  from  benefitting  from  the  laws  and  customs  of  war. 
In  this  context,  in  1927  a  Captain  in  the  US  Army  observed  that: 
"...  [W]hen  combatants  and  non-combatants  are  practically  identical  among  a  people, 
and  savage  or  semi-savage  peoples  take  advantage  of  this  identity  to  effect  ruses, 
surprises,  and  massacres  on  the  'regular'  enemies,  commanders  must  attack  their 
problems  in  entirely  different  ways  from  those  in  which  they  proceed  against  western 
peoples"58  . 
In  practice,  this  meant  that  there  is  no  room  for  the  application  of  the  laws  of  war  in  such 
conflicts  whatever  their  intensity,  magnitude  or  duration,  which  means  that  no  quarter  is 
given  even  to  children  and  women.  Since  the  western  armies  have  at  their  disposal 
superiority  in  fire  power  and  military  tactics,  those  wars  were  practically  genocide. 
Similarly,  a  Colonel  in  the  British  Army  wrote: 
*In  small  wars  against  uncivilized  nations,  the  form  of  warfare  to  be  adopted  must 
tone  with  the  shade  of  culture  existing  in  the  land,  by  which  I  mean  that  against 
59  peoples  possessing  a  low  civilization,  war  must  be  more  brutal  in  type" 
The  British  Manual  of  Military  Law  of  1914  states: 
"It  must  be  emphasised  that  the  rules  of  international  law  apply  to  warfare  between 
civilized  nations,  where  both  parties  understand  them  and  one  is  prepared  to  carry 
them  out.  They  do  not  apply  in  wars  with  uncivilized  States  and  tribes,  where  their 
place  is  taken  by  the  discretion  of  the  commander  and  such  rules  of  justice  and 
humanity  as  recommended  themselves  in  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  case"60  . 
'Savages'  were  then  seen  as  incapable  of  attaining  the  status  of  a  lawful  belligerent,  wars 
with  them  were  neither  international  nor  civil  wars.  They  were  of  a  special  nature,  since 
military  necessity  overrode  any  concern  for  humanity. 
In  my  view,  these  past  attitudes  are  responsible  in  a  large  part,  for  the  present  Third 
World  lack  of  faith  in  and  suspicion  of  European  humanitarianism.  They  prefer  to  cling 
to  their  sovereignty  rather  than  believe  the  European  cry  for  humanity. 
Turning  now  to  the  definition  of  proper  civil  wars,  those  which  take  place  in  Europe  and 
the  Americas,  I  will  begin  with  the  Lieber  Code,  which  is  a  national  instrument,  however, 
it  reveals  what  an  important  State  like  the  US  understands  to  be  civil  war. 
1.  The  Lieber  Code 
The  code  stipulates  in  its  Article  150  that: 
"Civil  war  is  war  between  two  or  more  portions  of  a  country  or  state,  each  contending 
for  the  mastery  of  the  whole  and  each  claiming  to  be  the  legitimate  government. 
The  term  is  also  sometimes  applied  to  war  of  rebellion  when  the  rebellious  provinces 
or  portion  of  the  State  are  contiguous  to  those  containing  the  seat  of  government"61  . 
58G. 
L.  Bridge-Cotby:  How  to  Fight  Savage  Tribes.  21  AJIL.  1927,  p.  279. 
59J. 
F.  C.  Futter.  cited  by  Bridge-Coiby.  Ibid,  p.  280. 
60  Ibid. 
61Schindter 
and  Toman  (eds.  ),  op.  c1t.,  supra.  chapter  2,  n.  63,  p.  21. 
136 This  definition  in  fact,  stresses  the  objectives  of  civil  wars.  They  are  either  the  taking  of 
the  political  authority  in  the  State,  or  secession.  However,  the  definition  does  not  define 
with  precision  the  factual  criteria  of  the  conflict.  Although,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the 
definition  characterises  the  contest  as  'war'.  This  implies  that  the  confrontation  must  be  of 
high  intensity,  as  in  the  war  between  States.  But,  there  is  no  indication  on  whether  the 
laws  of  war  apply  in  such  conflicts. 
It  must  be  noted  that  in  1862  (before  the  adoption  of  the  Lieber  Code)  the  US  Supreme 
Court  in  the  Prize  Cases,  had  an  opportunity  to  make  an  important  statement  concerning 
the  meaning  and  scope  of  civil  war.  It  stressed  that  the  parties  to  'war'  are  not  exclusively 
independent  states.  It  held: 
"...  [I]t  is  not  necessary  to  constitute  war,  that  both  parties  should  be  acknowledged 
as  independent  nations  or  sovereign  states  o,  62 
. 
Then  it  added: 
"A  civil  war  is  never  solemnly  declared;  it  becomes  such  by  its  accidents-the  number, 
power,  and  organization  of  the  persons  who  originate  and  carry  it  on.  When  the  party 
in  rebellion  occupy  in  a  hostile  manner  a  certain  portion  of  territory-,  have  declared 
their  independence;  have  commenced  hostilities  against  their  former  sovereign.  The 
world  acknowledges  them  as  belligerents  and  the  contest  a  war"63. 
In  the  opinion  of  the  US  Supreme  Court,  it  seems  that  the  actual  existence  of  a  civil  war 
is  a  matter  of  fact,  that  is  when  the  political  bound  is  broken  and  the  confrontation 
resembles  war  between  States  in  its  intensity  duration,  organization  and  occupation  by  the 
insurgents  of  a  substantial  party  of  the  national  territory,  the  civil  war  erupts.  The  influence 
of  Vattel  is  very  clear,  the  Court  in  fact,  had  quote  him  extensively.  It  is  factual  effectivity 
which  makes  the  contest  civil  war. 
However,  the  Court  noted  that  the  insurgents: 
"...  [C]Iaim  to  be  in  arms  to  establish  their  liberty  and  independence,  in  order  to 
become  a  sovereign  state,  while  the  sovereign  party  treats  them  as  insurgents  and 
rebels  who  owe  allegiance,  and  who  should  be  punished  with  death  for  their 
treason  "64 
. 
In  other  words,  even  when  the  strong  factual  elements  of  the  civil  war  are  present,  there 
is  nothing  to  prevent  the  established  Government  from  applying  its  penal  laws  against  its 
opponents.  Sovereignty  even  in  such  circumstances  still  plays  a  very  important  role  by 
giving  full  backing  to  all  the  actions  of  the  established  Government. 
Similarly,  when  under  Diab  v.  Attorney-General,  the  Israeli  Supreme  Court  had  an 
occasion  to  define  civil  war.  It  stated: 
"...  We  find  that  civil  war  is  a  war  of  the  citizen  against  the  State,  or  of  citizen  against 
citizen,  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  power  in  the  whole  state  or  in  part  of  it.  The 
62  F.  Deak  (cottected  and  ed.  by):  American  International,  Law  Cases  1783-1968.  Vot.  17,  Oceana  Pub., 
Inc/Dobbs  Ferry,  New  York,  1977,  p.  382. 
631bid, 
pp.  382-3. 
64  lbid,  p.  3a3. 
137 emphasises  is  on  the  word  'citizen.  That  is  to  say,  civil  war  always  implies  an  armed 
struggle  by  a  group  of  citizens  against  the  established  order  or  in  order  to  obtain 
power  over  its  own  State,  and  not  a  war  against  another  state  trying  to  impose  its  will 
over  the  territory  and  the  citizens  of  that  state,  that  is  to  say,  a  foreign  country.  This 
is  the  legal  meaning  of  the  word,  and  it  is  also  its  nominal  and  natural  meaning  for 
the  general  public  and  for  historians  "65 
. 
The  Court  emphasised  that  this  definition  is  a  summary  of  customary  definitions  of  civil 
war  found  especially  in  the  jurisprudence  of  the  US  courts.  It  must  be  noted  that  there  is 
nothing  in  the  definition  which  indicates,  that  civil  wars  are  seen  other  than  internal 
matters,  the  relevance  of  international  law  is  not  mentioned,  sovereignty  still  holds  the 
balance. 
2.  The  Recognition  of  Insurgency  and  Belligerency  and  their  Impact  on  the  Definition  of 
Civil  Wars 
Customary  international  law  has  as  a  matter  of  principle  considered  civil  wars,  as  matters 
falling  inside  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  the  State.  This  stand  is  consistent  with  the  basic 
aim  of  that  law,  namely  respect  for  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  and  non-  intervention  in  its 
internal  affairs  even  when  the  Government  in  power  is  challenged  by  a  portion  of  its 
population.  However,  in  the  19th  century,  the  situation  began  to  change,  civil  wars  could 
become  of  interest  to  international  law,  when  the  recognition  of  belligerency  is  granted. 
Thus,  according  to  Zorgbib: 
"le  message  de  Vattel  semble  au  XlXeme  si6cle,  en  voie  de  se  couler  dans  le  droit 
positif,  il  prend  forme  dans  Vinstitution  dite  de  la  reconnaissance  de  belligdrence, 
c'est-ý-dire  dans  I'assimilation  des  insurg6s  i  des  bellig6rents  r6guliers  par  le 
gouvernement  dtabli"66. 
The  influence  of  Vattel  is  important  in  the  emergence  in  positive  law  of  the  recognition  of 
belligerency.  Rougier  supports  this  line  of  thinking,  he  stresses: 
"...  [C]ette  assimilation  de  la  guerre  civile  A  la  guerre  itrang6re,  demand6e  par  Vattel, 
est  ce  que  l'on  nomme  aujourd'hui  la'reconnaiyance  des  insurg6s  comme  belligdrants' 
ou  encore  la  reconnaissance  de  belligdrence"6 
. 
It  must  be  stressed  that  the  institutions  of  insurgency  and  belligerency  do  not  apply  to  every 
civil  war,  certain  conditions  of  fact  and  law,  must  exist  before  their  legal  effects  come  into 
operation.  This  state  of  affairs,  necessitates,  in  my  view,  a  thorough  identification  of  the 
criteria  of  civil  wars  to  which  those  institutions  apply. 
This  process  of  definition  and  clarification,  would  in  my  opinion,  reveal  the  kind  of  civil 
war  to  which  States  may  concede  certain  of  their  sovereign  privileges  and  accept  certain 
limitations  of  their  sovereignty. 
65  Diab  v.  Attorney  General,  Israeti  Supreme  Court  sitting  as  Court  of  Criminat  Appeats,  Dec  2nd,  1952. 
Sir  H.  Lauterpacht  (ed.  ):  ILR,  1952.  Butterworth  &  Co.,  Ltd.,  London,  1957,  p.  552. 
66Zorgbib, 
op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  2,  n.  66,  p.  37. 
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cit.,  supra.  n.  6,  p.  196. 
138 2.1.  Recognition  of  Insurgency 
It  seems  that  the  status  of  recognition  of  insurgency,  has  less  legal  significance  than  the 
status  of  the  recognition  of  belligerency  in  customary  international  law,  it  is  in  the  words 
of  Visscher 
"...  [M]ore  limited  in  its  effects,  and  still  more  elusive  in  its  criteria  than  the 
recognition  of  belligerency,  it  is  adjusted  to  a  situation  of  fact  and  modelled  on  the 
course  of  events  "68 
. 
However,  there  is  a  general  support  for  the  view  that  recognition  of  insurgency  is 
necessitated  by  the  existence  of  an  internal  conflict.  Thus,  the  Assistant  Legal  Advisor  to 
the  US  State  Department,  Mr.  Yingling,  stressed  that: 
"...  [S]uch  recognition  [of  insurgeng]  is  an  acknowledgement  by  a  foreign  State  of  the 
fact  that  a  political  revolt  eXiStS.  "6 
Also,  the  recognition  of  insurgency  has  often  been  the  first  official  notice  that  third  States 
have  taken  of  the  eventual  possible  success  of  the  insurrection. 
The  implication  is  that  recognition  of  insurgency  admits  to  the  existence  an  insurgent 
forces  which  challenges  the  legal  Government.  They  occupy  a  part  of  the  territory,  and 
exercise  effective  control  over  the  persons  and  properties  within  that  area,  including  foreign 
persons  and  properties,  and  have  a  quasi-political  organization  which  may  deal  with  foreign 
States. 
Moreover,  whenever  the  recognition  of  insurgency  has  been  granted  by  foreign  States,  the 
reasons  behind  such  moves  were  essentially  to  regulate  the  political  and  economic 
intercourse  with  the  insurgents,  also  such  recognition  signals  that  foreign  States  do  not 
intend  to  treat  the  rebels  as  mere  law  breakers.  Higgins  stated  rightly  that: 
"The  recognition  of  insurgency  whether  implied  or  express,  is  an  indication  that  the 
recognizin  q  State  regards  the  insurgents  as  legal  contestants  and  not  mere  law 
breakers"7 
. 
However,  it  seems  that  the  internal  conflict,  in  the  eyes  of  the  established  Government, 
always  remains  an  internal  matter,  even  when  the  recognition  of  insurgency  has  been 
granted  by  foreign  States.  An  eminent  scholar  on  the  subject,  Padleford  argued: 
"Admission  of  insurgency  does  not  alter  the  legal  status  of  the  insurgents  within  their 
own  states.  They  remain  as  previously,  engaged  in  an  unlawful  attempt  to  overthrow 
the  established  government.  "71 
68  Ch.  De  Visscher:  Theory  and  Reality  of  International  Law.  Rev.  ed.  Translated  from  French  by  P.  E. 
Corbett.  PUP,  Princeton,  New  Jersey,  1968,  p.  245. 
69  Whiteman,  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1,  n.  8,  Vot.  2,  (1963),  p.  486. 
70  OP.  cit.,  supra.  n.  1,  p.  88. 
71 
N.  J.  Padetford:  International  andDfptomacy  in  the  Spanish  Civil  War.  MacMillan  Co.,  NewYork,  1939, 
p.  196. 
139 This  means  that  the  legal  Government,  can  claim  its  full  sovereignty  in  suppressing  the 
insurgents,  customary  international  law  does  not  limit  its  sovereignty  in  any  way. 
Lauterpacht  remarks  that: 
"...  [W]ith  regards  to  the  acts  of  the  insurgents  on  land  when  such  acts  do  not  cause 
injury  to  foreign  States  or  their  subjects  but  merely  manifestations  of  a  revolt  against 
the  constituted  authority,  outside  States  have  no  reason  to  express  an  opinion  or  to 
adopt  an  attitude".  72 
In  other  words,  in  cases  of  insurgency  the  Government  is  not  obliged  to  respect  the  laws  of 
war  in  its  relation  with  the  insurgents.  They  are  mere  criminals,  who  would  be  treated 
according  to  penal  laws. 
In  State  practice,  it  is  considered  that  the  institution  was  used  especially  in  the  practice 
of  the  US  vis-A-vis  the  Cuban  revolt  against  Spanish  rule  in  the  late  19th  Century.  The  US 
did  not  recognize  the  revolt  as  an  international  war,  because  of  the  lack  of  elements  which 
are  requisite  to  constitute  such  a  war,  however,  it  recognized  the  existence  of  an 
insurrectionary  State  of  affairs  to  which  the  laws  of  neutrality  must  apply. 
On  June  12th,  1895  a  formal  proclamation  issued  by  the  president,  informed  the  American 
people  that  Cuba  was: 
"The  seat  of  serious  civil  disturbances  accompanied  by  armed  resistence  to  the 
authority  of  the  established  government  of  Spain  a  power  with  which  the  US  are  and 
desire  to  remain  on  terms  of  peace  and  amity"tý 
The  Proclamation  prohibited  American  citizens  from  taking  part  in  those  hostilities  in 
whatever  form.  These  pronouncements  enabled  American  courts  to  acknowledge  a 
difference  between  insurgency  and  belligerency. 
Thus,  in  the  Three  Friends  Case,  the  US  Supreme  Court  stated: 
"The  distinction  between  recognition  of  belligerency  and  recognition  of  a  condition 
of  political  revolt,  between  recognition  of  the  existence  of  a  war  in  a  material  sense 
and  of  war  in  a  legal  sense,  is  sharply  illustrated  by  the  case  before  us.  For  here  the 
political  department  has  not  recognized  the  existence  of  a  de  facto  belligerent  power 
engaged  in  hostility  with  Spain,  but  has  recognized  the  existence  of  insurrectionary 
warfare,  etC.  "74 
. 
The  implication  is  that  it  is  the  political  interests  of  the  recognizing  State  and  not  the  reality 
of  civil  war,  in  the  field,  which  play  a  major  part  in  the  determination  of  the  existence  of 
the  status  of  insurgency. 
Also,  it  is  apparent  that  international  law  does  not  place  any  legal  obligations  upon  the 
recognizing  States,  it  is  left  to  such  Government  to  decide  freely  what  steps  they  can  take 
in  that  situation,  national  interests  are  generally  the  basis  upon  which  to  decide  such 
questions. 
720p. 
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140 The  Spanish  Civil  War  is  another  case  where  it  is  speculated  that  the  recognition  of 
insurgency  took  place,  in  fact  Lauterpacht  observes  that: 
"The  Spanish  Civil  War  of  1936-39  is  an  instructive  example  of  what  may  be  regarded 
as  recognition  of  insurgency"75. 
However,  it  seems  to  me  that  a  better  view  is  that  the  case  must  be  seen  as  an  example  of 
recognition  of  de  facto  Governments  rather  than  recognition  of  insurgency.  The  acts  of  the 
British  Governments  and  the  jurisprudence  of  British  courts  seems  to  support  that  view. 
In  a  letter  to  the  Appeal  Court  (dated  May  28th,  1938),  the  Foreign  Office  indicated  the 
position  of  the  British  Government  vis-i-vis  the  Franco  Government  in  these  terms: 
"His  Majesty's  Government  recognizes  that  nationalist  Government  as  a  Government 
which  at  present  exercises  de  facto  administrative  control  over  all  the  Basque 
provinces  of  Spain,  etc.  "76  . 
Thus,  there  is  no  mention  of  insurgency.  Similarly,  in  the  Arantzazu  Mendl  Case,  the  Court 
of  Appeal  concentrated  on  the  issue  of  whether  the  recognized  de  facto  Government  must 
be  treated  as  a  Government  of  a  sovereign  State.  The  answer  was  positive77  and  the  House 
of  Lords  upheld  its  decision,  recognition  of  insurgency  was  not  stressed78. 
The  main  conclusions  concerning  the  status  of  the  recognition  of  insurgency  are: 
1.  It  was  not  a  well  defined  legal  category,  with  the  result  that  the  conditions  of  its 
existence  and  its  legal  effects  are  not  always  very  clear  in  customary  practice. 
2.  It  seems  that  the  granting  of  the  recognition  does  not  in  any  way  challenge  the  legal 
Government,  since  the  latter  still  enjoys  the  rights  of  its  sovereignty,  among  them,  its  right 
to  suppress  its  opponents  by  all  its  means,  without  outside  interference. 
3.  It  is  political  considerations,  rather  than  legal  and  ethical  criteria  which  are  taken  into 
account  in  its  granting. 
2.2.  Recognition  of  Belligerency 
Recognition  of  belligerency,  was  the  institution  through  which  customary  international  law 
become  relevant  to  violent  events  which  take  place  inside  the  State,  in  that  sense  it  may  be 
said  that  it  involves  a  limitation  upon  State  sovereignty. 
Rougier  pointed  out  in  1903  that: 
"Cest  I'acte  [of  recognition  of  belligerency]  le  plus  gros  de  cons6quences  juridiques, 
qui  donne  A  la  guerre  civile  une  portde  internationale.  Aussi  peut-on  dire  que  c'est 
par  cette  th6orie  qu'  a  commencd  I'dtude  juridique  des  guerres  civiles"79  . 
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141 In  fact,  recognition  of  belligerency  makes  civil  war  a  'war'  in  the  legal  sense,  in  the  sense 
that  it  is  the  same  as  recognition  of  a  'state  of  war'  between  States. 
What  concerns  me  in  this  context,  is  the  question  of  the  conditions  necessary  for  the 
recognition  of  belligerency  since  they  throw  some  light  on  what  is  considered  civil  war  in 
customary  international  law,  and  by  consequence  in  what  circumstances  that  law  can  be  said 
to  restrict  the  sovereignty  of  the  State,  in  dealing  with  its  internal  problems. 
2.2.1.  The  Conditions  for  the  Granting  of  Belligerency 
President  Grant  in  his  address  to  the  US  Congress  in  1869  touched  directly  on  the 
conditions  which  must  be  present  in  a  civil  war,  in  order  to  be  a  'legal  war'  in  the  sense  that 
it  would  be  treated  according  to  international  law.  He  declared  that: 
"...  [T]he  question  of  belligerency  is  one  of  fact,  not  to  be  decided  by  sympathies  for 
or  prejudices  against  either  party.  The  relations  between  the  parent  state  and  the 
insurgents  must  amount,  in  fact,  to  war  in  the  sense  of  international  law.  Fighting 
though  fierce  and  protracted  does  not  constitute  war.  There  must  be  military  forces 
acting  in  accordance  with  the  rules  and  customs  of  war,  flags  of  truce,  cartels, 
exchange  of  prisoners  etc.,  -and  to  justify  a  recognition  of  belligerency  there  must 
be  above  all,  a  de  facto  political  organization  of  the  insurgents  sufficient  in  character 
and  resources  to  constitute  it,  if  left  to  itself,  a  state  among  nations  capable  of 
discharging  the  duties  of  a  state,  and  or  meeting  the  just  responsibilities  it  may  incur 
as  such  towards  other  powers  in  discharge  of  its  normal  duties"80 
Accordingly,  the  insurgents  must  have  in  fact,  the  characteristics  of  a  real  State,  in  order 
to  be  considered  as  belligerents.  The  conditions  of  the  civil  war  must  be  very  hight  indeed, 
which  means  that  only  a  very  limited  number  of  civil  wars  can  qualify  for  such  conditions. 
Many  eminent  scholars,  in  the  19th  century  have  advocated  that  when  certain  conditions 
of  fact  exist  in  internal  war,  belligerency  must  be  accorded.  Thus,  De  Martens  states: 
"...  [U]n  parti  politique  qui  a  pris  les  armes  contre  son  gouvernement  ligitime 
...  est 
reconnu  comme  bellig6rent  s'il  est  rdgulier6ment  organisd,  s'il  est  independant  de 
fait  et  s'il  respecte  les  lois  et  usages  de  la  guerre"81. 
Bluntschli82  is  of  the  same  view  together  with  HaII83. 
BoCited  by  W.  L.  Watker:  Recognition  of  BetLigerency  and  Grant  of  Bettigerent  Rights.  23  Transactions 
of  Grotfus  Society,  1937.  p.  188. 
81  F.  de  Martens:  Tralti  de  drolt  internatfonaL.  Traduit  du  russe  par  A.  1.6o,  tome  111,  Paris, 
Librairie  Marescq  AW,  1887,  p.  195. 
82M.  BtuntschLi  wrote: 
"La  notion  de  bettig6rence,  et  par  suite,  itapptication  du  drolt  clu  gens,  en  opposition  avec 
le  drolt  p6nat,  au  tieu  de  se  restreindre  A  deux  Etats  6trangers  en  guerre  Pun  avec  t8autre. 
6tL'  6tenclue  A  une  partle  fnt6grante  de  ta  poputation  d'un  Etat  qui:  : 
Est  de  fait,  organiske  coam  force  mititaire. 
b:  Observe  dans  ta  conduite  des  hostitit6s  tes  tois  cle  ta  guerre. 
c.  Croit  de  bonne  fof  tutter  au  tieu  et  ptace  de  tlEtat  pour  defendre  son  drolt  pubticle 
opinion  fmpartiate  sur  ta  question  de  t'Alabama.  I  RDILC,  1870,  p.  157. 
142 In  recent  times,  it  is  Lauterpacht  who  advocated  such  course,  he  maintains  when  certain 
conditions  of  fact  exist  recognition  of  belligerency  must  be  accorded:  These  conditions  are: 
1.  There  must  exist  within  the  State  an  armed  conflict  of  a  general  character. 
2.  The  insurgents  must  occupy  and  administer  a  substantial  portion  of  national  territory. 
3.  They  must  conduct  the  hostilities  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  war  and  through 
organized  armed  forces  acting  under  a  responsible  authority. 
4.  There  must  exist  circumstances  which  make  it  necessary  for  outside  States  to  define 
their  attitude  by  means  of  the  recognition  of  belligerency"84.  He  then  adds: 
"...  [R]ecognition  of  belligerency  is  in  essence  a  declaration  ascertaining  the  existence 
of  these  conditionS"85. 
This  view  in  fact,  is  in  accordance  with  Lauterpacht's  general  theoretical  position  vis-i- 
vis  recognition,  he  thinks  that  recognition  is  a  strictly  legal  institution,  which  must  be 
declared  whenever,  the  factual  conditions  as  required  by  law  are  present. 
To  me,  these  assertions  are  not  wholly  true,  recognition  in  general  and  especially  that  of 
belligerency  has  never  been  a  purely  legal  institution,  political  interests  are  the  real  factors 
behind  its  granting. 
In  my  view,  there  is  a  strong  evidence  to  the  fact  that  recognition  of  belligerency  or  its 
withholding,  were  animated  by  political  rather  than  legal  considerations.  The  logic  of  the 
system  of  international  law,  which  is  based  on  sovereign  States  favours  such  an  approach. 
States  want  to  keep  their  freedom  of  recognition,  since  it  is  in  their  view  a  political  game 
rather  than  a  legal  act. 
In  this  respect,  the  insurgents  in  Chile  in  189486,  were  not  recognized  as  belligerents, 
despite  the  fact  that  they  fulfilled  the  criteria  laid  down  by  Calvo  and  Bluntschli,  also  the 
US  refused  to  recognize  the  insurgents  in  Columbia  in  1885,  Haiti  in  1889  and  Brazil  in 
189387,  likewise,  Britain  recognized  the  Greek  insurgency  in  1825  that  is  after  full  four 
83Matt 
stated: 
"As  soon  as.  it  is  said,  that  a  considerable  population  is  arrayed  in  arms  with  the  professed 
object  of  attaining  political  ends,  it  resembles  a  State  too  nearly  for  it  to  be  possible  to 
treat  individuals  belonging  to  such  population  as  criminals,  it  would  be  inhuman  for  the  enemy 
to  execute  his  prisoners,  it  would  be  still  more  inhuman  for  foreign  States  to  capture  and  hang 
the  crews  of  warships  as  pirates,  humanity  demands  that  members  of  such  communities  be  treated 
as  belligerents,  and  if  so  there  must  be  a  point  at  which  they  have  the  right  to  demand  what 
confessedly  must  be  granted  to  them". 
W.  E.  Hatt:  A  Treatise  on  International  Law.  (Sir)  A.  P.  Higgins,  (ed.  ),  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  1924, 
pp.  37-38. 
84H.  Lauterpacht:  Recognition  in  International  Law.  CUB,  London,  1947,  p.  176. 
851bid. 
86  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  6,  p.  214. 
87See  E.  H.  Riedel:  Recognition  of  Belligerency:  In  Bernhardt  (ed.  ):  Encyclopedia  of  Public 
International  Law.  Instalment  4,1982,  North  Holland  Pub.  Co.,  p.  169. 
143 years  from  the  uprising,  in  which  the  insurgents  fulfilled  the  condition  of  real  insurgents8a. 
Similarly,  the  US  recognized  the  belligerency  of  the  insurgent  forces  in  Canada  on  January 
5th,  1838,  although  they  did  not  satisfy  any  real  conditions  of  a  real  civil  war.  89 
Writing  in  1895,  Beale  summarised  the  position  of  the  US  vis-i-vis  recognition  of 
belligerency  as  follows: 
"In  the  first  place,  we  have  not  recognized  belligerency  prematurely  ... 
We  never 
recognized  the  belligerency  of  Greece,  because  the  civil  war  in  that  country  did  not 
inconvenience  us  at  all,  or  call  for  our  interference.  We  recognized  civil  war  in 
Canada  when  our  own  soil  was  invaded;  and  we  recognized  the  belligerency  of 
Spanish  America,  eight  years  after  it  was  a  fact,  when  our  ocean  commerce  became 
involved  in  the  contest,  which  was  largely  naval"90. 
This  means  that  recognition  of  belligerency  depended  in  the  final  analysis  on  subjective 
criteria,  rather  than  legal  considerations. 
Recognition  of  belligerency,  is  then  always  discritionary,  the  established  Government 
especially  is  not  legally  obliged  to  grant  such  recognition  and  by  the  same  token  it  is  not 
bound  to  take  into  account  any  recognition  granted  by  third  States,  the  rebels  can  be  treated 
as  criminals.  Thus,  it  is  not  the  British  Government  recognition  of  the  belligerency  of  the 
Southern  States  in  the  American  civil  war,  which  obliged  the  US  Government  to  treat  the 
insurgents  as  belligerents,  but  it  was  the  recognition  of  the  US  Congress  on  July  4th,  1861 
of  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  against  the  II  States  of  the  South,  which  had  that  effect 
91. 
This  is,  in  my  view,  the  natural  consequence  of  State  sovereignty  as  understood  by 
international  law  in  that  era.  Under  the  latter  the  State  has  overall  jurisdiction  over  its 
territory  and  citizens,  its  relation  to  its  citizens  is  an  internal  matter,  in  the  absence  of  a 
clear  legal  obligation,  no  State  can  intervene  and  dictate  the  kind  of  treatment  to  be  given 
to  its  citizens  by  their  States.  The  concept  of  human  rights  was  not  yet  born. 
To  sum  up,  classical  international  law  gave  the  full  priority  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  State 
and  non-  intervention  in  its  internal  affairs,  the  rule  is  that  when  the  basic  units  of  that 
system  (the  States)  are  faced  with  internal  upheavals,  they  have  the  full  protection  of  the 
law  to  deal  with  the  situation. 
In  my  view,  this  is  implicit  in  the  fact  that  even  when  the  internal  conflict  is  serious  (in 
terms  of  its  intensity,  duration,  effective  control  of  a  certain  portion  of  the  national 
territory,  and  the  existence  of  a  political  organization  of  the  insurgents),  there  is  nothing 
which  obliges  the  recognition  of  belligerency  of  the  insurgents  especially  on  the  part  of  the 
established  Government. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  institution  (of  the  recognition  of 
belligerency)  has  to  some  extent  clarified  the  criteria  of  civil  wars  to  which  international 
88 
See  J.  H.  Beate,  Jr.:  The  Recognition  of  Cuban  Beltigerency.  9  HLR,  1895-96,  p.  412. 
89  lbid,  p.  409-10. 
901bid, 
p.  416. 
9'See  for  a  detalt  discussion  of  this  very  point  Zorgbib,  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  66,  pp.  40-42. 
144 law  may  become  relevant,  and  consequently  it  has  made  civil  war  not  a  term  of  art,  but  in 
the  words  of  De  Lupis  'it  could  be  possibly  defined  as  the  traditional  type  of  conflict  when 
92  insurgents  have  been  'recognized'  as  belligerent. 
In  other  words,  recognition  of  belligerency  has  afforded  the  legal  framework  for  the 
definition  of  civil  wars  in  customary  international  law  since  it  set  out  certain  conditions, 
which  States  can  take  into  account,  if  they  want  to  acknowledge  the  belligerency  of  the 
insurgents. 
It  seems  to  me  that  the  notions  of  sovereignty  and  non  intervention,  were  against  the 
spirit  of  such  an  institution,  mainly  because  it  involves  restrictions  on  the  discretion  of 
States  to  deal  with  their  enemies  and  it  may  give  some  legitimacy  to  the  struggle  of  their 
opponents. 
The  institution  (of  recognition  of  belligerency)  in  my  view  has  tried  to  bring  the  notion 
of  objectivity  into  the  realm  of  international  law.  But,  in  a  decentralized  system  of 
international  relations  such  an  attempt  was  bound  to  conflict  with  the  principles  of 
sovereignty  and  no  n-  intervention,  since  objectivity  cannot  be  applied  without  the  existence 
of  an  objective  central  agency,  which  is  above  the  States,  and  has  the  power  to  take  binding 
decisions. 
In  its  absence  (which  is  in  itself  a  manifestation  of  the  preference  by  States  of  sovereignty 
and  non-  intervention)  the  possibility  that  especially  third  States  might  be  guided  by  political 
and  economic  considerations  in  their  decision  to  grant  recognition  of  belligerency  rather 
than  objective  legal  criteria  remains  open.  This  fact  raises  the  possibility  of  the  breach  of 
sovereignty  and  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  States  faced  with  civil  wars. 
It  is  my  view,  that  the  notions  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention,  were  in  the  first  place 
responsible  for  the  rare  occurrence  of  recognition  of  belligerency  in  the  practice  of  States 
in  the  19th  and  the  first  half  of  the  20th  century,  despite  the  frequency  of  civil  wars, 
because  the  established  Governments  prefer  to  conduct  their  war  in  accordance  with  their 
discretion  and  not  according  to  the  laws  of  war,  the  latter  will  tie  their  hands  in  dealing 
with  the  insurgents  and  gives  them  legitimacy  and  signals  that  the  established  Government 
is  not  in  control  of  the  situation. 
Moreover,  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention  were  among  the  causes  of  the  obsolescence 
of  the  recognition  of  belligerency.  Thus,  Cassese  rightly  states  that  such  obsolescence  is: 
"...  [M]ainly  due  to  the  desire  of  the  Government  involved  in  civil  commotions  to  wipe 
out  rebellion  as  soon  as  possible,  as  well  as  to  the  interest  of  third  States  in  either 
holding  aloof  or  meddling  de  facto  in  the  conflict  without,  however,  going  to  the 
length  of  granting  insurgents  international  legitimisation"93 
. 
In  other  words,  the  obsolescence  of  the  institution  meant  that  States  retained  all  their 
sovereign  rights  to  quell  the  insurgents  without  any  restrictions  whatsoever,  and  third  States 
wanted  not  to  be  seen  as  intervening  in  the  internal  affairs  of  States  dealing  with  civil  wars, 
921.  D.  de  Lupis:  The  Law  of  War.  CUB,  Cambridge,  1987,  pp.  9-38. 
93  A.  Cassese:  InternationaL  Law  in  a  Divided  WorLd.  CLarendon  Press,  Oxford,  1986.  p.  281. 
145 at  least  formally. 
SECTION  IV:  Common  Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949  and  the  Definition 
of  an  Armed  Conflict  of  a  Non-  International  Character 
First  of  all,  Common  Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949  opens  the  way  for  a  new 
terminology  concerning  internal  conflicts,  the  term  'civil  war'  is  not  found  in  the  actual 
text  of  the  Article,  instead  a  new  term  is  used:  'An  armed  conflicts  of  a  non-international 
character'. 
In  my  view,  this  change  of  terminology  goes  in  line  with  the  attitude  adopted  after  the 
second  world  war,  which  consists  of  abandoning  the  term  'war'  and  its  substitution  by  the 
term  'Armed  Conflict'  the  latter  being  of  a  broader  scope,  and  it  avoids  the  fruitless 
discussions  about  the  definition  of  war. 
However,  in  the  context  of  internal  conflicts,  there  is  no  evidence  that  this  change  of 
terminology  has  any  legal  significance94.  Thus,  in  one  of  the  reports  drawn  up  during  the 
Diplomatic  Conference  of  1949,  it  was  stated  that: 
"It  was  clear  that  this  [Armed  conflict  not  of  an  international  character]  referred  to 
civil  war  and  not  to  a  mere  not  or  disturbances  caused  by  band  itS"95. 
It  must  be  stressed  that  Common  Article  3  proved  to  be  one  of  the  most  controversial 
subjects  during  the  Diplomatic  Conference  of  1949,25  meetings  of  the  Committee  charged 
with  its  drafting  were  necessary,  before  agreement  was  reached. 
The  reason  for  such  difficulty  lies  in  the  fact  that  Article  3  was  the  first  instance  of  an 
international  regulation  of  internal  wars  in  an  international  instrument.  This  fact  meant  that 
such  effort  may  very  well  involve  a  restriction  upon  State  sovereignty  in  one  area,  in  which 
States  customarily  claimed  to  be  the  masters  of  the  situation,  namely  civil  wars,  since  even 
recognition  of  belligerency  has  been  always  seen  as  of  a  discretionary  nature,  which  means 
that  it  was  not  a  real  threat  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  State.  Article  3  provides  in  part  that: 
"In  the  case  of  armed  conflict  not  of  an  international  character  occurring  in  the 
territory  of  one  of  the  high  contracting  parties,  each  party  to  the  conflict  shall  be 
bound  to  apply,  etc.  " 
94  Thus,  J.  A.  C.  Gutteridge  points  out  that: 
"An  entirety  new  conception  which  has  been  introduced  into  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949  is 
that  the  parties  to  each  convention  undertake  certain  obtigations  in  respect  not  of  an 
internationat  war  but  of  'a  confLict  not  of  an  internationat  character'  occurfng  in  the 
territory  of  one  of  the  high  contracting  parties  which  must  mean  a  civil  war". 
Thus,  according  to  her,  the  change  of  terminology  has  not  introduced  any  new  legal  dimension  to 
internal  war.  (The  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949.24  BYIL,  1949,  p.  300.  For  a  discussion  on  the  concept 
of  armed  conflict,  see  K.  J.  Partch:  Armed  Conflict,  in  Bernhardt  (ed.  ),  op.  cit..  supra.  n.  87, 
Instalment  3,1982,  pp.  25-28. 
95  Report  drawn  up  by  the  Joint  Committee  and  presented  to  the  Plenary  Assembly,  Final  Records  of  the 
Diplomatic  Conference  of  Geneva  of  1949,  Vol.  2,  Section  B,  Federal  Political  Dept.  2950  Berne,  p.  129. 
146 The  text  of  the  Article  then  did  not  define  what  is  meant  by  'Armed  conflict  not  of  an 
international  character'  and  did  not  indicate  what  is  the  authority  competent  to  determine 
the  existence  of  such  a  conflict.  This  section  tries  to  elucidate  the  meaning  of  an  armed 
conflict  not  of  an  international  character,  through  a  thorough  study  of  the  travaux 
pr6paratolres  of  the  Diplomatic  conference  of  1949.  It  tries  to  expose  fully  the  role  of 
sovereignty  and  non-intervention,  in  influencing  the  question  of  the  delimitation  of  the 
scope  of  Article  3. 
Recourse  to  subsequent  practice,  will  show  in  which  actual  situations  of  internal  disorders 
Article  3  had  been  seen  by  States  as  relevant,  and  whether  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention 
have  played  any  role  in  that  process. 
A.  Travaux  Prkparatolres  and  Definition  of  Armed  Conflict  not  of  an  International 
Character,  the  Role  of  Sovereignty  of  Non-Intervention  In  that  Process 
The  traumatic  effects  of  the  second  world  war  signalled  the  urgent  need  to  revise  the 
Geneva  Conventions.  In  the  context  of  internal  conflicts,  the  absence  of  any  regulation  of 
those  conflicts,  coupled  with  the  atrocities  of  the  Spanish  civil  war  and  the  movement 
towards  the  protection  of  human  rights  within  the  UN.  All  these  factors  have  led  the  ICRC, 
to  include  a  common  Article  in  its  proposed  Geneva  Conventions,  which  were  submitted 
to  the  Diplomatic  Conference  of  1949.  Common  draft  Article  2/4  stipulates: 
"In  all  cases  of  armed  conflict  not  of  an  international  character  which  may  occur  in 
the  territory  of  one  or  more  of  the  high  contracting  parties,  each  of  the  parties  to 
the  conflict  shall  be  bound  to  implement  the  provisions  of  the  present  convention, 
subject  to  the  adverse  party  likewise  acting  in  obedience  thereto"96. 
This  draft  article  was  approved  at  the  17th  Conference  of  the  ICRC.  The  Article  in  fact 
does  not  precisley  define  the  kinds  of  internal  conflict  to  which  it  is  supposed  to  apply,  in 
other  words  no  definition  is  provided,  and  in  the  same  time  it  envisages  the  application  In 
toto  of  the  draft  conventions  to  internal  conflicts,  however,  on  the  basis  of  reciprocity. 
This  stand  of  the  ICRC  seemed  to  be  ahead  of  its  times,  it  in  fact  ignored  that  States  are 
still  very  sensitive  to  any  efforts  at  limiting  their  sovereign  rights  to  deal  with  the  situation 
of  internal  conflicts  without  any  international  interference. 
The  first  discussions,  which  were  of  a  general  character  revealed  that  a  considerable 
divergence  of  opinion  exist  between  States.  Three  main  positions  can  be  detected  from 
those  primary  discussions.  The  first  group  was  composed  of  Socialist  States  Norway, 
Denmark  and  Mexico.  These  States  favoured  the  ICRC  approach,  in  regulating  internal 
conflicts  and  extending  all  the  provisions  of  the  Convents  to  such  conflict. 
The  USSR  led  the  attack,  by  rejecting  the  UK  claim  that  the  regulation  of  civil  wars  is 
outside  the  scope  of  international  law,  its  representative  Stated  at  the  very  first  meeting  of 
the  joint  committee  that: 
"The  UK  delegation  has  alluded  that  colonial  and  civil  wars  were  not  regulated  by 
96 
lbid,  p.  120. 
147 international  law,  and  therefore  that  decisions  in  this  respect  would  be  out  of  place 
in  the  text  of  the  conventions.  This  theory  was  not  convincing  since  although  the 
jurists  themselves  were  divided  on  this  point,  some  were  of  the  view  that  civil  war 
was  regulated  by  international  law.  Since  the  creation  of  the  United  Nations,  this 
question  seemed  settled.  Article  2  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  provided  that 
member  States  must  ensure  peace  and  world  security.  They  would  therefore  not  be 
indifferent  to  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  no  matter  the  character  or  localization  of 
the  conflict.  Colonial  and  civil  wars  therefore  come  within  the  purview  of 
international  law".  97 
Implicitly  then,  at  least  to  this  delegation,  the  developments  which  took  place  after  the 
adoption  of  the  UN  Charter  have  made  civil  wars  a  matter  of  international  concern,  hence 
the  regulation  cannot  be  considered  as  an  infringement  of  State  sovereignty  or  an 
intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  State  faced  with  such  conflicts. 
Hungary  went  even  further,  it  regrets  the  inclusion  of  the  idea  of  reciprocity"  in  the 
ICRC  draft  Article  2/4.  This  means  that  Hungary  would  like  to  see  established 
Governments  bound  to  apply  the  conventions  without  waiting  the  insurgents  to  do  so. 
Mexico  specifically  stressed  that  humanitarian  considerations  should  be  placed  above  the 
rights  of  States",  in  other  words,  it  advocates  that  humanitarian  considerations  should  limit 
the  sovereignty  of  the  State. 
In  my  view,  this  position  reflects  the  influence  of  the  emerging  idea  of  human  rights, 
protection  of  human  beings  must  not  be  seen  as  a  breach  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  State 
or  an  intervention  in  its  internal  affairs. 
It  seems  to  me  that  this  group  of  States,  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  omission  of  any 
definition  of  internal  conflict  in  the  context  of  draft  Article  2/4  was  a  wise  decision  by  the 
ICRC.  This  was  in  the  interest  of  a  wider  application  of  the  humanitarian  rules  to  a  wide 
range  of  internal  conflicts,  any  mention  of  some  factual  or  formal  conditions  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  armed  conflict  would  in  practice  give  the  established  Government  an 
opportunity  to  deny  the  application  of  the  conventions  simply  by  denying  the  existence  of 
such  conditions'00.  This  group  of  States  was  in  the  minority. 
971bid, 
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the  Hungarian  detegate  maintained  that: 
U...  Me  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  essentiat  aim  of  the  conference  was  to  extend  the  ffeLd 
of  action  of  the  Convention  as  much  as  possibte  for  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  confticts. 
He  regretted  that  the  StockhoLm  Conference  restricted  the  scope  of  the  text  submitted  by  the 
ICRC  by  inctuding  the  idea  of  reciprocity.  He  did  not  think  there  was  any  justification  for 
the  fear  expressed  by  certain  previous  speakers  that  the  convent  might  operate  as  an  inducement 
Incitement  to  take  up  arms". 
lbid,  p.  11. 
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100  That  was  the  impLication  of  the  statement  of  Romania  and  Norway.  The  former  stressed  that: 
"Humanitarian  considerations  shouLd  prevent  the  conference  from  introducing  restrictions  in 
the  text,  the  whoLe  object  of  which  was  to  extend  the  protection  of  the  conventions  to  the 
greatest  possibie  number  of  persons.  m 
(lbid).  The  tatter  put  It  in  this  way: 
148 However,  the  important  thing  is  that  they  basically  saw  no  contradiction  between 
sovereignty  and  international  regulation.  They  seem  to  insist  indirectly  that  the  development 
in  the  field  of  human  rights  have  placed  some  restrictions  upon  the  discretion  of  States  in 
dealing  with  their  own  citizens. 
To  some  authors  the  position  of  the  Socialist  countries,  especially  the  USSR,  which 
advocates  the  application  of  the  whole  body  of  Geneva  Conventions  to  internal  conflicts, 
is  motivated  by  political  designs  rather  than  humanitarian  concerns,  Cassese  argued  that: 
"Ce  West  pas  un  hasard  si  le  d6ldgu6  Sovidtique  parlait  toujours  de,  'guerres  civiles' 
et'guerres  coloniales',  entendant  clairement  par  ces  dernkres  une  cat6gorie  de  guerres 
civiles.  Si  on  pense  a  la  vision  politique  de  l'Union  Sovidtique,  ý  la  fin  des  ann6es 
quarante  (quand  la  guerre  froide  6tait  dans  sa  phase  la  plus  aigud)  il  semblait  dvident 
qu'une,  grande  protection  et  donc  la  Idgitimation  internationale  de  ceux  Qui 
combattent  lors  des  guerres  civiles  et  de  guerres  coloniales  dtaient  dans  la  ligne  des 
programmes  et  des  intentions  politiques  de  l'Union  Sovi6tique:  celle  ci  visait  A 
favoriser  le,  plus  possible  le  d6mant  Ilement  des  empires  coloniaux  comme  la 
d6stabilisation  des  pays  occidentaux"'O'. 
Despite  this,  it  appears  the  Soviets  who  generaly  cling  to  a  very  rigid  conception  of 
sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  are  nevertheless,  ready  to  admit  the  relevance  of 
international  regulation  to  internal  conflict. 
The  second  position  was  championed  in  fact  by  only  one  country;  Burma,  a  Third  World 
country  at  the  time  experiencing  civil  war.  To  that  State,  any  regulation  of  internal  conflict 
by  an  international  instrument  was  a  flagrant  violation  of  State  sovereignty  and  an 
intervention  in  its  internal  affairs  in  the  guise  of  humanitarianism. 
Burma  accordingly  opposed  the  inclusion  in  the  Geneva  Convention  of  any  article 
concerning  civil  war.  It  argued  that  from  its  own  experience  it  knew  of  foreign  intervention 
its  representative  General  Oung  stressed  that: 
"...  [T]he  proposed  convention  should  not  give  legal  status  to  insurgents  who  sought 
by  undem  cratic  methods  to  overthrow  a  legally  constituted  Government  by  force  I 
of  .  armsnlO?. 
In  other  words,  no  matter  how  serious,  the  internal  conflict  must  be  left  entirely  within  the 
sovereignty  of  the  State.  In  fact  the  Burmese  Delegation  was  not  only  opposed  to  the  ICRC's 
Draft  Article  2/4  (for  which  it  submitted  an  amendment  for  its  deletion)  but  was  against 
the  inclusion  in  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  any  reference  to  internal  armed  conflict  in 
whatever  form.  In  its  view  any  such  inclusion  would  be  an  encouragement  to  rebellions  and 
"When  belligerency  was  recognized  in  an  internal  conflict  serious  legal  consequences  were 
entailed  but  It  was  to  be  hoped  that  the  conference  would  agree  that  purely  humanitarian  rules 
should  be  applied  In  armed  conflicts  independently  of  any  recognition  of  belligerency".  (Mid). 
In  other  words,  absence  of  defunct  is  better  for  the  cause  of  applying  humanitarian  rules. 
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149 uprisings  against  the  established  Governments,  hence  a  flagrant  violation  of  the  '...  high 
principles  laid  down  by  the  United  Nations  Organization"  03.  The  reference  here  is 
implicitly  to  the  principles  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention. 
This  Delegation  clung  to  a  very  rigid  concept  of  sovereignty  which  admits  of  no 
restriction,  especially  when  it  touches  the  relationship  between  the  State  and  its  own 
citizens. 
The  third  position  was  espoused  by  the  majority  of  the  States  present  at  the  Conference, 
most  western  States  were  supporters  of  this  position,  the  USA,  Britain,  France,  Canada, 
Australia,  Spain  among  others. 
These  States  supported  the  principle  that  international  regulation  of  internal  conflicts  was 
needed.  However,  they  were  opposed  to  the  phraseology  of  the  ICRC  draft  Article  2/4;  the 
latter  in  their  view  would  in  practice  lead  to  the  unqualified  application  of  the  conventions 
to  any  form  of  disorder  within  the  State,  it  would  cover  all  forms  of  rebellion,  insurrection, 
anarchy  and  brigandage.  They  claimed  that  the  application  of  the  conventions  might  give 
the  insurgents  some  kind  of  legal  status  despite  the  express  stipulation  to  the  contrary  in  the 
instrument.  '  04 
The  French  delegate,  in  fact  has  expressed  the  theoretical  basis  by  which  the  attempts  to 
regulating  internal  conflicts  must  be  guided,  he  stressed: 
"...  [I)t  was  impossible  to  carry  the  protection  of  the  individuals  to  the  point  of 
sacrificing  the  rights  of  States"105 
In  other  words,  respect  for  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  must  be  placed  before  humanitarian 
considerations.  The  American  Delegate  seems  to  express  in  concrete  terms  what  the  French 
delegate  had  in  mind  when  he  stated: 
"Every  Government  had  a  right  to  put  dn  rebellion  within  its  borders  and  to 
punish  the  insurgents  with  its  penal  laws"' 
These  attempts  to  protect  individuals  might  well  jeopardise  the  legitimate  concern  of  the 
State,  to  keep  law  and  order  within  its  borders. 
It  seems  to  me  that  this  important  group  of  States,  have  not  attempted  to  characterise  the 
international  regulation  of  internal  wars  as  an  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  States, 
they  accepted  in  fact  the  relevance  of  international  law  to  such  conflicts.  However,  they 
insisted  that  such  international  regulation  must  proceed  from  the  premise  of  placing 
sovereignty  over  humanitarian  concerns. 
Faced  with  this  initial  objection  and  varying  opinions,  the  Conference  referred  Article 
2/4  to  a  small  committee  (the  special  committee  of  the  joint  committee).  The  latter 
1031bid, 
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1061bid, 
p.  17. 
150 produced  a  number  of  amendments  and  proposals.  They  revealed  that  only  one  amendment 
proposed  the  deletion  of  Article  2/4  and  also  only  one  proposal  for  the  retention  of  that 
Article  as  it  was  drafted  by  the  ICRC.  However,  all  other  amendments  stressed  that  if  the 
conventions  are  to  be  applied  to  internal  conflicts,  the  latter  must  have  the  characteristics 
of  an  internal  war. 
In  other  words,  the  majority  of  amendments  exposed  directly  the  question  of  definition 
of  internal  conflicts.  This  means  that  States  accept  limitation  of  their  sovereignty  (in  this 
context  by  applying  humanitarian  law)  only  when  the  conditions  of  internal  conflicts  are 
made  fully  clear.  The  legitimate  interests  of  established  Governments  must  be  wholly 
protected. 
The  different  proposals  before  the  Committee  reveal,  it  seems  a  general  pre-occupation 
by  the  majority  of  States,  to  include  formal  or  factual  criteria  which  must  be  met  before 
the  application  of  the  conventions. 
Thus,  the  French  thought  that  the  insurgents  must  be  '...  organized  military  forces 
belonging  to  a  responsible  authority  capable  of  respecting,  or  enforcing  respect  for  the 
Convention  in  a  given  territory'  107 
* 
This  means  that  the  Conventions  would  apply  only  Jn 
cases  in  which  the  insurgents  have  the  characteristics  of  a  real  State.  However,  the  Spanish 
proposal  was  less  stringent,  the  Conventions  within  view  would  apply  only  when  the 
established  Government  is  obliged  to  have  recourse  to  the  regular  military  forces  against  the 
insurgents  who  are  organized  military  and  possess  a  portion  of  the  national  territorylos. 
For  the  US,  the  Geneva  Conventions  can  apply  in  two  situations.  First,  when  the  parent 
Government  itself  recognizes  the  belligerency  of  the  insurgents,  in  this  situation  then  the 
established  Government  accepts  voluntarily  to  limit  its  sovereignty,  by  extending  the 
application  of  the  Convention  to  its  opponents. 
In  the  absence  of  such  recognition,  the  second  eventuality  arises,  in  this  case  according 
to  the  USA  certain  factual  elements  must  be  met  by  the  insurgents  in  order  to  be  recognized 
as  belligerent  and  qualify  for  the  application  of  the  Conventions; 
These  conditions  are: 
1.  The  insurgents  must  have  an  organization  purporting  to  have  the  characteristics  of  a 
State. 
2.  The  insurgent  civil  authority  must  exercise  de  facto  authority  over  persons  within  a 
determined  territory. 
3.  The  rebel  armed  force  must  act  under  the  direction  of  an  organized  civil  authority  and 
be  prepared  to  observe  the  ordinary  laws  of  war. 
4.  The  insurgent  civil  authorities  must  agree  to  be  bound  by  the  provisions  of  the 
109  Conventions 
In  the  US  view  in  the  presence  of  those  conditions,  third  States  may  recognize  the 
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151 belligerent  status  of  the  insurgents  whether  or  not  such  recognitions  was  accorded  by  the 
parent  Governmentilo. 
The  curious  fact  is  that  there  is  in  reality  no  difference  between  those  conditions 
advocated  by  the  USA  in  1949  and  the  conditions  of  the  recognition  of  belligerency 
mentioned  in  the  message  of  President  Grant  to  the  American  Congress  in  1879,  which 
indicates  that  despite  this  considerable  lapse  of  time,  and  the  developments  which  took 
place  after  it,  a  country  like  the  USA  still  clings  to  a  very  rigid  idea  of  State  sovereignty, 
since  the  latter  cannot  be  limited  easily.  Canada  proposed  first  the  deletion  of  Draft 
Article  2/4,  having  failed  in  that  attempt,  it  proposed  a  rigid  test  for  the  application  of  the 
Conventions  to  internal  conflicts.  It  stated: 
"...  [B]efore  saying  that  a  civil  war  was  of  the  kind  in  which  the  Conventions  should 
be  applied,  the  test  should  be  recognition  of  belligerency  of  the  rebels  by  the  lawful 
Government"Ili. 
This  Canadian  position  is  more  stringent  than  that  of  the  US.  it  will  simply  lead  to  the  non- 
application  of  the  conventions  in  many  internal  conflicts,  since  established  Governments 
rarely  acknowledge  that  their  enemies  are  more  than  breakers  of  the  local  law,  any  other 
course  of  action,  would  give  their  enemies  some  legal  status  and  may  restrict  their  attempts 
to  crush  their  opponents  quickly. 
Australia,  on  the  other  hand,  thought  that  for  the  internal  armed  conflict  would  quality 
for  the  application  of  the  proposed  Geneva  Conventions  as  a  whole,  that  conflict  must 
satisfy  certain  formal  and  factual  criteria.  Thus,  the  conflict  must  be  'a  full  scale  war,  and 
when  there  was  an  organized  form  of  Government  which  effectively  controlled  definite 
portions  of  the  national  territory  and  inhabitants  there  in"12.  These  are  the  factual 
conditions,  and  they  are  by  no  means  easy  to  obtain.  In  addition  Australia  stressed  that  some 
formal  criteria  must  be  present  in  order  to  apply  the  conventions. 
1.  The  de  Jure  Government  had  recognized  the  insurgents  as  belligerents;  or 
2.  The  de  Jure  Government  had  claimed  for  itself  the  right  of  belligerent;  and 
3.  The  de  jure  Government  had  accorded  the  insurgents  recognition  as  belligerents  for 
the  purpose  only  of  the  present  conventions. 
4.  That  the  dispute  had  been  admitted  to  the  agenda  of  the  UNSC  or  of  the  UNGA  of  the 
113  UN,  as  a  threat  to  international  peace,  beach  of  the  peace  of  an  act  of  aggression 
Thus,  in  three  situations,  the  power  of  the  established  Government  to  determine  the 
existence  of  an  internal  conflict  is  affirmed  at  least  implicitly.  However,  the  fourth  criteria 
is  interesting,  here  the  initiative  to  determine  the  existence  of  the  internal  conflict  is  taken 
out  of  the  direction  of  the  established  Government,  in  the  words  of  Elder: 
"Olbid, 
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152 "The  latter's  [the  fourth  criteria]  departure  from  the  traditional  discretionary  nature 
of  recognition  and  its  move  towards  a  quasi  -collective  legitimization  of  the 
qualitative  nature  of  internal  conflict  would  escape,  as  a  matter  of  procedure,  the 
114 
great  power  veto" 
The  Greek  representative  was  more  specific,  he  suggested  the  return  to  the  notion  of 
recognition  of  belligerency  as  a  standard  for  the  application  of  the  Conventions  to  internal 
conflicts,  but  he  proposed  that  the  majority  of  the  UNSC  should  be  competent  for  the 
purpose  of  determining  the  presence  of  the  conditions  of  such  recognition.  115 
This  is  a  new  approach  to  belligerency,  since  it  takes  into  account  the  new  development 
which  took  place  after  the  second  world  war,  especially  the  creation  of  the  UN,  it  will  be 
a  good  progress  in  international  law,  if  serious  internal  conflicts  are  treated  by  the  UN.  Falk 
rightly  notes  in  this  respect  that: 
"Belligerent  status,  if  objectively  determined  by  the  community  would  enable 
supranational  actors  t?  have  a  technique  to  justify  treatment  of  serious  internal  wars 
as  international  war".  16 
In  that  case  then  rebellions  and  internal  disorders  would  remain  within  the  domestic 
jurisdiction  of  the  State,  whereas  serious  challenges  may  very  well  be  internationalized  in 
the  sense  that  humanitarian  law  would  be  applicable  to  them  if  the  international  community 
may  decide  so. 
The  problem  with  this  approach  is  that  traditions  of  sovereignty,  and  the  ideological  rift 
between  the  two  great  powers  would  stand  as  a  barrier  against  any  attempt  at  centralising 
the  decisions  about  the  existence  of  internal  conflicts.  117 
This  explains  in  part  why  the  Greek  proposal  did  not  gain  any  support.  The  Soviet 
delegate  in  fact  emphasised  that  the  mission  of  the  UNSC  is  to  find  a  peaceful  solution  to 
conflicts  which  threatened  the  world  security  and  not  to  determine  the  existence  of  such 
conflict  and  recognizing  the  status  of  belligerency  to  its  parties.  118 
These  initial  amendments  and  proposals  produced  by  the  special  committee  of  the  joint 
committee  reveal  clearly  that  the  majority  of  States  did  not  in  principle  oppose  international 
regulation  of  internal  conflicts,  which  must  be  seen  as  a  welcome  step  in  the  direction  of 
making  international  law  relevant  to  serious  violent  crises  which  arise,  not  only  between 
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153 States,  but  also  to  those  occurring  within  States. 
However,  the  majority  emphasized  that  definition  of  internal  conflicts  is  necessary,  since 
the  non-definition  attitude  adopted  by  the  ICRC  coupled  with  the  extension  of  application 
of  the  whole  Conventions  to  such  conflict,  would  not  be  in  the  interests  of  the  established 
Government  since  their  power  to  deal  with  violent  upheavals  would  be  jeopardised  because 
any  insurgent  group,  however  small,  and  insignificant  can  claim  the  benefits  of  the 
Convention  hence  creating  legal  and  political  embarrassment  for  the  Government. 
Thus,  through  the  device  of  definition,  the  majority  of  States  raised  the  thresholds  of 
internal  conflict.  They  appealed  to  factual  and  formal  criteria  found  in  the  customary 
institution  of  recognition  of  belligerency,  and  in  the  majority  of  cases  left  it  to  the 
established  Government  to  determine  the  existence  of  internal  conflicts.  The  rational  behind 
such  attempts  is  very  clear.  It  is  to  protect  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  and  to  close  any  door 
to  unwanted  intervention  in  their  internal  affairs. 
The  proposals  and  amendments  produced  by  the  special  committee  of  the  joint  committee 
made  clear  that  the  majority  of  States  were  not  in  a  position  to  accept  draft  Article  2/4  of 
the  ICRC  as  it  stands.  Thus,  the  later  discussions  in  the  joint  committee,  led  to  the  rejection 
of  the  draft  Article  2/4  by  10  votes  to  I  with  I  abstention.  The  main  reason  behind  such 
rejection  as  it  appears  from  the  above  mentioned  Statements  and  amendments  is  that  draft 
Article  2/4  was  too  wide  in  scope,  which  means  that  it  covered  situations  which  States 
considered  as  matters  within  their  domestic  jurisdiction. 
This  rejection  led  to  the  appointment  of  a  working  group  on  May  II  th,  1949  with  the 
mission  of  drafting  a  new  Article  dealing  with  internal  conflict  taking  into  consideration 
the  views  and  amendments  made  by  States  on  the  ICRC  proposal.  It  was  composed  of  5 
States  (US,  France,  Norway,  Australia  and  Switzerland)  on  the  May,  1949,  a  new  draft  was 
produced,  it  states: 
"(I)  In  the  case  of  armed  conflict  not  of  an  international  character  occurring  in  the 
territory  of  one  of  the  hight  Contracting  Parties,  each  party  to  the  conflict  shall  be 
bound  to  implement  the  provisions  of  the  present  convention,  provided:  (a)  that  the  de  jure  Government  has  recognized  the  status  of  belligerency  of  the 
adverse  party  without  restrictions  or  for  the  sole  purposes  of  the  application  of  the 
present  or 
(b)  that  the  adverse  party  presents  the  characteristics  of  a  State,  in  particular,  that  it 
possesses  an  organized  military  force,  that  it  is  under  the  direction  of  an  organized 
civil  authority  which  exercises  de  facto  Governmental  functions  over  the  population 
or  a  determinate  portion  of  the  national  territory,  and  that  it  has  the  means  of 
enforcing  the  Convention  and  of  complying  with  the  laws  and  customs  of  war; 
application  of  the  Convention  in  these  circumstances  shall  in  no  way  depend  upon 
the  legal  status  of  the  parties  to  the  conflict. 
(c)  This  obligation  presupposes,  furthermore,  in  all  circumstances,  that  the  adverse 
party  declares  itself  bound  by  the  present  Convention  and  as  is  the  de  jure 
Government,  by  the  laws  and  customs  of  war  (and  that  it  complies  with  the  above 
conditions  in  actual  fact). 
(11).  The  provisions  relating  to  the  protecting  powers  shall,  however,  not  be 
applicable,  except  in  the  instance  of  special  agreement  between  the  parties  to  the 
conflict.  An  impartial  humanitarian  body  such  as  the  international  committee  of  the 
Red  Cross,  may  offer  to  the  parties  to  the  conflict  to  undertake  the  duties  conferred 
by  the  present  Convention  on  the  protecting  powers. 
(M)  In  the  case  of  armed  conflicts  which  do  not  fulfil  the  conditions  as  determined 
above,  by  means  of  special  agreements,  all  or  part  of  the  provisions  of  the  present 
154 Convention,  or,  on  all  circumstances,  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  underlying 
humanitarian  principles  of  the  present  convention. 
(IV)  In  all  circumstances  stipulated  in  the  forgoing  provisions,  total  or  partial 
application  of  th?,  present  Convention  shall  not  affect  the  legal  status  of  the  parties 
to  the  conflict.  "'  9 
This  draft  in  fact  combines  the  factual  and  formal  criteria  included  in  the  French, 
Australian  and  the  American  amendments  referred  to  above.  The  general  tone  of  the  draft 
is  plainly  in  favour  of  the  rights  of  the  State  rather  than  humanitarian  considerations,  since 
the  thresholds  of  the  internal  conflict  are  set  very  high  and  in  practice  very  few  conflicts 
would  satisfy  the  stringent  conditions  contained  in  that  draft. 
Moreover,  there  is  nothing  in  the  text  of  the  draft,  which  indicates  that  the  discretionary 
power,  of  the  established  Government  to  determine  the  existence  of  the  internal  conflict 
is  limited  in  any  way,  even  when  the  high  factual  criteria  are  present.  This  is  a  further 
example  of  favouring  the  rights  of  States. 
However,  despite  the  stringent  conditions  contained  in  the  draft  of  the  working  group, 
some  important  delegations  were  not  pleased  with  it.  Thus,  France  expressed  its  inability 
to  accept  the  application  of  the  whole  Conventions  to  internal  conflicts,  especially  the 
impossibility  of  such  application  in  the  case  of  the  civilian  Convention.  Britain  on  the  other 
hand  was  not  happy  with  the  mention  of  'belligerency'  since  the  latter  'implied  rights 
exceeding  the  scope  of  the  Conventions'.  120  Others  were  against  the  expression  'possessing 
the  characteristics  of  State'  which  they  feared,  might  be  interpreted  that  the  rebels  have 
some  legal  status.  121 
The  objections,  led  the  joint  committee  to  ask  the  same  working  group  (on  the  May  25th, 
1949)  to  submit  another  draft.  This  was  done,  the  new  draft  Article  dropped  any  language 
which  might  suggest  that  the  insurgents  possess  any  legal  status.  Also  a  new  provision  was 
included  specifically  for  the  application  of  the  civilian  Convention  in  internal  conflicts. 
Thus,  recognition  of  belligerency  does  not  suffice  to  apply  the  convention,  it  will  be  applied 
only,  either  in  part  or  as  a  whole,  by  special  agreements  between  the  parties  to  the 
conflict.  122 
1191bid, 
p.  124. 
1201bid, 
p.  47. 
12  'Thus,  Italy  proposed  "to  delete  the  terms  $present  the  characteristics  of  State'  which  gives  the 
impression  that  the  rebels  already  constitute  a  subject  In  international  taw".  Ibid. 
122The  Secord  Draft  of  the  first  working  group  in  fact,  included  a  new  Article  2  (a)  for  the  Civilian 
Convention.  It  provides: 
Oln  case  of  armed  conflict  not  of  an  international  character  occurring  in  the  territory  of  one 
of  the  high  contracting  parties,  the  parties  to  the  conflict  should  endeavour  to  bring  into 
force,  by  means  of  special  agreements,  all  or  part  of  the  provisions  of  the  present  convention, 
and  in  atL  circumstances  shaLL  act  in  accordance  with  the  underlying  humanitarian  principles 
of  the  present  convention". 
lbid,  p.  125. 
155 In  practice,  then  we  may  very  well  faced  with  a  situation  in  which  the  established 
Government  may  recognize  the  belligerent  status  of  their  opponents  (so  that  the  wounded 
and  sick  and  captured  combatants  would  be  treated  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  war)  and 
can  still  refuse  to  enter  into  special  agreement  for  the  protection  of  the  civilians. 
This  situation  underlines  the  fact  that  Governments  would  not  like  to  be  seen  as  losing 
the  control  over  their  own  civilian  population  since  that  would  hurt  their  claim,  that  they 
are  (established  Governments)  the  sole  representative  of  the  State. 
Apart  from  the  changes  mentioned  above,  the  second  draft  does  not  differ  much  from 
the  first  draft.  The  two  drafts  followed  the  method  of  limiting  the  cases  of  conflicts  of 
non-  international  to  which  the  conventions  would  apply.  This  has  been  done  by  adopting 
definitions  which  contain  very  rigid  criteria,  which  would  in  practice  exclude  any  internal 
conflict  which  would  not  attain  the  gravity  and  seriousness  of  an  international  war. 
It  seems  that  the  approach  which  was  followed  by  the  working  group  in  its  two  drafts  was 
not  accepted  by  the  majority  of  States.  The  main  reason  for  that  is,  in  my  opinion,  that 
States  feared  that  the  application  of  the  convention  In  toto  would  give  their  opponents 
certain  legal  status,  that  being  so,  despite  the  fact  that  the  two  drafts  expressly  stressed  that 
the  application  of  the  conventions  would  not  give  any  legal  status  to  insurgentS.  123 
During  the  discussion  of  the  second  draft,  the  French  Delegation  hinted  at  another 
approach  in  the  drafting  of  the  Article  concerned  with  internal  conflicts.  Instead  of  limiting 
the  cases  of  internal  conflicts,  to  which  the  conventions  would  apply  In  toto,  it  was 
proposed  to  restrict  the  provisions  of  the  conventions,  which  would  apply  in  such  cases.  The 
immediate  effect  of  such  an  approach  would  have  been  the  abandoning  of  the  attempts  at 
defining  internal  conflicts,  and  rather  concentrating  on  the  substantive  humanitarian  rules 
which  may  apply  in  those  conflicts. 
Thus,  the  French  delegation  introduced  the  new  approach  by  wishing  that: 
"...  [T]he  humanitarian  rules  contained  in  the  preamble  of  the  civilians  convention  to 
be  applied  also  to  war  of  non-  international  character,  such  a  preamble  should  be 
added  to  the  three  other  conventions,  and  contain  also  a  definition  of  judicial 
guarantees  in  penal  matters".  124 
This  led  to  the  appointment  of  a  second  working  group,  with  the  mission  of  drafting  a  new 
Article  dealing  with  internal  wars.  This  group  adopted  a  method  which  was  in  line  with  the 
French  proposal. 
1231n 
this  context,  the  French  detegate  attacked  the  method  foltowed  by  the  first  working  group.  He 
stated: 
0...  Mignatory  Governments  who  were  confronted  with  an  insurgent  movement  would  be  In  a 
dilemma:  either  they  would  never  apply  the  clauses  of  the  convention,  or  they  would  implicitly 
recognize  that  the  adverse  party  had  a  character  which  was  tantamount  to  that  of  State". 
lbid,  p.  78. 
1241bid, 
p.  78. 
156 The  new  draft  Article125  produced  by  the  second  working  group  did  not  define  non- 
international  conflicts.  However,  it  contained  the  humanitarian  rules  to  be  respected  in  such 
situations.  Thus,  only  basic  humanitarian  rules  would  apply  and  not  the  whole  convention. 
This  draft  was  subjected  to  various  criticisms.  The  most  important  criticisms  were  made 
by  the  Soviet  Union  and  Burma.  The  former  thought  that  the  obvious  outcome  of  the 
approach  of  the  second  working  group  would  be  that  a  large  number  of  important 
provisions  concerning  the  protection  of  war  victims  will  not  be  put  into  operation,  126  the 
Russian  Delegation  then  proposed  a  series  of  proposals,  with  the  object  of  widening  the 
range  of  humanitarian  rules  applicable  to  each  category  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars  (the 
wounded,  POW's  and  civilians),  however,  no  attempt  was  made  at  defining  non- 
international  conflicts. 
Burma  on  the  other  hand,  criticised  the  non-definition  of  "armed  conflicts  of  a  non- 
international  character'  this  phrase  in  its  view  may  'include  banditing,  uprisings,  disorders, 
rebellion  and  civil  war'127.  Its  delegate  tried  to  convince  the  Conference  that  any  inclusion 
of  any  Article  in  whatever  form  dealing  with  internal  conflict  is  very  dangerous.  He  stated: 
"...  [S]o  the  only  help  that  the  Article  will  give,  if  you  adopt  it,  will  be  to  those  who 
desire  loot,  pillage  political  power  by  undemocratic  means,  or  those  foreign  ideologies 
seeking  their  own  advancement  by  inciting  the  population  of  another  country.  If  you 
agree  that  this  will  be  the  result,  we  are  sure  you  will  not  adopt  this  Article, 
especially  if  you  will  realize  that  no  Government  of  an  independent  country,  can,  or 
will  ever,  be  inhuman  or  cruel  in  its  actions  towards  its  own  nationals.  If  you  will 
adopt  it  you  will  not  only  be  embarrassing  the  de  jure  Government,  but  you  will  also 
125The  ArticLe  adopted  by  the  second  working  group  stipulates  that: 
"Paragraph  I.  In  the  case  of  armed  conf  tict  not  of  an  international  character  occurring  in  the 
territory  of  one  of  the  high  contracting  parties,  each  party  of  the  conflict  shatt  be  bound 
to  apply,  as  a  minimum,  the  following  provisions: 
(1)  Persons  taking  no  active  part  in  the  hostilities,  and  those  placed  hors  combat  by  sickness, 
wounds,  captivity  or  any  other  cause,  shatt  be  treated  humanly  in  all,  circumstances  and  without 
any  discrimination.  To  this  end,  the  following  acts  are  and  shatt  remain  prohibited  with 
respect  to  the  above  mentioned  persons: 
(a)  Violence  to  life  and  person  in  particular  murder  of  all  kinds,  mutf  tation,  cruet  treatment 
and  torture; 
(b)  taking  of  hostages; 
(c)  outrages  upon  personal  dignity,  in  particular,  humanity  and  degrading  treatment; 
(d)  the  passing  of  sentences  and  the  carrying  out  of  executions  without  previous  judgments 
pronounced  by  a  regutaratory  constituted  court  affording  at  I  the  judicial  guarantees  which  are 
recognized  as  indispensable  by  civilized  parties. 
(2)  The  wounded  and  sick  shalt  be  collected  and  cared  for. 
(3)  No  adverse  discrimination  shall,  be  practised  on  the  basis  of  differences  of  race,  coLour, 
religion  or  faith,  sex,  birth  or  wealth. 
Paragraph  2.  An  impartial  humanitarian  body,  such  as  the  ICRC  may  offer  its  services  to  the 
parties  to  the  conflict. 
Paragraph  3.  The  parties  to  the  conf  Lict  should  further  endeavour  to  bring  into  force  by  means 
of  special  agreements,  all  or  part  of  the  other  provisions  of  the  present  convent. 
Paragraph  4.  The  application  of  the  preceding  provisions  shatt  not  affect  the  Legal  status  of 
the  parties  to  the  conflict". 
lbid,  pp.  125-126. 
1261bld, 
p.  326. 
1271bid, 
p.  329. 
157 seriously  endanger  its  sovereignty  as  you  will  be  taking  away  from  it  its  own  legal 
machi 
I 
nery  to  maintain  the  security  of  its  population  and  the  prosperity  of  its 
State" 
. 
Neither  of  the  two  extreme  views,  was  adopted,  in  fact  the  Russian  proposals  were  defeated 
by  the  joint  committee  by  9  votes  to  1. 
With  some  minor  modifications,  the  essentials  of  the  draft  proposed  by  the  second  working 
group  adopted  first  by  the  joint  committee  and  later  by  the  conference  as  Article  3.  The 
Article  as  adopted  contains  no  definition  of  'armed  conflict  of  a  non-  international 
character'.  However,  in  my  view,  the  travaux  p0paratolres,  reveal  clearly  that  the  majority 
view  holds  that  the  term  does  not  apply  to  every  kind  of  internal  disorder,  only  conflicts 
which  reveal  certain  gravity  and  intensity  could  be  included. 
In  this  respect,  in  the  19th  Plenary  Meeting  July  29th,  1949  which  adopted  the  future 
Article  3,  the  Delegate  of  Venezuela  stressed: 
"...  [W]e  must  be  quite  certain  of  what  is  meant  by  'armed  conflict  of  a  non 
international  character'.  There  is  no  doubt  that  this  does  not  apply  to  the  exploits  of 
bandits  or  the  riots  of  any  kind  but  to  civil  wars,  a  sociological  phenomenon  of 
political  history  which  often  in  essence  is  a  form  of  class  struggle".  29 
The  representative  of  Switzerland,  who  was  one  of  the  sponsors  of  the  actual  Article  3, 
argued  in  response  to  the  Burmese  delegate  who  sees  any  inclusion  of  rules  dealing  with 
internal  conflicts  as  an  encouragement  of  insurgency.  He  stated: 
"The  Burmese  delegate  is  afraid  that  the  Article  2A  [which  became  Article  3  in  the 
final  draft]  might  be  invoked  against  the  legitimate  Government,  in  cases  of 
individual  outbreaks  of  banditism  or  organized  movement  of  the  kind,  but  I  do  not 
consider  that  this  apprehension  is  well  founded.  These  provisions  are  applicable  in 
the  event  of  an  armed  conflict,  in  other  words,  an  armed  conflict  must  actually  be 
going  on  but  outbursts  of  individual  banditism,  or  even  movement  of  the  kind, 
complicated  or  aggravated  by  the  existence  of  a  conspiracy,  do  not  really  constitute 
an  armed  conflict  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  terms.  Nor  does  a  mere  riot  constitute 
an  armed  conflict.  An  armed  conflict  as  understood  in  this  provision,  implies  some 
form  of  organization  among  the  parties  to  the  conflict.  Such  organization  will,  of 
course  generally  be  found  on  the  Government  side;  but  there  must  also  be  some 
degree  of  organization  among  the  insurgents".  130 
It  seems  to  me  that  this  interpretation  is  interesting,  since  it  reveals  the  intentions  of  the 
sponsors  of  Article  3.  It  shows  clearly  that  'an  armed  conflict  not  of  an  international 
character'  has  some  kind  of  definition.  The  threshold  of  the  conflict  are  not  very  high,  in 
other  words  such  conflicts  do  not  have  to  resemble  international  conflicts,  however,  riots 
and  internal  tensions  are  excluded  they  remain  in  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  the  State. 
The  other  main  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  travaux  pr6paratolres  are  in  my  opinion 
the  following: 
128  lbid,  p.  329. 
129  Jbid,  p.  333. 
1301bid, 
p.  335. 
158 1.  There  was  a  wide  acceptance  that  international  law  is  relevant  to  internal  crisis  in 
certain  specific  cases.  To  me  this  is  in  fact  a  result  of  the  influence  of  the  humanitarian 
spirit  which  arose  after  the  second  world  war.  States  came  to  terms  with  the  idea  that  their 
treatment  of  their  citizens  has  to  be  guided  by  certain  fundamental  principles.  Human 
rights  ensured  the  protection  of  human  beings  during  peace  times  in  general,  humanitarian 
law  would  have  the  same  effect  during  times  of  armed  conflicts  either  internal  or 
international.  No  State  (except  Burma)  has  in  fact  attempted  to  characterise  such 
international  regulation  as  an  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  State  or  as  a  breach 
of  sovereignty. 
2.  However,  the  majority  of  States  (mostly  colonial  States,  US,  Canada,  Greece  and 
Burma)  were  concerned  about  the  effects  of  such  regulations  on  their  sovereign  rights  to 
keep  law  and  order  within  their  own  borders. 
Those  States  sought  to  limit  incursions  into  their  domestic  jurisdiction,  by  advocating  first 
strict  definitions  of  internal  conflicts.  In  fact,  these  definitions  contained  such  high  and 
serious  criteria,  that  in  practice  very  few  cases  would  qualify.  Thus,  the  technique  of 
definition  was  used  at  that  stage  for  a  very  specific  reason,  and  that  is  the  protection  of  the 
sovereignty  of  State. 
Later  in  the  conference,  however,  the  tone  has  changed,  States  concentrated  on  limiting 
the  humanitarian  rules  applicable  to  such  conflicts.  This  would  enable  them  to  keep  more 
discretion  and  liberty  in  the  crushing  of  their  opponents  and  would  reduce  the  chances  of 
the  insurgents  of  obtaining  legal  status. 
It  must  be  stressed  that  there  is  no  direct  indication  in  the  travaux  prkparatolres  which 
suggests  that  by  adopting  the  second  method  (of  restricting  the  rules  applicable  in  the 
internal  conflicts)  the  States  which  tried  to  define  the  internal  armed  conflicts  have 
abandoned  their  earlier  definitions,  and  have  opted  for  a  more  liberal  interpretation. 
Although  for  more  humanitarian  spirit,  it  seems  that  the  Statement  made  by  Switzerland 
(quoted  above)  must  be  taken  to  express  the  feeling  of  the  majority  of  States. 
3.  Moreover,  in  my  opinion,  States  wanted  to  limit  incursions  into  their  sovereignty,  by 
rejecting  the  competence  of  any  UN  organ  body  to  determine  the  existence  of  internal 
conflict.  Which  means  implicitly  that  they  wanted  to  remain  the  sole  authority  competent 
to  make  such  a  determination.  The  argument  that  when  certain  objective  criteria  exist,  the 
State  is  obliged  to  apply  Article  3  finds  no  real  support  in  travaux  pr6paratolres.  Also,  it 
seems  to  me  that  in  a  world  still  dominated  by  sovereignty  and  in  the  absence  of  a  central 
agency  above  the  States  any  talk  of  objectivity  is  out  of  place. 
However,  what  is  needed  in  my  view,  is  that  the  established  Governments  should  act  in 
good  faith  in  their  determination  of  the  existence  of  an  armed  conflict.  To  me,  it  would  be 
absurd  for  instance,  to  demand  that  the  insurgents  must  occupy  a  substantial  part  of  the 
national  territory  in  a  very  effective  way,  in  order  to  apply  Article  3  since  in  guerilla 
warfare,  which  is  the  dominant  method  of  warfare  in  our  present  world,  that  requirement 
would  never  be  fulfilled. 
159 B.  Subsequent  Practice  and  Situations  to  which  Common  Article  3  Applies 
In  this  context,  Row  writes: 
"  ...  [I]n  practice  Article  3  has  been  of  little  direct  significance,  simply  because  it 
attempts  to  control  the  manner  in  which  a  State  treats  its  own  citizens  in 
circumstances  where  the  Government  concerned  may  be  fighting  for  its  very 
existence.  In  addition,  a  State  may  take  the  view  that  any  trouble  that  it  is  having 
with  armed  groups  intent  on  bringing  down  the  Government  is  really  only  criminal 
and  that  its  laws  are  adequate  to  stamp  out  that  activity".  131 
In  other  words,  the  reason  for  the  lack  of  interest  of  Government  in  the  application  of 
Article  3,  is  that  it  may  restrict  its  discretion  in  dealing  with  its  opponent  and  also  it  may 
give  them  some  legal  status. 
Many  international  lawyers  interested  in  humanitarian  law  hold  similar  views132  suc  as 
De  Lupis  who  notes  that: 
"In  spite  of  the  modest  ambitions  of  common  Article  3  states  have  still  attempted  to 
evade  the  application  of  this  Article,  clairnipy,  that  a  conflict  did  not  fall  within  its 
ambit  but  constituted  a  mere  police  action".  '-" 
This  means  that  the  absence  of  definition  of  internal  conflict,  coupled  with  the  absence  of 
any  mechanism  for  the  determination  of  such  internal  conflict  have  resulted  in  practice  in 
limiting  the  role  of  Article  3  in  actual  civil  wars  situations,  and  this  gave  precedence  to  the 
claims  of  established  Governments.  In  this  way,  France,  the  UK  and  Portugal  refused  to 
acknowledge  the  application  of  Article  3  to  their  colonies,  they  acted  under  the  presumption 
that  established  Governments  have  the  right  to  put  down  uprisings,  by  all  means  required 
by  the  situation.  The  example  of  France  is  flagrant,  it  refused  in  the  first  years  of  the 
Algerian  war  to  recognize  that  the  conflict  falls  within  Article  3,  even  when  more  than 
400,000  soldiers  were  used  against  the  insurgents. 
Baxter  attributes  this  state  of  affairs  to: 
"...  [T]he  deceptively  simple  expression  'armed  conflict  not  of  an  international 
character'  has  not  proven  easy  to  apply  to  the  multiplicity  of  circumstances  under 
which  violence  may  break  out  in  a  state".  134 
However,  despite  the  above  misgivings,  State  practice  shows  that  in  certain  cases,  the 
Article  has  been  recognized  to  apply  either  explicitly  or  implicitly.  In  this  context,  Forsythe 
established  a  chart  on  the  initial  relevance  of  Article  3  to  the  situation  of  violence  during 
the  period  from  1949  to  1975,  three  categories  emerge  from  his  study: 
1.  In  the  first  category,  the  belligerents  signed  Ad  hoc  agreements  in  which  all  the  four 
131  P.  Rowe:  Defence:  The  Legat  lffptfcatfc>ns.  Brassey's  Defence  Pub.,  1987,  p.  142. 
132  Thus,  Bond  notes  that  $States  have  generalty  ignored  It  EArticle  311.  J.  E.  Bond:  The  Rutes  of  Riot: 
Internal,  Conf  I,  Icts  and  the  Law  of  War.  PUP,  Princeton,  1974,  p.  58. 
133 
Co.  cit.,  supra.  n.  92,  p.  169. 
134 
R.  R.  Baxter:  Jus  in  Betio  Interno:  The  Present  and  the  Future  Law,  in  Moore  (ed.  ),  op.  cit.,  supra. 
chapter  2,  n.  4,  p.  521. 
160 Geneva  Conventions  or  their  basic  principles  were  applicable  to  their  internal  conflicts. 
Examples  of  this  are:  The  Congo  in  1960-4,  The  Yemen  in  1963-67  and  Nigeria  in  1967- 
70. 
2.  In  the  second  category,  explicit  acceptance  of  the  applicability  of  Article  3  either  by 
Government  officials  or  by  a  non  -Governmental  party  (the  insurgents).  The  former  include: 
Guatemala  in  1954,  The  US  (Vietnam)  in  1964,  The  Dominican  Republic  in  1965,  Uruguay 
in  1972  and  Chile  in  1973. 
The  latter  (the  recognition  by  the  insurgents)  comprise  the  cases  of  Algeria  in  1956, 
Lebanon  in  1958,  Cuba  in  1959  and  Yemen  in  1962. 
3.  In  the  third  category,  Forsythe  lists  possible  situations  for  the  application  of  Common 
Article  3,  not  acknowledged  by  Governments  but  in  which  the  ICRC  visited  detainees.  He 
cites  several  examples  such  as  Algeria  (France)  in  1955,  Cyprus  (UK)  in  1955-58,  Hungary 
in  1956,  Malaysia  in  1956,  Kenya  (UK)  in  1956-59,  South  Vietnam  in  1957-66,  Rhodesia 
(UK)  from  1959  till  independence,  Laos  in  1961-72,  Indonesia  in  1966-69,  Aden  (UK)  in 
1966-67,  Bolivia  in  1971,  Guinea-Bissau  (Portugal)  in  1971-74,  Mozambique  in  1971-74, 
Burundi  in  1972,  and  Angola  (Portugal)  in  1973-75.  In  addition,  he  also  refers  to  instances 
where  the  ICRC  still  visits  detainees  as  illustrated  by  the  cases  of  Ethiopia  since  1974- 
present,  Lebanon  since  1975-present,  Northern  Ireland  (UK)  since  1971-present,  and 
Philippines  since  1972-present.  135 
The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  this  survey,  is  that  in  the  overwhelming  majority  of 
cases,  States  do  not  feel  obliged  to  declare  themselves  bound  by  Article  3.  this  would  tie 
their  hands  in  finishing  off  the  insurgents  at  the  earliest  possible  moment.  However,  if 
the  conflict  intensifies  and  prolongs  for  a  long  time,  States  to  save  their  faces  accept  the 
ICRC  humanitarian  initiatives,  without  committing  themselves  openly.  But,  it  has  to  be 
made  clear  that  States  can  accept  the  offer  of  the  ICRC,  but  refuse  to  acknowledge  the 
application  of  Article  3,  in  other  words,  they  can  still  deny  the  existence  of  an  armed 
conflict  of  a  non-international  character.  Thus,  the  UK  accepted  the  visits  of  the  ICRC  to 
the  'H'  block  prison  in  Northern  Ireland,  on  the  clear  understanding  that  such  permission 
did  not  imply  that  the  UK  Government  recognize  the  application  of  Article  3  to  the 
situations  in  that  region.  136  This  explains  in  part  why  the  ICRC  is  present  at  the  moment 
in  nearly  every  internal  conflict.  In  this  way,  in  1990  it  still  is  present  in  Afghanistan, 
Angola,  Burma,  Burundi,  Chad,  Chile,  Colombia,  East  Timor,  EI-Salvador,  Ethiopia, 
Kampuchia,  Lebanon,  Mozambique,  Nicaragua,  Paraguay,  Philippines,  Sri-Lanka,  Sudan, 
Surinam,  and  Uganda.  137 
Clearly,  the  majority  of  these  States  have  never  issued  declarations  in  which  they 
135  D.  P.  Forsythe:  Legat  Management  of  Internat  War:  The  1977  Protocot  on  Non-Internationat  Armed 
ConfLfcts.  72  AJIL,  1978,  pp.  275-276. 
1360P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  131,  p.  142. 
137See 
the  fottowing  issues  of  the  IRRC: 
March/Aprit  1989,29th  Year,  No.  269,  pp.  147-152. 
May/June  1989,29th  Year,  No.  270,  pp.  229-235. 
Sept/Oct  1989,29th  Year,  No.  272,  pp.  474-479. 
161 recognized  the  applicability  of  Article  3  to  their  conflicts.  They  maintain  that  such  an  act 
would  inevitably  carry  with  it  the  implication  that  the  insurgents  have  some  legal  status, 
thus  weakening  their  claim  to  be  the  masters  of  situations  and  the  holders  of  legitimacy. 
1.  The  ICRC  and  the  Definition  of  an  Armed  Conflict  not  of  an  International  Character 
and  the  Question  of  Determining  the  Existence  of  such  a  Conflict 
The  Official  Commentaries  of  ICRC  on  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949,  seem  to  be  guided 
by  two  principles,  first  the  conflict  to  which  Article  3  is  to  apply  must  satisfy  some 
conditions  of  fact  and  that  despite  the  absence  of  definition  in  the  text  of  the  Article.  It  is 
stressed  that: 
"It  must  be  recognized  that  the  conflict  referred  to  in  Article  3  are  armed  conflicts, 
with  armed  forces  on  either  side  engaged  in  hostilities-conflicts  in  short,  which  are 
in  many  respects  similar  to  an  international  war  but  take  place  within  the  confines 
U8  of  a  single  country" 
The  ICRC  in  the  same  commentaries  suggested  some  criteria  which  can  be  useful  in 
distinguishing  "a  genuine  armed  conflict  from  a  mere  act  of  banditry  or  an  organized  and 
short  lived  insurrection".  139  They  are  as  follows: 
"I.  That  the  party  in  revolt  against  the  de  jure  government  possesses  an  organized 
military  force,  an  authority  responsible  for  its  acts  acting  within  a  determined 
territory  and  having  the  means  of  respecting  and  ensuring  respect  for  the 
conventions. 
2.  That  the  legal  government  is  obliged  to  have  recourse  to  the  regular  military  forces 
against  insurgents  organized  as  military  and  in  possession  of  a  part  of  the  national 
territory. 
3.  (a)  That  the  de  jure  government  has  recognised  the  insurgents  as  belligerents;  or 
(b)  That  it  has  claimed  for  itself  the  rights  of  a  belligerent;  or 
(c)  That  it  has  accorded  the  insurgents  recognition  as  belligerents  for  the  purposes 
only  of  the  present  convention;  or 
(d)  That  the  dispute  has  been  admitted  to  the  agenda  of  the  UNSC  or  the  UNGA  of 
the  UN  as  being  a  threat  to  international  peace,  a'  breach  of  peace  or  an  act  of 
aggression. 
4.  (a)  That  the  insurgents  have  an  organization  purporting  to  have  the  characteristics 
of  a  state 
(b)  That  the  insurgents  civil  authority  exercises  de  facto  authority  over  persons 
within  a  determinate  territory 
(c)  That  the  armed  forces  act  under  the  direction  of  the  organized  civil  authority  and 
are  prepared  to  observe  the  ordinary  laws  of  war 
(d)  That  the  insurgents  civil  authority  agrees  to  be  bound  by  the  provisions  of  the 
C1  *140  onvention. 
These  criteria  in  fact  are  a  summary  of  the  proposed  definitions  which  some  States 
advanced  during  the  discussions  of  Article  3  in  the  Diplomatic  Conference  of  1949. 
1380P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  114,  p.  53. 
139  J.  Pictet  (ed.  ):  Geneva  Conventions  of  12  August  1949,  Commentary.  VoL.  1,  Geneva  Conventions  for 
the  Ametioration  of  the  Conditions  of  the  Wounded  and  Sick  in  Armed  Forces  in  the  Fietd,  Geneva,  ICRC, 
1952,  p.  50. 
1401bid, 
pp.  49-50. 
162 However,  the  second  principle  contained  in  the  ICRC  Commentaries,  is  that  'the  Article 
should  be  applied  as  widely  as  possible'141  meaning  that  the  conditions  cited  above  are  not 
necessarily  indispensable,  since  in  its  view  no  Government  may  in  practice  claim  even  in 
cases  of  mere  disturbances  that  it  is  not  bound  by  the  purely  humanitarian  rules  contained 
in  Article  3.  Thus,  in  its  view  the  matter  is  not  clear  cut.  It  wanted  to  satisfy  two 
opposing  demands,  a  demand  for  respect  for  the  sovereignty  of  State  on  one  hand  and  the 
demand  of  more  humanity  in  all  internal  confliq  whatever  their  intensity.  Later  on,  it 
seems  that  the  ICRC  adopted  an  approach  which  favours  the  demands  of  humanity  as 
opposed  to  claims  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention. 
In  its  report  to  the  CGEDHL  (1971),  the  ICRC  stressed  that: 
"To  be  sure,  Article  3,  de  lege  lata,  does  not  contain  a  definition  of  the  non- 
international  armed  conflict.  But  although  the  article  fails  to  specify  the  concept  of 
snon-  international  armed  conflict',  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  the  authorities  involved 
would  not  be  in  a  position  to  interpret  it  erroneously,  and  that,  when  the  conditions 
of  such  aKe-conflict  are  realized  the  humanitarian  standards  of  Article  3  must  apply. 
In  addition,  certain  elements  of  the  existing  text  can  be  singled  out:  a  non- 
international  armed  conflict  exist  in  the  case  of  hostilities  engaging  armed  forces 
within  the  same  State.  Thus  Article  3  leave  a  broad  power  of  appraisal  to  the  parties 
to  the  conflict,  but  nevertheless  does  not  give  them  the  power  of  sovereign  decisions 
as  the  application  of  its  provisions".  142 
In  fact,  the  ICRC  here  confirms  what  a  Commission  of  its  Experts  on  Humanitarian 
Assistance  of  Victims  of  Internal  Conflicts  has  arrived  to  in  1962.  "' 
Thus,  armed  conflicts  not  of  an  international  character,  are  not  supposed  to  have  the  same 
characteristics  of  an  international  war,  only  moderate  criteria  can  exist,  such  as  a  minimum 
of  organization,  existence  of  armed  hostilitiesagainst  the  established  Government,  also  a 
collective  character  of  the  conflict.  144 
The  ICRC  stressed  the  objective  character  of  those  conditions,  and  thus  tried  to  restrict 
the  discretion  of  the  established  Governments  in  the  matter  of  the  determination  of  the 
existence  of  an  internal  conflict,  which  eventually  leads  to  the  limitation  of  their 
sovereignty  in  that  domain. 
Despite  the  obvious  humanitarian  intent  behind  such  an  approach,  the  fact  remains  that 
States  rarely  acknowledge  the  existence  of  internal  conflict  even  when  the  existence  of 
those  'objective  conditions'  is  in  no  doubt. 
1411bid, 
p.  50. 
142CGEDHL  (Geneva  24  May-12  June,  1971),  V.  Protection  of  Victims  of  Non-Internatfonat  Armed 
Confticts,  pp.  36-37. 
143That  Commission  in  fact,  stressed  that: 
"La  determination  de  Pexistence  d'un  teL  conf  Lit  interne  r6pond  A  des  conditions  objectives. 
Ette  ne  peut  r4sutter  de  Pappr6cfation  dfscretionnaire  des  Etats  parties  aux  conventionslo. 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  32,  p.  525.  See  also  Ibid,  p.  44-45. 
144Atso, 
other  considerations  may  be  taken  into  consideration  such  as  "ta  dur6e  du  conf  tIct,  te  nombre 
at  Pencadrement  des  groupes  rebels,  teur  Installation  ou  teur  action  sur  une  partle  du  territoire, 
te  degr6  dI  ins6curit6,  tes  moyens  mis  en  oeuvre  par  te  gouvernement  t6gat  pour  rktabLir  II  ordre,  etc.  " 
Ibid,  p.  526. 
163 Ethiopia  is  a  flagrant  example  today,  after  30  years  of  conflict  in  Eritrea,  and  14  years 
in  Tigre  provinces,  where  two  well  armed  insurgent  groups  conduct  a  war  of  secession, 
and  despite  the  deployment  of  nearly  180,000  soldiers  in  Eritrea  and  40,000  in  Tigre  and 
despite  the  undeniable  popular  support  for  the  insurgents  in  those  two  regions,  145  there  is 
no  indication  whatsoever  that  the  Government  is  ready  to  accept  the  application  of  Article 
3. 
Thus,  there  is  a  real  doubt  that  States  can  adhere  to  a  theory  of  objectivity  in  matters 
which  they  see  as  vital  to  their  survival,  in  fact  ideological  and  political  interests  and  the 
decentralised  nature  of  the  international  system,  would  militate  against  such  an  approach. 
The  UN  practice,  in  my  view,  supports  indirectly  the  above  contention,  since  the 
organization  dealt  with  only  a  few  cases  of  internal  conflict,  and  only  rarely  referred 
directly  to  Article  3.  Also,  most  of  these  cases  concerned  wars  of  national  liberation 
movements  (especially  in  Africa)146  and  above  all  the  UN  dealt  with  internal  conflicts 
which  threatened  international  peace  and  security,  however,  even  in  those  cases,  the 
established  Government  in  bringing  the  matter  before  the  UN  never  claims  the  existence 
of  an  internal  conflict  but  always  complains  of  foreign  intervention. 
In  this  context,  when  Guatemala  in  the  summer  of  1954  was  in  the  midst  of  a  civil  war, 
its  foreign  Minister  announced  on  June  2nd,  1954  that  it  (the  Government)  had  uncovered 
"a  wide  internal  conspiracy  directed  from  'outside,  and  which  was  planned  by'  military 
technicians  separated  from  the  army  of  another  country".  147  Guatemala  later  brought  a 
complaint  (before  the  UNSC)  of  aggression  invasion  and  intervention  in  its  internal  affairs. 
The  UNSC  unanimously  adopted  a  resolution  calling: 
"...  [F]or  immediate  termination  of  any  action  likely  to  cause  bloodshed  and  requests 
for  all  members  of  the  United  Nations  to  abstain  in  the  spirit  of  the  United  Nations 
148  Charter  from  giving  assistance  to  any  such  action" 
145The  Daity  Tetegraph.  June  2rd,  1988,  p.  9. 
146 
Thus,  in  Resotution  2395  will),  the  UNGA: 
"12.  Calls  upon  the  Goverment  of  Portugal,  in  view  of  the  arvied  conflict  prevailing  in  the 
territories  and  the  inhuman  treatment  of  prisoners,  to  ensure  the  application  to  that  situation 
of  the  Geneva  Convention  Retatfve  to  the  Treatment  of  Prisoners  of  War  of  12  August  1949". 
Djonovich,  (ed.  ),  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1,  n.  79,  Vot.  12,  p.  172.  See  atso  Resotutfon  2649  and 
especiatty  Resotution  2674  (XXV)  Respect  for  Human  Rights  in  Internat  Confticts,  Para  3,4  and  5  in 
lbid,  Vot.  13,1970-1971,  pp.  289-292.  See  atso  Resotution  2918  (XVII)  Question  of  Territories  under 
Portuguese  Adiminstration,  in  particutar  para.  3/b  which  states: 
"The  just  treatment  of  the  freedom  fighters  of  Angota,  Guinea  Bissau  and  Cape  Verde  and 
Mozambique  captured  during  the  struggte  for  freedom  as  prisoners  in  accordance  with  the 
prfncfptes  of  the  Geneva  Convention  Retative  to  the  Treatment  of  Prisoners  of  War  of  August 
12th,  1949,  and  in  accordance  with  the  Geneva  Convention  Retative  to  the  Protection  of  Civitlan 
Persons  in  Time  of  War,  of  August  12th,  1949". 
Ibld,  (1972-1974),  p.  321. 
147Keesing's,  1954,  p.  13678. 
148  9  UNY,  1954,  p.  99. 
164 This  means  that  the  UNSC  abstained  from  declaring  the  existence  of  an  internal  conflict, 
it  concentrates  rather  on  its  main  mission  which  is  keeping  peace  and  security  in  the  world. 
It  must  be  conceded  that  recently  (in  the  1980s)  with  the  idea  of  combatting  widespread 
violation  of  human  rights,  the  UN  through  its  UNCHR,  the  Sub-Commission  of  Non- 
Discrimination  and  Minorities  and  the  UNGA,  have  stressed  the  importance  of  the 
application  of  the  rules  of  Article  3  as  a  means  of  elimination  of  those  violations  and  by  this 
they  indirectly  took  it  as  their  mission  to  indicate  the  existence  of  an  internal  conflict  of 
a  non  -international  character. 
The  case  of  El-Salvador  is  typical,  The  UNGA  did  not  hesitate  to  proclaim  the 
applicability  of  Article  3  to  the  situation  which  prevails  in  the  country.  In  this  respect, 
Resolution  36/155  of  December  16th,  1981  in  its  4th  paragraph  stipulates  that: 
"The  United  Nations  General  Assembly  draws  the  attention  of  all  parties  concerned 
to  the  fact  that  the  rules  of  international  law,  as  contained  in  Article  3  of  the  Geneva 
Conventions  of  1949  are  applicable  to  armed  conflicts  not  of  an  international 
character  and  requests  the  parties  involved  to  apply  a  minimum  standard  of 
protection  to  the  affected  persons".  149 
The  most  interesting  in  this  sphere,  is  that  EI-Salvador,  although  it  rejected  the  resolution 
because  in  its  opinion: 
overstepped  the  humanitarian  sphere  and  included  highly  political 
considerations  which  fell  exclusively  under  internal  jurisdiction".  '  50 
It  did  not  specifically  question  the  competence  of  the  UNGA  to  characterise  its  internal 
conflict  as  being  governed  by  Article  3.  In  fact,  the  UNGA  made  it,  from  1981,  a  custom 
in  adopting  resolutions  calling  for  the  applications  of  Article  3  to  the  conflict.  151 
In  my  view,  this  is  a  very  important  development,  it  signals  that  the  international 
community,  even  in  the  atmosphere  of  a  decentralised  world  system,  can  act  in  matters 
which  are  very  sensitive  to  States,  such  as  the  determination  of  the  existence  of  an  internal 
conflict,  and  this  can  restrict  the  discretion  of  established  Governments  in  that  sphere. 
The  idea  of  human  rights  serves  as  a  vehicle  for  such  enterprise  since  it  is  accepted  as 
valid  limitation  on  State  sovereignty.  This  concern  for  the  protection  of  human  rights, 
which  is  a  recognized  mission  of  the  UN,  may  very  well  include  in  some  circumstances  the 
application  of  humanitarian  rules  of  Article  3,  and  by  consequence,  Governments  have  to 
accept  that  verdict. 
However,  the  main  weakness  of  the  UN  activity  in  this  field  is  that  its  actions  are  very 
selective,  many  internal  conflicts  are  simply  ignored,  politics  and  super  power  rivalry  play 
149  This  resotution  was  adopted  by  90  votes  in  favour  2  against  and  53  abstentions.  35  UNY,  1981. 
p.  962. 
1501bid, 
p.  959. 
15  'Thus, 
Resolution  37/185  (Dec.  17th,  1982)  referred  in  its  para  2  to  the  application  of  Article  3. 
36  UNY,  1982.  p.  1127  and  Resolution  38/101  (Dec.  16th,  1983)  referred  also  to  Article  3  in  its  para 
3.37  UNY,  1983,  p.  889. 
165 a  major  part  in  this  failure. 
The  general  conclusion  from  State  practice,  is  that  in  the  over  whelming  majority  of 
cases,  States  still  cling  to  a  very  rigid  concept  of  sovereignty  in  the  matter  of  definition  and 
determination  of  the  existence  of  internal  conflicts.  The  idea  of  objectivity,  seems  to  be 
perceived  by  those  States,  as  non-existent  or  in  the  best  of  circumstances,  it  is  only  their 
decisions  which  are  objective. 
However,  a  very  slow  process  is  beginning  to  emerge,  whereby  the  recognized  mission 
of  the  UN  to  look  after  the  protection  of  human  rights  is  exploited  by  the  organization  to 
declare  in  some  instances  the  application  of  Article  3.  This  confirms  in  my  view  that  human 
rights  as  limitation  of  State  sovereignty  have  an  important  role  to  play  in  the  context  of 
internal  conflicts. 
2.  The  Doctrine  and  their  Interpretation  of  the  Situations  to  which  Article  3  Applies 
The  doctrine  is  divided  on  their  interpretation  of  the  situations  to  which  Article  3  of  the 
Geneva  Convention  applies.  Their  readings  of  the  legislative  and  the  subsequent  practice 
of  States  differ.  In  my  opinion,  three  main  tendencies  may  be  detected. 
The  first  view  is  advocated  by  Bond.  He  writes: 
"...  [S]tates  are  bound  to  observe  only  those  rules  to  which  they  agree,  and  they  have 
usually  resisted  even  minimal  efforts  to  tie  their  hands  in  dealing  with  domestic 
enemies.  All  this  may  suggest  that  the  delegates  considered  an  armed  conflict  not  of 
an  international  character  a  civil  war  by  any  other  name  and  voted  in  favour  of 
applying  a  limited  number  of  principles  to  a  limited  range  of  conflicts.  "  152 
According  to  this  opinion,  then  Article  3  is  very  restricted  in  scope,  it  implies  that  the 
Article  is  not  in  any  way  broader  than  the  traditional  concept  of  belligerency,  sovereignty 
and  its  demands  it  seems  are  behind  such  interpretations,  since  established  Governments 
will  not  consider  any  uprising  as  internal  conflict  to  which  Article  3  is  applicable.  This 
would  tie  their  hands  in  dealing  with  opponents. 
Schindler  and  Higgins  advocate  a  milder  position,  the  former  after  studying  the  practice 
of  the  ICRC  in  internal  conflicts,  153  maintains  that  armed  conflicts  within  the  meaning  of 
Article  3  are  to  be  differentiated  from  internal  disturbances  and  tensions.  The  latter  remains 
under  the  exclusive  control  of  the  established  Government,  he  stresses  that  the  armed 
conflict  in  the  context  of  Article  3: 
"...  [M]ust  show  certain  similarities  to  a  war  without  fulfilling  all  conditions  necessary 
152  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  132,  pp.  56-57. 
153  He  writes: 
"The  practice  of  the  ICRC  has  set  up  the  foLtowing  criteria  to  cletimit  non-internationaL 
confticts  from  internat  disturbances:  In  the  first  ptace,  the  hostftities  are  meant  to  be  of 
:  coLlective  character,  that  is  they  have  to  be  carried  out  not  onLy  by  singLe  groups.  In 
ddition  the  insurgents  have  to  exhibit  a  minimum  amount  of  organization.  Their  armed  forces 
shoutd  be  under  a  responsibie  command  and  be  capabLe  of  meeting  humanitarian  requirements". 
D.  SchindLer:  The  Different  Types  of  Armed  Confticts  According  to  the  Geneva  Conventions  and  the  two 
Protocots.  RCADI,  1979/111,  p.  147. 
166 154  for  the  recognition  of  insurgency" 
. 
According  to  this  view,  then,  armed  conflicts  within  the  meaning  of  Article  3,  are  of  a 
lower  intensity  than  the  traditional  concept  of  civil  war  and  recognition  of  belligerency. 
In  fact,  Schindler  thinks  that  Article  3,  is  a  clear  progress  in  comparson  to  the  old 
classical  international  law,  and  especially  the  traditional  institution  of  recognition  of 
belligerency,  and  then  states  that: 
"...  [T]he  provisions  of  Article  3  differ  in  three  ways  from  the  traditional  rules  on  civil 
wars  and  recognition  of  belligerency.  First,  they  are  to  be  applied  automatically  in 
case  of  an  armed  non-  international  conflict  no  recognition  is  necessary.  Not  even 
reciprocity  in  the  application  of  these  provisions  is  required. 
Secondly,  Article  3  sets  lower  requirements  to  the  intensity  of  an  armed  conflict  as 
would  be  necessary  for  the  recognition  of  the  insurgents.  Neither  is  it  necessary  that 
the  insurgents  exercise  control  over  a  part  of  the  state  territory  nor  must  they  embody 
attributes  of  a  government. 
Thirdly  and  finally,  in  case  of  a  non  -international  conflict  according  to  Article  3,  not 
all  the  laws  of  war  are  applicable  -  Article  3  contains  only  an  absolute  minimum  of 
duties  for  the  opposing  party"155. 
It  seems  to  me  that  in  practice  the  differences  stated  by  Schindler,  are  relative,  since  as  it 
has  been  shown  above,  some  internal  conflicts,  which  have  taken  place  in  the  last  30  years 
would  fulfil  at  least  in  part  some  of  the  conditions  of  the  application  of  the  status  of 
recognition  of  belligerency,  but  States  claimed  that  the  Article  is  not  applicable  (Algeria  at 
least  as  from  1956).  The  question  of  the  automatic  application  of  Article  3,  is  very 
problematic,  States  do  not  accept  easily  to  waive  their  discretion  in  that  important  matter, 
practice  shows  this  clearly. 
Higgins's  opinion  does  not  differ  much  from  Schindler's  view.  She  writes: 
"...  [Tlhe  Article  is  binding  on  both  parties,  and  is  not  subject  to  reciprocity.  It  does 
not  itself  define  an  'armed  conflict  not  of  an  international  character,  but  given  its 
humanitarian  purposes,  it  would  seem  to  be  applicable  to  major  insurgency  and 
probably  also  to  rebellion  as  well  as  to  civil  war".  156 
The  third  view  goes  very  far,  it  advocates  the  application  of  Article  3  even  to  internal 
disturbances  and  tensions.  The  main  argument  used,  is  that  since  the  rules  of  Article  3  are 
very  limited  in  number  and  humanitarian  in  spirit,  they  should  be  applied  to  all  ranges  of 
tensions  which  occur  within  the  State,  the  main  advocate  of  such  an  approach  is  Pictet,  he 
asked: 
"...  [W]hat  Government  would  dare  to  claim  before  the  world  in  a  case  of  civil 
disturbances  which  could  justly  be  described  as  mere  acts  of  banditry  that  Article  3 
not  being  applicable,  it  was  entitled  to  leave  the  wounded  uncared  for,  to  inflict 
1541bid. 
155  lbfd,  p.  146. 
156  Op.  cft.,  'supra.  n.  l.  p.  91. 
167 torture  and  mutilations  and  to  take  hostages".  157 
Despite  the  humanitarian  spirit  involved  in  such  a  statement,  the  fact  remains  that  the 
legislative  history  and  even  the  subsequent  practice  concerning  Article  3.  makes  it  clear  that 
Article  3  does  not  apply  to  situations  of  riots  and  civil  disturbances. 
The  three  opinions  in  my  view  are,  in  fact,  different  answers  to  the  central  question  of 
the  relation  between  humanity  and  sovereignty  in  the  context  of  internal  conflicts.  The  first 
view  stressed  the  priority  of  sovereignty  over  humanity,  the  second  view  tries  to  reconcile 
the  two  principles,  whereas  the  third  view  gives  an  absolute  priority  to  the  demands  of 
humanity  over  the  claim  of  sovereignty. 
To  me,  the  absence  of  a  clear  definition  of  the  expression  'armed  conflicts  of  a  non- 
international  character'  in  the  text  of  the  Article  itself,  and  the  absence  of  any  indication 
of  who  can  determine  the  existence  of  such  a  conflict,  have  in  practice  led  in  large  part  to 
the  weakening  of  Article  3.  Such  absence  of  definition  is  itself  a  manifestation  of  the  strong 
position  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention  in  international  relations. 
SECTION  V:  Definition  of  Armed  Conflicts  of  a  Non-International  Character  In  Protocol 
II  of  1977 
The  ambiguity  of  the  situations  to  which  common  Article  3  applies,  the  absence  of 
specific  rules  concerning  the  protection  of  civilians,  the  need  for  effective  restrictions  on 
means  and  methods  of  combat,  the  tragic  experiences  of  the  Vietnam  War,  Nigerian  and 
Bangladesh  civil  wars,  the  efforts  of  the  ICRC  and  its  calls  for  more  humanity  in  internal 
conflicts,  and  the  influence  of  the  idea  of  human  rights,  which  stressed  the  sacrosanct 
obligation  of  every  State  to  protect  the  fundamental  rights  of  the-individual  and  groups 
of  individuals.  These  different  elements  have  played  different  roles, 
'in 
revealing  the  need 
for  a  new  international  instrument  which  will  develop  Article  3. 
In  this  section,  I  will  concentrate  on  analyzing  the  definition  contained  in  Article  I  of 
Protocol  Il  of  1977,  the  criteria  involved  in  that  definition,  the  relation  of  Article  I  of  the 
Protocol  to  common  Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  and  finally  the  evaluation  of 
Article  I  of  Protocol  11. 
A.  Definition:  The  Criteria 
Article  1,  is  the  corner  stone  of  the  whole  Protocol  II,  it  has  been  termed  as  'the  keystone 
of  the  instrument'158  or  "...  I'article  premier  du  Protocole  en  est  reallement  la  pierre 
angulaire'.  159  The  Article  in  fact,  defines  the  scope  of  the  application  of  the  Protocol,  and 
by  implication  restricts  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  in  all  cases  covered  by  that  Article.  In 
157  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  139,  p.  50. 
iss 
Op.  cft.,  supra.  n.  23,  p.  1348. 
15  9R. 
Abt-Saab:  Droft  humanitafre  et  conftits  Internes.  Institut  Henry-Dunant,  Ed.  A.  Pddone,  Paris, 
1986.  p.  149. 
168 this  respect,  Romania  expressed  the  view  that  it  : 
"...  [Alattached  considerable  importance  to  the  field  of  application  of  draft  Protocol 
11,  since  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  was  involved".  160 
In  fact,  this  view  was  shared  by  many  States,  especially  Third  World  countries,  they 
emphasised  the  close  relationship  between  the  protection  of  their  sovereignty  and  the  need 
to  restrict  the  field  of  application  of  Protocol  11.161 
The  ICRC  draft  Article  1,  submitted  to  the  Diplomatic  Conference  of  1974-1977,  defines 
the  non-  international  armed  conflict  as  follows: 
*Article  1.  Material  field  of  application 
1.  The  present  Protocol  shall  apply  to  all  armed  conflicts  not  covered  by  Article  2, 
common  to  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  August  1949,  taking  place  between  arae-a 
forces  or  other  organized  armed  groups  under  responsible  command. 
2.  The  present  Protocol  shall  not  apply  to  situations  of  internal  disturbances  and 
tensions,  Inter  alia  riots,  isolated  and  sporadic  acts  of  violence  and  other  acts  of  a 
similar  nature. 
3.  The  foregoing  provisions  do  not  modify  the  conditions  governing  Article  3 
common  to  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  August  12  1949".  162 
The  definition  here  is  very  broad  indeed,  only  two  factual  criteria  are  necessary  to  make 
the  internal  disorders  'armed  conflict  not  of  an  international  character'.  First,  the  contest 
should  be  between  armed  forces  and  other  organized  armed  forces.  Secondly,  the  organized 
armed  groups  should  be  under  a  responsible  command. 
It  must  be  noted  that  in  accordance  with  the  first  criteria  only  contests  between 
Government  forces  and  insurgents  armed  groups  are  'armed  conflicts',  which  means  that 
when  the  established  Government  is  not  a  party  to  such  conflict,  Protocol  Il  is  not  relevant. 
Thus,  situations  of  civil  wars  like  those  which  took  place  in  Angola  in  1975,  and  currently 
in  Lebanon  are  not  covered  by  the  Protocol's  Article  1,  although  there  is  no  doubt  that 
Article  3  is  applicable. 
The  ICRCs  representative  at  the  Diplomatic  Conference  explained  on  February  14th, 
1975  the  rational  behind  their  approach  to  draft  Article  I  in  these  terms: 
"The  ICRC  had  had  the  difficult  task  of  determining  the  field  of  application  of  draft 
Protocol  11,  it  had  chosen  a  broad  field  to  cover  all  non-  international  armed  conflicts, 
and  for  that  purpose  had  endeavoured  to  specify  the  characteristics  of  a  non- 
international  armed  conflict  by  means  of  objective  criteria  so  the  Protocol  could  be 
applied  when  those  criteria  were  met  and  not  be  made  subject  to  other 
considerations".  163 
160  8  ORDCHL,  MDH/I/SR.  23,  para.  33.  p.  221. 
161  Thus,  Mexico  argued  that  it  "attached  the  greatest  importance  to  scope  and  field  of  application 
of  the  draft  Protocol  concerned  with  the  victims  of  internal  armed  conflicts  It  considered  it 
essential  that  the  Protocol  should  safeguard  the  sovereign  rights  of  States".  Ibid,  MDH/I/SR.  24 
para.  14,  p.  231. 
162  Ibid,  Vot.  1,  p.  33. 
1630p. 
cit..  supra.  n.  160,  CDDH/I/SR.  22.  para.  12,  p.  203. 
169 The  ICRC's  object  is  clear,  first,  it  made  the  definition  broad  in  order  to  cover  a  wide 
range  of  conflicts,  secondly,  it  excluded,  at  least  implicitly,  the  competence  of  the 
established  Government  in  determining  the  existence  of  such  conflicts.  The  aim  is  to  make 
the  Protocol  apply  automatically,  once  the  two  objective  criteria  are  present  in  the  conflict, 
and  thus,  surpassing  the  claims  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  by  Governments  facing 
such  challenges. 
It  must  be  stressed  that  draft  Article  1,  was  one  of  the  most  discussed  provisions  of  the 
ICRC's  draft  Protocol  II,  many  amendments  and  proposals  were  introduced  in  connection 
with  it,  a  working  group  was  created  to  find  a  suitable  definition.  That  group  had  to  create 
a  sub-group,  which  had  to  meet  six  times  in  order  to  reach  an  agreement.  164  This  difficulty 
of  reaching  an  agreement,  arises  from  the  fact  that  the  Article  touches  directly  on  the 
sovereignty  of  the  State,  and  its  ability  to  control  events  inside  its  borders  without  any 
interference. 
The  legislative  history  of  draft  Article  1,  reveals  that  States  held  two  different  opinions 
concerning  the  field  of  application  of  the  Protocol.  The  first  view  was  held  by  Socialist 
States  (except  Romania)  and  some  moderate  western  States,  like  Norway,  Sweden,  Italy, 
Switzerland  and  New  Zealand.  This  group  was  largely  happy  with  the  ICRC's  draft  Article. 
However,  some  States  of  this  group  were  against  the  introduction  of  two  kinds  of  internal 
armed  conflicts  (those  covered  by  Article  I  of  the  Protocol  and  those  covered  by  Article  3) 
they  advocated  a  single  category  of  those  conflicts. 
East  Germany  submitted  an  amendment  which  gave  an  identical  definition  to  the  two 
kinds  of  internal  conflicts,  only  two  criteria  have  to  be  present  in  order  for  the  Protocol  11 
to  apply.  The  armed  conflicts  must:  (i)  take  place  between  armed  forces  or  organized  armed 
165  groups;  and  (ii)  under  responsible  command. 
Thus,  East  Germany,  adopted  in  fact  the  criteria  of  the  ICRC's  definition  and  simply 
extended  it  to  Article  3.  However,  Norway  submitted  an  amendment  which  simply  states: 
"The  present  Protocol  shall  apply  in  situations  referred  to  in  Article  3  common  to 
Geneva  Conventions  of  12  August  1949  for  the  protection  of  the  war  victims".  166 
In  my  view,  this  amendment  despite  its  humanitarian  intent,  is  unrealistic  since  it  brought 
back  the  imperfections  of  Article  3  to  the  Protocol  11  such  as  the  absence  of  definition. 
164 
10  ORDCHL,  MDH/l/238/Rev  I.,  p.  93-94. 
M5 
East  Germany  in  fact,  submitted  the  fottowing  amendment: 
"Redraft  paragraph  I  as  follows: 
1.  the  present  ProtocoL  which  specifies  and  supplements  Article  3  common  to  the  four  Geneva 
Conventions  of  August  12th,  1949,  shalt  apply  to  all  armed  conf  Licts  which  in  conforming  with 
common  Article  3  have  not  an  international  character  and  take  place  between  armed  forces  or 
organized  armed  groups  under  responsible  command". 
4  ORDCHL,  CDDH/l/88,  P.  8. 
166 
Ibid.  p.  9. 
170 As  to  the  East  German  position,  which  can  be  safely  said  to  represent  the  socialist  States 
view,  167  it  seems  to  me  that  its  real  aim  was  to  restrict  the  field  of  application  of  Protocol 
11,  so  that  it  would  not  be  applicable  to  their  possible  internal  problems,  which  can  usually 
be  tackled  by  police  action.  Also  it  was  especially  directed  to  prevent  any  possibility  of 
intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  States.  168 
Socialist  States,  later  in  the  Conference,  and  after  it  became  clear  that  wars  of  national 
liberation  movements  are  to  be  considered  as  international  armed  conflicts,  tacitly  supported 
Third  World  countries,  in  playing  down  the  importance  of  Protocol  II. 
The  second  group  of  States  which  included  Third  World  countries  and  many  other  States, 
was  generally  critical  of  the  ICRC's  draft  Article  1,  to  them  the  definition  contained  in  the 
article,  was  broad  and  thus  it  will  open  the  way  for  outside  intervention,  and  would  tie  the 
hands  of  the  established  Government  in  crushing  violent  disorders  inside  the  country. 
Argentina  expressed  the  feeling  of  the  majority  when  its  delegate  stated: 
"...  [H]is  delegation  appreciated  that  draft  Protocol  Il  had  been  based  on  the  idea  of 
the  protection  of  humanity.  It  was  however,  unrealistic  in  some  respects,  certain 
articles  and  particularly  Article  1,  to  some  extent  infringed  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
State.  "119 
To  this  delegation,  in  order  for  the  sovereign  States  to  accept  such  an  instrument  (Protocol 
11),  the  approach  must  be  'realistic',  realistic  in  the  context  of  draft  Article  1,  meant  that 
the  Article  must  be  in  line  with  the  requirements  of  States  interests.  In  other  words,  its 
definition  must  be  strengthened,  it  must  contain  strong  criteria  which  only  limited  cases  of 
internal  wars  can  satisfy,  and  by  consequence  leave  a  considerable  margin  of  manoeuvre  to 
the  established  Government. 
In  fact,  many  States  which  belonged  to  this  group  submitted  amendments,  which  contain 
their  understanding  of  what  constitutes  an  'armed  conflict  not  of  an  international 
character'.  170  Indonesia  in  fact,  considered  that  Protocol  11  dealt  with  matters  coming  within 
the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  a  sovereign  State,  hence  a  cautious  and  practical  view  is  needed 
in  order  iP-give  due  respect  for  the  principle  of  sovereignty  and  integrity  of  States.  It 
suggested  that  to  attain  that  aim,  Article  I  should  take  into  account  the  following  criteria: 
167  * 
See  for  further  details  on  the  socialist  position:  J.  Toman:  La  conception  sovi6tique  du  conf  Lit 
arm6  non-  international,  in  St.  Trechsel  and  Y.  Hangartner,  (eds.  ):  VoLkerrecht  im  Dienste  Des  Menschen 
Festschrif  FOr  Hans  Haug.  Haupt,  Bern/Stuttgart,  1986,  pp.  309-335  (especially  327-331).  See  also  J. 
Toman:  The  Socialist  Countries  and  the  Laws  of  War  in:  Modern  Wars:  The  Humanitarian  Challenge.  A 
Report  for  the  Independent  Commission  on  International  Humanitarian  Issues.  Zed  Books  Ltd  London  to 
New  Jersey,  1986,  pp.  164-165. 
168  In  fact,  the  East  German  detegate  at  the  Conference  stated  in  defence  of  his  country's  amendment 
that: 
"The  introduction  of  new  categories  and  difficutt  distinctions  was  not  caLcuLated  to  strengthen 
the  deveLopment  of  internationat  humanitarian  Law,  instead,  it  might  encourage  interference 
in  the  internat,  affairs". 
OP-  Cit..  supra.  n.  160,  MDH/I/SR.  22,  para.  27,  p.  207. 
169  lbid,  CDDH/l/SR.  23.  para.  9,  p.  216. 
170 
OP-  cit.,  supra.  n.  165,  pp.  6-9.  Pakistan  MDH/1/26,  p.  6;  Irdonesia  MDH/l/32,  p.  7;  BraziL 
CDDH/1/79,  p.  83. 
171 1.  It  should  apply  to  regular  armed  forces  under  responsible  command  which  took  up 
arms  against  the  legitimate  Government,  or  to  armed  conflicts  taking  place  between  regular 
armed  forces  and  organized  armed  groups. 
2.  The  armed  forces  or  organized  groups  hostile  to  the  legitimate  Government  must 
exercise  continuous  and  effective  control  over  a  substantial  or  non-negligible  part  of  the 
territory  of  the  high  contracting  party. 
3.  The  armed  conflict  must  reach  a  certain  degree  of  intensity  and  continue  for  a 
prolonged  period.  171 
These  are  very  hard  factual  criteria,  no  insurgent  movement  which  took  arms  against 
established  Government  since  the  second  world  war,  can  satisfy  them,  thus,  the  occupation 
of  'a  substantial  part  of  the  State  territory'  criteria  in  fact  can  never  be  satisfied,  in 
conditions  of  guerilla  warfare,  also  the  subjective  elements  of  duration  and  intensity,  may 
very  well  be  abused  by  the  established  Government. 
Brazil  also  introduced  other  very  stringent  criteria  in  its  amendment  to  draft  Article  1; 
first,  the  insurgents  must  act  under  a  responsible  and  identifiable  authority,  secondly,  they 
must  clearly  distinguish  themselves  from  the  civilian  population  and  thirdly  the  insurgents 
must  exert  continuous  and  effective  control  over  a  non-negligible  part  of  the  territory.  172 
These  in  fact,  are  impossible  criteria  to  satisfy  by  guerillas  where  camouflage  among  the 
civilian  population,  is  the  essence  of  their  tactics,  especially  when  they  are  engaged  in 
actual  combats. 
The  Delegation  of  Vietnam,  after  emphasising  the  necessity  of  defining  the  concept  of 
'non-international  armed  conflict'  as  precisely  as  possible,  stressed  that: 
"...  [I]n  order  to  justify  the  application  of  humanitarian  law  and  reconcile  it  with  the 
principles  of  non-  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs,  this  delegation  considered  that 
the  scope  of  Protocol  11  should  be  limited  to  situations  of  armed  conflicts  of  a 
particularly  serious  nature".  173 
To  this  country  which  experienced  a  whole  range  of  deadly  conflicts,  fear  of  intervention 
is  the  reason  behind  its  attempt  at  raising  the  threshold  of  the  internal  conflict. 
Vietnam,  in  fact  introduced  a  proposal,  to  include  in  the  definition  of  armed  conflicts 
of  non-  international  character,  two  serious  elements: 
1.  Popular  support  for  the  cause  of  the  insurgents  and  secondly  the  occupation  of  a 
considerable  part  of  the  territory  by  the  insurgents.  Vietnam  explained  the  rational  behind 
the  first  criteria,  in  these  terms: 
"...  ]T]he  party  in  conflict  with  the  lawful  Government  should  at  least  be  fighting  for 
a  just  cause,  in  order  to  have  that  popular  support,  which  was  not  a  purely  sub  .  ective 
factor  but  could  be  easily  evaluated  on  the  basis  of  actual  demonstration".  1N 
171  lbid,  p.  7.  and  supra.  n.  160,  MDH/I/SR.  22,  para.  55,  p.  212. 
1721bid, 
p.  g. 
1730P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  160,  CDDH/l/SR.  22,  para.  55,  p.  212. 
1741bid,  MDH/I/SR.  22,  para.  59,  p.  213. 
172 The  necessity  of  the  second  criteria  was  explained  in  the  following  way: 
"...  [T]he  occupation  of  a  considerable  part  of  the  national  territory  implied  control 
of  that  portion  of  territory  by  the  responsible  command  and  was  proof  of  the 
seriousness  and  high  degree  of  intensity  of  the  hostilities  between  the  Government 
of  a  State  on  one  hand,  and  one  or  more  factions  on  the  other".  175 
Vietnam  in  fact,  tried  to  introduce  the  idea  of  just  war,  in  the  context  of  internal  conflicts. 
The  requirement  of  'popular  support'  is  very  hard  to  prove,  and  it  is  always  absent  in  the 
first  period  of  the  internal  conflict.  Moreover,  the  legal  Government  may  use  very  harsh 
methods  against  the  civilian  population,  in  order  to  terrorise  them  and  consequently 
suppress  any  explicit  show  of  support  for  the  insurgents. 
In  my  opinion,  the  criteria  of  just  cause  must  be  eliminated  in  the  sphere  of  the 
application  of  humanitarian  law,  since  what  is  just  for  the  insurgents  is  obviously  unjust 
for  the  Government,  no  Government  on  earth  can  admit  that  its  opponents  have  a  good 
reason  to  overthrow  it  by  the  use  of  force. 
Introducing  such  highly  political  and  moral  criteria  in  the  definition  of  internal  conflicts, 
would  mean  in  practice  that  established  Governments  would  be  in  the  position  to  treat  their 
enemies  inhumanly,  only  by  claiming  they  are  not  fighting  for  a  just  cause.  The  criteria  of 
just  cause  in  my  opinion  hides  in  effect  a  return  to  very  rigid  concept  of  sovereignty. 
As  to  the  criteria  of  "occupation  of  considerable  part  of  the  country",  it  seems  to  me  that 
even  the  Vietnamese  conflict  shows  that  despite  the  intensity  and  duration  of  the  contest, 
the  insurgents  could  not  claim  that  at  any  time,  they  controlled  a  considerable  part  of  the 
country,  this  assertion  will  go  against  the  logic  of  guerilla  warfare. 
However,  Pakistan  tried  to  appear  as  a  moderate  it  introduced  an  amendment,  which 
emphasised  some  factual  and  psychological  elements.  They  are  the  following: 
A.  The  conflict  must  take  place  between  the  armed  forces  of  the  Government  and 
organized  armed  forces 
B.  The  hostilities  must  be  of  some  intensity  and  last  for  a  reasonable  period  of  time. 
C.  The  insurgents,  must  occupy  a  part  of  the  territory. 
D.  The  insurgent  armed  forces  must  be  represented  by  a  'responsible  authority'  and  have 
the  intention  to  apply  the  obligation  contained  in  Article  3  and  the  Protocol. 
E.  The  established  Government  may  recognize  the  existence  of  a  conflict  not  of  an 
international  character  before  the  above  conditions  are  satisfied.  176 
What  has  been  done  in  this  amendment  is  that  it  tried  to  tone  down  some  of  the  onerous 
conditions  advanced  by  the  hardliners,  it  in  fact,  dropped  the  adjectives  of  'non-negligible' 
and  'considerable'  which  have  been  attached  to  the  quality  of  the  territory  which  must  be 
occupied  by  the  insurgents.  Moreover,  the  hostilities  must  be  of  'some  intensity"  and  not 
high  intensity,  the  duration  has  been  said  to  be  of  'a  reasonable  period  of  time'  instead  of 
175  Jbid,  p.  213. 
1760P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  165,  ODN/l/26,  p.  6. 
173 prolonged  duration.  Also,  it  opened  the  way  for  the  established  Government's  discretion  in 
determining  the  existence  of  the  internal  armed  conflict. 
It  must  be  noted  that  some  Third  World  countries  have  let  it  be  known  that  after  the 
inclusion  of  wars  of  national  liberation  in  Article  I  of  the  first  Protocol.  They  saw  no  need 
at  all  in  pressing  for  any  international  regulation,  since  any  attempt  to  that  would  be  an 
infringement  of  their  sovereignty,  and  would  open  the  door  for  foreign  interference  in  their 
domestic  affairs.  They  considered  that  internal  laws  are  sufficient  for  dealing  with  such 
events.  177 
However,  Article  I  was  adopted  by  the  conference  in  June  2nd,  1977,  after  lengthy 
discussions.  178  It  must  be  noted  that  the  Article  was  not  the  object  of  any  revision  in  the 
simplified  version  of  Protocol  11,  which  was  presented  by  Pakistan  in  the  very  last  days  of 
the  diplomatic  conference,  179  and  which  led  to  acceptance  of  Protocol  11  by  consensus 
ATticle  I  as  adopted,  Teads  as  follows: 
"I.  This  Protocol  which  develops  and  supplements  Article  3  common  to  the  Geneva 
Conventions  of  12  August  1949,  without  modifying  its  existing  conditions  of 
application,  shall  apply  to  all  armed  conflicts  which  are  not  covered  by  Article  I  of 
the  Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  12  August  1949  and  relating 
to  the  protection  of  victims  of  international  armed  conflict  (Protocol  1)  and  which 
take  place  in  the  territory  of  high  contracting  party  between  its  armed  forces  and 
dissident  armed  forces  or  other  organized  armed  groups  which  under  responsible 
command  exercise  such  control  over  a  part  of  its  territory  as  to  enable  them  to  carry 
out  sustained  and  concerted  military  operations  and  to  implement  this  Protocol. 
2.  This  Protocol  shall  not  apply  to  situations  of  internal  disturbances  and  tensions, 
such  as  riots,  isolated  and  sporadic  acts  of  violence  and  other  acts  of  a  similar  nature, 
as  not  being  armed  conflicts".  180 
177The 
main  spokesman  of  this  stand  was  India.  Thus,  even  after  the  vote  on  draft  ArticLe  1,  he 
stated: 
,  'my  detegation  betieves  that  the  provisions  of  Protocot  11,  witt  onty  mititate  against  the 
overeignty  of  States  and  will.  interfere  in  their  internaL  affairs.  The  internal,  taw  and  oLder 
Ituations  are  the  sote  concern  of  sovereign  States  and  these  probtems  are  to  be  deatt  with 
according  the  domestic  taws  of  the  country". 
7  ORDCHL,  CDDH/SR.  49,  p.  81. 
1781n  fact,  the  Chairman  of  working  group  B  of  Committee  1,  which  drafted  Articte  1,  stressed  In  the 
49  Ptenary  Meeting  in  which  the  Articte  was  adopted  that: 
11  Art  icte  I  represented  a  very  f  rag  He  consensus  reached  on  Ly  after  tengthy  cons  ide  rations". 
lbid,  CDDH/SR.  49,  para.  38,  p.  66. 
179  Pakistan  at  the  last  session  of  the  Diptomatic  Conference  and  after  consuttations  with  Canada, 
Egypt  and  the  ICRC,  submf  tted  an  amendment  which  amputated  nearly  the  half  the  provisions  of  Protocol 
11  as  adopted  at  the  Committee  level.  The  reasons  advanced  were: 
1.  A  majority  of  States  (especially  from  the  Third  World)  firmly  held  the  view  that  the  text  (as 
adopted  at  the  committee  Level)  entered  into  unnecessary  details,  rendering  it  not  only  cumbersome 
but  difficult  to  understand  and  to  apply  in  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  a  non-InternationaL 
conflict. 
2.  Consequently  the  provisions  of  the  Protocol  must  be  within  the  perceived  capacity  of  those  involved 
to  apply  them,  and  therefore,  precise  and  simple  and, 
3.  Those  provisions  should  not  appear  to  affect  the  sovereignty  of  any  State  Party  or  the 
responsabRity  of  its  Goverment  to  maintain  taw  and  order  and  defeat  national  unity,  nor  be  able  to 
be  invoked  to  justify  any  outside  intervention.  See  ibid,  MDH/SR.  49,  para.  iO-12,  p.  61. 
180  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  61,  p.  121 
174 The  article  was  adopted  on  a  roll  call  vote,  with  58  in  favour,  5  against  and  29 
abstentions.  181  The  Indian  delegate  who  voted  against  the  Article,  interpreted  the  result  of 
the  voting  as  follows: 
W 
... 
[fludging  by  the  voting  pattern  it  is  seen  as  many  as  34  delegates-more  than  one 
third  present  in  the  conference-did  not  vote  in  favour  of  this  Article,  which  is  indeed 
the  very  basis  of  this  Protocol.  Clearly,  34  delegations  have  expressed  their 
disapproval  of  this  Protocol. 
Moreover,  further  analysis  of  the  vote  shows  that  all  the  delegations  which  did  not 
vote  in  favour  of  Article  I  are  from  the  developing  world,  with  the  exception  of 
Norway".  182 
Columbia  on  the  other  hand  expressed  the  feeling  that  Article  1: 
a  ...  [H]ad  been  adopted  by  a  fragile  majority,  and  that  in  the  last  resort  and  after  much 
discussion  it  had  been  approved  through  sheer  fatigue".  183 
it  seems  that  only  the  consensus  vote  to  the  whole  Protocol,  which  saved  Article  1.  This 
Article  then  is  a  compromise  formula  and  as  such  it  will  be  the  subject  of  different 
interpretations. 
On  the  other  hand,  what  we  can  note  in  Article  I  as  adopted  is  a  real  shift  towards  the 
point  of  view  of  the  group  of  States  which  put  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  before  the 
requirements  of  humanity,  in  internal  wars.  Thus,  there  is  a  real  emasculation  of  the  criteria 
of  the  internal  armed  conflict,  so  as  to  make  the  application  of  the  Protocol  very  limited  in 
practice. 
In  fact,  the  Article,  as  it  is  drafted,  ignores  implicitly  demands  of  guerilla  warfare,  it  is 
silent  on  the  point  of  who  determines  the  existence  of  the  internal  conflict,  and  it  applies 
only  to  the  contests  in  which  the  established  Government  is  a  party  to,  all  these  elements, 
in  my  opinion,  are  examples  of  the  triumph  of  those  who  advocate  more  protection  for  State 
sovereignty. 
Thus,  if  the  overwhelming  majority  of  States  during  the  conference,  supported  the  need 
for  a  clear  definition  of  armed  conflicts  not  of  an  international  character,  in  order  to  avoid 
the  imperfections  of  Article  3  (which  contains  no  definition).  The  travaux  prkparatolres, 
in  my  opinion,  clearly  show  that  the  majority  of  States  used  the  device  of  definition  as  a 
real  vehicle  of  strengthening  their  sovereignty,  and  preventing  any  intervention  in  their 
internal  affairs,  simply  by  making  the  criteria  of  internal  conflict  very  difficult  to  obtain. 
It  must  be  stressed  that  Third  World  States  were  the  main  driving  force  behind  such  a 
stand.  The  reason  in  my  opinion,  is  not  because  they  were  inhuman.  but  for  the  simple  fact 
that  they  see  themselves  as  the  main  seat  of  internal  conflicts,  and  they  are  suspicious  and 
181 
States  which  voted  against  the  Article  were:  Argentina,  Cameroon,  Chile,  India  and  Syria.  Among 
the  abstaining  States  were:  Algeria,  Angola,  Brazil,  Indonesia,  Lebanon,  Mozambique,  Nicaragua, 
Nigeria,  Norway,  Philippines,  Sudan,  Sri-Lanka,  Thailand,  Turkey,  Uganda  and  Zaire.  op.  cit.,  supra. 
n.  177.  CDDH/SR.  49,  p.  70. 
182 
lbid 
183 
lbid,  p.  78. 
175 fearful  of  any  international  regulation  of  their  behaviour  during  times  of  such  conflicts, 
since  that  regulation  may  be  used  to  limit  their  discretion  in  putting  down  the  rebellion,  and 
may  give  those  who  want  to  intervene  in  their  internal  affairs,  an  acceptable  legal  basis. 
B.  Analysis  of  the  Criteria  of  Armed  Conflicts  of  a  Non  -International  Character  Included 
In  Article  1  of  Protocol  11 
The  criteria  included  in  the  definition  of  armed  conflict  not  of  an  international  character, 
in  the  text  of  Article  I  of  the  Protocol  11  are  the  following: 
1.  The  contest  should  be  bewteen  the  armed  forces  of  the  State  and  dissident  armed 
groups:  This  implies  first;  that  the  established  Government  must  resort  to  the  use  of  its 
armed  forces  in  order  to  quell  the  rebellion,  the  use  of  police  action  suffice  to  render  the 
Protocol  inapplicable,  the  use  of  armed  forces  itself  is  a  manifestation  of  the  gravity  of  the 
situation.  Secondly;  only  when  the  established  Government  is  a  party  in  the  conflict  does 
Protocol  11  apply.  The  ICRC  official  commentary  to  Protocol  11,  states  that: 
"...  [T]his  criteria  illustrate  the  collective  character  of  the  confrontation,  it  can  hardly 
consist  of  isolated  individuals  without  co-ordination".  184 
2.  The  insurgents  must  be  under  responsible  command.  This  means  that  the  insurgents 
must  have  some  kind  of  organization  with  a  responsible  leadership,  which  is  capable  of 
directing  the  operations  in  an  effective  way,  and  can  ensure  discipline  within  the  fighting 
forces.  The  ICRC  commentary,  however,  stresses  that  the  existence  of  a  responsible 
command  '-does  not  necessarily  mean  that  there  is  a  hierachical  system  of  military 
organization  similar  to  that  of  regular  armed  forces'.  185 
3.  Control  of  a  part  of  the  territory  by  the  insurgents:  To  me  this  criteria  in  fact  signals 
the  triumph  of  the  advocates  of  sovereignty,  since  they  are  aware  of  the  fact,  that  it  will 
never  be  fulfilled  in  the  first  period  of  the  conflict,  and  even  after  that,  the  criteria  is  very 
difficult  to  ascertain  in  situations  of  guerilla  warfare. 
Similarly,  there  is  no  precise  and  express  indication  as  to  what  is  the  proportion  of  the 
territories  which  has  to  be  controlled,  and  how  this  control  is  to  be  exercised.  Bothe  stresses 
that: 
" 
... 
[T]he  extent  of  the  control  must  be  only  such  'as  to  enable'  the  adverse  part  'to 
carry  out  sustained  and  concerted  military  operations.  Nor  can  the  proportion  of  the 
territory  over  which  control  must  be  exercised  be  indicated  precisely.  It  seemed 
preferable  to  determine  the  extension  of  such  territory  by  indicating  its  function  ('as 
to  enable...  )  instead  of  fixing  that  it  should  be  a  "considerable  part'...  in  a  'non- 
negligible  part'.  "  186 
In  my  view,  there  is  no  reason  why  States  could  not  use  a  contrary  argument  and  demand 
1840p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  23,  pars.  4460,  p.  1351. 
1851bid. 
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M.  Bothe,  K.  J.  Partsch  and  Watdemar,  A.  Sotf:  New  Rutes  for  Victims  of  Armed  Confticts.  Martimis 
Nfjhoff,  The  Hague/goston/London,  1982,  pp.  627-28. 
176 that  the  control  must  be  of  a  non-negligible  part  of  the  territory,  the  possibility  is  there, 
and  the  fear  for  sovereignty  may  very  well  lead  to  such  an  interpretation.  187 
4.  The  insurgents  must  conduct  sustained  and  concerted  military  operation.  This  criteria 
emphasises  implicitly  the  elements  of  duration  and  intensity  of  the  conflict,  188  and  this  will 
bring,  in  practice,  subjective  elements  to  bear  upon  the  determination  of  the  conflict.  This 
is  another  loophole  which  may  be  used  by  the  established  Government  to  resurrect  the 
application  of  the  Protocol. 
5.  The  ability  of  the  insurgents  to  implement  the  Protocol.  This  criterion  is  closely  linked 
to  the  criteria  listed  above,  in  a  way  it  is  the  existence  of  these  criteria,  which  can  indicate 
in  part,  that  the  insurgents  can  be  capable  of  implementing  the  rules  of  Protocol  11. 
This  criterion  is  in  my  view  highly  subjective,  in  practice,  it  may  very  well  open  another 
loopholes  for  the  legal  Government  to  avoid  the  application  of  Protocol  11. 
It  must  be  stressed  that  even  with  the  high  criteria  included  in  the  definition  of  internal 
conflicts  in  Article  1.  some  Third  World  States  still  insist  that: 
"...  [T]he  conditions  in  Article  I  Qý  did  not  provide  adequate  safeguards  'for  the 
protection  of  State  sovereignty'".  1 
This  in  my  view,  explains  in  part  the  reticence  of  the  majority  of  States  and  especially  those 
who  experience  internal  wars,  to  ratify  the  Protocol  II.  In  fact,  only  3  States  who  are 
engaged  in  such  contests  dared  to  ratify  that  Protocol  on  the  31st  October  1989  (El- 
Salvador,  Surinam  and  the  Philippines).  190 
1871n  fact,  Indonesia  advocated  such  a  stand.  Thus,  even  after  the  adoption  of  Article  1,  it  stressed 
that  it  wouLd  like  to  see  the  last  three  tines  (of  Article  1/1)  anpLified  on  the  following  lines: 
11...  (EIxercise  continues  and  effective  control  over  a  substantial  non-negLigibLe  part  of  its 
territory  for  such  a  prolonged  period  as  to  enable  them  to  carry  out  sustained  and  concerted 
military  operations  of  a  high  intensity  and  to  implement  this  Protocol". 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  177,  CDDH/SR.  49,  para.  7%  p.  71. 
18SThe  ICRC  Commentary  Is  opposite  to  such  a  contention  it  stressed  that: 
"The  criteria  of  duration  and  intensity  were  not  retained  as  such  in  definition  because  they 
would  have  introduced  a  subjective  element". 
He  then  adds  that: 
"On  the  other  hand,  the  criterion  whether  mititary  operations  are  sustained  and  concerted, 
white  imptying  the  etement  of  continuity  and  Intensity,  couptes  with  an  objective  assessment 
of  the  situation". 
Op.  cit..  supra.  n.  23,  para.  4469,  p.  1353. 
189  Statement  made  by  Indonesia  after  the  vote  on  Articte  I  of  the  Protocot  It.  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  177, 
MDH/SR.  49,  p.  71. 
1900n  Oct.,  31st,  1989,88  States  were  parties  to  Protocol.  I  and  78  were  parties  to  ProtocOt  I  I.  See: 
IRRC,  1989,29th  year,  No.  272,  p.  490.  The  reason  for  such  retuctance  (in  the  ratification  of  ProtocoL 
11)  seems  to  be  in  the  words  of  Gasser: 
not  so  much  a  tack  of  enthusiam  for  one  or  other  of  the  provisions  of  ProtocoL  11 
which  appear  wetL-batanced.  These  governinents  seem  to  reject  the  very  idea  of  creating 
Internationat  ruLes  reLating  toevents  considered  tobe  fnternaL  affairs  of  sovereign  states". 
177 C.  The  Situations  to  which  Article  1  of  Protocol  IT  Applies 
The  majority  of  the  doctrine  supports  the  contention  that  the  conditions  of  Article  I  of  the 
Protocol  11  are  very  high,  they  in  fact  introduce  through  a  back  door  the  classical  concept 
of  civil  war  and  belligerency. 
In  this  respect,  Herczegh  a  Hungarian  international  lawyer,  stresses  that: 
"Protocol  11,  holds  the  traditional  concept  of  civil  war  whose  cardinal  eigment  is  the 
virtual  control  over  a  part  of  the  territory  of  the  country  in  question'.  Iyl 
Green  supports  such  an  interpretation,  he  states: 
"This  definition  is  so  framed  as  to  require  a  level  of  military  organization  and 
sophistication  that  ensures  its  application  only  in  the  traditional  type  of  civil  war".  192 
Another  writer  maintained  that: 
"Protocol  11  has  in  effect  reStated  the  general  rule  of  international  law  relating  to  the 
status  of  belligerency.  Before  a  situation  assumes  such  a  status  the  conflict  is  to  be 
considered  as  a  purely  domestic  affair".  193 
In  practice  then,  the  Article  will  apply  only  to  rare  cases.  This  point  has  been  pointed  out 
clearly  by  Schindler  who  stated  that: 
"...  [T]he  fact  that  Protocol  11  only  covers  conflicts  of  high  intensity  will  mean  that  this 
Protocol  will  only  be  applied  in  relatively  few  cases.  The  Spanish  civil  war  and  the 
civil  war  in  Nigeria  were  mentioned  as  examples  at  the  Geneva  Conference".  194 
Cassese  also  supports  the  same  view.  He  states: 
"...  [Protocol  11]  ne  rdgit  pas  Wimporte  quelle  guerre  civile,  mais  seulement  des  guerres 
de  longue  durde  et  de  grande  intensit6.  Le  Protocol  a  donc  la  meme  sphýre 
d'application  que  les  normes  couturnkres  form6es  pendant  la  guerre  civile 
Espagnole".  195 
I  think  that  the  conditions  laid  down  in  Article  I  leave  no  doubt  that  the  above  statements 
Some  Legal  Issues  Concerning  Ratification  of  the  1977  Geneva  Protocols,  in  M.  A.  Meyer,  (ed.  ):  Armed 
Conflicts  and  the  New  Law:  Aspects  of  the  1977  Geneva  Protocols  and  the  1981  Weapons  Convention. 
British  Institute  of  International  and  Comparative  Law,  London,  1989,  p.  97. 
191 
G.  Herczegh:  Protocol  Additional  to  the  Geneva  Convention  on  the  Protection  of  the  Victims  of  Non- 
International  Armed  Conflicts,  in  Gryorgy,  Harazti,  (ed.  ):  Questions  of  International  Law.  VoL.  2, 
Akadeemial  Kiado  Budapest  1981,  p.  75.  See  also  the  same  author:  Development  of  International 
Humanitarian  Law.  Akademiai  Kiado  Budapest,  1984,  p.  208. 
192  Cited  by  K.  J.  Keith:  The  Present  State  of  International  Humanitarian  Law.  9  AYIL'  1985,  p.  18. 
193  M.  R.  RweLamira:  The  Significance  and  Contribution  of  the  Protocols  Additional  to  the  Geneva 
Conventions  of  August  1949  in  Swinarski  (ed.  ),  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1,  n.  1,  p.  234. 
194  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  153,  p.  149. 
1950p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  101,  p.  571.  See  also  the  same  author:  Respect  of  Humanitarian  Worms  in  Non- 
International  Armed  Conflicts  in  Modern  Wars:  The  Humanitarian  Challenge.  A  Report  for  the  Independent 
Commission  on  International  Humanitarian  Issues.  Zed  Brooks  Ltd.  London  and  New  Jersey,  1986,  p.  91. 
178 are  correct,  and  that  the  Protocol  will  apply  only  to  internal  wars,  which  have,  to  a  large 
extent,  the  characteristics  of  international  wars.  This  opinion  is  supported  by  the  majority 
of  States,  which  made  explanation  of  their  votes  when  Article  I  was  adopted. 
Thus,  Canada  stressed  that  the  conditions  laid  down  in  Article  I  'could  only  exist  in  a 
civil  war  situation'.  196  Bindschindler,  as  the  delegate  of  Switzerland,  stressed  that: 
"...  [T]he  text  which  had  just  been  adopted,  however,  fell  short  of  everyone's  hopes 
since  its  scope  was  too  narrow  and  it  covered  only  cases  of  conventional  civil  war, 
which  had  become  rare".  197 
Pictet  on  the  other  hand,  as  a  representative  of  the  ICRC  in  the  conference  argued: 
"...  [T]hat  draft  Protocol  11  had  been  criticized  as  committing  States  too  far,  but  its 
field  of  application  had  been  so  precisely  limited  that  it  could  be  only  in  clearly 
defined  civil  conflicts".  198 
These  statements  confirm  in  my  view  my  contention  that  claims  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention,  have  been  used  effectively,  in  limiting  the  cases  of  internal  conflicts  to  be 
regulated  by  humanitarian  law  to  the  minimum.  In  fact,  the  conditions  of  Article  1, 
contradict  the  spirit  of  guerilla  warfare,  which  is  the  main  form  of  the  overwhelming 
majority  of  internal  wars  which  are  going  on  at  the  moment. 
D.  Who  Can  Determine  the  Existence  of  a  Non  -International  Armed  Conflict  within  the 
Meaning  of  Article  1  of  Protocol  11 
The  Article  itself  is  silent  on  this  important  question.  However,  two  diametrically  opposed 
views  have  been  advanced  during  the  conference  and  even  after  the  adoption  of  the 
Protocol. 
The  first  view  advocates  that  Article  I  containing  objective  criteria,  which  need  no 
special  mechanism  or  authority  for  their  determination.  This  view  was  held  by  ICRC  and 
some  western  States.  Thus,  the  ICRC  delegate  stressed  at  the  very  start  of  the  discussions 
of  draft  Article  I  that: 
"...  [I]t  [the  ICRC]  had  chosen  a  broad  field  to  cover  all  non-  international  armed 
conflicts  and  for  that  purpose  had  endeavoured  to  specify  the  characteristics  of  a 
non-international  armed  conflict  by  means  of  objective  criteria  so  that  the  Protocol 
could  be  applied  when  those  criteria  were  met  and  not  be  made  subject  to  other 
196 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  177,  MDH/SR.  49,  p.  77. 
197 
Ibid.  MDN/SR.  58,  para.  194,  p.  300. 
198  lbid,  MDH/SR.  49,  p.  60.  However,  it  must  be  noted  that  a  minority  of  States  expressed  the  view  that 
the  conditions  of  Articte  I  resembte  those  of  insurgency  in  traditionat  internationat  taw,  rather  then 
bettigerency.  Thus,  Ecuador  took  the  view  that: 
"Protocol  11  brings  under  humanitarian  taw  the  terms  Laid  down  by  international  Law  for  the 
recognition  of  insurgency". 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  168.  MDH/SR.  49,  p.  79.  In  my  opinion,  such  assertions  have  no  real  weight  since 
the  concept  of  Insurgency  and  its  conditions  is  not  very  clear  even  in  traditional  taw  and  in  the 
State  practice  at  that  point. 
179 considerations".  199 
The  implication  is  that  the  established  Government  has  no  power  of  determination  of  the 
existence  of  an  internal  conflicts  in  its  borders. 
Some  delegations  also  supported  such  a  stand.  Thus,  the  US  delegates  stressed  that: 
"...  [T]he  conditions  it  [Article  1]  laid  down  for  application  of  the  draft  Protocol  to 
internal  conflicts  were  reasonably  objective  and  could  be  applied  without  great 
difficulty".  200 
Belgium  also  stated  the  same  point  of  view,  it  stressed  that: 
"...  [N]o  provision  introduced  in  the  present  text  of  Article  I  could  constitute  an 
arbitrary  or  subjective  prerequisite  enabling  a  high  contracting  party  to  evade  the 
application  of  the  Protocol".  201 
Egypt  for  its  part  thought  that  any  attempt  to  introduce  the  right  of  the  Government  to 
determine  the  existence  of  an  internal  conflict,  would  mean  the  return  to  the  concept  of 
the  recognition  of  belligerenCy.  202 
The  ICRC,  in  its  recent  official  commentary,  advocates  also  the  idea  of  the  automatic 
application  of  Protocol  II.  It  states  clearly  that: 
"...  [T]he  Protocol  applies  automatically  as  soon  as  the  material  conditions  as  defined 
in  the  Article  are  fulfilled.  The  aim  of  this  system  is  the  protection  of  the  victims  of 
armed  conflict  should  not  depend  on  an  arbitrary  decision  of  the  authorities 
concerned".  203 
Bothe  and  others  support  the  same  view.  They  advocated  that: 
"...  [A]II  the  qualifications  required  in  paragraph  I  are  of  an  objective  nature.  There 
is  no  room  for  discretion  on  the  part  of  the  high  contracting  party  in  whose  territory 
a  conflict  covered  by  the  provisions  of  Article  I  occurs,  to  decide  whether  this 
204  conflict  fulfils  the  requirements  and  from  which  date". 
l 99  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  160,  MDH/I/SR.  22,  para.  12,  p.  203. 
2001bid,  MDH/l/SR.  29,  para.  32,  p.  292. 
201  lbid,  p.  291. 
202The  Egyptian  detegate,  Abi-Saab,  In  fact,  stated  that: 
"Amendments  to  Article  I  requiring  the  recognition  by  the  established  Government  of  the 
existence  of  a  situation  of  an  internal  armed  conflict,  introduced  a  purely  subjective  and 
voluntary  criterion;  they  revived  the  old-fashioned  doctrine  of  recognition  of  belligerency. 
But,  if  there  were  a  recognition  of  belligerency  there  would  be  no  need  for  a  Protocol  11 
because  according  to  general  international  Law.  the  whole  body  of  the  Law  of  war  would  then 
apply  including  the  four  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949  and  their  Additional  Protocol  Im. 
lbid,  MDH/l/SR.  24,  para.  31,  p.  235. 
2030p. 
cit.,  supra.  n-23,  para.  4459,  p.  1351. 
204  op.  cit..  supra.  n.  186,  p.  628. 
180 Then,  they  added: 
"Independent  of  any  position  taken  by  the  Government  in  power,  the  adverse  party 
and  the  members  of  its  forces,  and  the  civilian  population  and  all  persons  affected 
by  the  armed  conflict  are  entitled  to  the  protection  provided  in  the  ProtoCol,  o.  205 
Many  States  especially  from  the  Third  World  together  with  Romania  were  against  the  above 
view  during  the  conference.  Similarly,  even  after  the  adoption  of  Article  I  they  stressed 
the  inalienable  right  of  the  established  Government  to  determine  the  existence  of  an 
internal  conflict  within  its  borders.  The  rational  behind  such  claims,  lies  obviously  in  the 
arguments  that  any  other  course  would  compromise  State  sovereignty  and  inevitably 
constitute  an  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  State  concerned. 
Romania  in  fact  submitted  in  the  first  Diplomatic  Conference  (1974)  an  amendment, 
which  proposed  to  add  at  the  end  of  Article  1/1  the  following: 
"In  cases  where  the  State,  on  whose  territory  the  events  are  taking  place  recognizes 
the  existence  of  the  conflict,  its  character  and  its  constituent  elements.  "  W 
It  seems  that  the  proposal  did  not  gain  much  support  in  working  group  B.  Although  one 
delegation  at  least,  (Brazil)  still  insist  on  the  spirit  of  the  Romanian  amendment.  207 
At  the  1977  session  of  the  Diplomatic  Conference,  and  in  the  49  Plenary  Meeting  in 
which  Article  I  was  adopted,  Columbia  tried  to  introduce  an  oral  amendment  to  Article  1, 
which  specifies  that: 
"The  determination  of  the  con  itions  referred  to  above  shall  be  a  matter  for  the  State  908 
in  which  the  conflict  occurs". 
This  amendment  was  withdrawn,  but  on  explaining  its  vote  (it  abstained)  Columbia  made 
it  clear  that: 
"...  [W]ithin  the  context  of  this  Article  [Article  11  the  insertion  of  subjective  elements 
gives  rise  to  difficulties  of  interpretation,  and  my  delegation  believes  that  in  the 
exercise  of  sovereignty  resides  the  right  to  determine  such  situations  the  text 
approved  does  not  contradict  that  in  any  way".  209 
2051bid. 
2060p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  165,  p.  7. 
207  Thus,  Brazit  supported  by  some  States  request  the  sub-group  of  working  group  B,  that  the  fottowing 
text  be  incorporated  in  Articte  1/1  after  the  words  11  ...  Protocol.  1:  recognizes  as  such  by  the  High 
Contracting  Party  in  whose  territory  the  armed  conftict  is  considered  to  exist...  ".  op.  cit.,  supra. 
n.  164,  CDDH/l/REV/1,  pp.  93-94. 
208  Op.  cit.,  supre.  n.  177,  CDDH/SR.  49,  para.  56,  p.  84. 
2091bid, 
p.  78. 
181 Many  States  supported  the  Columbian  position  in  the  explanation  of  their  votes  for  Article 
1.210  Chile  for  instance,  stressed  that  the  application  of  Protocol  11  was  determined  by 
criteria  whose  definition  by  third  parties  would  constitute  interference  on  the  internal 
211  affairs  of  the  State. 
Moreover,  it  must  be  stressed  that  States  confronted  by  internal  conflicts  may  resort  to 
Article  3  of  the  second  of  the  Protocol,  (on  non  -intervention)  to  characterise  any  attempt 
by  third  parties  to  determine  the  existence  of  such  conflicts,  as  intervention. 
I  think  that  the  whole  argument  is  between  those  who  cling  to  a  very  rigid  concept  of 
sovereignty,  because  they  see  themselves  the  main  target  of  internal  wars,  and  those  who 
are  inclined  to  see  some  limitation  to  State  sovereignty  to  grant  human  beings  some 
protection  against  the  cruelty  of  internal  conflicts. 
In  my  view,  in  practice,  the  objective  character  of  the  Criteria  of  Article  1,  can  be 
apparent,  if  the  established  Government  acts  in  good  faith  in  the  fulfilment  of  its 
international  obligations.  in  fact  the  argument  of  human  rights,  and  the  need  for  the 
protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars,  militates  in  favour  of  limiting  the  State  power 
in  the  issue  of  the  determination  of  the  existence  of  the  internal  conflict,  since 
Governments  faced  with  such  conflicts,  are  always  tempted  to  abuse  their  power,  and  thus 
deny  protection  to  the  victims  in  need. 
The  experience  of  El-Salvador  is  a  case  in  point,  the  Government  is  a  party  to  the 
Protocol  11.  However,  until  now  there  is  no  official  recognition  of  the  application  of 
Protocol  11  to  the  conflict.  Despite  the  fact  that  all  the  elements  of  Article  1,  are  objectively 
present.  Thus,  the  insurgents  apparently  control  5  of  the  14  provinces  of  the  country,  such 
control  has  enabled  them  to  conduct  sustained  and  concerted  operations  against  the 
Government  forces.  The  insurgents  also  have  shown  their  ability  to  implement  the 
humanitarian  rules,  by  accepting  the  distribution  of  relief  in  the  zones  controlled  by  them, 
and  by  accepting  the  exchange  of  prisoners  through  the  ICRC.  212 
This  state  of  affairs,  has  led  the  international  community  through  the  UNCHR  and 
especially  the  UNGA  to  declare  the  application  of  Protocol  11  to  the  situation  in  El- 
Salvador. 
21OThus,  Tanzania  stressed  in  the  exptanation  of  its  vote  on  Articie  1  (it  abstained)  that: 
"Our  delegation  would  specifically  not  allow  this  determination  to  be  made  by  a  body  that  is  not  a 
representative  of  the  State  in  which  the  conflict  takes  place". 
lbid,  p.  84. 
211  Ibid,  p.  75.  It  must  be  noted  that  Chile  after  joining  in  the  adoption  of  Protocol  11  by  consensus, 
stated  that: 
"The  Chilean  delegation  joined  the  consensus  of  the  adoption  of  Protocol  11;  as  it  explained 
when  Article  I  was  voted  on,  It  did  so  on  the  understanding  that  the  determination  of  the 
conditions  for  its  application  ties  with  no  authority  other  than  the  State  in  whose  territory 
the  conflict  takes  place,  for  reasons  of  sovereignty  and  non  intervention 
...  is. 
lbid,  MDH/SR.  56,  p.  232. 
212See  Americas  Watch  Report:  Protection  of  the  Weak  and  Unarmed:  the  Dispute  over  Counting  Human 
Rights  Viotations  in  Et-Setvador.  Fob.  1984,  p.  37-38. 
182 Thus,  in  Resolution  38/101  of  December  16th,  1983,  the  UNGA  drew  the  attention  of 
the  parties  to  the  conflict  that: 
"...  The  rules  of  international  law,  as  contained  in  Article  3-and  additional  Protocol 
I  and  11  thereto,  are  applicable  to  armed  conflicts  not  of  an  international  character, 
such  as  in  EI-Salvador.  etC".  213 
The  case  of  EI-Salvador  has  in  my  opinion  established  that  the  legal  Government  will 
fortify  its  supposed  right  to  the  determination  of  the  existence  of  an  internal  conflict,  when 
it  acts  in  an  arbitrary  way. 
Concern  for  human  rights  protection  can  be  established  as  a  legal  bias  for  international 
community  intervention  to  declare  the  application  of  Protocol  11,  in  certain  cases  of  internal 
conflicts.  To  me  this  is  the  logical  consequence  of  accepting  human  rights  as  a  valid 
limitation  on  State  sovereignty.  214 
E.  The  Relation  of  Article  3  to  Protocol  II 
In  its  draft  Article  I  submitted  to  the  Diplomatic  Conference,  the  ICRC  gave  a  broad 
definition  to  non-international  armed  conflicts,  excluded  situations  of  internal  disturbances 
and  tensions  from  the  application  of  humanitarian  law,  and  lastly  paragraph  3  of  the  Article 
(1)  stated  that: 
"The  forgoing  provisions  do  not  modify  the  conditions  governing  the  application  of 
Article  3  common  to  the  Geneva  Convention  of  August  12,1949". 
Thus,  Protocol  11  sets  out  two  kinds  of  non-  international  armed  conflicts,  on  one  hand  those 
which  must  satisfy  the  conditions  of  Article  I  and  on  the  other  hand  those  covered  by 
Article  3. 
The  intention  of  the  ICRC,  was  to  keep  the  conditions  of  application  of  Article  3 
unchanged,  in  other  words  the  ICRC  wanted  to  keep  an  autonomous  existence  of  Article 
3,  in  order  that  the  rising  of  the  thresholds  of  the  definition  of  Article  I  does  not  react 
upon  Article  3.215 
During  the  conference,  four  opinions  concerning  the  position  of  Article  3  in  the  Protocol 
11  can  be  noticed: 
21337  UNY,  1983,  p.  887. 
214  Cassese,  however,  advocates  the  estabtfshment  of  a  lcomit6  de  sages'  which  consists  of  prominent 
individuaLs  of  great  prestige  from  the  Third  WorLd  countries,  which  woutd  have  as  a  main  function  the 
determination  of  the  existence  of  an  internal,  armed  confLict  in  the  meaning  of  ProtocoL  11.  See  A. 
Cassese:  Respect  of  Humanitarian  Norms  in  Non-Internationat  ConfLict,  In:  Modern  Wars:  The 
Humanitarian  Chattenge.  A  Report  for  the  Independent  Commission  on  International,  Humanitarian  Issues. 
Zed  Brooks  Ltd.  London  &  New  Jersey,  1986,  pp.  96-97. 
215See  the  comments  of  the  ICRC  detegate  in  connection  with  this  subject.  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  160, 
MDH/I/SR.  22,  para.  16.  p.  204. 
183 1.  Some  States  tried  to  drop  any  hint  or  reference  to  Article  3  in  the  text  of  Article  1,  of 
the  Protocol  11,216  the  implication  is  that  all  internal  conflicts,  other  than  riots  and  internal 
disturbances  and  tensions,  will  be  covered  only  by  Protocol  11.  This  position  in  fact  gives 
sovereignty  priority  over  any  humanitarian  considerations.  However,  this  view,  it  seems  had 
not  attracted  States,  since  even  hardliners  concentrated  on  raising  the  thresholds  of  conflicts 
covered  by  Protocol  11,  rather  than  eliminating  Article  3. 
2.  Some  other  States  tried  to  establish  the  identity  of  the  field  of  Application  of  Article 
3  and  Protocol  II,  by  extending  the  definition  of  armed  conflicts  covered  by  Protocol  11  to 
Article  3.  This  was  the  position  of  socialist  States.  These  States  wanted  in  fact  to  establish 
only  one  kind  of  internal  conflict,  the  rational  behind  such  a  stand  was  advocated  by  East 
Germany,  which  stressed  that  the  introduction  of  new  categories  and  difficult  distinctions: 
"...  [W]as  not  calculated  to  strengthen  the  development  of  international  humanitarian 
law.  Instead,  it  might  encourage  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  States".  217 
It  seems  that  the  real  motive  behind  the  socialist  stand  was  to  exclude  any  possibility  of 
applying  Article  3  to  situations  of  internal  disturbances  and  tensions,  which  may  constitute 
the  main  forms  of  internal  disorder  in  those  StateS218  and  thus,  protect  State  sovereignty. 
3.  Norway,  219  however,  tried  to  establish  the  identity  of  the  field  of  application  of 
Protocol  11  and  Article  3,  however,  unlike  socialist  States,  it  did  not  attempt  to  give  any 
definition  to  that  unique  kind  of  internal  conflict.  Clearly,  the  intention  of  Norway  was  to 
make  the  overwhelming  majority  of  internal  conflicts  benefit  from  the  application  of 
Protocol  11  and  thus  restrict  the  discretion  of  States  to  a  greater  extent. 
4.  However,  the  majority  of  States  opted  for  the  importance  of  keeping  an  independent 
scope  of  application  for  Article  3.  This  in  fact  was  to  compensate  for  the  emasculation  of 
the  definition  of  conflicts  covered  by  Protocol  11. 
Abi  Saab  (Egypt)  during  the  Conference  gave  the  rational  behind  such  an  approach  in 
these  terms: 
"It  was  a  step  in  the  right  direction  of  gearing  the  scope  of  protection  to  the  level  of  intensity  of  the  conflict  rather  than  to  abstract  legal  categories  such  as  internal  and 
international  armed  conflicts.  Such  an  approach  by  stages  was  more  in  conforming 
with  the  spirit  and  purpose  of  humanitarian  law  and  with  the  multiple  forms  of 
contemporary  armed  conflicts,  especially  guerilla  warfare  and  low  intensity  conflicts. 
For  the  same  reason,  it  was  essential  to  safeguard  the  indepSndent  scope  of 
application  of  Article  3  common  to  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949".  20 
216Romania 
advocated  such  course  In  fact,  it  submitted  an  amendment,  proposing  the  deletion  of 
paragraph  3  of  Article  1  of  the  ICRC  draft.  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  165,  CDDH/1.30  (March  12th,  1974),  p.  7. 
Romania  explained  later  that  it  considered  para  3  of  Article  I  as  unnecessary.  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  160, 
MDH/l/SR.  23,  para.  34,  p.  221. 
217 
Op  .  cit.,  supra.  n.  160,  CDDH/I. SR.  22,  para.  27,  p.  207. 
218  For  further  details,  see  Toman,  op.  cit..  supra.  n.  167,  pp.  328-331. 
219 
OP.  cit.,  supra.  n.  165,  MDH/1/218  (17.2.1975),  p.  9. 
220  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  160,  CDDH/I/SR.  24,  pare.  30.  pp.  234-235. 
184 The  implication  then,  is  that  humanitarian  law  will  be  served  by  keeping  an  independent 
scope  of  application  for  Article  3,  since  that  Article  would  be  applicable  in  situations  which 
are  not  covered  by  Protocol  11.  The  actual  text  of  Article  I  as  it  was  adopted  establishes  the 
relationship  between  the  Protocol  and  Article  3  in  the  following  fashion: 
'This  Protocol  which  develops  and  supplements  Article  3  common  to  the  Geneva 
Conventions  of  12  August  1949  without  modifying  its  existing  conditions  of 
application.  etc*. 
The  suggestion  is  that.  when  the  Protocol  applies,  Article  3  applies  automatically.  However, 
when  the  thresholds  of  the  Protocol  definition  are  not  present  Article  3.  will  be  applied  only 
when  the  situation  is  not  characterized  as  internal  disturbances  and  tensions. 
It  must  be  noted,  that  in  the  49th  plenary  meeting,  in  which  Article  I  as  it  stands  now 
has  been  adopted.  Cameroon  submitted  an  oral  amendment  which  would  have  reduced  the 
significance  of  Article  3,  it  suggested  that: 
"..  41]n  his  view  (the  delegate],  the  words  'without  modifying  its  existing.  conditions 
of  application'  in  paragraph  I  were  unnecessary  and  could  be  deleted.  ""' 
It  seems  that  the  immediate  implication  of  this  amendment,  would  be  the  establishment 
through  a  back  door  of  the  similarity  of  the  field  of  application  of  Protocol  11  and  Article 
3.  and  thus  indirectly  extending  the  high  thresholds  of  the  definition  of  armed  conflict  in 
Protocol  11  to  that  of  Article  3.  This  suggestion  in  fact,  would  kill  the  autonomy  of  Article 
3  and  at  the  same  time  enlarge  the  number  of  internal  conflicts,  which  can  escape  any 
international  regulations.  The  proposal.  however,  was  withdrawn.  Mexico  made  a  very 
interesting  observation  in  connection  with  the  Cameroonian  amendment  when  it  stressed 
that: 
"...  Mhat  Committee  I  had  considered  the  phrase  to  be  very  important,  in  so  much  as  it  ensured  that  the  applicatiQ  of  Article  3  common  to  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949, 
should  not  be  jeopardized*.  'P2 
This  observation.  underlines  the  general  feeling  of  States  that  there  are  two  sorts  of  internal 
conflicts.  to  which  humanitarian  law  contained  in  the  Protocol  11  and  in  Article  3  can  be 
applied.  It  also  implies  that  the  field  of  application  of  Article  3  is  broader  than  that  covered 
by  Protocol  11.2Z3 
However.  one  writer  has  gone  so  far  as  to  suggest  that 
221 
OP.  cit.,  swo.  n.  177.  MON/lIS4.49.  pers.  46,  p.  67. 
2221bfd. 
2231n 
this  context.  the  Syrian  delegate  expressed  the  view  that  "Article  I  was  retrogressive  when 
compared  with  the  provisions  of  Article  30.  This  implies  -m9  other  things,  that  he  sees  Article  3 
as  having  a  broader  field  of  application.  since  It  applies  to  conflicts  which  are  of  some  tower 
intensity.  Ibfd.  pars  47.  p.  67. 
185 "...  [N]either  Protocol  11  nor  Common  Article  3  contain  any  criteria  to  determine  their 
224  exact  relationship  with  each  other". 
In  my  view,  this  suggestion  is  not  wholly  true,  the  legislative  history  of  Protocol  11  affords 
some  very  important  indication  as  to  that  relationship. 
Moreover,  Egypt  and  Belgium  referred  specifically  to  that  question  in  their  explanation 
for  their  votes  for  the  two  Protocols.  The  former  stated  that: 
"Protocol  11  develops  some  aspects  of  Article  3  common  to  the  Geneva  Conventions 
of  1949,  without  completely  covering  its  scope.  Consequently  Article  3  still  represents 
the  minimum  protection  for  everything  that  is  not  covered,  and  better  covered  by  this 
Protocoln.  225 
The  latter  explained  that: 
"...  [W]hile  this  Article  (1)  which  develops  and  supplements  common  Article  3  does  not 
cover  all  possible  applications  of  Article  3,  neither  does  it  modify  the  conditions  of 
applications  ... 
in  other  words  the  entire  philosophy  of  the  provisions  of  common 
Article  3  whether  explicitly  reaffirmed  or  not,  is  included  in  the  Protocol".  226 
No  State  has  contradicted  such  an  interpretation. 
Furthermore,  the  relationship  between  the  Protocol  11  and  Article  3,  is  based  upon  the 
autonomy  of  their  respective  fields  of  application.  In  case  of  the  absence  of  the  conditions 
of  application  of  Protocol  11,  in  that  situation  only  the  minimum  rules  of  Article  3  will 
apply.  However,  when  the  conditions  of  the  application  of  Protocol  Il  are  present,  all  the 
rules  contained  in  Article  3  as  developed  in  the  Protocol  II  apply.  The  ICRC  commentary 
and  the  doctrine  confirms  such  interpretation.  It  states: 
"...  [I]n  circumstances  where  the  conditions  of  application  of  the  Protocol  are  met  the 
Protocol  and  Common  Article  3  will  apply  simultaneously,  as  the  Protocol's  field  of 
application  is  included  in  the  broader  one  of  common  Article  3.  On  the  other  hand, 
in  a  conflict  where  the  level  of  strife  is  low,  and  which  does  not  contain  the 
characteristic  features  required  by  the  Protocol,  only  Common  Article  3  will 
apply".  227 
Abi  Saab  stresses  the  same  point.  He  writes: 
"Le  Protocole  compl&te  I'article  3  commun  par  rapport  A  un  seul  espace  de  conflits 
armds  r6gis  par  ce  dernier.  Mais  il  Wexclut  ni  ne  limit  I'application  de  I'Article  3A 
ce  meme  type  de  conflij,,  et  c'est  dans  ce  sens  qu'il  ne  modifie  nullement  ces 
conditions  d'application". 
2240p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  193,  p.  234. 
2250p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  177,  MDH/SR.  49,  p.  76. 
2261bid. 
2270P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  23,  para.  4457,  p.  1351. 
228G.  Abi  Saab:  Conftfts  armds  non-internationaux,  in:  Les  dimensions  internationates  du  droit 
humanitaire.  Institut  Henry  Dunant,  ed.  A.  P6done,  UNESCO,  1986,  p.  267.  Atso  S.  Junod  and  Bothe  Stated 
the  same  view.  The  former  indicates  that  when  Protocot  11  is  appticabte  due  to  the  existence  of  its 
conditions,  Articte  3  witt  "retain  an  autonomous  existence,  its  appticabitfty  is  neither  restricted 
186 This  kind  of  interpretation,  in  my  view,  is  consistent  with  the  object  and  purpose  of  the 
Protocol  11.  The  latter  in  fact,  stipulates  that: 
"This  Protocol  shall  not  apply  to  situations  of  internal  disturbances  and  tensions  and 
other  acts  of  a  similar  nature,  as  not  being  armed  conflicts". 
However,  the  question  is  whether  Article  3  as  opposed  to  Protocol  11  is  applicable  to  such 
situations.  One  view  stresses  the  application  of  Article  3  to  such  situations;  only  Protocol 
11  is  precluded.  In  this  respect,  Bothe  writes: 
"...  [P]uisque  le  Protocole  11,  ne  modifie  pas  les  conditions  actuelles  de  Papplication  de 
I'Article  3  common  aux  Conventions,  la  d6finition  n6gative  du  conflit  arm6  contenu 
au  paragraphe  2  de  I'Article  I  ne  peut  concerner  que  le  Protocole  11  et  non  F2R9S 
I'Article  3.  La  question  du  champ  d'application  de  I'Article  reste  done  ouverte". 
In  fact,  Bothe  is  defending  a  position  which  has  been  advocated  by  West  Germany,  in  its 
explanation  of  its  vote  for  Article  I  of  the  Protocol.  In  this  context,  it  stated  that: 
"...  The  existing  conditions  of  application  of  Article  3  common  to  the  Geneva 
Conventions  are  not  modified.  This  is  clearly  expressed  in  Article  1,  paragraph  I  of 
Protocol  Il.  It  also  applies  to  paragraph  2  of  the  same  Article.  Consequently  the 
negative  definition  of  the  term  'Armed  Conflict'  in  paragraph  2  applies  only  to 
Protocol  II,  not  to  Article  3  Common  to  Geneva  Conventions.  This  is  the 
understanding  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  as  to  the  interpretation  of  Article 
I  of  Protocol  Il".  230 
Whatever  the  humanitarian  motives  behind  such  assertions,  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  the 
nor  subjected  to  the  scope  of  Protocol  Ilm-  junod:  Additional  Protocol  11,  History  and  Scope,  33  AULR, 
1983,  p.  35. 
The  Latter  notes  in  this  respect,  that: 
11  ...  It  is  the  idea  behind  common  Article  3  which  is  developed  and  supplemented,  not  the 
provisions  of  the  Article  itself.  The  field  of  application  of  Article  I  is  different  from  that 
of  Common  Article  311. 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  186,  p.  623. 
229M.  Bothe:  Confl,  its  arm6s  internes  et  droit  international,  hunanitaire,  82  RGDIP,  1978,  p.  90. 
Simitarty,  Gasser  advocated  such  views.  He  stated: 
"'This  minimum  standard,  of  international  humanitarian  taw,  contained  in  Article  3,  largely 
corresponds  to  the  body  of  guarantees  f  rom  wh  f  ch  Governments  cannot  derogate,  even  in  emergency 
situations.  These  rules  are  binding  in  armed  conflicts,  including  non-internationaL  armed 
conflicts,  and  hence  also  logically  in  internal  disturbances  and  tensions". 
Proposats  for  a  Code  of  Conduct.  IRRC,  1988,  (28th  year),  No.  262,  p.  45. 
230  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  177,  CDDH/SR.  49,  pp.  79-80.  Itaty  eartfer  in  the  Diptomatic  Conference  (in  1975) 
seems  to  support  such  interpretation  (advocated  by  West  Germany)  it  stated: 
"The  situations  provided  for  in  paragraph  2  did  not  fail  within  the  scope  of  application  of 
draft  Prot  ocot.  11  since  that  Protocol  did  not  regard  them  as  armed  conft,  I  cts;  though  that  wou  Id 
clearly  not  exclude  the  possibility  that  some  of  them  might  come  within  the  field  of 
application  of  Common  Article  311. 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  160,  MDH/l/SR.  29,  para.  25,  p.  290. 
187 majority  of  States  would  support  such  a  view,  since  it  leads  to  the  restriction,  of  State 
sovereignty  to  a  large  extent. 
In  fact,  it  seems  certain  that  socialist  and  Third  World  States  do  not  support  any  extension 
of  Article  3  to  situations  of  internal  disturbances  and  tensions.  Thus,  in  its  explanation  of 
vote  for  Protocol  I  and  11,  East  Germany  expressed  the  feeling  of  the  majority  when  it 
stressed  that: 
"Many  countries  have  expressed  their  fears  that  Protocol  Il  might  lead  to  an 
infringement  of  their  sovereignty.  Because  of  that  fact  it  seems  important  to  us  that 
Article  I  of  Protocol  II  unambiguously  States  that  Protocol  11  as  well  as  Article  3 
common  to  the  Geneva  Conventions  do  not  apply  to  situations  of  internal 
disturbances  and  tensions,  such  as  riots,  isolated  and  sporadic  acts  of  violence  and  231  other  acts  of  a  similar  nature". 
This  interpretation  is  supported  also  by  the  ICRC  Commentary,  where  it  is  stressed  that 
internal  disturbances  and  tensions  are  not  within  the  field  of  application  of  humanitarian 
law  and  that  the  ICRC  acts  in  that  area  only  on  an  ad  hoc  basiS.  232 
This  interpretation  would  in  my  view,  satisfy  the  limits  to  which  States  are  ready  to 
accept  limitations  on  their  sovereignty. 
F.  Evaluation  of  Article  1  of  Protocol  11 
It  is  my  opinion,  that  the  high  and  serious  threshold  of  application  of  Article  1,  coupled 
with  the  absence  of  a  definition  of  armed  conflict  regulated  by  Article  3  common  to 
Geneva  Conventions  and  the  express  provision  that  the  Protocol  does  not  apply  to  situations 
of  internal  disturbances  and  tensions  will  mean  that  in  practice  many  internal  conflicts,  will 
not  be  covered  by  any  rule  of  humanitarian  law. 
Keith  rightly  stressed  that  the  Protocol  II  cannot  apply  to  situations  of  urban  guerilla 
warfare,  since  it  (the  Protocol)  requires  some  kind  of  territorial  control.  Moreover,  it  is  very 
doubtful  whether  those  situations  can  be  regulated  by  Article  3.233  This  is  a  concrete 
example  of  an  armed  conflict,  which  may  very  well  find  no  protection  by  humanitarian  law. 
Although,  human  rights  as  an  accepted  restriction  of  State  sovereignty  may  still  play  a 
useful  role  in  the  protection  of  the  fundamental  human  rights  such  as  the  right  to  life, 
2310P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  177,  CDDH/SR.  56,  p.  243.  See  atso  J.  Toman:  The  Sociatfst  Countries  and  the  Laws 
of  Armed  Conftict  in:  ModernWars:  The  Humanitarian  Chattenge.  A  Report  for  the  Independent  Commission 
on  Internationat  Humanitarian  Issues.  Zed  Books  Ltd,  1986,  p.  166. 
232  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  23,  p.  1356.  Simitarty,  Meron  seems  to  support  this  view:  Draft  ModeL  Dectaration 
on  Internat  Strife.  IRRC,  1988.28th  year,  No.  262,  p.  60.  Likewise,  Bedlaouf  takes  the  same  stand,  he 
state: 
"in  its  present,  humanitarian  taw  does  not  provide  a  sound  legal  basis  for  the  ICRC  to 
intervene  in  such  situations.  frequent  though  may  be  involving  all  kinds  of  racial  riots, 
violent  strikes  and  social  tensions". 
Humanitarian  Law  at  a  Time  of  Failing  National  and  International  Consensus  in  Modern  Wars.  The 
Humanitarian  Challenge,  a  Report  for  the  Independent  Commission  on  Humanitarian  Issues.  Zed  Books, 
London,  1986,  p.  20. 
2330p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  192,  p.  20. 
iss prohibition  of  torture  and  the  need  for  humanitarian  treatment  in  those  situations. 
Furthermore,  I  think  that  in  practice,  States  faced  with  violent  challenges  to  their 
authority,  will  have  a  very  wide  discretion  to  choose  between  the  categories  of  armed 
conflicts  contained  in  Article  I  of  the  Protocol.  This  may  result  in  delays  in  the  application 
of  humanitarian  rules. 
Similarly,  it  seems  to  me  that,  despite  the  argument  that  the  development  and  codification 
of  humanitarian  law  has  not  to  be  seen  as  an  infringement  of  State  sovereignty,  or  an 
234  intervention  in  its  internal  affairs,  the  majority  of  States  especially  from  the  Third  World 
were  not  convinced.  Consequently,  even  after  the  adoption  of  the  two  Protocols,  many 
States  in  their  explanation  of  their  votes  asserted  that  Protocol  II  touches  on  their 
sovereignty.  235  This  will  have  in  practice,  a  negative  effect  upon  the  application  of  that 
Protocol.  In  this  way,  Article  1,  is  very  rigid  in  the  sense  that  it  did  not  take  notice  of  the 
234  Thus,  Pictet  as  a  deLegate  of  the  ICRC  argued  that: 
"Despite  the  misgivings  of  some  delegations,  the  Protocols  did  not  represent  a  danger  to  the 
Governments...  nothing  in  the  texts  was  prejudicial  to  national  sovereignty". 
op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  177,  CDDH/SR.  49,  para.  4,  p.  59.  Similarly,  the  USSR  delegate  stressed  that: 
11...  Protocot  11  contained  a  number  of  ArticLes  of  great  weight,  while  at  the  same  time 
avoiding  tanguage  which  couLd  be  interpreted  as  attempting  to  interfere  inthe  internat  affairs 
of  States". 
lbid,  CDDH/SR.  58,  para.  93,  p.  297. 
235Thus,  Mauritania  stressed  that: 
M  ...  (Ilit  considers  that  Its  provisions  [Protocol  III  are  essentially  a  matter  of  national 
sovereignty". 
Ibid,  CDDH/SR.  58,  p.  324.  The  Philippines  made  it  cLear  that: 
"...  Ellt  wouLd  have  abstained  as  wetL  If  a  vote  had  been  taken  on  ProtocoL  11,  because  it 
adheres  strongLy  to  the  principLe  that  it  Is  the  sovereign  right  of  every  state  to  cleaL  with 
rebel,  movements  within  its  territory  in  any  manner  it  deems  fit,  and  to  appty  its  nationat  taw 
according". 
lbid,  MDH/SR.  56,  p.  243.  Turkey  atso  expressed  the  view  that: 
"Protocol  11.  even  in  its  present  form  presents  aspects  which  seem  to  conflict  with  the 
sovereign  right  of  the  State".  lbfd,  p.  249. 
Zaire  noted  that: 
"...  [Hlowever  good  the  intentions  of  Its  authors  might  have  been,  the  fact  remained  that 
several  provisions  of  Protocol  It  encroached  upon  the  rules  of  State's  domestic  Law  and  thereby 
dangerously  compromised  the  sovereignty  and  territorial  jurisdictions  of  those  States". 
lbid,  p.  219.  Uganda  enphasised  atso  that  it  has: 
0...  kR]etuctantty  joined  the  consensus  on  the  adoption  of  Protocol  It  and,  If  the  text  of 
Protocol  11  had  been  put  to  the  vote,  our  delegation  would  have  abstained  because  some  of  its 
provisions  infringe  the  sovereignty  of  States". 
Ibid,  p.  251.  Finatty,  Iran  dectared  that: 
"The  simptif  fed  text  neverthetess  contained  some  provisions  that  were  tacking  in  ctarity  and 
that  might  be  interpreted  as  a  threat  to  State  sovereignty". 
lbid,  CDDH/SR.  58,  p.  309. 
189 development  of  methods  of  warfare  in  internal  conflicts.  Guerilla  tactics  are  the  main 
method  of  the  weak,  and  insurgents  are  always  weak  in  matters  of  arms  and  equipment, 
intelligence  and  personnel. 
Established  Governments  faced  with  such  methods,  will  be  at  ease  in  denying  the 
application  of  Protocol  11,  since  the  insurgents  will  hardly  be  able  to  assert  control  over  a 
certain  part  of  the  territory. 
It  has  also  been  suggested  that  Article  I  contains  objective  conditions,  their  existence 
does  not  need  any  formal  determination  by  any  one,  be  it  the  established  Government,  the 
rebels  or  a  third  party.  It  is  asserted  that  in  practice  many  problems  of  interpretation 
concerning  such  'objective  conditions'  will  arise.  This  would  not  be  in  the  interests  of  the 
victims  of  internal  conflicts.  In  my  opinion,  the  concept  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention  will  play  a  major  role  in  the  raising  of  the  Problems  of  interpretation. 
However,  on  the  positive  side,  I  think  that  the  definition  of  non-  international  armed 
conflicts  in  Article  1,  and  its  inclusion  of  Article  3  Common  to  Geneva  Conventions  can 
be  interpreted  as  a  positive  step  in  the  development  of  humanitarian  law  in  internal 
conflicts,  since  the  implication  is  that  Common  Article  3  halbeen  given  a  definition  which 
the  text  of  the  Article  (3)  had  left  out. 
Such  a  definition  must  be  seen  against  the  high  threshold  of  application  of  Article  1,  in 
other  words  Article  3  must  be  interpreted  as  containing  a  lower  threshold  of  application 
compared  to  Article  1,  which  means  in  practice  that  many  internal  conflicts  which  do  not 
satisfy  the  conditions  of  Article  I  may  very  well  be  covered  by  Article  3. 
Despite  the  limited  number  of  humanitarian  rules  contained  in  Article  3,  they  ate  to  be 
observed  by  all  States,  hence  they  are  now  an  established  legal  limitation  upon  State 
sovereignty.  Also  due  to  the  very  low  number  of  States  who  challenged  the  reference  to 
Common  Article  3,  in  the  text  of  Article  I  (in  fact  only  Romania  did  so).  It  is  suggested 
here,  that  the  Article  (3),  must  be  seen  as  becoming  a  rule  of  Jus  cogens  in  the  meaning  of 
Article  53  of  the  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties  of  1969,  which  every  State 
must  observe  in  internal  conflicts  which  satisfy  at  least  two  conditions.  First,  they  are  not 
internal  disturbances  and  tensions  within  the  meaning  of  Article  1/2  of  the  Protocol  11. 
Secondly,  they  do  not  satisfy  the  thresholds  of  application  of  Protocol  Il  laid  down  in 
Article  1/1  of  the  same  Protocol. 
Moreover,  on  the  positive  side,  it  seems  that  Article  I  is  a  positive  limitation  of  State 
sovereignty,  since  it  codifies  some  conditions  of  the  traditional  concept  of  belligerency, 
in  an  obligatory  international  instrument. 
When  the  conditions  of  Article  I  exist  in  an  internal  conflict,  the  sovereignty  of  the  State 
give  way  to  the  applications  of  a  host  of  humanitarian  rules,  which  are  essentially  of  a 
human  rights  nature.  This  means  that  the  movement  for  the  application  of  human  rights  in 
peace  time,  has,  as  a  limitation  upon  the  sovereignty  of  State,  found  another  extension  to 
periods  of  violence  and  times  of  war. 
190 CHAPTER  FOUR 
THE  PROTECTION  OF  THE  VICTIMS  OF  INTERNAL  WARS 
Introduction 
Civil  wars  are  well  known  for  their  cruelty  and  inhumanity  since  sentiments  run  very  high 
and  the  temptation  to  indulge  in  committing  atrocities  is  very  present.  In  this  respect, 
Vitelius  in  the  battle  of  Bepriar,  exclaimed: 
"Le  corps  d'un  ennerni  mort  sent  toujours  bon,  surtout  si  c'est  un  compatriote".  1 
Similarly,  General  Sherman  who  committed  many  atrocities  during  the  American  civil  war 
believed  that  'the  only  possible  way  to  end  this  unhappy  and  dreadful  conflict  is  to  make 
it  terrible  beyond  endurance.,  2  This  means  that  the  question  of  the  protection  of  the  victims 
of  internal  conflicts  acquires  a  pressing  importance,  since  lives  of  human  beings  are  at 
stake. 
It  must  be  indicated  that  the  term  'victims  of  internal  wars'  will  include  the  civilian 
population,  the  wounded  and  the  sick  and  the  captured  combatants  held  prisoners.  In 
general,  it  includes  those  who  do  not  bear  arms  or  those  who  are  unable  to  continue  the 
fight  because  of  their  injury,  sickness  or  capture. 
My  assertion  in  this  chapter  is  that,  even  if  States  still  use  the  argument  of  sovereignty 
and  non-intervention  to  block  or  limit  the  regulation  of  their  conduct  towards  their  own 
citizens  especially  in  times  of  emergency,  nevertheless,  they  gradually  began  to  accept  some 
timid  curtailment  of  their  absolute  rights  especially  in  the  context  of  the  subject  matter  of 
this  chapter. 
It  is  asserted  that  the  concept  of  human  rights  has  helped  to  a  great  extent  the  acceptance 
by  States  of  some  important  humanitarian  rules,  concerning  the  protection  of  the  victims 
of  internal  wars,  first  in  common  Article  3  and  especially  in  the  context  of  Protocol  11. 
In  order  to  cover  the  subject  of  this  chapter,  the  latter  will  be  divided  into  3  sections. 
First,  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  conflicts  in  customary  international  law. 
Secondly,  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  conflicts  in  Common  Article  3  of  the 
Geneva  Convention.  Thirdly,  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  conflicts  in  Protocol 
Il. 
Section  1:  The  Protection  of  the  Victims  of  Internal  Conflicts  under  Customary 
International  Law 
In  this  section,  my  aim  is  to  search  for,  first,  the  roots  of  the  protection  of  victims  of  wars 
in  general,  secondly,  to  state  what  are  the  customary  rules  on  the  protection  of  victims  in 
wars  in  general  whatever  the  nature  of  the  conflict,  and  lastly,  to  see  whether  those  rules 
1  Cited  by  M.  Veuthey:  Les  conftits  arm6s  de  caract6re  non-internationat  et  te  droit  humanitaire,  in 
Cassese  (ed.  ):  Current  Probtems  of  Internationat  Law.  Giuffrb,  Mitan,  1975,  p.  181. 
2  Cited  by  F.  Kalshoven:  AppLicabiLity  of  Internationat  Customary  Law  in  Non-Internationat,  Armed 
ConfLfct,  ibid,  p.  274. 
191 of  customary  law  apply  in  situations  of  civil  wars.  This  will  be  done  essentially  by  studying 
the  State  practice  and  throughout  the  whole  section,  the  influence  of  the  principle  of 
sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  on  these  issues  will  be  sought  and  elucidated. 
A.  The  Roots  of  the  Protection  of  the  Victims  of  War 
It  is  claimed  by  some  writers  that  if  rules  relating  to  the  conduct  of  hostilities  find  their 
roots  in  the  usages  and  traditions  of  what  is  called  chivalry.  The  roots  of  protection  victims 
of  war  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  the  publicists,  3  such  as  Grotius,  Vattel,  Montesquieu 
and  Rousseau. 
However,  before  analysing  the  contributions  of  these  writers  and  the  State  practice  vis- 
A-vis  victims  of  wars,  especially  in  the  17th  and  18th  centuries,  it  is interesting  to  note  that 
even  if  the  roots  of  modern  law  of  war  in  general,  and  that  of  the  protection  of  the  victims 
of  war  especially,  are  to  be  found  in  the  writings  and  the  State  practice. 
Other  civilizations,  especially  the  Islamic  one,  which  was  in  direct  contact  with  the  West, 
has  developed  a  very  coherent  body  of  rules  of  warfare,  wherein  they  stressed  the 
importance  of  the  protection  of  victims  of  wars.  Thus,  the  rules  on  the  protection  of  non- 
combatants  in  general,  were  to  apply  in  wars  between  the  Islamic  States  and  other  States  and 
also  in  wars  between  Moslems  that  is  in  'internal  wars'. 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  main  reason  for  the  interest  of  Islam  in  the  laws  of  war  and  the 
protection  of  victims  springs  from  the  fact,  that  the  'Jihad'  (the  holy  war)  was  a  component 
part  of  the  religion.  It  was  a  duty  for  the  Islamic  State  and  moslern  individuals.  This  being 
so,  its  regulation  was  very  important. 
The  examples  of  good  treatment  of  the  victims  of  war  can  be  found  in  the  Islamic 
historY4  such  as  it  is  illustrated  by  the  treatment  of  the  Algerian  Emir  Abdelkader  during 
his  war  against  the  French  occupation  (1830-1847).  Prisoners  were  kept  by  him 
5 
and  treated 
well  and  in  many  instances  released  upon  the  intervention  of  Catholic  priests. 
However,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  idea  of  non-combatancy  and  the  humane 
treatment  of  those  who  lay  down  their  arms  because  of  injury  or  capture,  have  developed 
essentially  in  the  context  of  Europe.  Theoretically,  it  is  the  17th  and  18th  centuries  that 
witnessed  the  seeds  of  such  developments.  Those  developments  it  seems  were  essentially  a 
reaction  against  what  was  going  on  in  practice,  war  was  more  or  less  total,  no  one  escaped 
its  horrors. 
One  witness  of  that  epoch,  Sorel  wrotes: 
38est, 
op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1,  n.  1,  pp-63-64. 
4  See  in  this  respect,  14uhamed  Tatlat  At-Ghunalmi:  A  General  Review  of  Humanitarian  Law  in  Islam,  in: 
First  Egyptian  Seminar  on  international  Humanitarian  Law.  ICRC,  Egyptian  Society  of  International  Law, 
Cairo,  November  1982,  pp.  43-93.  See  also  General  Samir  Muhamed  Fadet:  Contemporary  Developments  in 
International  Humanitarian  Law  applicable  in  Armed  Conflicts:  A  Comparison  with  Islamic  Principles 
Cin  Arabic),  ibid.  pp.  95-105. 
5  D.  Borrer:  Narrative  of  a  Campaign  against  the  Kabaites  of  Atgerfa  with  the  Mission  Of  14.  SuChet  to 
the  Emir  Abd-Etkader  for  an  Exchange  of  Prisoners.  Longman,  Brown,  Green  &  Longmans,  London,  1848, 
pp.  274-321. 
192 "...  [La  guerre]  d6pouille  I'homme  du  vernis  d'emprint  dont  il  se  part;  elle  le  met  ý  nu, 
ddcouvrir  toutes  ses  infermitdes;  Iftche  tous  ses  vices,  d6bride  toutes  ses  passionS".  6 
He  then  observes  that: 
"Les  hommes  du  dix-huitiýme  si6cle  restent  bruteaux  et  emport6s.  La  plupart 
dissertent  6galement  sur  Ilhumanit6,  pour  peut  sont  humains.  La  'sensibilit6'  est  pure 
affaire  de  modes". 
7 
He  then  describes  how  war  was  conducted  in  the  18th  century  as  follows: 
"Le  fait  de  la  guerre  tombe  sur  le  pays  occup6  et  Ncrase.  On  proscrit  les  habitants 
rdput6s  dangereux  ou  simplement  suspects  les  autres  prennent  peur,  et  pour  se 
soutraire  au  p6ril  qui  menace  non-seulement  leurs  biens,  mais  leur  personne, 
I'honneur  de  leurs  fernmes  et  de  leurs  filles,  its  dmigrent.  Alors,  on  met  une  taxe  sur 
les  absents,  puis  on  d6molit  les  maisons  de  ceux  qui  ne  le  payent  pas  ".  8 
Thus,  the  population  of  the  State  against  which  war  is  declared  are  considered  as  'enemy', 
their  property  can  be  taken. 
The  war  against  the  prince  is  a  war  against  every  individual  in  his  realm,  those 
indivuduals  are  therefore  destined  to  suffer  every  disruption  of  family  ties  and  every  loss 
of  property  and  honour.  It  is  against  this  background,  that  publicists  began  to  urge 
moderation  and  humanity  in  dealing  with  the  victims  of  war.  In  this  context,  Grotius  even 
if  he  regarded  the  population  of  the  adversary  as  'enemies',  he  nevertheless  maintained  that 
moderation  must  prevail.  He  approved  Cicero  who  in  his  "first  book  to  his  officers,  advises 
the  sparing  of  those  who  have  committed  no  acts  of  atrocity  and  cruelty  in  war  and  that 
wars  undertaken  to  maintain  honour  should  be  conducted  upon  principles  of  moderation". 
9 
However,  he  did  not  rule  out  the  possibility  of  killing  the  innocent,  if,  in  the  language 
of  today,  military  necessity  requires  it.  He  writes  that: 
*Though  there  may  be  circumstances  in  which  absolute  justice  will  condemn  the 
sacrifice  of  lives  in  war,  yet  humanity  will  require  that  the  greatest  precaution  should 
be  used  against  involving  the  innocent  in  danger  except  in  cases  of  extreme  urgency 
and  utility".  10 
We  can  see  in  this  statement  the  seeds  of  the  distinction  between  combatants  and  non- 
combatants,  we  can  infer  also  that  he  sees  that  the  hardships  of  war  must  be  directed 
essentially  against  those  who  bear  arms,  innocents  and  their  belongings  should  be  protected 
from  the  horrors  of  war.  " 
6A.  Sorel:  L'Europe  at  ta  r6votution  Francaise.  lere.  partie,  Les  moeurs  potitiques  at  les  traditions. 
Meme  ed.  Librarie  Plon,  Paris,  1897,  p.  81 
7  Mid,  p.  82. 
81bid, 
p.  83. 
9H.  Grotius:  The  Rights  of  War  and  Peace,  translated  by  A.  C.  Campbell.  M.  Walter  Dunne  (Pub.  ),  London 
and  Washington,  1901,  p.  30. 
101bid, 
p.  360. 
111bid. 
193 However,  in  the  context  of  the  protection  of  prisoners  of  war  he  observed  that: 
"It  is  the  practice  among  Christian  powers  to  detain  prisoners  of  war,  till  their  ransom 
be  paid;  the  amount  of  which  dspends  upon  the  will  of  the  conqueror  unless  it  has 
been  settled  by  express  treaty.  "' 
This  means  that  on  the  question  of  POW's,  Grotius  was  pragmatic,  since  it  seems  that  he 
regards  that  paying  a  ransom  is  better  than  enslavement  or  outright  killing. 
On  the  other  hand,  Vattel  states  his  general  principle  in  somewhat  harsh  words: 
"When  the  ruler  of  the  state,  the  sovereign  declares  war  upon  another  sovereign,  it 
is  understood  that  the  whole  nation  is  declaring  war  upon  the  other  nation..:  The  two 
nations  are  therefore  enemies  and  all  the  subjects  of  one  nation  are  enemies  of  the 
subjects  of  the  other".  13 
He  also  emphasized  that: 
"All  citizens  are  exposeýjto  losses  and  it  is  his  misfortune  upon  whom  they  fall.  If  in 
civil  society  we  must  risk  our  lives  for  the  State,  we  may  well  risk  our  property  "-  14 
However,  this  sweeping  statement  of  the  general  principle  on  the  effects  of  war  is  followed 
by  excluding  women,  children,  feeble  old  men,  the  sick,  ecclesiastics,  men  of  letters, 
husbandmen  and  generally  those  who  are  not  armed.  These  categories  which  we  may  call 
them  non-combatants  if  they  offer  no  resistance  'the  belligerent  has  no  right  to  maltreat  or 
15  otherwise  offer  violence  to  them  much  less  put  them  to  death'. 
Moreover,  Vattel  argued  that  if  the  Sovereign  desires  to  keep  his  conscience  clear,  and 
fulfill  the  duties  of  humanity,  he  should  keep  in  mind  that  the  right  to  wage  war  upon  his 
fellow-men,  must  be  a  matter  of  necessity  and  a  remedy  against  a  wrong  done.  He  then 
stressed: 
"If  he  [the  Sovereign]  is  impressed  with  that  great  truth  he  will  not  push  the  remedy 
beyond  its  just  limits,  and  he  will  be  careful  not  to  make  more  severe  or  more 
disastrous  to  mankind  than  the  care  of  his  own  safety,  etc.  "  16 
In  other  words,  if  the  war  between  States  is  inevitable,  its  conduct  must  not  be  without  any 
limits.  This  is  the  anti-thesis  and  theoretical  foundation  of  the  Declarations  of  St. 
Petersburg  of  1868  and  of  Brussels  of  1874,  and  indeed  the  whole  movement  of  codification 
of  the  laws  of  war  which  has  been  undertaken  in  the  19th  century. 
The  impact  of  Rousseau  and  Montesquieu,  to  name  but  two,  is  considerable  in  the 
development  of  the  concept  of  combatants  and  non-combatants  and  human  treatment  of  the 
victims  of  war  in  general.  In  this  context,  Montesquieu  stressed  that: 
121bid, 
p.  347. 
130p. 
cit.,  supra.  chapter  3,  n.  9,  p.  259. 
141bid, 
p.  321. 
151bid, 
p.  282. 
161bid, 
p.  279. 
194 "...  [N]ations  ought  to  do  to  one  another  in  peace  the  most  good  and  in  the  war  the 
least  evil".  17 
The  implication  is  that  war  is  not  mutual  destruction,  and  that  massive  inhuman  treatment 
of  enemy's  subjects  will  not  help  future  relations  with  that  same  enemy. 
Montesquieu,  then  outlined  his  basic  theory  concerning  what  nations  ought  to  do  to  each 
other  in  war.  He  noted  that: 
"It  is  false  that  killing  in  war  is  lawful,  unless  in  case  of  absolute  necessity".  18 
He  gave  priority  to  the  standard  of  civilization,  lives  are  to  be  protected  unless  military 
necessity  intervenes.  However,  it  is  obvious  that  attacks  against  the  innocent  civilians, 
killing  of  helpless  sick  and  wounded  soldiers,  refusing  to  give  quarter,  or  inhuman 
treatment  of  those  who  laid  down  their  arms,  can  never  be  justified  by  the  claim  of  absolute 
military  necessity.  This  is  the  likely  implication  of  what  Montesquieu  advocates. 
He  also  stated  in  clear  terms  his  position  vis-A-vis  prisoners  of  war,  he  was  against  their 
enslavement  or  killing,  his  reason  was  that: 
"...  [W]ar  gives  no  other  right  over  prisoners  than  to  disable  them  from  doing  further 
harm  by  securing  their  persons.  All  nations  concur  in  detesting  murdering  of 
prisoners  in  cold  blood".  ' 
Once  the  soldier  is  hors-de-combat,  he  must  be  treated  humanely,  he  is  no  longer  a  lawful 
object  of  attack  or  killing.  These  humanitarian  views  were,  in  fact,  the  real  basis  upon 
which  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  war  was  to  be  built  as  we  will  see  later. 
Rousseau  is  considered  widely  as  the  main  architect  of  the  theoretical  foundation  of  thý 
laws  of  war,  especially  its  aspect  dealing  with  the  protection  of  persons.  He  writes: 
"Cest  le  rapport  des  choses  et  non  des  hommes  qui  constitue  la  guerre,  et  Ntat  de 
guerre  ne  pouvant  naltre  des  simples  relations  personnelles,  mais  seulement  des 
relations  rdelles,  la  guerre  privde  oij  I'homme  a  homme  ne  peut  exister  ni  dans  Ntat 
de  nature,  ou  it  n'y  a  point  de  propriW  constante,  ni  dans  Ntat  social,  oil  tout  est 
sous  I'autorit6  des  joiS".  20 
This  observation  shows  that  Rousseau  believes  that  men  are  essentially  good,  by  their 
nature.  They  are  not  directed  to  inflict  pain  on  each  other.  This  assumption  has  led  him  to 
pronounce  his  much  quoted  observation  that: 
"...  [L]a  guerre  West  donc  point  une  relation  d'homme  A  homme,  mais  une  relation 
d'Etat  ý  Etat,  clans  laquelle  les  particuliers  ne  sont  ennernies  quaccidentellement,  non 
point  comme  des  hommes,  ni  meme  comme  citoyens  mais  comme  soldats,  non-point 
17C.  de  Montesquieu:  The  Spirit  of  the  Laws  (1748),  transtated  by  T.  Nugent.  Hafner  Pub.  Co.,  New 
York,  1949,  p.  5. 
181bid, 
p.  236. 
191bid. 
20  J.  J.  Rousseau:  Du  contrat  social.  Une  Introduction.  E.  Dreyfus-Brisac,  Paris,  1896,  pp.  22-23. 
195 comme  membres  de  la  patrie,  mais  comme  ses  defensseUrSn.  21 
This  important  observation  has  since  then  become  the  classical  introduction  in  any  dealing 
with  the  subject  of  the  laws  of  war,  and  especially  the  protection  of  its  victims.  The 
implication  in  this  pronouncement  is  that  the  civilian  population  is  protected  against  the 
evils  of  warfare,  since  war  is  essentially  the  business  of  the  soldiers  in  the  field  of  combat. 
Rousseau  also  stressed  that: 
"...  [L]a  fin  de  la  guerre  ttant  la  destruction  de  I'Etat  ennemi,  on  a  le  droit  Wen  tuer 
les  ddfensseurs  tant  qui'ils  ont  les  armes  i  la  main;  mais  aussitot  qu'ils  les  posent  et 
rendent,  cessant  d'etre  ennemis  ou  instruments  de  1'ennemi,  ils  redevienment 
simplement  hommes,  et  l'on  n"a  plus  de  droit  sur  leur  vie  ".  22 
This  observation  laid  the  ground  for  the  protection  of  the  prisoners  of  war  who  were  in  the 
past  the  object  of  brutal  treatment.  Thus,  when  they  laid  down  their  arms  because  of 
capture  or  injury,  they  are  no  longer  enemy  soldiers.  They  revert  to  their  ordinary  human 
nature. 
The  maxims  of  Rousseau  have  exercised  a  deep  influence  upon  writers  of  international 
law,  and  also  upon  the  State  practice  in  the  form  of  later  codification.  As  a  result,  the 
predominance  of  the  liberal  political  theory  with  its  insistence  upon  the  individual  and  his 
private  property  as  the  foundation  of  the  whole  political  and  economic  life  produced  the 
essential  distinction  between  combatants  and  non-combatants.  Consequently,  it  gave  much 
more  protection  to  the  individual  and  his  property,  and  also  protection  to  the  soldiers  once 
he  became  a  mere  human  being. 
In  this  context,  a  writer  observed  in  1912  that: 
*The  civilised  view  of  war  is  that  it  is  an  affair  of  Governments  acting  through  and 
against  officially  organised  forces,  and  that  the  peaceful  private  citizens  of  both 
countries  should  be  as  little  disturbed  as  possible  ... 
it  is  more  and  more  recognised  that 
only  the  regular  armed  forces  should  fight,  that  only  Government  property  should 
be  captured  and  that  the  private  citizen  should  suffer  only  through  increased  taxation. 
Naval  prize  is  an  exception  but  it  is  recognised  as  such  and  its  scope  is  more  and 
more  limited  by  international  conventions.  "23 
This  passage  shows  clearly  the  influence  of  Montesquieu  and  especially  Rousseau  on  legal 
writings  in  the  19th  and  the  beginning  of  the  20th  centuries. 
However,  Best  took  a  radical  interpretation  of  Rousseau.  According  to  him,  Rousseau's 
maxim  was  a  good  piece  of  propaganda  but,  it  was  doubly  defective  and  disadvantageous 
when  adopted  and  announced  as  a  guide  to  practice.  What  Rousseau  actually  said  in  Best's 
view  is  that: 
"...  [W]ars  were  between  'states'  not  'peoples'  therefore  (if  you  swallow  this)  people(s) 
were  not  objects  of  military  operations.  But  people(s)  nevertheless  got  hurt,  often 
very  badly.  How  else  could  that  be  explained  by  a  Rousseauite,  except  as  some  sort 
of  unavoidable  accident  or  incidental  feature  of  war,  more  or  less  beyond  your  own 
211bid, 
p.  24. 
221bid, 
p.  25. 
23  H.  T.  Kingsbury:  Capture  after  Capitutation:  A  Juristic  Anachronism.  6  AJIL,  1912,  P.  657. 
196 control  and  responsibility". 
24 
In  accordance  with  this  line  of  argument,  Best  concludes  by  stressing  that: 
"Thus  a  huge  realm  of  civilian  wartime  experience  was,  so  to  speak,  lifted  beyond  the 
primary  range  of  judicial  scrutiny  and  placed  in  a  second  category  of  things  that  just 
25  happened  in  war". 
Then,  Best  cited  the  practice  to  prove  his  point,  he  concentrated  on  the  French  Revolution. 
Thus,  General  Deflers,  who  was  the  commander  of  the  Army  of  Pyrenees  Orientales, 
answered  the  Spanish  General  Ricardos,  who  demanded  that  combatants  must  be  clearly 
distinguished  from  non-combatant  by  saying: 
"...  [L]a  force  g6n6rale  de  la  R6publique  se  compose  du  peuple  entier,  tous  les  Frangais 
sont  des  soldats".  26 
Moreover,  the  French  Decree  on  Levke  en  Nlasse  (August  23rd,  1793)  proclaimed  that: 
"Young  men  shall  go  to  battle;  married  men  shall  forge  arms  and  transport  provisions, 
women  shall  make  tents  and  clothing  and  shall  serve  in  hospitals,  children  shall  turn 
old  linen  into  lint;  the  aged  shall  betake  themselves  to  public  places  in  order  to  arouse 
the  couray  of  the  warriors  and  preach  hatred  of  kings  and  the  unity  of  the 
Republic".  7 
However,  despite  such  misgivings,  Rousseau's  influence  upon  the  later  development  of  the 
laws  of  war  cannot  be  denied.  Thus,  the  Declaration  of  St.  Petersburg  of  December  II  th, 
1868  stipulated  that: 
"The  progress  of  civilisation  should  have  the  effect  of  alleviating  as  much  as  possible 
the  calamities  of  war;  that  the  only  object  which  states  endeavour  to  accomplish 
during  war  is  to  weaken  the  military  forces  of  the  enemy".  28 
In  order  to  achieve  this  end  (weakening  of  military  forces  of  the  enemy),  it  is  sufficient  to 
disable  the  greatest  possible  number  of  enemy  men  and  by  implication  this  declaration  goes 
in  the  'Rousseauite'  tradition  of  limiting  the  war  to  the  field  of  combat,  thus  preserving  the 
civilian  population  of  the  horrors  of  war.  Wars  are  not  regarded  as  a  vengeance,  they  are 
regulated  so  that  at  least,  those  who  are  not  members  of  the  armed  forces  must  be  spared 
in  their  lives  and  property. 
The  Brussels  Conference  of  1874  stated  in  its  final  protocol  that: 
"...  [I]t  had  been  unanimously  declared  that  the  progress  of  civilisation  should  have  the 
effect  of  alleviating  as  far  as  possible  the  calamities  of  war  and  that  the  only 
legitimate  object  which  states  should  have  in  view  during  war  is  to  weaken  the  enemy 
240p. 
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28Schindler 
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197 without  inflicting  upon  him  unnecessary  sufferingS".  29 
Then  the  same  declaration  adds  that: 
"...  [W]ar  being  thus  regulated  would  involve  less  sufferings,  would  be  less  liable  to 
those  aggravations  produced  by  uncertainty,  unforeseen  events  and  the  passions 
excited  by  the  struggle,  it  would  tend  more  surely  to  that  which  should  be  its  final 
object;  the  re-establishment  of  ood  relations  and  a  more  solid  and  lasting  peace  4 
between  the  belligerent  states". 
The  implication  of  these  pronouncements  is  that  the  object  of  the  regulation  of  warfare  is 
to  limit  its  horrors.  Victims  of  war  are  the  prime  beneficiaries  from  that  regulation.  It  is  to 
be  observed  that  the  declaration  puts  into  practice  Montesquieu's  view,  concerning  the  final 
object  of  war. 
The  project  of  the  International  Declaration  Concerning  the  Laws  and  Customs  of  War, 
adopted  at  the  Brussels  Conference  of  1874  which  was  signed  but  never  ratified,  contains 
extensive  references  to  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  warfare  such  as  Article  38  which 
provides  for  the  protection  of  family  honour,  rights  and  the  lives  and  property  of  persons, 
their  religious  convictions  and  property.  31 
Thus,  it  seems  that  States  began  to  feel  that  civilians  must  be  protected.  Sovereignty  has, 
then,  actually  been  limited,  since  military  necessity  which  is  the  name  of  sovereignty  during 
the  war,  cannot  be  invoked  to  destroy  the  lives  and  property  of  persons  when  no  real 
military  advantage  can  be  gained. 
Article  23  of  the  same  Declaration,  after  establishing  that  POW  are  in  the  power  of  the 
enemy  Government  rather  than  of  the  individuals  or  units  who  captured  them,  stressed  that 
they  must  be  treated  humanely  and  according  to  Article  26  they  must  not  be  compelled  to 
participate  in  the  operation  of  war. 
The  Oxford  Manual  on  the  Laws  of  war  on  land  published  in  September  9th,  1880, 
provides  as  a  general  principle  in  Article  I  that: 
"The  state  of  war  does  not  admit  of  acts  of  violence,  save  between  the  armed  forces 
of  belligerent  stateS".  32 
Article  7  forbids  the  maltreatment  of  the  non  combatant  population.  Article  10  stresses  that 
the  wounded  and  the  sick  should  be  brought  in  and  cared  for,  without  any  discrimination. 
The  interest  of  the  Manual,  which  has  been  drawn  by  the  most  distinguished  authors  of 
international  law,  lies  in  its  stress  upon  that  "it  'the  manual'  has  contented  itself  with  stating 
clearly  and  codifying  the  accepted  ideas  of  our  age  so  far  as  this  has  appeared  allowable  and 
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33  This  statement  appears  in  its  Prdface.  The  phrase  'accepted  ideas  of  our  time' 
includes  in  my  opinion  the  whole  intellectual  production  of  the  later  Enlightenment 
concerning  war  in  general.  Among  this  of  course,  stands  the  work  of  Montesquieu  and 
Rousseau. 
The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  is  that  the  theoretical  basis  of  customary  international  law 
concerning  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  war  is  to  be  found  in  writings  of  Grotius, 
Vattel,  Montesquieu  and  Rousseau;  none  of  them  saw  sovereignty  as  going  in  the  direction 
of  allowing  atrocities  against  the  victims  of  war. 
B.  Customary  Rules  Concerning  the  Protection  of  the  Victims  of  War  In  General 
In  rejecting  the  claim  that  Germany  was  not  bound  by  The  Hague  Convention  of  1907 
because  of  the  general  participation  clause  contained  in  that  Convention,  the  Nuremberg 
Tribunal  stated  that: 
"...  [B]y  1939  these  rules  [The  Hague  rules]  laid  down  in  the  conventions,  were 
recognized  by  all  civilized  nations  and  were  regarded  as  being  declaratory  of  the  laws 
and  customs  of  war  which  are  referred  to  in  Article  6(b)  of  the  Charter".  34 
In  other  words,  the  rules  contained  in  those  instruments  are  considered  as  customary  rules. 
However,  those  instruments  do  not  contain  any  express  rules  on  the  protection  of  civilians, 
but  many  references  can  be  interpreted  as  containing  the  fundamental  distinction  between 
combatants  and  non-combatants.  Thus,  Article  46  of  the  Fourth  Convention  of  1907 
provides  for  the  protection  of  family  honour,  rights  and  lives  of  persons,  respect  for  their 
religious  convictions  and  prctices,  and  private  property.  Articles  22,23,25,26  and  28  of 
the  same  Convention  contains  also  indirect  references  to  the  protection  of  civilians. 
Nevertheless,  if  the  distinction  between  combatants  and  non-combatants  is  easily  deduced 
from  the  Hague  Conventions  and  regulations,  it  is  difficult  to  find  specific  rules  on  the 
protection  of  civilians.  The  codification  of  such  specific  rules  was  not  made  until  the  end 
of  the  Second  World  War. 
However,  it  must  be  indicated  that  the  customary  distincýtion  between  combatants  and 
non-combatants  has  come  under  heavy  pressure.  Thus,  the  whole  economic  structure  which 
contribute  to  the  efforts  of  war  is  regarded  as  a  legitimate  target. 
Moreover,  the  advent  of  aerial  warfare  especially,  has  been  regarded  as  making  the 
concept  of  total  war  a  reality.  In  this  context,  Spaight  writes: 
"War  is  now  a  totalitarian  affair,  affecting  all  the  individuals  of  a  nation,  and  there 
are  no  'non  -combatants'  today,  for  all  contribute  in  some  way  to  the  national  effort. 
The  coming  of  the  bombing  aircraft  has  increased  the  difficulty  of  differentiating 
between  the  soldier  and  the  civilian".  35 
However,  it  seems  that  the  advent  of  total  war  has  led,  if  not  to  the  killing  of  the  traditional 
distinction  between  combatants  and  non-combatants,  to  the  division  of  the  civilians  to 
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199 different  categories. 
Thus,  in  general,  civilians  involved  in  the  military  and  economic  efforts  of  war  were 
considered  in  the  opinion  of  some  as  a  lawful.  object  of  attack.  In  this  context,  Rolland 
stressed  that: 
"...  [S]euls  sont  ill6gitimes  et  condamnables  les  bombardements  aeriens  de  nature,  6tant 
donn6es  les  circumstances  dans  lesquelles  its  sont  opdr6s,  IA  atteindre  principalement 
ou  exclusivement  la  population  civile  ne  coopdrant  pas  a  la  production  du  material 
militaire".  36 
Nevertheless,  the  prevailing  view  still  holds  that  the  distinction  between  combatants  and 
non-combatants  must  continue.  The  argument  that  'total  war'  has  suspended  it,  or  even 
abrogated  many  important  rules  of  customary  international  law  was  not  accepted,  indeed 
37  the  spirit  of  the  whole  judgment  of  Nuremberg  goes  in  that  direction. 
The  conclusion  is  that  customary  international  law  does  not  contain  a  wholly  developed 
system  of  protection  of  the  civilian  population.  Nevertheless,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
general  distinction  between  combatants  and  non-combatants  is  well  entrenched  in  that  law. 
Many  references  in  The  Hague  Conventions  can  be  interpreted  as  establishing  some  essential 
guarantees  for  the  protection  of  civilians,  especially  the  rule  that  civilians  must  never  be 
an  object  of  attack. 
With  regard  to  the  POW's,  the  Hague  Conventions  of  1899  and  1907  regulate  their  status 
(Articles  4  to  20  of  the  IV  Convention  of  1907  respecting  the  laws  and  customs  of  war  on 
land).  Thus,  Article  4  of  the  IV  Hague  Convention  makes  the  general  principle  that  they 
must  be  treated  humanely.  Article  7  obliges  the  State  into  whose  hands  the  POW's  have 
fallen  to  treat  them  as  regards  food,  lodging  and  clothing  on  the  same  footing  as  the  troops 
of  the  Government  who  captured  them. 
In  the  Nuremberg  War  Trials,  the  defense  lawyers  of  the  Nazis  accused  of  maltreatment 
and  killing  of  Soviet  POW"s  tried  to  justify  the  German  atrocities  on  the  grounds  that  the 
Soviet  Union  was  not  a  party  to  the  Geneva  Convention  of  1929  dealing  with  POW.  The 
tribunal  then  had  an  occasion  to  make  clear  the  position  of  POW"s  in  customary 
international  law.  In  fact,  it  supported  the  Soviet  protest  of  September  15th,  1941  to 
Germany  against  the  regulations  for  the  treatment  of  Soviet  POW's  signed  by  the  German 
General  Reinecke  on  September  8th,  1941.  The  protest  stated: 
"The  Geneva  Convention  for  the  treatment  of  prisoners  of  war  is  not  binding  in  the 
relationship  between  Germany  and  the  USSR.  Therefore  only  the  principles  of 
general  international  law  apply.  Since  the  18th  century  these  gradually  have  been 
established  along  the  lines  that  war  captivity  is  neither  revenge  nor  punishment  but 
solely  protective  custody,  the  only  purpose  of  which  is  to  prevent  the  POW  from 
further  participation  in  the  war.  This  principle  was  developed  in  accordance  with  the 
36  L.  Rottard:  Les  pratiques  de  ta  guerre  aerlenne  dans  le  conftit  de  1914  et  te  droit  des  gens. 
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200 view  by  V  armes  that  it  is  contrary  to  military  tradition  to  kill  or  injure  helpless 
3  people". 
The  Tribunal  considered  that  this  Soviet  protest  'correctly  stated  the  legal  position'.  39 
As  to  the  sick  and  wounded,  they  were  the  first  to  receive  international  Protection  in 
international  codification  efforts.  The  movement  was  initiated  by  the  famous  Swiss  national, 
Henry  Dunant.  Thus,  in  1863  at  a  conference  in  which  16  States  were  present,  a  resolution 
was  adopted.  In  its  preamble,  the  States  present  expressed  their  desire  : 
"...  [O]f  coming  to  the  aid  of  the  wounded  should  the  military  services  prove 
inadequate".  40 
The  conference  resolved  then  that  each  country  shall  have  a  committee  whose  duty  of  war 
would  be  to  assist  the  army  medical  services  by  every  means  at  its  disposal.  The  conference 
also  recommended  that  in  time  of  war  the  belligerents  shall  proclaim  the  neutrality  of 
ambulances  and  military  hospitals  and  that  official  medical  personnel,  voluntary  medical 
personnel  and  the  inhabitants  who  aid  in  the  relief  of  the  wounded  must  be  recognized. 
From  that  Resolution  began  the  whole  history  of  the  Red  Cross  movement.  Thus,  the  first 
international  Convention  on  the  Condition  of  the  Wounded  was  adopted  on  August  22nd, 
1864.  It  made  the  undertakings  of  the  first  Resolution  of  1863  obligatory.  Article  6  of  that 
Convention  poses,  in  fact,  the  fundamental  humanitarian  rule  concerning  the  wounded  and 
the  sick: 
"Wounded  or  siýk  combatants,  to  whatever  nation  they  may  belong,  shall  be  collected 
and  cared  for".  1 
The  convention  went  so  far  as  to  encourage  inhabitants  to  care  for  the  wounded  and  sick.  42 
That  convention  (of  1864)  has  been  revised  by  an  Additional  Protocol  of  October  20th, 
1868  which  essentially  extended  its  benefits  to  naval  forces.  Then,  it  was  replaced  by  the 
Convention  of  1906.  The  latter  being  replaced  by  the  Convention  of  1929  and  finally  the 
Geneva  Convention  (the  first)  of  1949  replaced  that  of  1929.  It  seems  that  these  conventions 
are  viewed  by  all  as  reflecting  now  the  customary  rules  on  the  subject  since  their 
application  over  the  last  100  years  had  achieved,  in  the  words  of  Solf  'a  remarkable  measure 
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The  conclusion  is  that  customary  international  law  contained  some  general  principles  and 
even  some  specific  rules  for  the  protection  applicable  of  POW's  and  of  the  wounded  and 
sick  which  are  only  applicable  in  inter-States  wars.  This  situation  can  be  explained  in  my 
view,  by  two  reasons.  The  first,  is  that  humanitarian  ideas  exercised  important  influence 
toward  restricting  the  horrors  of  war,  in  relation  to  these  helpless  categories  of  the  victims. 
Secondly  and  more  importantly,  because  such  humanitarian  protection  is  in  the  interest  of 
States.  Pragmatism  led  the  latter  to  look  for  better  treatment  of  their  soldiers  who  fall  into 
the  enemy's  hands  in  exchange  for  doing  the  same  to  those  enemy  soldiers  who  fall  into 
their  hands. 
However,  as  concerning  the  civilians,  the  matter  is  a  little  different.  There  were  no 
specific  rules  for  their  protection  although  the  essential  distinction  between  combatants  and 
non-combatants  is  there.  The  lack  of  precise  regulations  even  in  inter-State  wars  can  be 
explained  in  my  view,  on  the  basis  that  States  do  not  welcome  any  international  regulation 
of  their  behaviour  towards  their  citizens.  This  is  a  matter  of  domestic  jurisdiction  and 
sovereignty.  They  allowed  some  protection  of  their  citizens  only  when  some  parts  of  their 
territory  fell  under  occupation. 
C.  Customary  Rules  on  the  Protection  of  the  Victims  of  War  and  Internal  Conflicts 
It  must  be  stressed  that  the  above  developments  concerning  the  protection  of  the  victims 
of  wars  have  been  conceived  only  to  apply  to  inter-States  and  not  intra-States  conflicts. 
Humanitarian  rules  were  to  apply  only  to  those  who  are  giving  their  lives  to  preserve  and 
defend  the  territorial  and  political  sovereignty  of  the  State.  Thus,  at  first  glance,  it  is  very 
difficult  to  imagine  that  States  will  give  any  humanitarian  protection  to  those  whose 
declared  aim  is  to  overthrow  them.  The  interplay  of  the  notions  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention  will  not  help  the  cause  of  the  rebels.  The  crime  of  high  treason,  as  a  natural 
product  of  the  concept  of  sovereignty,  has  been  developed  to  deal  with  the  rebels. 
Harsh  treatment  always  awaits  those  who  attempt  to  fight  the  State,  from  within  or 
outside.  State  practice  shows  that  since  the  12th  Century,  internal  conflicts  and  those  who 
44  fomented  them,  received  attention  in  treaty  practice.  Thus,  in  a  Treaty  of  September  1177 
between  King  Henry  11  and  King  Louis  of  France,  it  was  agreed,  among  other  things,  that 
both  sides  undertook  to  banish,  on  request,  each  other's  enemies  from  their  dominions. 
Another  treaty  12  years  later,  between  King  Richard  I  and  King  Philip  of  France  again 
45  provided  for  the  extradition  of  each  other's  malefactors. 
However,  in  customary  law,  the  laws  of  war  can  be  applied  only  when  the  recognition 
of  belligerency  takes  place,  especially  when  that  recognition  emanates  from  the  established 
Government  itself.  The  problem,  as  we  have  seen  earlier  in  Chapter  111,  is  that  in  practice, 
43  W.  A.  SoLf:  Development  of  the  Protection  of  the  Wounded  and  sick  and  Shipwrecked  under  the  Protocols 
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202 States  experiencing  civil  wars  do  not  easily  recognise  or  accept  the  belligerency  of  their 
enemies.  Sovereignty  gives  them  the  right  to  deal  with  their  citizens  at  their  discretion, 
especially  those  who  take  up  arms  against  their  authority.  Other  States,  by  the  same  token, 
have  no  right  to  demand  any  better  treatment  for  those  rebels. 
The  doctrine  of  humanitarian  intervention,  it  seems,  is  not  accepted  in  State  practice, 
especially  in  times  of  internal  conflict.  In  the  very  rare  cases  of  recognition  of  belligerency, 
States  acknowledged  that  recognition,  mainly  because  the  conflict  has  attained  a  very  high 
degree  of  intensity  that  it  resembles,  in  fact,  an  international  war. 
1.  The  State  Practice  In  Cases  of  Civil  Wars  In  which  Recognition  of  Belligerency  has 
Taken  Place 
It  must  be  noted  that  in  the  actual  cases  of  recognition  of  belligerency  in  State  practice,  the 
established  Government  stress  that  the  recognition  is  given  due  to  humanitarian  motives, 
in  order  to  dismiss  their  opponent's  claim  to  a  legal  status. 
Thus,  in  the  American  Civil  War,  Articles  153  and  154  of  the  Lieber  Code  are  revealing. 
The  former  States,  in  substance,  that  the  extension  of  humanitarian  rules  to  the  rebels  does 
not  confer  on  them  any  legal  status,  they  remain  rebels  and  only  victory  in  the  field  settles 
the  future  relations  between  the  warring  parties.  The  latter  Article  (154)  made  it  clear  that 
the  application  of  the  customs  and  usages  of  warfare  in  the  field  between  the  Government 
forces  and  the  rebels  does  not  prevent  the  former  from  trying  the  leaders  of  the  rebellion 
on  a  charge  of  high  treason. 
All  this  can  be  explained,  in  my  view,  by  the  fact  that  the  established  Government,  even 
when  it  recognizes  the  belligerency  of  its  enemies,  it  does  not  feel  that  it  has  done  so 
because  of  a  legal  obligation,  but  only  because  of  humanitarian  motives. 
States  do  not  wish  to  weaken  their  sovereignty  by  recognizing  that  another  party  can  share 
their  monopoly  of  representation  over  the  territory  and  its  inhabitants.  In  this  context, 
Article  152  explicitly  states  that: 
"When  humanity  induces  the  adoption  of  the  rules  of  regular  war  toward  rebels 
whether  the  adoption  is  partial  or  whole,  it  does  in  no  way  whatever  imply  a  partial 
or  complete  acknowledgement  of  their  Government,  if  they  have  set  up  one,  or  of 
them  as  an  independent  and  sovereign  power.  Neutrals  have  no  right  to  make  the 
adoption  of  the  rules  of  war  by  the  assailed  Government  toward  rebels  the  ground 
of  their  own  acknowledgement  of  the  revolted  people  as  an  independent  power  H.  46 
This  Article  spells  out  the  limits  of  the  recognition  of  belligerency  in  regard  to  the 
application  of  the  laws  of  war.  Sovereignty  and  non-intervention  are  not  suspended  on  the 
recognition  of  belligerency,  which  means  among  other  things,  that  other  States  cannot  use 
that  recognition  as  a  pretext  for  demanding  the  application  of  the  norms  of  the  laws  of  war 
to  the  conflict. 
However,  it  seems  that  in  practice  once  the  recognition  of  belligerency  has  been  granted, 
Governments  usually  respect  the  laws  of  war,  especially  the  rules  relating  to  the  protection 
of  the  victims  of  war.  Fear  of  reprisals  and  the  idea  of  reciprocity  ensure  that,  in  general, 
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1.1.  The  American  Civil  War 
In  this  war,  the  institution  of  recognition  of  belligerency  as  a  concept  had  reached  its  fullest 
requirements  (since  basically  nothing  had  been  added  in  future  similar  conflicts),  affords 
in  fact,  a  good  example  of  how  the  laws  of  war  have  been  applied  in  civil  wars.  The  Lieber 
Code  covers,  in  effect,  a  very  large  part  of  the  laws  of  war,  and  it  seems  as  Wright  correctly 
observed: 
"...  [T]he  standards  set  ý.  y  the  Code  seem  to  have  been  generally  observed  by  both  sides 
during  the  civil  war".  " 
The  Code  recognizes  the  distinction  between  combatants  and  non-combatants  (Article  155). 
However,  since  the  concept  of  belligerent  occupation  cannot  be  applied  in  civil  war,  mainly 
because  it  is  in  contradiction  with  the  territorial  unity  of  the  State  which  the  established 
Government  is  set  to  guarantee  and  because  also  any  recognition  of  belligerent  occupation 
would  mean  that  the  insurgents  have  legal  status.  Hence,  special  regulation  must  then 
determine  the  relation  of  the  legal  Government  with,  especially  its  'own  citizens'  who  are 
in  the  zone  controlled  by  the  insurgents.  This  raises,  in  effect,  the  question  of  the  treatment 
of  the  civilian  population  in  civil  wars. 
The  Lieber  Code  stresses  in  its  Article  155  the  following: 
"The  military  commander  of  the  legitimate  Government,  or  war  of  rebellion,  distinguishes  between  the  loyal  citizens  in  the  revolted  portion  of  the  country  and  the 
disloyal  citizens.  The  disloyal  citizens  may  be  further  classified  into  those  citizens 
know  to  sympathize  with  the  rebellion  without  positively  aiding  it,  and  those  who, 
without  taking  up  arms,  give 
4ý  ositive  aid  and  comfort  to  the  rebellious  enemy 
without  bodily  forced  thereto". 
ATti  cle  156  then  envisages  the  kind  Of  treatment  of  each  category  of  those  citizens.  Thus, 
loyal  citizens  must  be  protected  from  the  TigOUTs  and  horrors  of  war  while  disloyal  citizens 
must  bear  all  the  hardships  and  deprivations  of  war,  the  military  commander  has  to  throw 
all  the  burden  of  war  on  them. 
Thus,  the  civilian  population,  at  least  its  "disloyal"  portion  are  to  suffer  greatly.  This  is 
the  logic  of  sovereignty,  the  State  protects  only  those  who  obey  its  power  and  authority. 
Those  who  disobey  must  not  expect  any  mercy. 
Moreover,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  Lieber  Code  did  not  incorporate  the  idea  of 
the  levke  en  masse.  This  means  that  it  does  not  exist  in  civil  wars,  since  any  resistance 
against  the  approaching  army  of  the  established  Government,  will  be  considered  as  high 
treason,  death  being  the  penalty.  In  fact,  Article  157  of  the  Lieber  Code  makes  it  plain  that: 
"Armed  or  unarmed  resistance  by  citizens  of  the  United  States  against  the  lawful 
movement  of  their  troops  is  levying  war  against  the  United  States  and  is  therefore 
470.  Wrf  ght:  The  knerican  Cf  Ai  War.  fn  Fatk  (ed.  ).  op.  cf  t.,  supra.  chapter  2,  n.  8,  p.  56. 
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As  to  POW's,  the  Lieber  Code  establishes  that  category  and  stresses  that  POW  is  not 
subjected  to  any  punishment,  the  status  of  POW's  were  recognised  in  fact,  by  both  sides  to 
the  conflict. 
In  practice,  it  seems  that  even  if  generally  the  laws  of  war  were  adhered  to.  nevertheless 
many  instances  of  cruelty  were  present.  The  civilian  population  was  the  main  target  of  such 
violations  of  the  laws  of  war.  In  this  respect,  General  Sherman  wrote  to  the  Mayor  of 
Atlanta,  when  the  latter  city  was  under  siege  by  the  Federal  forces: 
"War  is  cruelty,  and  you  cannot  refine  it  and  those  who  brought  war  into  our  country 
deserve  all  the  curses  and  maledictions  a  people  can  pour  out.  I  know  I  had  no  hand 
in  making  this  war  and  I  know  I  will  make  more  sacrifices  today  than  any  of  you 
to  secure  peace.  If  the  United  States  submits  to  a  division  now,  it  will  not  stop  but 
50  will  go  on  until  we  reap  the  fate  of  Mexico,  which  is  eternal  war". 
General  Sherman  was  generally  very  harsh  in  the  treatment  the  civilians  and  their 
belongings.  During  the  siege  of  Atlanta,  he  wrote  to  General  Hood,  the  Confederate 
Commander  of  Atlanta  that: 
"Atlanta  is  no  place  for  families  or  non  -combatants". 
51 
The  General  replied  : 
"And  now  sir,  permit  me  to  say  that  the  unprecedented  measure  you  propose 
transcends,  in  studied  and  ingenious  cruelty,  all  acts  ever  before  brought  to  my 
attention  in  the  dark  history  of  war.  In  the  name  of  God  and  humanity,  I  protest, 
believing  that  you  will  find  you  are  ex  yelling  from  their  homes  and  firesides  the 
wives  and  children  of  a  brave  people".  5 
As  to  POW's,  on  both  sides  of  the  conflict,  nearly  30,000  men  died  out  of  some  two 
hundred  thousand.  In  the  north,  from  cold  weather  and  disease  and  in  the  south  from 
inadequate  food  and  epidemics.  53 
1.2.  The  Boer  War 
In  this  conflict,  the  insurgents  resorted  to  the  methods  of  guerrilla  warfare  which  meant 
that  they  used  the  countryside  as  their  main  logistic  and  intelligence  source.  This  led  the 
British  to  resort  to  the  questionable  policy  of  establishing  concentration  camps  which  were 
first  used  by  the  Spaniards  during  the  Cuban  insurrection  in  order  to  isolate  the  insurgents 
and  thus,  making  their  defeat  feasible.  In  those  camps,  civilians  were  badly  treated  and  they 
suffered  greatly. 
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205 The  policy  was  inaugurated  by  a  memorandum  of  December  21  st,  1900  signed  by  General 
Lord  Kitchener.  It  stated: 
"The  General,  Commander  in  Chief,  desires  that  all  possible  means  be  taken  to  stop 
the  present  guerrilla  warfare  of  the  various  means  for  the  accomplishment  of  this 
object,  one  which  has  been  strongly  recommended  and  has  lately  been  successfully 
tried  on  a  small-scale  is  the  removal  of  all  men,  women  and  children  and  natives 
from  the  districts  which  the  enemy's  band  particularly  OCCUpy".  54 
Inside  these  concentration  camps,  a  policy  of  discrimination  in  the  treatment  of  the  civilian 
population  was  instituted.  Families  of  neutrals  and  insurgents  who  had  surrendered  were 
to  be  afforded  better  treatment  than  families  whose  fathers,  husbands  and  sons  were  in  the 
opposing  force.  The  policy  of  establishing  concentration  camps  was  justified  by  the  British 
on  the  ground  of  humanity  (example:  the  protection  of  the  occupants  of  lonely  farms)  and 
also  for  inducing  the  insurgents  to  surrender. 
In  practice,  the  picture  was  different.  The  camps  witnessed  a  very  high  rate  of  mortality 
due  to  the  lack  of  sanitation,  medicine  and  doctors.  The  harsh  treatment  of  the  families  of 
the  insurgents  did  not  encourage  the  latter  to  surrender,  on  the  contrary,  their  numbers 
increased.  It  is  also  to  be  mentioned  that  General  Lord  Kitchener,  by  means  of  his 
instructions  of  January  24th,  1901,  ordered  his  commanders  in  the  field  to  clear  the 
countryside  systematically  of  supplies,  horses,  cattle,  crops,  transport  vehicles  and  non- 
combatant  families.  He  directed  that  supplies  and  crops  if  not  used  were  to  be  burnt; 
55  bakeries  and  mills  were  to  be  destroyed. 
This  policy  led  to  a  growing  opposition  in  Britain.  In  Parliament,  Lloyd  George  asked: 
"Why  make  war  against  women  and  children?  It  was  the  men  that  were  their 
enemies  so 
. 
56 
Then  he  added: 
"...  [B]y  every  rulgf  civilized  war,  we  were  bound  to  treat  women  and  children  as 
non  -combatants". 
The  implication  is  clear,  rules  of  war  must  be  adhered  to  even  in  cases  of  civil  war.  The 
distinction  between  combatants  and  non-combatants  is  the  golden  rule  of  these  'rules  of 
civilized  war'.  Thus,  humanity  demanded  the  full  protection  of,  women  and  children, 
pragmatism  also  demanded  the  same  since: 
"...  [B]rave  men  will  forget  injuries  to  themselves  much  more  readily  than  they  will 
insults,  indignation  and  wrongs  to  their  women  and  children.  "58 
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206 The  policy  of  concentration  camps  was  later  abandoned,  however,  not  on  moral  ground  or 
legal  principle  but  it  seems  simply  because  it  was  too  expensive  in  financial  terms  since  it 
was  estimated  that  the  Boer  war,  apart  from  the  Napoleonic  wars,  was  the  most  expensive 
war  in  the  British  history. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  that  the  treatment  of  the  sick  and  wounded  was  in  general 
humane.  In  this  respect,  when  the  famous  siege  of  Ladysmith  was  imposed  by  the 
insurgents,  from  October  1899  to  the  end  of  February  1900,  the  Boers  allowed  the 
establishment  of  a  neutral  camp  some  four  miles  from  the  town  where  the  wounded  and 
59  non-combatants  could  be  protected  and  cared  for. 
Despagnet  in  fact,  described  the  attitude  of  the  Boers  vis-i-vis  prisoners  and  wounded 
soldiers  in  the  following  fashion: 
'Aussi  les  t6moignages  abondent-ils  pour  prouver  que  pleins  d'humanitd  pour  les 
prisoniers,  les  malades  ou  les  bless6s  tomb6s  en  leur  pouvoir,  ils  ont  souvent  poussd 
les  igards  envers  eux  jusqu'a  la  bont6  et  meme  jusqu'i  la  d6licatesse.  On  peut  croire 
d'ailleurs,  qu'ils  avaient  le  souci  de  s"assurer  compktement  le  beau  r6le  aux  yeux  des 
puissances  neutres  dont  ils  ne  cessaient  pas  de  r6clamer  Vintervention".  60 
The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  American  Civil  War  and  the  Boer  War,  as  examples 
of  civil  wars,  in  which  the  recognition  of  belligerency  has  been  granted,  is  that  such 
recognition  brings  into  operation  the  body  of  the  laws  of  war,  as  if  the  war  is  between 
States.  This  concession,  on  the  part  of  the  established  Government  is  directed  especially  by 
pragmatic  motives,  in  order  to  save  the  life  and  mitigate  the  suffering  of  its  captured  and 
wounded  soldiers. 
It  appears,  that  the  first  beneficiaries  from  the  application  of  the  laws  of  war  are 
especially  the  soldiers  of  the  two  sides  since,  whenever  they  become  hors  de  combat,  either 
by  capture  or  injury,  they  will  benefit  from  the  status  of  POW's,  they  are  not  criminals. 
However,  it  seems  that  the  civilian  population  and  especially  those  who  are  labelled  as 
'disloyal'  citizens,  were  in  general  treated  with  harshness  and  severity.  Their  essential 
objects  of  livelihood  were  considered  as  military  targets.  They  were  (the  civilians) 
sometimes  interned  in  camps.  This  is  due  among  other  things  to  the  absence  of  specific  legal 
rules  as  to  the  treatment  of  civilians  in  case  of  customary  law  itself. 
2.  The  State  Practice  In  Cases  where  the  Recognition  of  Belligerency  has  not  Taken  Place 
It  appears  that  customary  international  law,  recognized  only  a  certain  minimum  standard 
of  protection  of  individuals  in  civil  wars,  only  when  they  are  foreigners.  However,  the 
59  C0100et  Mapteton,  who  was  the  principat  medicaL  Off  Icer  of  Ladysmith  hospitat,  wrote  In  this  regard: 
"I  have  seen  some  of  the  Boers,  as  I  am  in  charge  of  the  hospital  out  there.  I  have  several 
times  met  the  Boers  under  the  f  tag  of  truce  to  discuss  sundry  matters.  Those  I  have  seen  have 
all  been  very  pleasant  fellows  indeed  and  very  friendly.  They  have  behaved  extremely  well  to 
Our  wounded  prisoners,  attending  them  and  giving  them  everything  they  had  themselves.  All  our 
wounded  speak  highly  of  the  kindness  they  have  received  at  their  hands". 
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207 citizens  of  the  country,  either  in  peace  or  war  times  were  only  under  the  protection  of  their 
own  local  laws. 
Thus,  in  the  absence  of  the  recognition  of  belligerency,  international  law  affords  no 
protection  whatsoever  to  the  victims  of  internal  wars.  In  other  words,  sovereignty  gained 
the  upper  hand,  it  is  more  important  than  caring  for  those  who  arose  in  arms  against  their 
sovereign.  The  era  of  human  rights  was  not  yet  born. 
In  this  context,  Wilson  writing  in  1907  summed  up  the  British  practice  with  its  colonies 
in  this  way: 
"The  English  law  and  practice  maintaining  that  insurrection  in  a  dependent 
community'is  waging  war  against  the  Queen'  and  this  act  may  involve  the  annexation 
of  the  revolted  territory".  61 
Accordingly,  the  uprising  in  Manipur  in  1891  was  treated  as  a  crime,  to  which  criminal  law 
extended,  thereby  justifying  the  execution  of  the  revolt  leaders  as  criminals. 
State  practice  in  civil  wars,  where  the  recognition  of  belligerency  was  absent,  shows  that 
cruelty  was  the  order  of  the  day  and  that  there  is  little  evidence  that  other  States  considered 
their  behaviour  as  illegal. 
2.1.  The  Greek  War  of  Independence 
In  this  case,  Turkey  refused  to  recognize  any  status  to  the  rebels,  instead  considered  them 
as  mere  bandits  to  whom  the  most  cruelty  must  be  applied.  Siotis  notes  in  this  regard  that: 
"...  [T]oute  dtude  de  la  rdvolution  Gr6que  ne  peut  que  nous  amener  A  la  constatation 
que  pendant  le  d6roulement  des  hostilit6s  les  cruautds  les  plus  atroces  furent  commises 
de  part  et  d'autre  et  que  tout  souci  d'humaniser  le  conflit  6tait  compktement  absent 
des  intentions  des  responsables  de  la  conduite  de  la  guerre".  62 
In  this  respect,  a  Turkish  Commander  (Ibrahim  Pasha,  Pasha  of  the  Peloponnese)  declared 
in  1825: 
"I  am  determined  to  put  them  down  [the  rebels]  ....  everything  shall  be  destroyed  and 
"63  the  inhabitants  in  the  mountains  must  perish  whether  of  cold  or  hunger. 
This  means  that  he  clearly  did  not  distinguish  between  combatants  and  non-combatants,  the 
war  is  conducted  against  all  Greeks. 
However,  the  insurgents  also  behaved  in  the  same  fashion.  Thus,  when  they  captured 
Tripolitsa,  the  principal  inland  town  of  the  Peloponnese  in  October  1821.  First  hand  reports 
established  that: 
"..  [W]omen  and  children  were  frequently  tortured  before  they  were  murdered,  after 
the  Greeks  had  been  in  possession  of  the  city  for  forty-eight  hours,  they  deliberately 
collected  together  about  two  thousand  persons  of  every  age  and  sex  but  principally 
61G.  G.  Witson:  Insurgency  and  InternationaL  Maritime  Law.  1  AJIL.  1907,  p.  52. 
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208 women  and  children  and  led  them  to  a  ravine  in  the  nearest  mountain,  there  they 
were  all  murdered.  The  writer  saw  heaps  of  unburied  bones  bleached  by  the  winter 
"64  rains  and  summer  suns  in  passing  this  spot  two  years  after  the  catastrophe. 
This  means  in  fact,  that  the  rebels  in  reprisal  against  the  authorities  resorted  to  genocidal 
tactics. 
Thus,  in  order  to  secure  the  unity  of  the  Empire,  hence  its  sovereignty  over  Greece, 
human  lives  and  sufferings  were  not  considered  worthy  of  any  regard.  Law  was  totally 
absent  and  the  dictates  of  barbarity  prevailed.  The  racial  and  religious  hatred  between  the 
two  communities  seems  to  play  a  major  role  in  the  actions  mentioned  above. 
2.2.  The  Wars  of  Independence  in  Latin  America 
In  the  wars  of  independence  which  swept  Latin  America  in  the  beginning  of  the  19th 
century,  the  institution  of  belligerency  has  not  yet  been  developed.  This  meant,  among  other 
things,  that  there  were  no  legal  restrains  on  the  conduct  of  States  vis-&-vis  their  'disloyal' 
subjects,  who  took  up  arms  to  fight  their  sovereign.  In  fact,  there  is  abundant  evidence  that 
the  Spaniards  were  very  cruel  towards  the  insurgents  and  even  to  the  civilian  population. 
In  a  letter  by  Jose  de  Martin,  one  of  the  famous  Generals  of  the  Revolution  to  his  British 
friend,  the  Earl  of  Fife  on  December  9th,  1817,  wrote: 
"What  emotions  of  grief,  my  dear  friend,  must  excite  in  your  breast  the  destiny  of 
these  delightful  regions!  It  would  seem  as  if  the  Spaniards  were  bent  upon  making 
a  desert  of  them,  such  is  the  war  which  they  wage.  Neither  age  nor  sex  is  spared 
"65  from  the  sword  and  the  block.  They  have  laid  in  ashes  a  vast  number  of  places. 
He  then  added: 
"In  short,  speaking  without  any  prepositions,  they  appear  to  be  brutes  rather  than 
beings  imbued  with  reason.  I  can  verify  this  charge  by  the  conduct  of  the  Spanish 
captain  himself  who  held  the  supreme  command  in  this  province  [Chili].  A  few  days 
previous  to  my  entrance,  he  threatened  in  the  public  papers  to  inflict  upon  me  not 
the  sort  of  death  which  is  adapted  to  military  men,  but  the  gallows,  as  if  I  had  been 
a  highwayman".  66 
By  implication  then,  the  Spanish  despite  the  widespread  and  organized  revolt,  still  consider 
that  there  is  no  room  for  any  rules  of  the  laws  of  war,  therefore  the  insurgents,  the  civilians 
and  their  essential  objects  of  livelihood  were  all  lawful  targets  of  war. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  that  the  insurgents  were  largely  restrained  in  their  actions,  in 
this  respect  Jose  de  San  Martin  emphasised  in  the  same  letter  mentioned  above: 
...  I  might  have  retaliated,  instead  of  which  he  [the  Captain,  Commander  of  Chili]  as 
well  as  one  hundred  and  fifty  officers,  in  common  with  upwards  of  three  thousand 
men  that  were  taken  prisoner  have  been  treated  with  all  the  consideration  dictated 
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209 67  by  our  enlightened  age". 
This  statement  in  fact,  makes  it  clear  that  some  leaders  of  the  insurgents  at  least,  have 
embraced  the  ideas  of  Rousseau  and  Montesquieu.  They  understood  very  well  that  POW's 
are  not  criminals.  They  must  be  treated  in  accordance  with  the  dictates  of  humanity. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  that  the  insurgents  were  not  ready  to  accept  this  unequal 
position  for  long.  They  signalled  that  they  could  and  would  resort  to  reprisals.  In  this 
context,  Jose  de  San  Martin  made  clear  to  his  British  friend  that: 
"Your  Lordship  will  exclaim  that  this  is  fighting  on  very  unequal  terms.  Indeed,  the 
period  of  so  much  generosity  is  drawing  to  a  close.  If  they  continue  the  infamous 
system  of  warfare  which  all  along  they  have  been  pursuing,  your  Lordship  may  rest 
assured  that  to  m_y  great  sorrow,  I  shall  find  myself  under  the  dire  necessity  of 
sacrificing  them".  ' 
Despite  the  apparent  readiness  of  the  insurgents  to  apply  some  minimum  rules  of  custom 
and  usages  of  warfare,  the  Spanish  conduct  led  them  to  behave  in  some  instances  in  the 
same  manner,  especially  in  relation  to  captured  Government  soldiers.  In  fact,  in  a  letter 
dated  April  II  th,  1818  from  San  Martin,  the  General  summed  up  the  Spanish  conduct  of 
war  in  a  very  clear  fashion  thus: 
"No  one  is  ignorant  of  the  conduct  pursued  by  the  Spaniards  with  respect  to  their 
colonies,  and  of  the  kind  of  warfare  they  have  adopted  for  subjugating  them.  It  was 
reserved  to  the  age  of  liberality,  mental  improvement  and  philanthropy  to  witness 
the  horrors  committed  by  the  Spaniards  in  peaceful  America,  horrors  which  humanity 
5ýg 
shudders  to  contemplate  and  which  are  inflicted  upon  us  Americans  for  havin 
"6  incurred  the  crime  of  asserting  the  rights  of  the  general  will  of  her  inhabitants  . 
The  strange  thing  is  that  no  Government  has  condemned  the  Spanish  conduct  vis-i-vis  its 
colonies.  Thus,  Britain  which  was  the  leading  great  power  in  that  period  had  no  special 
reason,  it  seems  to  desire  the  independence  of  the  Spanish  colonies.  In  fact,  it  (Britain)  had 
tried  for  a  while  to  mediate  between  the  insurgents  and  Spain  in  order  to  keep  them  under 
Spanish  rule.  The  main  interest  of  Britain  was  to  keep  its  trade  with  South  America,  by 
protecting  its  shipping  fleet  from  seizure,  either  by  the  Spaniards  or  the  insurgents. 
The  question  of  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Latin  America  Republics  was 
decided  by  taking  into  consideration  only  those  interests;  there  was  no  protest  from  Britain 
that  Spain  was  violating  certain  customary  rules  of  war,  the  assumption  is  Britain  might 
have  thought  that  any  protest  is  a  violation  of  Spanish  sovereignty. 
2.3.  Other  Cases 
In  other  cases  of  civil  war,  where  the  recognition  of  belligerency  was  not  granted,  the 
evidence  suggests  that  cruelty  was  the  order  of  the  day,  no  restraints  seem  to  be  observed 
especially  by  the  established  Governments.  They  used  their  full  freedom  of  discretion  in 
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210 crushing  their  enemies.  Thus,  during  insurrection  in  Cuba  of  1869,  General  Balmacida,  the 
Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Government  forces,  made  killings,  assassinations  and  arson  the 
rules  of  his  fight  against  the  insurgents.  He,  in  fact,  signed  a  Proclamation  in  which  it  was 
expressly  stated: 
"Toute  m.  Ale  ag6  de  plus  15  qui  sera  rencontr6  hors  de  sa  derneure  pourra  etre  fusilld. 
Toute  maison,  habitde  ou  inhabit6e,  sur  la  quelle  le  drapeau  blance  ne  flottera  pas 
pourra  d  re  brul6e,  les  fernmes  pourront  etre  transport6es  de  force  &  Jiguani  oit  i 
Bayano". 
ýýO 
These  draconian  measures,  made  the  distinction  between  combatants  and  non-combatants 
obsolete,  since  the  war  is  mainly  waged  against  civilians.  Actually,  it  was  in  this  war  that 
the  use  of  concentration  camps  was  first  resorted  to. 
In  the  War  of  the  Commune  of  Paris,  Marx  wrote: 
"The  Commune  knew  that  its  opponents  cared  nothin  for  the  lives  of  the  people  of 
Paris,  but  cared  much  for  their  own  Paris  buildings". 
ý' 
In  this  bloody  war,  shooting  prisoners,  especially  by  the  established  Government,  was 
common  practice.  The  Communards  took  hostages  in  the  hope  of  protecting  their  captured 
soldiers.  However,  the  continuing  shooting  of  the  prisoners  by  the  Government  led  the 
insurgents  to  act  in  the  same  way. 
In  the  Russian  civil  war,  it  was  also  the  prisoners  who  suffered  most,  especially  at  the 
hands  of  the  'Whites',  i.  e.  the  insurgents.  Thus,  when  White  Officers  were  asked  about  the 
fate  of  captured  Government  soldiers,  their  usual  answer  was: 
"...  [W]e  kill  all  of  them  that  are  communists.  Jews  and  commissaries  stood  no  chance, 
of  course,  but  it  was  somewhat  difficult  to  ascertain  which  of  the  others  were 
communists.  The  system  generally  followed  was  this.  From  among  the  prisoners,  a 
man  who  looked  like  a  Bolshevik  was  led  aside,  accused  with  great  violence  of  being 
a  notorious  communist  but  afterwards  promised  that  his  life  would  be  spared  if  he 
gave  the  names  of  all  those  among  his  companions  whom  he  knew  to  belong  to  the 
Bolshevik  party.  This  ingenious  scheme  which  was  tried  on  more  than  one  victim  in 
each  part,  ý  of  prisoners  generally  resulted  in  a  number  of  Red  soldiers  being 
"2  executed. 
Thus,  the  insurgents  acted  without  any  mercy,  hatred  was  the  order  of  the  day. 
In  the  Spanish  Civil  War,  it  was  estimated  that  the  total  number  of  those  killed  on  both 
sides,  including  military  and  civilians  casualties,  was  approximately  1,200,000  of  whom 
450,000  soldiers  and  750,000  civilians.  73  It  seems  that  the  war  was  conducted  in  a  way 
which  ignores  all  restraints.  Maurras  stated,  in  this  respect: 
*L'anarchie  Espagnole  comme  l'anarchie  Russe  exprime  avec  clarit6  un  recul 
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211 incontestable  de  tout  ce  qui  a  distingu6  I'hornme  de  I'animal".  74 
The  terror  method  was  resorted  to  especially  by  the  insurgents,  in  order  to  neutralise  the 
masses,  which  sympathized  either  actively  or  passively  with  the  Republicans.  Conclusive 
evidence  of  the  deliberate  and  systematic  nature  of  Franco's  terror,  was  provided  by  a 
document  found  on  Manual  Canacha,  a  rebel  officer,  who  was  taken  prisoner.  It  was  a  copy 
of  a  circular  addressed  to  the  high  officers  in  the  insurgents  army;  it  stressed  the  following: 
"One  of  the  most  important  tasks,  if  victory  is  to  be  assured  is  the  undermining  of 
the  morale  of  the  enemy  troops.  The  army  has  neither  sufficient  troops  nor  sufficient 
arms  to  resist;  nevertheless  the  following  instructions  must  be  rigidly  observed: 
1.  In  order  to  safeguard  the  provinces  occupied,  it  is  essential  to  instal  a  certain 
salutary  terror  into  the  population.  When  the  troops  occupy  a  place,  the  local 
authorities  must  first  be  taught  a  lesson  in  respect;  if  they  have  escaped,  a  similar 
procedure  must  be  adopted  towards  the  members  of  their  families.  In  every  case  the 
methods  resorted  to  must  be  of  a  clearly  spectacular  and  impressive  character  and 
must  indicate  clearly  that  the  leaders  of  the  troops  ge  determined  to  proceed  with 
like  severety  against  anyone  who  offers  resistance". 
The  document  also  indicated  in  clear  terms  that: 
N.  Every  town  along  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat  and  all  the  areas  behind  the  enemy 
lines  are  to  be  considered  as  battle  zones.  In  this  connection,  no  differentiation  must 
be  observed  between  the  places  harbouring  enemy  troops  and  those  not  doing  so.  The 
panic  experienced  by  the  civilian  population  along  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat  is  a 
factor  of  the  utmost  importance  in  contributing  towards  the  demoralisation  of  the 
enemy  troops.  The  experience  of  the  last  world  war  shows  that  accidental  destruc  on 
of  enemy  hospitals  and  ambulances  has  a  highly  demoralising  effect  on  troops. 
96 
The  Circular  also  noted  that  after  the  entry  into  Madrid  of  the  rebel  forces,  and  in  any 
event  of  any  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  populace: 
"The  streets  should  be  put  under  fire  without  any  further  parleying.  In  view  of  the 
fact  that  large  numbers  of  women  are  fighting  on  the  enemy  side,  there  should  be  no 
distinction  of  sex  in  such  cases.  The  more  ruthless  we  are  the  more  quickly  shall  we 
quell  hostile  opposition  among  the  population,  the  more  quickly  will  the  restoration 
of  Spain  be  effected".  77 
It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  the  rebels,  behaved  in  such  a  way  that  no  distinction  whatsoever 
between  combatants  and  non-combatants  must  exist.  Total  war  is  the  only  way  to  success. 
Terror,  in  fact,  was  not  employed  to  defeat  the  Republicans,  but  to  destroy  them 
completely.  The  German  press  hailed  the  practice: 
"The  principle  of  modern  Nationalism  'no  opp  ent  but  shall  be  destroyed'  is 
thoroughly  carried  out  ... 
just  as  here  in  Germany 
74  Ch.  Maurras:  Vers  t'Espagne  cle  Franco.  Ed.  clu  Livre  moderne,  Paris  1943,  p.  74. 
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212 It  must  be  stressed  that  rebel  leaders  publicly  acknowledged  that  no  political  opponent 
should  be  spared.  All  have  to  die  in  order  to  win  the  war  effectively.  Thus,  the  famous 
broadcaster  and  Commander  of  the  second  division  of  the  rebel  army,  General  de  Llano, 
talked  openly  on  the  radio  of  that  intention.  On  July  23rd,  1936,  he  stated: 
"Our  brave  legionnaires  and  the  regulars  have  shown  the  red  cowards  what  it  means 
to  be  a  man.  And  incidentally  the  wives  of  the  Reds  too.  These  communist  and 
anarchist  women,  after  all  have  made  themselves  fair  game  by  their  doctrine  of  free 
love".  79 
In  another  broadcast,  on  August  19th,  1936,  he  insisted  that: 
"Eighty  percent  of  the  families  of  Andalusia  are  already  in  Mourning.  And  we  shall 
not  hesitate,  either  to  adopt  even  more  rigorous  measures  to  assure  OUT  ultimate 
Victory.  We  shall  go  on  to  the  bitter  end  and  continue  our  good  work  until  not  a 
single  marxist  is  left  in  Spain".  80 
When  Seville  was  occupied  by  the  rebels  this  policy  was  put  into  practice;  in  one  day  more 
than  9000  workers  were  slaughtered.  81 
Killing  of  prisoners  and  the  taking  of  hostages  was  resorted  to  on  both  sides.  In  this 
context,  a  Red  militiaman  told  Maurras  that: 
dtait  difficile,  sinon  impossible  de  faire  des  prisoniers  ceux  qui  nous  avaient 
mitraill6s  et  que  nous  venions  de  prendre  les  armes  A  la  main  avaient  W  condamn6s 
A  mort.  Le  flagrant  ddlit  ne  n6cessitait  pas  les  formalit6s  d'un  proc6s".  82 
The  Government,  however,  used  to  judge  those  accused  of  sedition  in  regular  courts,  but, 
later  in  the  war  the  practice  changed  "men  were  taken  from  their  houses,  hustled  into  cars 
"  83  and  thrown  out  and  shot  by  the  roadside  .  The  rebels  proclaimed  publicly  that  they 
resorted  to  the  taking  of  hostages.  In  this  respect,  General  de  Llano  stated  in  August  18th, 
1936: 
"I  have  to  inform  you  that  I  have  in  my  power  as  hostages  a  large  number  of  the 
relatives  of  the  Madrid  criminals  who  are  answerable  with  their  lives  for  our  friends 
in  the  capital".  84 
The  Spanish  Civil  War  shows  that  the  conflict  was  conducted  in  an  atrocious  inhumane 
fashion.  The  modern  methods  of  war  such  as  aerial  bombardment  helped  the  rebels 
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213 especially  to  apply  their  methods  of  terror.  One  explanation  of  such  a  state  of  affairs  lies 
in  the  fact  that  the  rebels  wished  to  destroy  and  put  to  an  end  all  the  19th  century  spirit 
which  was: 
"...  [L]iberal,  decadent,  masonic,  materialist  and  Frenchified  and  to  return  to 
impregnate  ourselves  with  the  spirit  of  the  sixteenth  century,  imperial,  heroic,  proud, 
Castilian  spiritual  mythical  and  chivalrous".  85 
One  sign  of  this  attitude  was  not  only  the  change  of  street  names  but  especially  on  the 
methods  of  war.  By  the  return  to  the  sixteenth  century  methods.  In  fact,  a  memorandum 
drawn  up  by  the  governing  body  of  Madrid  faculty  of  law  in  1936,  specifically  supports 
that  contention.  It  is  stated: 
"...  [C]ivil  wars  that  divide  families  and  breed  hatred  have  always  been  prosecuted  in 
a  particularly  ruthless  manner;  the  crimes  that  are  being  committed  by  the  insurgents 
at  the  moment,  however,  surpass  anything  that  has  hitherto  been  known  in  the  way 
of  organized  savagery.  The  spirit  that  inspires  these  retrograde  hordes  is  that  of  the 
Carlist  wars,  the  spirit  that  existed  under  the  fanatical  and  intolerant  regime  of 
Ferdinand  VIL  Once  more  the  Red  caps  of  the  'Requetes'  have  risen  up  from  the 
blood  drenched  Spanish  soil-  once  more  bishops  and  priests  play  their  part  in 
dastardly  guerrilla  warfare".  'o 
In  the  Spanish  Civil  War,  no  recognition  of  belligerency  took  place  which  meant  in  the  first 
place,  as  we  have  seen,  that  no  legal  standards  were  adhered  to  in  the  area  of  protection  of 
the  victims  of  war,  by  both  parties  and  especially  the  insurgents  who  behaved  like  an 
invading  army  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries.  All  the  legal  and  moral  standards 
of  the  enlightenment  were  forgotten. 
It  must  be  stressed  on  the  other  hand,  that  foreign  intervention,  especially  on  the  side  of 
the  insurgents,  was  decisive  in  their  victory.  in  fact,  it  helped  them  to  apply  their  ultra- 
modern  tactics  of  terror  in  a  perfect  way,  by  bombarding,  attacking  and  destroying  civilians 
and  civilian  objects  essential  for  their  livelihood. 
2.4.  Conclusions  as  to  State  Practice  In  Customary  International  Law  In  Cases  where  the 
Recognition  of  Belligerency  has  not  Taken  Place 
The  main  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  State  practice,  in  customary  international  law,  is  that 
the,  ideology  of  the  State  and  sovereignty  gained  the  upper  hand.  That  law  had  no  place  for 
the  protection  of  those  who  take  arms  against  their  sovereign.  Protection  was  reserved  for 
entities  (States)  rather  than  individuals,  the  latter  were  mere  objects,  in  the  sense  that  they 
have  no  rights  directly  enjoyable  under  the  law  (international  law),  their  relation  with  their 
State  is  the  business  of  the  State  alone.  The  idea  that  the  individual  has  a  legitimate  right 
to  be  protected  on  his  life  and  property,  on  the  international  plane,  irrespective  of  his 
nationality  had  to  wait  until  the  birth  of  the  concept  of  human  rights. 
On  the  level  of  humanitarian  law,  this  meant  that  States  accepted  the  protection  of 
victims  of  war  only  in  their  mutual  wars.  The  ideology  of  State  and  sovereignty  required 
85H.  Thomas:  The  Spanish  Civil  War.  Hamfsh  Hamilton,  3rd  ed..  London,  1977,  p.  509. 
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214 that  stand;  those  who  fight  for  their  sovereign  must  be  protected  when  they  fall  into  enemy 
hands.  Thus,  the  enlightenment's  production  in  the  field  of  humanitarianism  were  exploited 
for  the  benefit  of  those  who  obey  the  State  and  not  for  those  who  challenge  its  authority. 
Thus,  in  the  absence  of  the  recognition  of  belligerency  it  seems  that  the  parties  behaved 
as  though  no  restraints  existed.  This  meant  that  the  defenceless  civilian  population 
particularly  was  fair  game  between  the  two  parties,  the  struggle  for  power  seems  to 
overshadow  any  other  consideration. 
It  is  also  to  be  observed  that  foreign  assistance,  especially  to  insurgents,  led  the  rebels, 
as  the  Russian  and  particularly  the  Spanish  case  show,  to  adopt  strategies  of  total  warfare 
with  its  inevitable  horrendous  consequences  to  civilians  and  civilian  objects. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Spanish  Civil  War  shows  the  rebels  had  an  organized  and 
disciplined  armed  forces,  unlike  the  Government  forces  who  were  essentially  militia  units 
which: 
"...  [W]ith  a  few  exceptions  had  no  staff  of  officers  they  would  trust  to  lead  P  em  into 
the  field  and  were  for  the  most  part  ignorant  of  the  organization  of  war". 
Even  with  that  advantage,  the  insurgents  seem  to  have  acted  on  the  premise  that,  in  order 
to  conduct  an  effective  war,  civilians  must  be  attacked.  They  used  their  organizational  skills 
in  that  direction.  The  reason  would  seem  to  be  that  they  wanted  to  exterminate  any  leftist 
opposition,  so  when  they  came  to  power,  their  authority  would  never  be  challenged. 
D.  Can  the  Laws  of  War  Apply  in  Situations  of  Civil  Wars  then  the  Recognition  of 
Belligerency  Is  Absent 
It  must  be  indicated  that  on  the  level  of  doctrine,  some  writers  have  insisted  that  even  when 
the  recognition  of  belligerency  is  absent,  the  laws  of  war  and  especially  those  of  its  rules 
relating  to  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  war  must  be  applied.  Their  justification, 
however,  differs.  It  was  Vattel,  who  was  the  first  international  lawyer  to  try  to  argue  for 
the  extension  of  the  laws  of  war  to  internal  conflicts.  He  maintained  that  civil  war  gives  rise 
to  two  independent  parties  within  the  Nation  who  must  be  considered  as  forming  two 
political  bodies,  in  other  words,  as  two  separate  States.  88 
The  implication  is  that  in  order  to  be  considered  like  a  war  between  States,  the  civil  war 
must  have  the  real  characteristics  of  those  wars  (between  States)  in  intensity  and  magnitude. 
He  then  argued  that  once  the  situation  had  attained  the  level  described  above: 
"It  is  perfectly  clear  that  the  established  laws  of  war,  those  principles  of  humanity, 
forbearance,  truthfulness  and  honour  which  we  have  earlier  laid  down  should  be 
observed  on  both  sides  in  a  civil  war.  The  same  reasons  which  make  those  laws  of 
obligation  between  State  and  State  render  them  equally  necessary  and  even  more  so 
in  the  unfortunate  event  when  two  determined  parties  struggle  for  the  Possession  of 
their  common  fatherland".  89 
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215 Thus,  it  seems  that  pragmatism,  among  other  things,  has  led  Vattel  to  this  conclusion,  since 
cruelty  and  maltreatment  will  result  in  cutting  all  bonds  between  the  warring  factions  and 
hence  makes  the  chances  of  a  speedy  peace  very  remote.  The  spirit  of  vengeance  will  grow 
and  reconciliation  will  be  very  hard  to  achieve. 
In  other  words,  political  wisdom  and  also  humanity,  demand  that  either  in  internal  or 
international  wars,  the  maxims  and  dictates  of  humanity  must  be  respected  in  the  conduct 
of  the  war.  However,  it  seems  that  Vattel's  view  and  advice  has  not  been  acted  upon  in  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  cases  of  civil  wars  which  took  place  at  that  time  and  afterwards. 
States  choose  to  stick  to  the  freedom  of  discretion  in  dealing  with  their  enemies,  which 
sovereignty  affords  them. 
In  the  modern  era,  some  international  lawyers,  continue  to  stress,  that  there  is  a  minimum 
standard  which  emerges  from  the  customary  law  of  war  which  must  be  respected,  in  all 
conflicts,  irrespective  of  their  nature  or  formal  characterization.  McDougal  and  Florentino 
argued  that: 
"...  [B]ecause  the  law  of  war  is  designed  for  the  benefit  of  all  mankind  and  not  merely 
of  certain  belligerents,  most  observers  agree  further  that  this  most  basic  policy  of 
minimum  unnecessary  destruction  of  values  applies  to  all  forms  of  hostilities, 
irrespective  of  the  characterization  of  the  resort  to  violence  as  lawful  or  unlawful, 
of  the  formal  character  of  one  or  the  other  participants  as  an  intra-state  rebel  group 
or  unrecognised  Government  or  an  international  organization,  of  the  intensity  of  the 
violence  and  its  extension  in  time  and  space  and  of  recognition  or  non-recognition 
of  the  existence  of  a  technical  state  of  war".  90 
However,  the  main  criticism  of  this  approach,  in  my  opinion,  is  that  it  is  built  on  the 
assumption  that  the  laws  of  war  are  designed  for  the  benefit  of  all  mankind,  which  is  not 
true.  Laws  of  war  were  designed  for  those  who  fight  only  for  the  State,  in  traditional 
international  law.  The  reason  of  State  sovereignty  and  its  protection  favoured  that  only 
when  the  recognition  of  belligerency  takes  place  can  those  laws  be  extended  to  internal 
conflicts,  in  all  other  cases  of  civil  wars,  sovereignty  takes  precedence. 
On  the  other  hand,  Kalshoven  has  also  tried  to  indicate  that  customary  rules  of  warfare 
aPply  to  civil  wars.  According  to  him: 
"It  would  be  very  strange  indeed  if  completely  different  codes  of  conduct  or 
standards  of  civilization  would  apply  according  as  the  conflict  would  have  to  be 
classified  as  an  international  or  non  -  inte  rnational.  "91 
He  then  went  on  to  suggest  that: 
"Notwithstanding  this  sharp  difference  [between  civil  and  international  wars]  in  legal 
regimes  as  they  appear  from  the  written  instruments,  it  would  be  astonishing  indeed 
to  find  that  the  underlying  custom  I,  codes  of  conduct  applicable  in  the  two  situations 
really  have  nothing  in  common.  "9 
90 
N-S.  McDougat  and  P.  Ftorentino:  Principtes  of  the  Law  of  War.  67  YLJ,  1958,  pp.  827-828. 
91 
OP-  Cit.,  supra.  n.  2,  p.  272. 
92  lbid,  p.  273. 
216 He  supported  his  contention  by  noting  first  that  the  Lieber  code  was  written  for  a  civil  war 
situation,  despite  all  its  contents  being  drawn  from  the  rules  which  apply  between  States, 
and  secondly  by  concentrating  on  some  general  pronouncements,  made  by  Britain  in  the 
first  Peace  Conference  in  The  Hague  in  1899,  and  some  pronouncements  by  the  US 
concerning  the  Protocol  of  1925  Concerning  the  Use  of  Gas.  93  Lastly  Cassese  indicated  that: 
"As  to  customary  international  law  very  few  rules  concerning  inter-State  wars  have 
evolved  in  such  a  way  as  to  also  cover  internal  conflicts.  Mption  can  be  made  of 
some  general  norms  concerning  the  protection  of  civilians  W.  9 
He  then  cites  these  rules  which  are:  The  rule  prohibiting  attacks  upon  civilian  population, 
the  principle  whereby  military  objectives  only  be  can  attacked,  and  the  rule  providing  that 
reasonable  care  must  be  taken  in  attacking  military  objectives  so  that  through  carelessness 
95  a  civilian  population  in  the  neighbourhood  is  not  bombed. 
However,  it  seems  to  me,  and  despite  the  manifest  humanitarian  motives  behind  the 
statements  and  opinions  made  above,  it  is  very  difficult  to  suggest,  and  especially  difficult 
to  prove  that  States  which  were  involved  in  civil  wars  in  which  no  recognition  of 
belligerency  had  taken  place,  behaved  or  considered  themselves  as  restricted  in  their  actions 
vis-A-vis  their  opponents,  by  any  legal  standards,  or  some  general  rules  of  customary 
international  law. 
A  strict  approach,  in  fact,  suggests  that  in  customary  international  law  the  laws  of  war 
apply  only  in  cases  of  the  recognition  of  belligerency.  Demands  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention,  in  the  absence  of  such  recognition,  repulse  any  claim  to  treat  the  insurgents 
according  to  the  customary  rules  of  warfare.  Hence  the  claims  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention  overrode  the  claims  of  humanity  and  moderation  in  these  circumstances. 
Furthermore,  there  is  no  practice  which  suggests  that  States  have  acted  in  any  way  which 
indicates  that  they  had  accepted  that  there  were  some  legal  constraints  on  their  actions  by 
virtue  of  customary  international  law.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  evidence  to  suggest  the 
opposite,  in  the  sense  that  established  Governments  saw  themselves  as  free  from  any  legal 
restraints  in  their  actions  against  their  opponents.  Thus,  when  in  1912  the  ICRC 
93  Thus,  when  discussing  the  prohibition  of  dum  dum  buttets,  the  main  objections  came  from  Britain. 
Its  representative  maintained  that  the  buttets  had  been  found  to  constitute  an  indispensabte  means 
of  stopping  the  attack  of  the  indigenous  enemy  (in  the  British  Indies).  Katshoven  suggested  that: 
...  ECItearty  the  retevance  of  experiences  gained  in  the  fnternat  mititary  actions  In  the 
Indies  for  the  debate  on  prohibition  of  the  use  of  certain  buttets  in  an  International,  war  was 
never  doubted  by  this  representative". 
lbid,  p.  275.  See  atso  the  view  of  the  US  concerning  the  1925  Protocot  on  the  Prohibition  of  the  Use 
of  Gas,  is  that  the  protocoL  cannot  be  used  to  prohibit  the  use  of  gas  by  the  police.  Kalshoven 
comments  that: 
"The  distinction  made  here  by  the  USA  is  between  use  in  war  and  use  for  potice  purposes,  not 
between  internaL  or  internationat  confLicts". 
Ibid.  p.  276. 
94 
A.  Cassese:  A  Tentative  Appraisat  of  the  Otd  and  the  New  Humanitarian  Law  of  Armed  Conftict,  in 
Cassese  (ed.  ):  The  New  Humanitarian  Law  of  Armed  Conftict.  Ed.  Scientific&  S.  R.  L.,  Naptes,  1979, 
p.  490. 
95  Ibid. 
217 Conference,  an  US  motion  was  proposed  for  the  possibility  for  Red  Cross  societies  to  extend 
their  assistance  and  relief  to  the  wounded  and  sick  and  generally  to  all  non-combatants  in 
situations  of  civil  war,  96  to  the  warring  factions.  Despite  the  plain  humanitarian  sense  of 
this  proposition,  it  was  rejected  out  of  hand  by  the  Russian  delegate,  General  Yermolov, 
who  insisted  that: 
"I  consider,  in  addition  that  the  Red  Cross  societies  should  have  no  duty  towards 
insurgents  or  bands  of  revolutionaries  whom  the  laws  of  my  country  regarded  as 
criminals".  97 
Schl6gel  observed  that: 
"This  statement  met  with  such  general  aýý 
mere  exchange  of  views  on  the  subject". 
proval  that  it  was  not  possible  to  have  a 
This  plainly  means  that  there  is  no  feeling  whatsoever  that  States  are  bound  by  any  rules 
in  dealing  with  their  opponents. 
Again  it  seems  to  me  that  in  the  absence  of  the  recognition  of  belligerency,  civil  wars 
functioned  largely  beyond  international  legal  rules,  and  even  when  some  instances  of  respect 
of  some  rules  of  war  can  be  traced  in  a  few  cases  of  civil  wars,  usually  the  motive  was 
humanitarian  or  more  precisely  mere  pragmatism,  but  never  under  the  sense  of  legal 
obligation. 
Thus,  in  the  Spanish  Civil  War  which  witnessed  many  acts  of  cruelty  and  inhumanity  as 
we  have  seen  above.  Nevertheless,  it  witnessed  some  instances  of  apparent  compliance  with 
the  basic  rules  of  war,  such  as  the  treatment  on  both  sides  of  each  other's  captives  as  POW's, 
but  this  practice  has  never  been  acted  upon  as  emanating  from  legal  obligations  since  many 
flagrant  violations  of  the  rights  of  the  POW  had  occurred  on  a  large  scale. 
Despite  the  claim  of  the  Republicans  that  they  would  treat  POW's  in  accordance  with 
their  military  code,  and  the  claims  of  the  Nationalists  that  they  will  respect  the  laws  of  war: 
"It  was  reported  that  the  Republicans  still  execute  POW's,  who  were  members  of 
fascist  organizations  or  of  the  civil  guard.  Prisoners  who  could  convince  their 
Republican  captors  that  they  had  been  forced  to  fight  for  the  Nationalists  against 
their  will  were  enrolled  in  the  Republican  Army".  99 
96  The  American  motion  suggested  in  fact  that: 
116.  Such  Red  Cross  societies  of  other  countries  extending  their  assistance  in  time  of  such 
disturbances  shalt  confine  their  aid  strictly  to  the  care  and  nursing  of  the  sick  and  wounded, 
as  provided  In  the  Geneva  Conventions  and  in  The  Hague  Conventions  for  the  adaptation  to  naval 
war  of  the  principles  of  the  Geneva  Convention,  or  to  relieving  the  suffering  of  non- 
combatants,  inhabitants  of  the  country  and  such  societies  shall  render  such  aid  and  assistance 
with  the  utmost  impartiality  as  between  the  opposing  factions,  etc.  " 
Cited  by  A.  SchtbgeL:  Civil,  War.  IRRC,  March  1970,  p.  124. 
971bid, 
p.  125. 
981bid. 
99  A.  Van  Wyaen  Thomas  arxi  A.  J.  Thomas  Jr.:  The  Civit  War  fn  Spafn,  fn  Fatk  (ed.  ),  op.  cft  ch  pter  2,  n.  8,  p.  125.  ..  a 
218 Nationalists  also,  as  we  have  seen,  practised  outright  execution  of  captured  Republican 
soldiers. 
Thus,  it  appears  that  the  parties  to  the  civil  war,  did  see  themselves  as  free  from  any  legal 
bounds  when  dealing  with  their  enemies.  Their  local  law  prevailed  over  any  other 
consideration,  and  that  law  is  always  severe  towards  all  those  who  challenge  the  authority 
and  legitimacy  of  the  established  order. 
The  conclusion  is  that  in  the  absence  of  the  recognition  of  belligerency,  there  is  no 
evidence  that  States  feel  that  they  are  bound  by  any  other  rules,  other  than  the  dictates  of 
sovereignty,  even  the  general  principles  of  the  laws  of  war,  such  as  the  protection  of 
combatants,  human  treatment  of  POW's  and  the  caring  for  the  sick  and  wounded  can  hardly 
be  said  to  be  applicable  to  civil  wars  without  the  consent  of  the  established  Government. 
This  is  a  sad  state  of  affairs  but  it  reflects  what  the  international  community  believes  to 
be  right,  since  the  logic  of  absolute  sovereignty  demands  it.  This  State  of  affairs  also 
reflects  that  in  a  decentralised  world  when  no  common  ethics  are  shared  by  its  components 
the  claims  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  will  be  held  by  the  State  to  be  the  most 
important  thing  to  care  about. 
However,  the  tragic  fact  is  that  when  recognition  of  belligerency  is  not  in  use  any  longer 
and  in  the  absence  of  customary  rules  applicable  to  internal  wars,  the  only  rule  which 
regulates  the  conduct  of  the  State  towards  its  citizens  is  sovereignty,  absolute  sovereignty. 
This  situation  coupled  with  the  tragic  events  of  the  Spanish  civil  war  and  World  War  11, 
clearly  demonstrated,  in  general,  the  need  for  some  kind  of  international  regulation  to 
render  such  conflicts  more  humane.  The  advent  of  the  UN  with  its  emphasises  on  human 
rights  has  also  accentuated  that  need  for  regulation.  All  these  elements  have  led  to  the  first 
international  attempt  at  regulation  in  the  form  of  common  Article  3,  which  will  be  the 
subject  of  the  next  section. 
Section  IT:  The  Protection  of  the  Victims  of  War  In  Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Convention 
The  non-recourse  of  States  to  the  recognition  of  belligerency  which  was  the  only  door 
through  which  the  rules  of  warfare  may  apply  to  civil  wars.  The  horrors  of  the  Spanish 
Civil  War  especially  highlighted  the  terrible  sufferings  of  the  civilian  population.  These 
elements  coupled  with  the  humanitarian  spirit  that  arose  after  the  Second  World  War,  as  a 
reaction  to  the  terrible  crimes  committed  by  the  Nazis  against  the  civilians,  the  POW's  and 
even  against  a  section  of  the  German  population  itself,  and  which  were  exposed  fully  by 
the  judgments  of  the  Tokyo  and  Nuremberg  tribunals. 
Moreover,  the  inclusion  of  the  concept  of  human  rights  in  the  UN  Charter  and  especially 
the  efforts  of  the  ICRC  to  induce  States  to  agree  to  some  kind  of  regulation  of  internal 
conflicts.  All  these  factors  have  in  different  degrees  influenced  States  to  try  to  regulate 
internal  conflict. 
However,  it  must  be  noted  that  although,  States  reluctantly  accepted  the  principle  of 
regulation  of  internal  conflicts  in  the  context  of  an  international  instrument,  they  tried  (at 
least  the  majority)  to  reduce  its  significance  by  several  means.  One  was  to  Minimise  the 
kind  of  substantive  rules  that  are  to  be  applied,  in  line  with  the  requirements  of  the 
protection  of  their  sovereignty  from  major  incursion.  This  occurred  in  the  Diplomatic 
219 Conference  of  1949  and  again  in  the  subsequent  application  of  that  Article. 
A.  The  Travaux  Pr6paratolres  of  the  Diplomatic  Conference  of  1949  and  the  Protection 
of  the  Victims  of  Internal  Wars 
The  need  for  adequate  humanitarian  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars  had  been 
expressed  especially  in  the  ICRC  conferences  long  before  1949,  i.  e.,  as  beginning  from  1921 
(at  the  Xth  Conference),  the  Conference  adopted  Resolution  XIV,  100  which  was  wholly 
concerned  with  the  question  of  relief  in  the  circumstances  of  civil  wars.  At  the  XVIth 
Conference  in  London,  a  very  important  Resolution  (XIV)101  dealt  with  the  role  and 
activity  of  the  Red  Cross  in  times  of  civil  war.  The  Conference  by  that  resolution  requested 
the  ICRC  and  the  national  Red  Cross  societies  to  endeavour  to  obtain  the  application  of  the 
'humanitarian  principles'  contained  in  the  1929  Geneva  Convention  and  the  Xth  Hague 
Convention  of  1907  relating  to  the  Treatment  of  the  Wounded  and  the  Sick,  the  POW  and 
the  Protection  and  Safety  of  Medical  Personnel.  The  Resolution  also  demanded  the 
protection  and  respect  of  life  and  liberty  of  non-combatants,  especially  children. 
This  Resolution,  it  must  be  noted,  was  adopted  when  the  Spanish  Civil  War  was  raging 
with  all  its  cruelties,  hence,  it  shows  clearly  the  progress  made  in  the  public  opinion,  in  the 
sense  that  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  cannot  bar  the  protection  of  human  beings  even 
in  internal  conflicts. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  Conference  of  1938  laid  the  first  step  toward 
Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Convention.  The  Second  World  War  prevented  the  holding  of  the 
Diplomatic  Conference  that  was  to  revise  the  Geneva  Convention  of  1929.  However,  after 
the  war,  the  atmosphere  was  appropriate  for  a  new  effort  for  the  revision  and  development 
of  humanitarian  law  in  general.  Three  conferences102  took  place  between  1946  and  1948  and 
produced  the  famous  Article  2/4,  which  became,  after  a  heated  and  prolonged  discussion 
at  the  Diplomatic  Conference  of  1949,  the  Common  Article  3. 
The  general  view  of  these  conferences  was  that  the  conventions  which  should  be  adopted 
must  apply  to  internal  as  well  as  international  conflicts.  The  Diplomatic  Conference  of  1949 
shows  that  the  hopes  of  the  ICRC,  were  ahead  of  their  time.  They  neglected  the  fact  that 
States,  both  old  and  new,  still  hold  to  their  sovereignty  and  to  non-  intervention  in  their 
internal  affairs.  Hence,  Draft  Article  2/4,  which  in  general  envisaged  the  application  of  the 
whole  Convention  to  civil  wars,  was  quickly  the  object  of  a  vigorous  attack.  Sovereignty 
was  the  essential  element  of  the  argument.  Rosemary  Abi-Saab  rightly  observed  that: 
"Les  thýses  en  presence  tournent  autour  d'un  point  essentiel,  celui  du  principe  de  la 
souverainet6  de  I'Etat.  L'attitude  adopt6e  A  Ngard  de  ce  point  fondamental 
d6terminera  I'attitude  aussi  bien  quant  au  champ  d'application  des  Conventions  et  de 
la  d6finition  du  conflit  arm6  de  caract6re  non-international  que  quand  aux  modalit6s 
100  For  the  text  of  the  Resolution  (XIV),  see  CGEDHL  (Geneva  24  May-12  June  1971,  V.  Protection  of 
Victims  of  Non-  International  Conflicts  Submitted  by  the  ICRC),  Geneva,  January  1971,  Annex  VI,  p.  013. 
lollbid, 
Amex  VII,  pp.  15-16. 
102  These  conferences  were:  (1)  Pretiminary  Conference  of  the  Nationat  Societies  of  the  Red  Cross, 
1946.  (if)  Conference  of  Goverment  Experts  1947;  and  (Iff)  The  XVII  Internationat  Conference  of  the 
Red  Cross  (StockhoLm  1948). 
220 d'application  et  au  contenu  de  la  riglementation  proposie".  103 
The  discussions  at  the  Diplomatic  Conference  revealed  to  a  large  extent  the  correctness  of 
that  observation.  Thus,  in  the  first  meeting  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  April  26th,  1949,  the 
French  delegate  noted  concerning  Draft  Article  2/4  that: 
"The  Conference  at  Stockholm  had  been  mainly  concerned  with  the  protection  of  the 
individual  but  it  was  also  necessary  not  to  lose  sight  of  the  rights  of  the  States".  104 
He,  in  fact,  stressed  that  it  was  inconceivable  to  carry  the  protection  of  the  individuals  to 
the  point  of  sacrificing  the  rights  of  States.  Moreover,  the  French  delegate,  with  the 
blessing  of  the  majority  of  the  delegates  present  in  Geneva,  implicitly  placed  the  rights  of 
States  before  human  rights  in  the  context  of  internal  conflicts.  This  means  that  when 
individuals  rise  in  arms  against  their  own  Governments,  they  should  expect  that  the  rights 
of  their  Government  override  their  individual  rights  as  human  beings. 
However,  it  seems  important  to  see  how  each  category  of  the  victims  of  internal  conflicts 
has  been  treated  by  the  Conference.  This  will  show  how  the  principles  of  sovereignty  and 
non-intervention  have  been  used  to  limit  the  extension  of  humanitarian  rules  to  those 
victims. 
1.  The  POW 
The  Greek  delegate  led  the  opposition  to  the  proposal  of  the  ICRC  to  extend  the  POW  status 
to  captured  insurgents.  His  view,  in  fact,  reflects  what  a  State  which  has  just  finished  a 
drama  of  a  civil  war  thinks  about  the  fate  of  its  captured  enemies.  He  stressed  that: 
"The  adoption  of  the  text  as  at  present  [Draft  Article  2/4]  would  entail  the  application 
to  the  latter  'The  rebels'  of  the  provisions  of  Articles  74  and  100  of  the  POW 
Convention.  The  rebels  could  not,  therefore,  be  charged  with  crimes  against  common 
law  committed  before  their  arrest  and  they  would  be  automatically  granted  a  pardon 
at  the  end  of  the  disturbances.  Furthermore,  they  could  claim  the  protection  of  a 
protecting  power.  The  possibility  of  such  protection  might  incite  political  opponents 
to  take  up  arms  against  a  legitimate  Government".  105 
Captured  insurgents  then,  were  singled  out  as  the  category  which  needs  no  international 
protection,  States  it  seems  were  not  prepared  to  treat  insurgents  as  a  legitimate  and  bona 
fide  belligerents.  The  US  delegate,  in  fact,  stressed  that: 
"...  [E]very  Government  had  a  right  to  put  down  rebellion  within  its  borders  and  to 
punish  the  insurgents  in  accordance  with  its  penal  laws  ".  106 
Other  delegations  suggested  that  the  need  for  humane  treatment  for  captured  insurgents  did 
103R.  Abi-Saab,  op.  cit.,  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  3,  n.  159,  p.  54. 
104  Final  Records  of  the  Diplomatic  Conference  of  Geneva,  1949,  Vot.  2,  Section  B,  Federal  Political 
Dept.,  Bern,  1950,  p.  10. 
105 
Ibid,  p.  11. 
106  lbid,  p.  12. 
221 not  entail  the  application  of  the  POW  status,  to  them  local  penal  law  can  guarantee  such 
humane  treatment  in  a  very  effective  way.  107 
Burma  in  fact,  went  even  further.  Its  representative,  General  Oung  stressed  that: 
"The  proposed  Convention  should  not  give  legal  status  to  insurgents  who  sought  by 
undemocratic  methods  to  overthrow  a  legally  constituted  Government  by  force  of 
arms".  108 
In  other  words,  only  the  deletion  of  any  reference  to  civil  wars  would  satisfy  the 
requirements  of  sovereignty.  The  argument  of  sovereignty,  at  least  implicity,  was  used  to 
deny  any  legal  status  or  any  international  regulation  of  the  most  hated  category  of  the 
victims  of  internal  wars. 
2.  The  Civilian  Population 
The  British  delegate  led  the  attack  against  the  Civilian  Convention  by  pointing  out  that: 
"Careful  consideration  of  the  provisions  of  the  Convention  concerning  civilians,  in 
particular,  left  little  room  for  doubt  that  their  application  to  civil  wars  would  strike 
at  the  root  of  national  sovereignty  and  endanger  national  security".  109  - 
The  problem  is  that  the  Civilian  Convention  was  essentially  based  on  the  concepts  of 
nationality  and  occupation.  These  concepts  are  really  strange  in  the  case  of  civil  wars,  since 
the  civilian  population  holds  the  nationality  of  one  State  in  the  whole  territory,  even  in  that 
portion  which  is  under  the  control  of  the  insurgents.  Thus,  the  established  Government  is 
not  expected  to  apply  different  sets  of  laws  to  its  nationals. 
Moreover,  occupation  by  the  insurgents  of  certain  portions  of  territory.  even  if  effective, 
can  hardly  be  admitted  by  the  established  Government  as  analogous  to  occupation  by  a 
foreign  power,  since  the  question  of  the  applicable  law  will  raise  fundamental  difficulties 
and  serious  problems  in  connection  with  the  concept  of  sovereignty  of  which  the  established 
Government  claims  to  be  the  sole  holder. 
The  Canadian  delegate  expressed  the  difficulties  described  above  in  this  manner: 
"The  introduction  of  the  fourth  paragraph  into  Article  2  seemed  even  more 
impossible  in  the  case  of  the  civilian  convention.  Here  the  persons  protected  were 
essentially  enemy  nationals  residing  in  the  country.  It  would  be  inconceivable  to 
suggest  that  even  in  a  large-scale  civil  war  supporters  of  the  rebels  could  justify 
demands  from  the  lawful  Government  that  they  be  treated  as  protected  persons  under 
the  civilian  convention,  although  they  were  not  living  in  the  part  of  the  country 
controlled  by  the  rebels.  No  lawful  Government  would  be  able  to  quell  a  rebellion 
under  these  circumstances".  '  10 
It  appears  then  that  the  status  of  the  captured  insurgents  and  the  civilians,  as  the  main 
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222 victims  of  internal  wars  were  not  considered  worthy  of  complete  protection  (at  least  at  the 
beginning  of  the  discussion  of  Draft  Article  2/4).  In  my  view,  the  reason  of  the  concept  of 
sovereignty  is  still  seen  by  a  large  number  of  States  to  exclude  the  protection  of  those 
individuals  who  take  up  arms  against  their  lawful  Government  or  those  individuals  among 
the  civilian  population  who  support  them. 
Individuals  who  do  not  obey  the  lawful  Government  cannot  expect  any  better  protection 
than  that  provided  in  the  laws  promulgated  by  the  Government  which  they  are  fighting. 
Paradoxically,  the  Nuremburg  judgment  did  not  influence  the  attitude  of  States  on  the 
particular  point  of  the  'protection  of  the  civilians'.  Its  effect  (of  the  judgment)  is  obvious 
in  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention  as  a  whole.  However,  that  convention  was  to  be  applied 
only  in  the  context  of  international  wars.  Sovereignty  it  seems  was  stronger  than  the 
humanitarian  spirit  of  the  Nuremburg  judgment  in  the  context  of  civil  wars. 
The  preliminary  opposition  described  above  to  the  Draft  Article  2/4  submitted  by  the 
ICRC,  opened  the  way  for  the  establishment  of  two  working  groups,  with  the  express 
mission  of  drafting  a  new  common  draft  Article  2/4,  which  would  satisfy  the  majority  of 
States  present  at  the  Conference. 
In  Chapter  III,  I  dealt  with  the  work  of  these  two  groups  in  relation  to  the  question  of 
the  definition  of  civil  wars.  Here  I  will  concentrate  on  their  contribution,  if  any,  to  the 
protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars. 
3.  The  First  Working  Group  and  Its  Work 
In  its  first  new  Draft  (Article  2/4),  the  working  group  (the  first)  accepted  the  idea  of  the 
application  of  the  whole  convention  to  civil  wars  on  two  important  conditions.  First,  it 
raised,  as  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  111,  the  thresholds  of  the  definition  of  civil  wars,  so  they 
will  in  effect  resemble  international  wars.  Secondly,  the  institution  of  the  protecting  power 
will  not  operate  automatically,  only  special  agreements  between  the  belligerent  parties  will 
bring  it  into  operation.  Thus,  according  to  this  version,  the  victims  of  internal  wars  will 
enjoy  the  same  treatment  accorded  in  the  case  of  international  conflicts. 
However,  many  delegations  were  not  satisfied  with  that  solution,  among  them  being  the 
French  delegate.  Although,  he  was  in  support  of  the  extension  of  the  humanitarian 
principles  of  the  convention  to  internal  conflicts,  he  felt  that: 
"It  was  impossible  to  extend  all  the  clauses  of  the  convention  to  internal  confligls. 
This  impossibility  was  particularly  obvious  in  the  case  of  the  civilian  convention".  "' 
He  was  strongly  supported  by  the  British'  12  and  the  Burmese  delegates  who  were  unable  to 
accept  the  proposition  of  the  working  group.  113  On  the  other  hand,  the  Soviet  Union 
expressed  the  view  of  the  minority  when  its  representative  stated  that  the  proposed  draft 
"rendered  still  more  difficult  the  application  of  the  convention  to  cases  of  armed  conflict 
"'Ibid, 
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223 not  of  an  international  character".  114 
In  the  light  of  these  divergent  positions,  the  same  working  group  was  directed  to  draw 
up  a  new  Draft  Article  2/4.  The  second  Draft  distinguished  between  two  kinds  of  non- 
international  armed  conflicts  to  which  different  rules  would  apply.  The  first  kind  resembles 
international  wars,  in  this  case,  the  Conventions  on  POW  and  the  Sick  and  Wounded  would 
be  applicable  on  the  strict  condition  of  reciprocity. 
In  cases  of  internal  conflicts,  which  do  not  attain  the  intensity  of  the  first  kind,  the 
conventions  or  part  of  them  can  be  applied  only  through  special  agreements  failing  the 
conclusion  of  such  agreements.  The  belligerents  are  directed  to  conform  to  the  humanitarian 
principles  of  those  conventions. 
Concerning  the  civilian  conventions,  the  second  Draft  contained  a  completely  new 
article,  115  according  to  which  the  convention  or  part  would  be  applicable  only  through 
special  agreements  whatever  the  intensity  of  the  war. 
Thus,  in  effect,  even  in  cases  of  major  civil  wars,  civilians  would  not  have  effective 
protection,  States  wanted  to  have  a  free  hand  to  deal  with  their  subjects  and  punish  severely 
those  who  help  or  try  to  help  the  'traitors'  who  took  up  arms  against  their  legitimate 
Government. 
However,  the  new  Draft  of  the  first  working  party  was  not  accepted.  Many  delegations 
submitted  amendments.  The  most  important  were  those  tabled  by  Britain  and  France. 
Britain  in  effect,  demanded  that  even  in  the  case  of  a  major  civil  war,  the  provisions  of  the 
conventions  would  apply  only  after  six  months  from  the  beginning  of  the  conflict. 
The  British  proposal  was  very  dangerous  from  a  humanitarian  point  of  view,  since  as  the 
experience  of  civil  wars  shows  the  cruelty  and  brutality  are  always  present  in  the  first 
period  of  the  conflict.  The  effect  of  the  British  amendment  was  to  give  a  free  hand  to  the 
Government  to  finish  off  the  insurgents  in  six  months  by  whatever  rileans,  since  at  the  end 
of  that  period  the  Government  would  be  obliged  to  apply  the  conventions.  Thus,  the 
Government  will  be  in  a  race  against  time,  emdeavouring  to  end  the  conflict  before  the 
deadline. 
The  French  delegation  supported  by  many  other  delegations,  attacked  the  second  Draft 
of  the  first  working  group  on  the  grounds  that  it  contained  dangerous  elements.  It 
considered  that: 
"...  [S]ignatory  Governments  who  were  confronted  with  an  insurgent  movement  would 
be  in  a  dilemma;  either  they  would  never  apply  the  clauses  of  the  conventions  or  they 
would  implicitly  recognise  that  the  adverse  party  had  a  character  which  was 
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Therefore,  to  that  delegation  any  attempt  to  apply  the  conventions  to  internal  conflicts  will 
give  a  legal  status  to  the  rebels,  hence,  it  touches  indirectly  on  the  sovereignty  of  the  State 
and  its  freedom  of  action. 
Similarly,  the  USSR  was  unable  to  accept  the  working  party's  second  Draft,  but  for 
different  reasons.  In  its  view,  the  Draft  was  too  restrictive,  it  considered  that  at  the 
outbreak  of  an  internal  conflict,  the  application  of  the  convention  should  be  automatic. 
Special  agreements  might  be  taken  into  consideration  in  the  course  of  the  conflict  but,  the 
USSR  added,  it  would  not  be  acceptable  to  leave  persons  who  require  protection  without 
defence.  117  However,  the  USSR  was  in  the  minority  and  it  seems  that  the  voice  of 
sovereignty  won  the  day. 
4.  The  Work  of  the  Second  Working  Group 
After  the  failure  of  the  first  working  group  to  satisfy  the  majority,  a  second  working  group 
was  appointed  with  the  mission  of  drawing  up  another  Draft  Article  (Article  2/4).  The 
working  group  chose  a  new  approach.  There  is  no  room  for  the  application  of  the  whole 
convention  to  internal  conflicts,  only  some  fundamental  humanitarian  rules  would  be 
applicable. 
The  French  delegate  chaired  the  group  and  introduced  the  new  Draft  by  stating  that: 
"It  offered  in  all  cases  and  circumstances  the  chief  advantage  of  permitting  the 
automatic  implementation  of  concrete  and  precise  provisions  which  were  the  essence 
of  humanitarian  rules  to  be  observed  in  cases  of  armed  conflicts  not  of  an  international  character".  118 
In  fact,  these  'concrete  and  precise  provisions,  were  some  general  and  fundamental 
principles  of  humanitarian  law  which  in  practice,  need  more  precision  and  elaboration  if 
they  are  to  have  any  effect  at  all  in  the  protection  of  victims  of  internal  wars. 
The  US  delegate  criticised  the  second  working  group's  approach,  because  it  did  not  oblige 
the  contracting  States  to  apply  the  whole  conventions  in  certain  serious  cases  of  internal 
wars-119  Furthermore,  he  thought  that  the  new  Draft  Article  2/4  had  simply  prohibited 
some  acts  of  violence,  which  in  fact  had  been  forbidden  by  other  international  instruments 
and  would  serve  no  useful  purpose  in  practice.  120  It  appears  that  the  US  delegate  was 
referring  to  the  Genocide  Convention  and  to  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights. 
Norway  raised  a  very  important  question  concerning  the  fate  of  captured  insurgents.  It 
pointed  out  that: 
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225 "...  [A]ccording  to  the  proposal  under  discussion,  a  Government  with  the  intention  of 
executing  combatant  insurgents  or  of  taking  them  as  hostages  instead  of  capturing 
them  would  be  at  liberty  to  do  So".  121 
No  precise  answer  was  given  to  this  question.  However,  an  important  delegation  (the  US) 
was  quick  to  point  out  that  the  de  jure  Government  should  treat  insurgents  as  regular 
combatants.  122  The  same  delegation  went  even  further.  It  stressed  that  the  law  of  combat 
has  to  be  applied  even  in  internal  conflicts.  It  stressed  that: 
"Combatants  should  also  be  entitled  to  some  protection.  The  use  of  poison  or  gas,  for 
instance,  was  prohibited  by  international  law  but  international  law  only  applied  to 
wars  ýetween  states  and  the  prohibition  should  also  be  extended  to  cover  civil 
wars.  "  23 
This  proposition  is  very  interesting  since  Article  3,  as  adopted,  does  not  contain  any  express 
reference  to  the  regulations  of  methods  and  means  of  warfare.  To  this  important  State  (the 
US),  the  means  of  injuring  the  enemy  are  not  unlimited  even  in  cases  of  civil  wars. 
At  the  37th  meeting  of  the  Special  Committee,  the  USSR  introduced  a  proposal  which  in 
the  opinion  of  that  delegation  was  a  compromise  between  all  drafts  and  observations  made 
during  the  discussions  on  Draft  Article  2/4.  It  conceded  that  it  was  impossible  in  the  light 
of  the  discussions  which  took  place  to  apply  all  the  provisions  of  the  Conventions  in  a 
conflict  of  a  non  -international  character.  Its  proposal  selected  some  fundamental 
humanitarian  principles  which  would  apply  to  each  category  of  the  victims  of  internal 
conflicts  (civilians,  POWs  and  the  sick  and  wounded).  Inhuman  treatment  and  other  cruel 
acts  and  discriminations  are  prohibited  in  the  case  of  all  these  categories  of  victims. 
It  seems  to  me,  that  despite  the  humanitarian  flavour  of  the  Soviet  proposal  it  does  reflect 
the  Soviet  political  stand  which  encouraged  national  revolution  against  colonialism. 
However,  the  Soviet  proposals  were  quickly  attacked  by  the  French  and  even  by  the  Italians. 
They  concentrated  their  attack  particularly,  on  the  proposal  extending  the  term  POW  to 
captured  insurgents,  which  would  impair  the  sovereignty  of  the  Government  and  its 
freedom  of  action.  124  In  my  opinion,  only  on  the  ground  of  arguments  for  sovereignty  can 
we  understand  the  failure  of  attempts  of  giving  POW  status  to  insurgents. 
The  Soviet  proposal  which  is  in  effect  milder  than  the  ICRC's  Draft  Article  2/4,  was 
rejected  in  the  Special  Committee  by  9  votes  to  I  (July  8th,  1949).  This  is  a  revealing  case, 
States  were  not  ready  to  commit  themselves  in  any  manner  concerning  the  treatment  of 
rebels  and  of  the  civilian  population.  To  them,  this  would  impair  their  sovereignty  and 
would  give  a  legal  status  to  their  opponents  which  would  open  the  door  for  foreign 
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226 intervention  in  their  internal  affairs. 
At  the  end,  it  must  be  indicated  that  the  second  working  group  Draft,  after  being 
amended  slightly  by  the  Special  Committee  was  adopted  by  the  conference  in  its  plenary 
session  by  34  in  favour,  28  against  and  I  abstention,  that  Draft  became  the  well-known 
common  Article  3. 
The  voting  showed  clearly  that  Article  3  was  adopted  by  a  slim  majority  which  indicates 
that  an  important  number  of  States  were  not  happy  with  it,  since  it  made  vulnerable  their 
exclusive  jurisdiction  over  events  which  occur  in  their  territories. 
5.  Conclusions  to  be  Drawn  from  the  Travaux  Prkparatolres 
1.  From  the  start  of  the  Conference.  the  majority  of  States  felt  that  any  general  extension 
of  the  Geneva  Convention  to  all  the  victims  of  internal  wars  would  not  be  acceptable 
whatever  the  magnitude  and  intensity  of  the  conflict,  the  reason  being  that  the  sovereignty 
of  the  State  would  be  impaired.  However,  Schl6gel  attributed  such  failure  to  the  following: 
"The  little  legal  protection  from  which  the  victims  of  civil  war  benefited  was  the 
logical  outcome  of  the  impossibility  for  Governments  to  agree  on  what  should  be 
demanded  of  the  rebel  party  for  it  to  have  recognition  of  equal  rights  under  the 
Geneva  Conventions".  12.5 
2.  The  majority  of  States  resisted  all  attempts  to  give  captured  insurgents  POW  status. 
Established  Governments  closed  the  door  to  any  international  regulation  in  that  domain  in 
the  name  of  preserving  their  discretion. 
3.  Because  civilians  hold  the  nationality  of  their  State  and  are  thus  bound  by  the  duty  of 
allegiance,  they  were  not  regarded  as  eligible  for  extensive  international  protection  as  in  the 
case  of  international  war.  Sovereignty  closed  the  door  to  real  protection. 
4.  However,  there  was  a  general  consensus  that  the  sick  and  wounded  should  be  treated 
with  humanity.  No  detailed  provisions  were  made  for  the  effective  application  of  the 
principle  that  those  victims  (the  sick  and  wounded)  should  be  'collected  and  cared  for' 
which,  in  practice,  brought  many  problems. 
5.  There  was  no  detailed  discussions  concerning  the  actual  principles  included  in  Article 
3,  which  in  practice,  led  to  different  interpretations  of  the  concepts  involved.  For  example, 
the  concept  of  'human  treatment'  which  is  a  central  principle  in  the  context  of  Article  3, 
has  not  been  defined  in  any  precise  form. 
B.  Analysis  of  the  Actual  Contents  of  Common  Article  3 
Article  3  signals,  in  my  view,  the  rapprochement  between  humanitarian  law  and  human 
rights,  since  human  rights  apply  in  peace  time  and  most  of  them  will  be  suspended  in  times 
of  emergencies.  The  remaining  few  rights  after  the  suspension  will  be  protected  by 
humanitarian  law.  Those  rights  that  are  protected,  represent  the  point  of  meeting  between 
human  rights  and  humanitarian  law. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  must  noted  that  before  the  adoption  of  the  Geneva  Convention  of 
1949,  two  events  in  particular,  contributed  to  the  eventual  meeting  between  human  rights 
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227 and  humanitarian  law. 
First,  the  UN  Charte  r  mentions  human  rights  as  one  of  the  purposes  of  the  organization 
(Article  1/3).  The  UN  Secretary-General,  in  one  of  his  reports  in  the  late  1960s,  made  the 
argument  that  the  human  rights  disposition  of  the  UN  Charter  did  not  distinguish  between 
periods  of  peace  and  war,  between  military  and  civilian  personnel.  He  wrote: 
"...  [L]a  terminologie  de  la  Charte  s'applique  dans  sa  g4n6ralit6  aux  civils  aussi  bien 
qu'aux  militaires,  elle  englobe  les  personnes  vivant  sous  la  juridiction  de  leurs  propres 
autoritis  nationales  et  les  personnes  vivant  dans  les  territoires  OCCUpiS*.  126 
This  interpretation  of  the  dispositions  of  the  UN  Charter  extends  implicitly  the  application 
of  the  regime  of  human  rights  to  internal  conflicts,  since  apparently  there  is  no  distinction 
between  different  kinds  of  conflicts  in  the  application  of  human  rights. 
Secondly,  it  must  be  remembered  that  in  1948,  the  first  international  instrument  of 
human  rights  was  adopted  (the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights).  That  Declaration, 
in  effect,  contains  no  derogation  clause  in  times  of  emergencies.  This  may  be  interpreted 
that  all  human  rights  must  be  respected  at  all  times  or  at  least  some  of  them:  such  as  the 
right  to  life,  prohibition  of  torture  and  the  right  to  a  fair  trial.  Although,  participants 
present  at  Geneva  in  1949  were  military  men,  diplomats  and  those  who  in  general,  defend 
the  rights  of  States,  nevertheless,  they  had  to  take  into  account  what  happened  in  Paris  in 
1948.  In  this  context,  Quentin-Baxter  wrote: 
"The  proof  of  this  lay  in  the  new  Article  3  common  to  all  four  Conventions, 
providing  ?,.  simple  Code  of  Human  Conduct  in  conflicts  not  of  an  international 
"  27  character  . 
It  seems  to  me,  that  there  are  three  views  regarding  the  question  of  what  kind  of  rules  are 
included  in  Common  Article  3. 
1.  The  First  View 
This  view  holds  that  Article  3  does  not  bring  anything  new,  its  guarantees  are  stipulated  in 
general  in  all  civilized  States'  laws.  In  this  connection,  Pictet  maintains  that  Article  3 
imposes  only- 
"...  [A]  few  essential  rules  which  the  Government  in  fact  respects  daily  under  its  own 
laws,  even  when  dealing  with  common  criminaIS".  128 
Similarly.  Siotis  argued: 
"...  [L]es  principes  hurnanitaires,  qui  sont  A  la  base  des  r6gles  dont  I'application  est 
prdvue,  Wont  nullement  besoin  d'explication  et  constituent  des  616ments  essentiels  de 
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228 toute  morale  humaniste,  rationaliste  ou  religieuse".  129 
He  then  added  that: 
"...  [N]ous  avons  M  des  rýgles  de  droit  intern  jonal  dont  I'application  ne  peut  en 
ancune  mankre  nuire  au  maintain  de  I'ordre"Iý 
In  his  view,  the  rules  of  Article  3  do  not  constitute  any  derogation  from  the  State's 
sovereignty. 
In  my  opinion,  this  approach  ignores  that  Article  3  was  not  easily  accepted  by  the 
majority  of  States  present  at  Geneva.  Because  States  mainly  considered  that  it  touches  upon 
their  freedom  of  action  and  their  right  to  maintain  law  and  order  within  their  borders. 
Moreover,  even  if  we  concede  that  the  rules  included  in  the  Article  are  already  found  in 
the  Codes  of  Conduct  of  civilized  States,  their  (the  rules)  inclusion  in  an  international 
agreement  was  not  easy,  since  it  brings  with  it,  in  their  opinion,  the  prospect  of 
intervention  in  their  internal  affairs. 
Other  viewpoints  differ  in  their  interpretation  of  the  fundamental  notion  of 
'humanitarian  treatment'.  This  principle,  as  it  is  known,  is  a  fundamental  principle  of 
human  Tights,  and  of  the  laws  of  war. 
This  divergence  of  interpretation  led  to  different  conclusions  as  to  the  rules  embodied  in 
Article  3.  Thus,  when  the  notion  of  'human  treatment'  is  interpreted  as  a  human  right 
principle,  it  is  said  to  mean  respect  for  the  right  to  life  and  prohibition  of  torture  and  the 
right  to  fair  trial. 
To  me,  the  right  to  life  in  this  Context,  must  include  the  means  of  survival,  it  is  not  a 
negative  right  in  the  sense  that  the  State  must  abstain  from  doing  certain  things.  It  is  also 
a  positive  right  in  the  sense  that  the  State  must  provide,  or  allow  other  humanitarian 
agencies  such  as  the  ICRC  to  provide,  essentials  namely  food,  shelter  and  medical  supplies. 
However,  it  must  be  indicated  that  Article  3  does  not  prohibit  capital  punishment 
therefore,  the  right  to  life  for  captured  insurgents  does  not  include  protection  from  the 
death  penalty.  In  such  circumstances,  the  notion  of  'human  treatment'  must  be  interpreted 
as  excluding  summary  execution.  A  fair  judgment  is  a  necessary  element  of  human 
treatment  in  the  case  of  the  worst  treated  victims  of  internal  wars  (captured  insurgents). 
This  brings  us  to  the  conclusion  that  the  human  rights  approach  in  the  interpretation  of 
Article  3  leads  to  indicate  that  all  these  rights  to  life,  prohibition  of  torture  and  fair  trial 
are  now  cardinal  elements  of  the  human  rights  system  and  thus,  they  constitute  a 
fundamental  limitation  upon  the  State's  sovereignty. 
No  State  can  claim  that  it  will  not  respect  them,  and  it  has  no  right  to  characterise  as  an 
intervention  in  its  internal  affairs  any  attempt  by  the  international  community  to  state  its 
views  on  the  subject,  or  demand  respect  for  those  rights.  The  emergency  situation  has  no 
relevance  in  this  respect.  Such  approach  affords  the  benefit  that  the  instruments  of  human 
rights  may  be  used  to  protect  the  civilians  and  even  the  combatants  in  times  of  emergency. 
129  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  62,  p.  212. 
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229 2.  The  Second  View 
Another  view  concerning  the  contents  of  Article  3,  hold  that  the  article  must  be  seen  as  an 
attempt  to  state  aresumd'  of  the  essential  principles  of  'Geneva  Law,  which  deals  with  the 
protection  of  the  victims  of  war.  They  stress  that  the  principle  of  humane  treatment  and 
other  principles  included  in  Article  3  such  as  'the  taking  of  hostages'  and  'caring  for  the 
wounded  and  sick'  must  be  seen  and  interpreted  within  the  perspectives  of  the  law  of  the 
Geneva  tradition  and  not  that  of  human  rights.  However,  they  admit  that  the  influence  of 
human  rights  appears  at  least  in  two  instances  in  Article  3:  'The  prohibition  of  outrages 
upon  personnel  dignity,  in  particular,  humiliating  and  degrading  treatment"  and  of  non- 
discrimination. 
In  this  context,  Wilhelm  observed  that: 
"Quand  au  contenu  des  garanties  fondamentales  de  I'Article  3,  on  peut  dire  en  un  mot 
qu'elles  correspondent  au  syst6me  des  Conventions  de  Geneva  de  1949,  c'est_i-dire 
qu'elles  proftent  les  bless6s  et  les  malades  aussi  que  les  personnes  combattant  ou  non 
qui  sont  tombdes  ou  se  trouvent  au  pouvoir  de  I'adversaire  ".  131 
According  to  him,  the  central  notion  of  'humane  treatment'  comes  directly  from  the 
tradition  of  the  law  of  Geneva  and  to  some  extent  The  Hague.  it  can  be  found  in  the 
Geneva  Convention  of  1929  and  in  what  is  called  'Martens  Clause'  in  the  Preamble  of  the 
IV  Hague  Convention  of  1907. 
He  also  stresses  that  other  rules  included  in  Article  3  can  be  found  in  the  Geneva 
Conventions  of  1949.  The  prohibition  of  taking  hostages  is  stipulated  in  Article  34  of  the 
IV  Geneva  Convention,  collecting  and  caring  for  the  sick  and  wounded  in  Article  40  of  the 
132  first  Convention  and  so  on. 
It  seems  to  me,  that  although  this  kind  of  argument  is  not  without  solid  foundation,  the 
human  rights  approach  may  afford  the  benefit  that  States  will  be  at  odds  in  denying  the 
application  of  certain  fundamental  rules  of  human  rights  in  situations  of  internal  conflicts. 
Because  in  demanding  respect  for  those  fundamental  rules,  third  States  cannot  be  seen  as 
making  an  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  State  concerned,  as  their  position, 
cannot  in  any  way,  be  interpreted  as  giving  rebels  any  legal  status  or  giving  the  conflict  any 
characterisation. 
However,  to  interpret  Article  3  in  the  light  of  the  tradition  of  Geneva  Conventions,  may 
be  considered  by  an  established  Government  engaged  in  an  internal  conflict,  as  an  attempt 
of  giving  the  rebels  some  kind  of  legal  status  and  also  as  a  way  of  inducing  that 
Government  to  accept  that  the  conflict  is  an  internal  one,  to  which  certain  rules  must  be 
applied. 
3.  Third  View 
This  view  goes  very  far  and  tries,  in  my  opinion,  to  interpret  the  clause  of  "humane 
treatment"  in  the  light  of  the  law  of  war  stricto  sensu.  In  this  connection  many  principles 
131  J.  R.  WitheLm:  Protection  de  ta  personne  humaine.  RCADI.  1972/111,  p.  369. 
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230 and  rules  of  Jus  In  bello  are  inferred  from  that  principle,  i.  e.  'the  principle  of  humane 
treatment'. 
Thus,  the  fundamental  rule  of  the  laws  of  war,  namely'the  protection  of  non-combatants, 
is  deduced,  and  from  that  rule  many  other  rules  were  inferred  such  as  the  prohibition  of 
bombardment  of  open  towns  and  villages,  the  distinction  between  lawful  and  unlawful 
targets  of  attack  and  even  the  nature  of  weapons  which  may  be  used.  The  principle  of 
military  necessity  is  introduced.  All  military  acts  must  be  decided  in  the  light  of  the 
necessities  of  the  situation.  In  other  words,  the  idea  of  humane  treatment  and  the  general 
object  of  Article  3,  has  been  interpreted  as  prohibiting  total  war  in  civil  wars. 
An  example  of  this  exercise  is  what  has  been  done  by  Bond,  Pinto,  O'Brian  and  others. 
Pinto  interpreted  the  prohibition  of  violence  to  life  and  murder  of  all  kinds,  mentioned  in 
Article  3  (A),  as  prohibiting  bombardment,  indiscriminate  aerial  attacks  and  also  all  means 
of  combat  which  cause  unnecessary  sufferings.  133 
Bond,  after  observing  that  the  idea  that  the  laws  of  war  should  govern  internal  conflicts, 
argued  that  the  use  of  biological  and  chemical  weapons,  resort  to  strategic  bombings, 
committing  of  reprisals,  relocation  of  the  civilian  population,  defoliation  of  farm  and  forest 
lands  and  destruction  food  stores  and  the  claim  to  treat  captured  insurgents  as  common 
criminals  or  traitors  rather  than  POW's.  To  all  these  important  issues,  he  maintains  that 
although,  Article  3  does  not  prohibit  them  specifically,  he  stressed  that  a  broad 
interpretation,  especially  of  the  principle  of  humane  treatment,  would  render  most  of  the 
acts  listed  above  as  illegal  because  most  of  those  actions  would  affect  non-combatants, 
hence  they  would  in  one  way  or  another  violate  the  obligations  to  treat  them  humanely. 
O'Brian  does  not  base  himself  on  a  broad  interpretation  of  Article  3  in  order  to  introduce 
the  application  of  certain  rules  of  Jus  In  bello,  in  internal  conflicts.  Rather,  he  seems  to 
argue  from  what  experience  shows.  In  this  context,  he  writes: 
* 
...  [I]n  a  serious  contemporary  revolutionary  war  both  sides  are  likely  to  resort  to 
means  proscribed  or  limited  by  jus  In  bello,  rules  prohibiting  the  use  of  disproportionate  or  indiscriminate  firepower  against  heavily  civilian  targets  and  banning  measures  of  population  control  which  exceeds  the  standards  set  for 
belligerent  occupations".  134 
He  then  adds: 
"...  [A]dmittedly  no  international  convention  has  accepted  these  standards  as  binding 
on  belligerents  in  civil  war  but,  as  will  be  argued,  these  limits  should  be  the  basis  for 
evaluating  the  treatment  of  civilians  in  such  conflicts.  "135 
However,  it  seems  to  me  that  O'Brian  argument  does  not  find  real  support  in  practice.  The 
Vietnam  war  is  a  case  in  point.  In  this  context,  Falk  was  right  when  he  wrote: 
"...  [F]or  a  number  of  reasons  it  is  equally  complicated  to  apply  the  laws  of  war  to  the 
conduct  of  a  large-scale  counter-  insurgency  war.  The  virtually  inevitable  illegality 
133  See  Pinto,  op.  cit.,  supra,  chapter  2,  n.  90,  p.  533. 
134  W.  V.  O'Brian:  The  Jus  in  Betio  In  Revotutfonary  War  Law.  IS  VJIL,  1978,  p.  204. 
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231 of  insurgents  methods  and  tactics  tends  to  vindicate  recourse  to  effective  responses. 
Governments  generally  maintain  the  Tight  to  request  external  help  to  defeat  such 
internal  armed  struggles.  In  addition,  counter-insurgency  weaponry  and  tactics  are 
a  somewhat  recent  development.  International  law  is  generally  a  orded  a  very 
limited  sphere  of  applicability  in  relation  to  a  largely  internal  war". 
"6 
Then,  he  arrived  at  a  different  conclusion  concerning  the  applicability  of  certain  rules  of 
jus  In  bello  in  internal  conflicts. 
It  seems  to  me,  however,  that  the  views  of  those  who  support  the  broad  interpretation  of 
Article  3,  in  order  to  include  some  fundamental  rules  of  Jus  In  bello,  face  in  practice,  some 
legal  and  political  obstacles  which  States  may  resort  to.  First  of  all,  according  to  the  law  of 
treaties,  the  aim  of  any  interpretation  is  to  elucidate  the  intentions  of  the  parties. 
Consequently,  it  is  very  hard  to  prove  that  the  parties  to  the  Geneva  Conventions  envisaged 
such  broad  interpretation.  No  words,  no  preparatory  work  and  in  a  way  no  subsequent 
practice  concerning  Article  3,  supports  such  contention.  The  only  legal  device  for  the 
acceptance  of  such  broad  interpretation  is  the  conclusion  of  special  agreements  between  the 
parties. 
In  my  view,  Baxter,  appears  to  be  correct  when  he  stressed  that: 
"...  [T]he  obligations  of  Article  3  are  cast  in  such  general  terms  and  leaves  so  many 
things  unsaid  that  they  cannot,  even  under  the  best  of  circumstances,  be  an  adequate 
guide  to  the  conduct  of  belligerents  in  civil  strife".  137 
4.  Conclusion 
It  seems  that  the  fundamental  defect  of  Article  3  is  as  Schl6gel  argues  "...  lies  in  the  lack  of 
balance  between  the  principle  in  heading  I  and  the  enumeration  as  examples  of  particular 
violations  under  sub-headings  (a)  to  (d)".  138  The  same  idea  was  expressed  by  Veuthey,  who 
observed  that: 
"I'Article  3  concrdtise  le  general  principe  'le  traitement  humain"  non  par  une 
description  du  traitement  A  accorder  mais  d'une  manjýre  n6gative  en  inumdrant  ce 
qui  est  incompatible  avec  un  tel  traitement  humain".  139 
Therefore,  what  is  absent  from  Article  3  in  my  view  is  a  positive  formulation  of  the  idea 
of  'humane  treatment'  which  can  include  amongst  other  things,  some  fundamental  economic 
and  social  rights,  such  as  the  supply  of  food  to  those  in  need  in  situations  of  internal  strife 
and  their  right  to  receive  such  supplies  through  independent  channels.  Moreover,  the 
prohibition  of  any  kind  of  forced  labour,  the  right  to  receive  medical  care  for  the  sick  and 
wounded  and  the  duty  of  the  medical  staff  and  the  civilian  population  as  a  whole  to  give 
the  necessary  assistance  are  not  mentioned  in  Article  3. 
136See 
P.  D.  Trooboff:  Law  and  Responsibitity.  Univ.  of  North  Carotine  Press,  Chapet  Hitt,  1975,  p.  51. 
137R. 
Baxter:  Jus  In  Betto  Interno:  The  Present  and  Future  Law,  in  Moore  (ed.  ),  op.  cit.,  supra. 
chapter  2,  n.  43.  pp.  528-9 
138 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  96,  p.  133. 
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232 C.  Subsequent  Practice  Concerning  Article  3 
To  what  extent  has  Common  Article  3  in  practice  protected  the  victims  of  internal  wars? 
This  is  a  very  important  question  since  it  shows  us  how  far  States  are  ready  to  honour  their 
obligations  and  especially  how  they  interpret  their  obligations  contained  in  the  Article,  and 
finally  how  the  two  principles  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention  were  sometimes  used 
to  limit  these  obligations. 
In  this  respect,  I  will  deal  with  three  points:  (i)  The  State  practice  in  actual  civil  wars;  (ii) 
the  UN  and  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars  and,  finally,  (iii)  the  judgment 
of  the  ICJ  in  the  Nicaraeua  Case  and  Article  3. 
1.  The  State  Practice  In  Actual  Civil  Wars 
This  reveals  beyond  any  doubt  that  the  protection  of  victims  of  such  conflicts  is  not  wholly 
satisfactory.  Thus,  the  civilians,  the  POW's,  were  not  effectively  protected  and  even  the  sick 
and  wounded  were  not  afforded  the  real  conditions  of  protection  since  Article  3  does  not 
protect  the  persons  who  may  afford  assistance  to  persons  in  need  e.  g.  the  medical  staff. 
This  practice,  as  will  be  seen,  reveals  many  instances  of  those  attempting  to  give 
assistance  to  the  sick  and  wounded  being  considered  as  committing  a  crime  punishable  in 
law.  In  order  to  cover  this  point,  I  will  deal  with  the  fate  of  the  civilians,  captured 
insurgents  and  finally  the  sick  and  wounded,  in  actual  civil  wars. 
1.1.  The  Civilian  Population 
In  a  civil  war  more  than  an  international  conflict,  civilians  are  in  general  intimately 
involved  in  the  contest.  Victory  will  be  on  the  side  of  those  who  can  muster  the  support  of 
the  population.  In  this  context,  Mao  Tse-Tung  stressed  that: 
"The  people  may  be  likened  to  water.  the  troops  to  fish  who  inhabit  it".  140 
They  'the  civilians'  are  the  source  of  food,  shelter,  intelligence  and  care  for  the  wounded 
and  sick.  Because  of  that,  the  civilians  have  sometimes  become  military  targets  themselves 
especially  in  the  eyes  of  the  established  Government.  They  are  the  victims  of  terrorist  acts, 
bombardment,  displacement,  etc.  Their  property  too,  which  is  an  essential  element  of  their 
survival,  is  at  the  mercy  of  the  two  sides  of  the  conflict. 
It  appears  that  the  practice  revealed  that  the  use  of  the  guerrilla  method  of  warfare  has 
led  Governments  fighting  in  such  situations  to  act  as  if  the  general  distinction  between 
combatants  and  non-combatants  which  is  implicit  in  Article  3  is  non-existent,  they  behave 
in  a  total  warlike  manner.  The  guerrilla  method  of  warfare  seems  to  negate  the  application 
of  any  humanitarian  rules.  The  cases  which  I  will  deal  with  point  in  that  direction. 
1.1.1.  In  Vietnam 
140  Cited  by  J.  B.  Ketty  and  G.  A.  Pettetner:  Legat  Controt  of  Poputations  in  Subversive  Warfare.  5  VJIL, 
1965-6,  p.  174.  - 
233 In  Vietnam  both  the  US  and  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  acknowledged  the 
application  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  to  the  conflict.  14  1  The  NLF  gave  the  assurance  that 
it  did  not  consider  the  Conventions  applicable  to  the  conflict,  it  did,  however,  assure  the 
ICRC  that  POW's  would  be  treated  humanely. 
The  field  manual  (April  1964)  of  the  US  forces  stressed  that  when  the  US  forces  are 
involved  in  fighting  the  insurgents,  they  will  apply  the  rules  contained  in  Article  3  and  will 
encourage  their  local  allies  to  do  likewise.  In  fact,  the  manual  in  its  point  D  stipulated  that: 
"Civilians  taking  no  part  in  the  hostilities  are  entitled  to  the  protection  in  Article  3 
above.  The  US  forces  coming  into  contact  with  the  civilian  population  will  apply 
these  provisions,  will  -insurgency  forces  to  likewise 
, 
ye  the  insurgents  and  counter 
apply  the  provisions.  "  4 
However,  the  reality  was  otherwise.  The  civilians  were  the  main  victims  of  the  war  since 
in  order  to  destroy  the  insurgents,  they  must  first  be  separated  from  the  civilians.  This  was 
basically,  an  impossible  task  as  only  political  means  could  achieve  that  result,  military 
means  could  only  lead  to  disaster. 
The  Americans  and  their  allies  relied  on  their  military  superiority  to  achieve  victory. 
They  resorted  to  saturation  bombing,  use  of  anti-personnel  weapons,  air  and  artillery 
bombardment  of  small  villages  which  resulted  in  heavy  casualties  among  the  civilians.  A 
total  war  policy  was  admitted  even  by  the  American  administration  itself.  In  this  context, 
John  McNaughton,  then  the  US  Assistant-Secretary  of  Defence,  was  able  to  state: 
"We  seem  to  be  proceeding  on  the  assumption  that  the  way  to  eradicate  the  Viet  Cong 
is  to  destroy  all  the  village  structures,  defoliale  all  the  jungles  and  then  cover  the 
entire  surface  of  south  Vietnam  with  asphalt".  143 
The  US  and  their  allies  have,  in  fact,  resorted  to  many  tactics  that  resulted  in  making  the 
civilians  the  first  target  of  the  war.  Special  forces  composed  of  Cambodians,  tribesmen, 
Chinese  and  Vietnamese  were  used  by  the  CIA,  these  were  indiscriminately  violent.  The 
CIA  also  hired  people  to  disguise  themselves  as  Viet  Cong  and  discredit  communists  by 
141  The  US  Secretary  of  State,  Dean  Rusk,  wrote  to  the  JCRC  on  10th  August,  1965  stating  that: 
NThe  United  States  has  always  abided  by  the  humanitarian  principles  enunciated  in  the  Geneva 
Convention  and  will  continue  to  do  so.  In  regard  to  the  hostilities  in  Vietnam,  the  US 
Government  is  applying  the  provisions  of  the  Geneva  Convention  and  we  expect  other  parties  to 
the  conflict  to  do  likewise.  " 
Likewise,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Repubtic  of  Vietnam,  Dr.  Tran  Van  Do,  sent  a  simitar 
tatter  to  the  ICRC  in  which  he  stated  that: 
"The  Goverment  of  the  Repubtic  Is  futty  prepared  to  respect  the  provisions  of  the  Geneva 
Convention  and  to  contribution  activety  to  the  efforts  of  the  ICRC  to  ensure  their 
apptfcation". 
Cited  by  L.  Petrowski:  Law  and  the  Conduct  of  the  Vietnam  War,  in  Fatk,  (ed.  ).  op.  cit.,  supra. 
chapter  2,  n.  8,  p.  483. 
142  Cited  by  Ketty  and  PetLetner,  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  140,  pp.  185-86. 
143  Cited  by  T.  Farrar:  The  Laws  of  War  25  Years  after  Nureffberg.  IC,  1971,  No.  583,  p.  28. 
234 committing  atrocities  against  the  civilians.  144 
Farrer  summarised  the  attitude  of  the  higher  echelons  of  the  American  administration  as 
follows: 
"In  the  eyes  of  President  J.  F.  Kennedy-the  high  priest  of  counter  -  insu  rgency-  and 
certain  of  his  advisors,  Vietnam  was  the  doctrine's  acid  test.  His  successor  observed 
that  the  tough  and  cocky  guerrillas  were  still  swimming  in  their  life-preserving 
human  sea.  More  subtle  means  failed  and  President  L.  B.  Johnson  turned  to  blunter 
weapons.  No  one  apparently  bothered  to  tell  him  about  the  laws  of  war".  145 
In  other  words,  no  legal  constraints  were  respected,  total  war  with  its  inevitable  lack  of 
distinction  between  combatants  and  non-combatants,  was  accepted  both  as  a  policy  and  a 
practice. 
Falk  describes  the  war  in  Indochina  as  follows: 
"...  [The  war  in  Indochina]  was  the  first  modern  instance  in  which  the  environment 
has  been  selected  as  a  'military  target'  appropriate  for  comprehensive  and  systematic 
distinction  ".  146 
In  practice,  such  a  policy  will  hit  the  civilians  hard,  rather  than  anyone  else,  since  it  is 
directed  at  drying  up  the  sea  of  civilians,  so  that  the  insurgents  will  die  immediately. 
Falk  notes  in  this  respect,  that. 
"This  drying  up  process  is  translated  militarily  into  making  the  countryside  unfit  for 
civilian  habitation.  To  turn  Indochina  into  a  sea  of  fire  and  compel  peasants  to  flee 
their  ancestral  homes  was  embodied  in  a  series  of  war  policies  including  'free-fire 
zones';  'search  and  destroy'  operations  and  various  efforts  to  move  villages  forcibly 
into  secure  areas  W.  147 
The  result  is  that  the  war  tends  toward  genocide  with  respect  to  the  people  and  ecocide  with 
respect  to  environment.  The  US  Department  of  Defense  has,  in  fact,  estimated  that  between 
1965  and  1968  annual  expenditure  on  chemicals  rose  from  $10  million  dollars  to  $70 
million. 
148 
It  would  seem  that  the  destruction  of  people  and  environment  has  been  considered  by 
officers  in  the  field  as  a  matter  of  military  necessity.  Petrowski  states  that: 
"In  some  officers  eyes,  it  would  be  considered  a  matter  of  'military  necessity'  to  burn 
down  an  entire  village  to  kill  one  sniper".  149 
This  causes  civilians  to  be  caught  in  the  middle,  they  were  used  as  a  means  of  fighting 
insurgents. 
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235 1.1.2.  Malaya 
In  this  country,  the  British  used  between  275,000  and  395,000  soldiers  in  order  to  defeat 
8,000  to  10,000  communist  guerrillasl5o  and  it  seems  that  much  of  the  weight  of  the  terror 
fell  on  the  Chinese  citizens  from  whom  the  guerrillas  tried  to  gain  support. 
Thompson,  a  very  well-known  expert  on  counter-insurgency  tactics,  explained  the  means 
by  which  the  Government  fought  the  communist  insurgents  in  the  following  fashion: 
"Some  very  tough  laws  were  enacted  in  Malaya.  One  enabled  the  Government  to  seize 
and  deport  all  Chinese  found  in  a  declared  bad  area.  Another  allowed  the 
Government  to  impose  a  collective  fine  on  all  the  inhabitants  of  an  area  where  the 
people  were  unco-operative.  On  the  other  hand,  laws  imposing  strict  curfews,  a 
mandatory  death  penalty  for  carrying  arms,  life  imprisonment  for  providing  supplies 
or  other  support  to  terrorists  restricted  residen  e  or  detention  for  suspected  terrorist 
supporters  and  so  on  were  effectively  used".  151 
With  these  measures,  no  room  was  left  for  the  freedom  of  civilians,  their  lives  and  deaths 
were  virtually  left  at  the  discretionary  power  of  the  established  Government.  it  is  also  clear 
that  the  main  characteristics  of  the  above  listed  crimes,  is  that  they  were  broadly  stipulated, 
in  order  to  make  any  act  or  movement  of  the  civilians  suspected.  The  accused  always  had 
to  explain  the  suspicious  conditions  of  their  acts  which  meant  that  the  action  of  the 
Government  forces  could  easily  degenerate  into  a  wholesale  restriction  of  the  fundamental 
rights  of  the  citizens. 
1.1.3.  Algeria 
The  official  Algerian  figure  of  those  who  died  for  the  cause  of  independence  'The  martyrs' 
is  one  and  a  half  million.  It  is  estimated  that  the  majority  of  those  who  died  were  civilians 
since  the  highest  figure  mentioned  by  the  FLN  for  its  forces  during  the  war  was  130,000. 
However,  after  the  war,  250,000  claimed  to  have  been  fighters  for  the  FLN.  152 
The  estimated  figures  on  the  French  side  were  20,000  military  personnel  and  25,000 
civilians.  It  appears  to  me  that  the  French,  especially  from  1956,  had  resorted  to  a  policy 
of  total  war.  Every  Muslim  Algerian  was  considered  as  a  political  sympathiser  of  the  FLN, 
if  not  an  actual  member.  In  this  context,  the  Report  of  the  French  Commission  "de 
sauvegarde  des  droits  et  libertds  individuels'  established  by  the  Government  of  Guy  Mollet 
cited  the  General  Director  of  the  National  Security  as  saying  that: 
"la  police  Algdrienne  comme  la  gendarmerie.  se  livraient  sur  les  inculpds  suspects  ou 
simple  pr6venus  &  des  m6thodes  d'investigation  relevant  beaucoup  plus  de  la  Gestapo 
que  dune  police  d6mocratique".  153 
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236 The  same  report  quotes  a  high  ranking  official  as  saying  that: 
"Ies  m6thodes  brutales  d'interrogation-violence,  s6vice  ou  torture  ont  une  efficacitd 
nettement  supdrieure  aux  procddds  autorisds  par  les  rdglements".  154 
Teguia  stresses  that  the  majority  of  those  who  died  during  the  war  were  not  armed 
combatants.  They  were,  in  fact,  defenceless;  women,  children  and  the  old.  He  then  gives 
some  examples  of  the  methods  and  pictures  of  the  repression  practised  by  the  French  army. 
He  writes: 
"Des  agglom&rations  rurales  totalement  effacdes  de  la  carte  par  des  bombardement  au 
napalm,  une  multitude  de  charniers,  de  fosses  communes,  dont  certaines  restent 
inconnues  de  nos  jours,  des  exdcutions  sommaires  innombrables,  des  d6placements 
de  population  par  millions,  des  prisons  et  des  camps  de  concentration  bondds,  la  loi 
faisant  forictionner  fr6quement  la  guillotine,  des  r6gions  enti6res  vid6es  de  toute  vie 
humaine  et  sournises  A  un  bombardement  incessant  pour  1'entrainement  des  artilleurs, 
des  aviateurs  oii  Ncrasement  des  'rebelles",  ont  marqu6  les  sept  ans  et  quart  de 
guerre".  155 
Scherer  describes  the  methods  used  by  the  French  army  in  the  famous  'la  Bataille  d'Alger' 
in  these  terms: 
"...  [L]a  r6pression  atteint  un  degr6  de  brutalit6  rarement  surpass6  dans  I'histoire  de 
I'arm6e  Franqaise.  Des  unit6s  d'61ite  sont  gangren6es  par  le  racisme,  i  force  de'casser 
du  bougnoule'  et  cherchant  un  exutoire  A  leur  besoin  de  violence  dans  des  m6thodes 
fascistes".  156 
Lebjaoui,  a  nationalist  leader,  quotes  some  examples  used  by  the  French,  as  revealed  by 
published  reports  of  some  French  officers  and  soldiers: 
"Ddbut  mai  (1956),  pr6s  de  Batna  A  la  suite  d'une  embuscade  oil  deux  soldats  trouvant 
la  mort,  quinze  suspects  sont  interrogds,  torturds,  quatorze  sont  fusill6s  sur  les  quinze. 
Vallde  de  la  sommam:  trois  suspects  arr&6s,  enterrds  jusqu'au  cou,  apr6s  avoir  eux- 
memes  creus6  leur  trou,  en  plein  soleil.  Une  gamelle  d'eau  est  placde  A  cinquante 
centimWes  de  leurs  16vres.  Ils  sont  laissds  aussi  deux  jours  environ.  N'ayant  pas 
parl&,  deux  sont  abattus.  Le  troisi6me  parle,  mais  abattu  aprW.  '  57 
Torture  in  fact,  became  nearly  an  official  policy.  Thus,  the  famous  56me  Bureau  which 
specialised  in  extracting  information  from  suspects,  was  a  body  whose  main  function  was 
torture  and  inhumane  treatment.  A  leaked  ICRC  report  was  published  by  Le  Monde  (dated 
January  5th,  1960)  which  the  Government  unsuccessfully  tried  to  seize.  The  report  revealed 
that  torture  and  inhumane  treatment  were  systematically  used,  in  fact,  many  prisoners  died 
from  lack  of  medical  attention  and  conditions  of  internment  were  disastrous. 
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237 However,  the  FLN  also  used  terror  against  civilians.  The  justification  was  that  they  were 
convicted  by  revolutionary  courts  for  their  acts  in  collaborating  with  the  enemy.  It  is 
estimated  that  the  Muslim  Algerians  were  the  hardest  hit.  The  tactics  of  the  urban  guerrilla 
used  by  the  FLN  in  the  big  cities  such  as  Algiers,  Constantine  and  Oran  resulted  in  the 
killing  of  innocent  civilians  by  the  French.  In  the  famous  'la  Bataille  d'Alger'  in  1957,  the 
158  FLN  estimated  that  6000  persons  were  killed  in  the  town. 
However,  Siotis  writing  in  1958  observed  that  the  use  of  terrorist  tactics  by  the  FLN 
against  the  collaborators  of  the  French  had  declined  because  in  his  view: 
"...  [D]ýs  le  moment  oii  l'organization  politique  et  militaire  de  l'insurrection  prit  des 
formes  plus  pouss6es  et  que  ses  responsables  acceptýrent  I'application  des  dispositi  ?  ns 
des  contentions  de  Gen6ve,  le  nombre  et  I'ampleur  de  tels  attentats  a  diminu6".  1  9 
He  then  notes: 
"ll  West  pas  impossible  que  cette  diminution  soit  due  A  d'autres  causes,  mais  nous 
somme  de  I'avis  que  I'acceptation  des  lois  de  la  guerre  accompagn6e  par  une  tactique 
militaire  beaucoup  plus  conforme  aux  usages  de  la  guerre,  constitue  une  preuve  de 
la  maturitd  politique  indispensable  A  toute  mise  en  oeuvre  des  dispositions  des 
conven  ions".  160 
The  explanation  is  also  that  the  fight  for  the  hearts  and  minds  of  the  population  both  in 
Algeria  and  especially,  in  France  were  of  the  utmost  importance  in  the  strategy  of  the  FLN. 
In  the  legal  field,  throughout  the  conflict  the  French  position  either  in  the  application  of 
Article  3  or  the  entire  Conventions  of  Geneva,  was  unclear.  Thus,  in  1954,  the  French 
argued  that  the  matter  was  a  mere  police  action,  which  meant  that  there  is  no  room  for  the 
application  of  Article  3.  However,  in  1955,  the  French  PM,  Mr.  Faure,  noted  in  the 
Assernbl6e  Nationale  that  Article  3  is  applicable  to  the  situation.  This  acknowledgement  had 
never  been  published  in  the  Journal  Officiel  de  la  R6publique  Frangaise.  161 
On  the  other  hand,  in  1956,  Mr.  Guy  Mollet,  the  then  French  PM  recognized  that  the 
conflict  was  no  longer  a  matter  of  penal  law  but  had  attained  the  level  of  an  armed  conflict 
of  a  non  -international  character.  Thus,  the  communlqu6  of  'la  Presidence  du  Conseil'  of 
June  23rd,  1956  relative  to  the  mission  of  the  ICRC  in  Algeria,  stated  the  following: 
"En  conformit6  avec  I'Article  3  des  Conventions  de  Gen6ve  relatives  aux  cas  de 
conflits  armds  ne  presentent  pas  un  caracWe  international  et  surgissant  sur  le 
territoire  de  l'un  des  parties  contractantes,  le  Comit6  International  de  la  Croix-Rouge 
a  offert  ses  services  au  gouvernement  Frangais.  Le  gouvernement  I'a  autoris6  A 
envoyer  en  Algdrie  une  mission  en  vue  de  visiter  les  camps  d'hdbergement  et 
l'iloignement  dans  lesquels  ont  W  rassamblds  les  intern6s  administratifs  et 
d'entreprendre  des  visites  des  lieus  de  d6tention  oii  se  trouvent  les  personnes 
poursuivies  a  la  suite  des  6venements".  162 
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238 Despite  these  pronouncements,  the  French  never  admitted  in  a  clear  cut  way  that  the  war 
was  either  civil  or  an  international  one.  Therefore,  on  July  25th,  1960,  when  the  war  was 
at  its  height  and  resembled  an  international  war,  the  French  Government  rejected  the 
capacity  of  the  GPRA  set  up  by  the  FLN  in  1958  (which  has  been  recognised  by  many 
foreign  States),  to  adhere  to  the  Geneva  Conventions  in  the  following  terms: 
"The  French  Government  recalls  that  the  self-styled  'Provisional  Government  of  the 
Algerian  Republic'  set  up  on  foreign  territory  by  the  leaders  of  the  rebellion  in  the 
French  Department  of  Algeria,  cannot  on  any  grounds,  claim  the  capacity  of  'state' 
or  that  of  'power'  consequently.  It  does  not  possess  the  re?  uisite  competence  to 
'adhere'  to  the  said  conventions,  according  to  the  text  itself".  63 
The  French  Government  raised  the  question  of  legitimacy  of  the  representativity  of  the 
insurgents  and  the  question  of  sovereignty  over  Algeria  to  reject  the  capacity  of  the 
insurgents  to  adhere  to  the  conventions  and,  by  implication,  its  refusal  to  apply  the 
humanitarian  standards  set  in  those  conventions  to  this  conflict  even  when  France  was 
attempting  to  enter  into  negotiation  with  the  GPRA. 
1.1.4.  Nigeria 
In  Nigeria,  the  civilians  especially  in  the  Biafran  side,  were  cruelly  treated;  bombings  and 
starvation  were  used  extensively,  coupled  with  a  lack  of  food  and  medicines.  Genocide  was 
a  reality.  Shepherd  wrote: 
"A  question  must  be  posed  whether  there  is  uncontrollable  genocidal  movement  in  the 
Nigerian  army.  Evidence  of  indiscriminate  killing  of  non-combatants  is 
incontrovertible".  164 
O'Brian  also  wrote  that  the  killing  of  the  lbos  in  Benin  and  mid-western  regions  'leaves  no 
doubt  that  the  war  is  being  waged  in  a  genocidal  Spirit'.  165  The  insurgent's  Leader,  Lt.  Col. 
Ojukwu,  in  fact,  repeatedly  made  allegations  of  genocide.  166 
This  situation  led  the  Federal  Government  on  September  6th,  1968  to  invite  the 
Governments  of  Britain,  Canada,  Poland  and  Sweden,  the  UN  Secretary-General  and  the 
OAU  each  to  send  a  representative  to  Nigeria  to  observe  the  Federal  Army's  operation  in 
the  areas  affected  by  the  conflict. 
In  their  first  consolidated  report,  the  observers  found  that  the  Federal  Government  was 
following  its  declared  policies  of  protecting  the  lbo  people  and  lbo  property  in  Federal  held 
areas.  They  insisted  that  they  had  neither  seen  nor  heard  evidence  that  the  Federal  Army 
was  practising  a  policy  of  genocide  against  the  lbo  people  and  they  then  concluded  that  the 
term  'genocide"  was  unwarranted.  167 
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239 However,  on  the  controversial  ciuestion  of  bombing  of  civilians,  the  observers  made  clear 
that  'it  was  impossible  to  receive  proof  that  allegations  are  false'168  which  means  that  the 
allegations  that  indiscriminate  bombings  against  the  civilian  population  were  true. 
It  must  be  noted  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  conflict,  the  head  of  the  military 
Government  and  Commander-  in-Chie  f  of  the  armed  forces  issued  instructions  to  the 
Nigerian  army,  air  force  and  navy  in  which  he  insisted  that: 
"...  [N]o  mercy  will  be  shown  to  the  rebel  clique  and  their  collaborators  anywhere.  The 
task  of  the  Federal  military  Government  is  to  save  the  country  from  disintegration 
and  uncontrolled  bloodshed".  169 
In  other  words,  in  the  name  of  preserving  the  territorial  integrity  which  is  a  central 
component  of  sovereignty,  everything  is  justified  in  order  to  eliminate  the  insurgents  and 
their  collaborators,  the  latter  being  civilians.  The  result  of  such  policy  was  well  known  over 
2  million  people  died,  most  of  them  civilians. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  made  clear  that  on  the  legal  side,  the  Federal  Government, 
because  of  its  insistence  on  the  unity  of  Nigeria  and  its  sovereignty  had  never  acknowledged 
officially  the  applicability  of  Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Convention  to  the  situation.  However, 
many  implicit  acts  can  be  interpreted  that  the  Federal  Government  considered  very 
important  parts  of  the  Geneva  Convention  as  applicable.  Thus,  the  Nigerian  Foreign 
Minister  referred  to  Article  23  of  the  Civilian  Convention  in  order  to  allow  the  ICRC  free 
passage. 
The  Federal  Government  also  issued  a  code  of  conduct  to  its  forces  which  indicated 
among  other  things: 
"The  aim  of  the  war  is  to  keep  Nigeria  and  Nigerians  together.  To  ensure  this  noble 
task,  maximum  and  sincere  efforts  will  be  made  to  preserve  as  many  lives  as 
possible".  170 
It  then  made  clear  to  Federal  forces: 
"...  [Y]ou  will  not  repeat  not  bomb  any  non-military  targets.  Any  gathering  of  the 
civilian  population  will  be  avoided.  Military  targets  will  not  normally  be  towns.  You 
will  end  vour  to  maintain  a  maximum  restrain  on  your  activities  over  the  rebel 
forces".  ';? 
However,  in  practice,  Biafran  towns,  ports  and  villages  were  the  primary  targets  of  attack 
which  inevitably  resulted  in  huge  civilian  casualties  as  Stated  above.  172 
Examples  of  genocide  are  not  rare  in  this  respect.  The  New  York  Review  (dated 
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240 December  21st,  1967)  noted: 
"In  some  areas  outside  the  east  which  were  temporarily  held  by  Biafran  forces,  as  at 
Benin  and  the  midwestern  region,  Ibos  were  killed  by  local  people  with  at  least  the 
acquiescence  of  the  Federal  forces.  About  1,000  Ibo  civilians  perished  at  Benin  in  this 
way  . 
Moreover,  it  was  reported  in  The  Washington  Morning  Post  (dated  September  27th, 
1968)that: 
"The  greatest  single  massacre  occurred  in  the  Ibo  town  of  Asaba  where  700  Ibo  males 
were  lined  up  and  shot". 
Ojukwu,  the  Leader  of  the  insurgents,  repeatedly  accused  the  Federal  Government  of 
carrying  out  a  policy  of  genocide  against  the  Ibo  people.  173  This  means,  in  fact,  that  the 
Code  of  Conduct  of  the  Federal  army  had  not  been  respected  in  practice,  it  was  a 
propaganda  tool  for  the  Federal  Government  and  it  was  the  civilians  who  paid  the  price. 
1.1.5.  Yemen 
The  civil  war  in  the  Yemen  broke  out  in  September  1962  and  ended  formally  in  1969, 
fought  between  the  Republicans  supported  by  the  Egyptians  and  the  Royalists  supported 
by  the  Saudis.  174  The  war  was  long,  costly  and  bitterly  divisive.  Egypt  sent  a  60,000  strong 
army  175  to  help  the  new  republic  and  Saudi  Arabia  offered  money  and  refuge  to  the 
royalists.  The  Yemen  war,  in  my  view,  was  the  Vietnam  of  the  Arabs.  The  hatred  between 
the  two  factions  and  their  supporters  was  intense. 
The  royalists  resorted  to  guerrilla  methods  and  the  republicans  relied  on  their  superiority 
in  the  air.  The  use  of  bombardment  resulted  inevitably  in  the  loss  of  civilian  lives.  176 
1731n  his  speech  of  January  27th,  1968  Ojukwu  stated: 
"Gowon  conspired  with  his  Northern  Nigerians  to  massacre  more  than  3,000  Eastern  Nigerians  in 
May,  1966.  This  Is  genocide. 
Gowon  murdered  his  supreme  commander,  stole  his  mantle  of  office  and  proceeded  to  direct  the 
extermination  of  army  officers  and  men  of  Eastern  Nigerian  origin.  This  is  genocide. 
Gowon  plotted  and  carried  out  the  wholesale  massacre  throughout  Nigeria  of  persons  of  eastern 
origin  in  September  1966,  killing  more  than  30,000  defencetess  men,  women  and  children.  This 
is  genocide. 
Gowon,  in  1966,  organised  the  pillage  and  destruction  of  properties  belonging  to  Eastern 
Nigerians  in  Northern  Nigeria.  This  is  genocide. 
Gowon's  genocidal  acts  precipitated  the  mass  exodus  of  millions  of  Eastern  Nigerians  resident 
in  different  parts  of  Nigeria,  abandoning  aLL  their  properties,  businesses  and  means  of 
livelihood.  This  is  genocide.  Gowon  refused  to  compensate  Eastern  Nigerians  who  had  Lost  all 
their  property  as  a  result  of  his  activity.  This  is  genocide. 
Gowon  permitted  the  wanton  destruction  of  properties,  Looting  and  rape  throughout  those  areas 
of  Biafra  overrun  by  his  troops.  This  is  genocide. 
Gowon  ordered  the  forcible  transfer  of  Biafran  children  from  their  homes  in  Ofafra  to  Nigeria. 
This  is  genocide. 
For  all  these  acts,  Gowon  stands  condemned  for  genocide-a  crime  condemned  by  the  civilized 
world  under  international  law,  a  crime  against  humanity,  a  crime  against  God". 
lbid,  p.  241. 
174For 
a  background  to  the  events  see:  14  Keesingis,  1963-64,  pp.  19297-19303. 
17516  Keesing's,  1967-1968,  p.  21893. 
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241 Numerous  reports  alleged  that  the  Egyptians  used  poison  gas  against  royalists  and  dissident 
republican  villages.  177 
It  must  noted  that  in  January  1963,  the  contending  parties  agreed  'to  respect'  the 
principles  of  the  Geneva  Conventions'.  Boals  suggests  that: 
"These  pledges  appear  to  go  beyond  acceptance  of  the  provisions  of  Article  3  and 
supports  a  more  far-reaching  interpretation  of  the  obligations  of  the  parties  with 
respect  to  the  laws  of  war  than  might  otherwise  be  the  case  in  an  internal  conflict".  1  (8 
However,  the  practice  of  the  warring  factions  in  the  field  diverged  from  what  was 
proclaimed.  This  situation  led  Boals  to  concede  that. 
"...  [I]nternational  law  was  extremely  ineffective  in  regulating  the  conduct  of  the 
parties  in  the  Yemen  internal  war  and  hostilities  went  forward  largely  without 
refereng  to  applicable  standards  of  conduct  embodied  in  existing  or  evolving 
State".  19 
It  seems  to  me  that  foreign  intervention  was  a  factor  which  accentuated  the  suffering  of  the 
civilian  population  and  made  the  war  more  cruel.  As  Stookey  stressed  that: 
"Yemen,  in  effect,  again  had  two  regimes  under  respective  sponsorship  of  rivals  for 
influence  in  the  Arab  world".  180 
It  was  those  foreign  powers  who  introduced  sophisticated  arms  capable  of  mass  destruction, 
which  had  previously  been  unknown  and  prohibitively  expensive  in  the  under  developed 
and  tribal  Yemen. 
1.2.  Captured  Combatants 
As  we  have  seen,  during  the  Geneva  Conference  in  1949,  States  have  rejected  conferring 
the  status  of  POW  on  captured  insurgents  since  this  will  mean,  among  other  things,  that  they 
have  to  : 
"...  [R]epeal  their  treason  laws  and  confer  on  their  domestic  enemies  a  licence  to  kill, 
maim  or  kidnap  security  personnel  and  destroy  security  installations  subject  ?  nly  to 
honourable  detention  as  POW's  until  the  conclusion  of  the  internal  ýonflict".  81 
In  the  eyes  of  established  Governments,  the  extension  of  the  POW  status  to  captured 
insurgents,  would  encourage  rebellion  and  insurrection  since  the  personal  risks  of  those  who 
1771bid 
178  K.  BoaLs:  The  Relevance  of  International  Law  to  the  InternaL  War  in  Yemen,  in  Falk  (ed.  ),  op.  cit., 
supra.  chapter  2,  n.  8,  p.  315. 
1791bid, 
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180  R.  W.  Stookey:  The  Politics  of  the  Yemen  Arab  Republic.  Westview  Press,  Boulder,  Colorado,  p.  232. 
See  also:  N.  A.  Zabarah:  Yemen:  Traditionalism  vs.  Modernity.  Praeger  Pub.,  New  York,  1982,  pp.  72. 
85;  and  R.  D.  Burrowes:  The  Yemen  Arab  Republic:  The  Politics  of  Development:  1962-1986.  Westview 
Press/Croom  Helm,  1987,  pp.  22-27. 
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Transnationat  Practice.  33  AULR,  1983,  p.  59. 
242 rebel  are  greatly  diminished.  Therefore,  even  when  insurgents  carry  out  their  operation  in 
conformity  with  the  laws  of  war,  they  are  not  immune  from  prosecution  upon  capture. 
Common  Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Conventions,  in  fact,  does  not  take  away  the  right  of  the 
established  Government  to  prosecute  its  enemies  according  to  its  own  laws,  it  only  forbids 
summary  executions  without  trial. 
Hence,  the  law  in  the  words  of  Myrowitz: 
" 
... 
[G]ives  the  Government  in  power  a  very  strong  protection,  establishing  for  their 
benefit,  a  discrimination  whose  most  striking  expression  consists  of  the  fact  that  the 
182  law  of  civil  war  ignores  the  status  of  the  prisoner  of  war" 
The  practice,  however.  shows  that  in  some  cases  of  large-scale  civil  wars,  Governments  and 
especially  insurgents,  try  at  lease  on  a  de  facto  basis  to  grant  the  status  of  POW's  to  their 
respective  captured  combatants. 
A  typical  case  is  Nigeria,  where  the  Federal  Government  extended  on  a  de  facto  basis, 
a  treatment  similar  to  that  of  POW's  to  captured  Biafran  soldiers.  They  were  not  prosecuted 
for  the  sole  act  of  taking  arms  against  the  legal  Government. 
The  Military  Code  of  conduct  for  the  Nigerian  army  issued  by  the  Federal  Government 
in  July  1967,  suggests  that  in  all  their  actions  against  the  rebels,  the  Federal  army  has  to 
observe  the  rules  contained  in  the  Geneva  Conventions  and  on  the  more  specific  question 
of  POW's.  The  Code  stipulates  that: 
"Soldiers  who  surrender  will  not  be  killed.  They  are  disarmed  and  treated  as  POW's. 
They  are  entitled  in  all,  cir  umstances  to  humane  treatment  and  respect  for  their 
person  and  their  honour 
. 
If 
However,  since  only  'surrendered  soldiers'  can  be  treated  as  POW's,  the  number  of  those 
who  can  enjoy  it  would  be  insignificant  due  to  the  hatred  between  the  two  warring  factions. 
It  must  be  pointed  out  that  the  situation  in  Nigeria  was  bad  for  the  captured  combatants. 
In  his  interim  Report  of  January  17th,  1969,  the  representative  of  the  UN  Secretary- 
General  in  Nigeria  expressed  his  concern  for  the  POW's.  He  stressed  that: 
"...  [R]elatively  few  prisoners  had  been  taken  in  the  course  of  the  war".  184 
He  then  described  their  treatment  as  follows: 
"The  care  and  custody  of  the  POW  once  they  had  been  moved  away  from  the 
divisional  areas  was  assigned  to  the  civil  prison  authorities  and  consequently  POW 
were  subjected  to  much  the  same  regime  as  common  law  offenders  and  civilian 
detainees.  The  limited  prison  facilities  resulted  in  extreme  overcrowding  and  the 
available  medical  services  were  inadequate.  Prisoners  also  lacked  opportunities  for 
exercise  and  spent  too  little  time  in  the  open".  185 
182  H.  Myrowitz:  The  Law  of  War  in  Vietnam,  in  Falk  (ed.  ),  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  2,  n.  8,  P.  521. 
183Cited  by  A.  Rosas:  The  LegaL  Status  of  POW's.  SuomaLafnen  Tiedeakatemfa,  Helsinki,  1976,  P.  197. 
184  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  164,  p.  91. 
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243 Moreover,  Biafra  had  never  indicated  its  views  on  the  applicability  of  the  Geneva 
Convention  to  the  war,  either  In  toto  or  only  Article  3.  However,  in  relation  to  POW's, 
Rosas  argues  that: 
"...  [I]n  view  of  her  general  position  on  the  legal  nature  of  the  conflict,  it  may  be 
assumed  that  Biafra  acknowledged,  as  a  minimum,  the  applicability  of  the  customary 
law  relating  to  POW's".  186 
It  seems  to  me,  that  the  practice  in  general  indicates  that  when  the  conflict  intensifies  and 
the  insurgents  became  capable  of  sustaining  a  prolonged  war,  the  situation  will  lead  the 
established  Government  to  treat  captured  insurgents  as  POW's  at  least,  on  a  de  facto  basis, 
in  the  hope  that  the  insurgents  will  reciprocate,  therefore  protecting  Government  soldiers. 
At  the  same  time,  the  Government  would  play  down  any  legal  significance  of  such  moves 
by  insisting  that  only  humanitarian  norms  are  behind  its  actions.  On  the  other  hand,  and  as 
a  general  rule,  insurgents  frequently  seem  willing  to  grant  POW  status  to  captured 
Government  soldiers,  despite  their  scarce  resources.  The  political  and  legal  significance  of 
such  moves  are  clear.  They  made  the  insurgent  organizations  appear  respectable  and  capable 
of  assuming  obligations  like  Governments. 
Guerrilla  organizations  even  liberate  captured  soldiers  when  unable  to  maintain  them.  In 
this  context,  Che  Guevara  stated  the  policy  of  the  Cuban  insurrection  as  follows: 
"What  can  never  be  done  is  to  keep  prisoners  unless  a  secure  base  of  operations 
invulnerable  to  the  enemy  has  been  established.  Otherwise  prisoners  will  become  a 
dangerous  menace  to  the  security  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  regions  or  to  the  guerrilla 
band  itself  because  of  the  information  he  can  give  upon  rejoining  his  army.  If  he  has 
not  been  a  notorious  criminal,  he  should  be  set  free  after  receiving  a  lecture".  187 
1.2.1.  Algeria 
The  FLN  in  Algeria  insisted  throughout  the  conflict  that  it  had  conferred  POW  status  on 
French  soldiers.  The  FLN  also  issued  a  detailed  procedure  to  be  followed  by  its  forces  in 
cases  of  capture  of  French  soldiers,  188  and  in  its  10  commandments  of  the  Arm6e  de 
Libdration  Nationale  (ALN),  the  military  wing  of  the  FLN,  the  combatants  were  instructed 
to  'se  conformer  aux  principes  de  l'Islam  et  aux  lois  internationales  dans  la  destruction  des 
forces  ennemies'.  189  It  is  well  known  that  according  to  Islam,  the  captives  must  be  treated 
well  and  in  a  good  manner.  190  A  well-known  military  Commander  wrote  in  the  FLN 
newspaper  "El  Moudjahid": 
l  86  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  183,  p.  196. 
187  E.  Che  Guevara:  Guerrilta  Warfare.  Penguin  books,  p.  49. 
IB8  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  152,  p.  196. 
189  Cited  by  M.  Veuthey:  Guerri  I  la  at  drolt  human!  tafre.  Henry  Durrant  Institute,  Genbve,  1976,  p.  202. 
190  In  this  respect,  see:  M.  Khaddurf  (translation  and  Introduction):  The  Islamic  Law:  Shaybani's 
Siyar.  The  John  Hopkins  Press,  Baltimore,  Maryland  1966,  pp.  75-138  and  Sheikh  Abdut-Aziz  Khayyat: 
International  Humanitarian  Law  and  Islamic  Law.  First  Arabic  Middle  East  Seminar  on  International 
Humanitarian  Law,  Amman,  5-13  April  1981,  Report  presented  by  the  ICRC  and  the  Jordanian  National  Red 
Crescent  Society,  1981,  pp.  131-32. 
244 OVALN  s'est  tOujours  efforcde  de  traiter  le  plus  humainement  possible  les  prisonners 
Frangais.  Nos  Moudjahidines  vont  jusqu'a  sacrifier  leur  maigre  confort  au  profit  des 
soldats  captur6s".  191 
However.  the  French  Government  refused  for  a  very  long  to  grant  POW  status  to  the 
captured  rebels,  they  were  treated  as  common  criminals  and  they  were  often  sentenced  to 
death  for  terrorist  activities.  192  Torture  and  various  forms  of  inhumane  treatment  of 
captured  insurgents  and  suspects  were  systematically  resorted  to.  In  this  context, 
Hutchinson  wrote  that: 
"...  [P]unishment,  often  in  the  form  of  physical  torture  was  meted  out  to  guilty  and 
innocent  alike  in  contrast  to  the  more  discriminating  and  subtle  violence  of  the 
FLN".  193 
In  fact,  numerous  cases  of  alleged  beatings,  torture  and  starvation  of  prisoners  in  order  to 
extort  "confessions'  had  been  cited  in  the  French  press  and  even  in  the  debates  of  the 
French  Assemblde  Nationale.  194 
On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  pointed  out  that  the  continued  policy  of  France  in 
executing  the  captured  insurgents  led  the  FLN  to  declare  on  April  30th,  1958  that  the 
insurgents  would  'respect  the  laws  of  war  only  if  the  enemy  does  the  same,  195  and  that  a 
French  soldier  would  be  shot  for  every  rebel  guillotined.  Thus,  the  FLN  resorted  to  the 
execution  of  French  soldiers  on  at  least  two  occasions  (in  May  1958,  two  POW's)  and  in 
August  1960.  It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  the  FLN  tried  to  justify  these  executions  not 
as  reprisals  but  rather  as  punishments  meted  out  by  special  courts  of  the  Liberation  Army 
for  alleged  war  crimes  committed  against  the  civilian  population  such  as  torture,  rape  and 
murder.  196 
In  general,  it  seems  that  the  FLN  has  tried  very  hard  to  comply  with  the  details  of  the 
third  convention  despite  the  harsh  conditions  of  guerrilla  warfare,  which  made  it  very 
difficult  to  organize  and  maintain  POW  camps.  The  FLN  sent  lists  of  POW's  captured  by 
its  units;  prisoners  received  parcels  from  their  families;  were  able  to  send  letters  and  tape 
recordings  and  in  one  instance,  at  least  the  ICRC  was  able  to  visit  captured  French  soldiers. 
This  occurred  in  1957.  The  FLN  also  handed  over  to  the  ICRC  on  January  II  th,  1958,  four 
French  soldiers.  197 
In  the  later  years  of  the  war,  France  began  to  change  its  attitude  toward  the  problem  of 
1910p. 
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d'Atger.,  Vot.  1  (Llembrasement).  ENAL.  Alger,  1984,  pp.  229-245. 
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245 captured  rebels.  They  (the  French)  allowed  the  ICRC  to  visit  camps  and  prisons  on  at  least 
10  occasions.  Thus,  on  January  13th,  1959,  some  important  measures  of  amnesty  and 
clemency  for  Algerian  captives  were  announced.  It  was  decided  that: 
1.  All  persons  condemned  to  death  would  have  their  sentences  commuted  to  life 
imprisonment  (179  persons  were  to  benefit  from  this  measure). 
2.  Seven  thousand  suspects  would  be  released  from  the  internment  camps  in  Algeria. 
3.  Sentences  on  all  Algerian  rebels,  other  than  those  on  whom  the  death  sentence  had  been 
passed  or  those  serving  terms  of  less  than  three  months,  would  be  reduced  by  one-tenth. 
4.  Rebels  serving  sentences  of  three  months  or  those  who  had  been  wounded  in  military 
operations,  would  be  immediately  released,  etc.  '98 
On  January  19th,  1959,  it  was  announced  in  Algeria  that  7,188  suspects  had  been  released 
from  internment  camps  in  application  of  the  amnesty.  199  These  measures  it  must  be  stressed, 
were  essentially  taken  to  mark  the  beginning  of  General  de  Gaulle's  seven  year  presidential 
office.  They  were  politically  motivated  and  they  did  not  in  any  way  amount  to  a  recognition 
of  the  POW  status  since  captured  insurgents  were  still  considered  criminals.  However,  a 
partial  recognition  of  the  status  of  FLN  POW's  came  indirectly,  and  under  strict  conditions, 
in  1959  in  a  memorandum  to  the  French  Minister  of  Justice.  In  this  context,  a  member  of 
General  Massu's  staff  declared  that: 
"Rebels  captured  with  guns  in  their  hands,  guiltless  of  any  crimes  before  joining  a 
rebel  group  are  not  prosecuted  but  are  interned  in  military  camps.  They  are  treated 
as  members  of  an  enemy  army  ".  200 
In  practice,  this  means  that  insurgents  in  order  to  benefit  from  such  treatment,  the  captured 
insurgents  must  satisfy  the  conditions  of  Article  IV/2  (a)  of  the  third  Geneva 
Convention.  201  The  implication  is  that  the  irregular  forces  of  the  FLN,  members  of  the 
OCFLN  who  work  among  the  population  and  do  not  bear  arms  or  carry  weapons,  would  still 
be  treated  as  terrorists. 
The  Algerian  case  suggests  that  even  the  elementary  humanitarian  rules  of  Common 
Article  3,  were  not  respected  especially  in  the  first  period  of  the  conflict.  Summary 
19812  Keesing's,  1959-1960,  p.  16628. 
1991bid. 
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201  Articte  IV/2  (a)  provides,  inter  atia,  that: 
112.  Members  of  other  mi  lit  ia  and  members  of  other  volunteer  corps,  including  those  of  organized 
resistance  movement,  belonging  to  a  party  to  the  conflict  and  operating  in  or  outside  their 
own  territory,  even  if  this  territory  is  occupied,  provided  that  such  militia  or  volunteer 
corps,  including  such  organized  resistance  movement,  fulfil  the  following  conditions: 
(a)  That  of  being  commanded  by  a  person  responsible  for  his  subordinates; 
(b)  That  of  having  a  fixed  distinctive  sign  recognizable  at  a  distance; 
(c)  That  of  carrying  arms  openly; 
(d)  That  of  conducting  their  operations  in  accordance  with  the  taws  and  customs  of  war. 
Friedman,  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  3,  n.  17.  pp.  590-591. 
246 executions  in  the  field,  torture  and  inhumane  treatment  were  used  systematically.  202  in  this 
context,  a  close  confidant  of  General  de  Gaulle  who  worked  in  Algeria  from  1958  until 
1962  wrote: 
"Quand,  dans  une  situation  comme  I"Algdrie,  la  justice,  si  je  peux  dire,  16gale,  ne  peut 
plus  faire  entiýrement  face  a  sa  tAche,  qu'elle  est  encombr6e  et  que  son  n6cessilre 
formalisme  laisse  impunis  des  crimes  certains,  il  se  forme  une  justice  parallOe".  03 
He  then  added  that: 
"On  n'envoie  plus  les  gens  devant  les  tribunaux  on  les  interne,  ou,  si  le  cas  est  grave, 
ils  sont  cens6s  avoir  W  abattus  en  cherchant  i  s'enfuir.  Et  comme  la  lenteur  de  la 
justice  affaiblit  beaucoup  1'exemplarit6  de  la  repression,  on  cherche  par  d'autres 
moyens  A  rendre  celle-ci  terrifiante:  Mabitude  s'6tait  prise  ainsi,  a  une  ipoque 
d'exposer  sur  la  place  des  villages  les  cadavres  des  terroristes  abbatus.  Sinistres 
pratiques,  dont  on  peut  penser  que,  plut6t  que  d'inspirer  la  crainte  elle  attisait  les 
haines".  204 
It  must  be  noted  that  even  when  France  recognised  the  limited  protection  from  prosecution 
for  a  limited  number  of  FLN  soldiers  only  a  small  number  of  captured  insurgents  had 
benefitted  from  it.  Thus,  at  the  close  of  conflict,  they  were  only  3600  persons.  On  the  other 
hand,  no  formal  acknowledgement  of  POW  status  was  declared  by  the  French  Government, 
the  latter  tried  to  make  sure  that  no  legal  status  was  given  to  the  FLN. 
However,  it  seems  that  the  FLN  in  general  was  willing,  despite  their  limited  resources, 
to  apply  the  whole  third  Geneva  Convention,  especially  from  1958,  the  year  of 
establishment  of  the  GPRA.  Of  course,  the  benefits  from  such  a  course  of  action  were 
evident,  since  in  practice,  it  is  the  French  who  held  a  large  number  of  FLN  soldiers  and 
sympathizers;  also  from  a  legal  and  political  viewpoint,  it  enhanced  the  cause  of  the  FLN. 
1.2.2.  Vietnam 
In  Vietnam,  the  most  significant  factor  is  the  enormous  divergence  between  what  the 
Government  issued  as  standards  of  behaviour  towards  captured  enemy  soldiers  and  the 
atrocities  committed  by  the  army  in  the  field. 
Thus,  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  armed  forces  guide  book  for  handling  combat  captives 
stated  that: 
"Viet  Cong  have  been  warned  by  their  commanders  that  once  we  capture  them,  we 
will  kill  them.  Therefore,  captured  VC's  are  'wise'  to  seek  a  quiet  death  rather  than 
be  tortured  ...  We  must  make  them  realise  that  they  have  been  subjected  to  false  VC 
propaganda  by  handling  them  in  a  good  manner  .  . 
205 
202See  in  this  respect:  D.  Amrane:  Llextention  de  la  tutte  armL&e  pendant  lea  premi6res  ann6es  cle  ta 
guerre  de  Lib6ration  nationate,  in:  Le  retentissement  de  ta  R*votution  ALg6rier'ne.  Cotloque 
fnternationaL  d'Atger  (24-28  Nov.  1984),  ENAL.  Aiger,  1985,  pp.  90-108.  See  aLso  H.  Greer:  A  Scattering 
of  Dust.  Hutchinson  of  London,  1962,  pp.  150-181. 
203  B.  Tricot:  Les  sentlers  de  La  paix:  Atg6rie  1958-1962.  PLon,  Parts,  1972,  p.  85. 
2D41bid. 
205  Cited  by  R.  Mitter  (ed.  ):  The  Law  of  war.  Lexington  Books,  Lexington  &  London,  and  D.  C.  Heath 
Co.,  1975,  p.  167. 
247 Moreover,  in  a  wallet-size  plastic  card  which  was  written  in  Vietnamese  and  was  given  to 
the  Republic's  army,  it  stated  that: 
"When  a  communist  rebel  prisoner  is  captured  he  will  be  treated  humanely  by  you 
although  he  is  not  recognized  as  a  POW  in  accordance  with  the  meaning  normally 
used  internationally 
... 
do  not  seek  revenge  under  any  reason  0.206 
In  substance,  the  South  Vietnamese,  who  collected  a  great  number  of  prisoners,  were  not 
prepared  to  grant  POW  status  to  their  captives.  However,  they  indicated  they  would 
implicitly  conform  to  Article  3  since  the  captured  are  to  be  treated  humanely.  Furthermore, 
the  evidence  suggests  that  the  standards  of  humane  treatment  were  not  adhered  to  by  the 
South  Vietnamese  Government.  Thus,  the  Viet  Cong  captives  were  executed  in  the  field, 
or  tortured  to  death,  207  revenge  was  the  norm. 
The  issue  of  treatment  of  detainees  was  raised  with  regard  to  the  Provincial  Interrogation 
Centers.  These  centers  were  built  by  American  funding,  (44  centers  were  built)  and  were 
run  by  the  Vietnamese  special  police  who  specialised  in  interrogating  VC  suspects.  They 
were  advised  directly  by  the  CIA.  The  Vietnamese  police,  as  Guenter  Lewy  remarked  that: 
"...  [W]as  not  a  highly  professional  organization  and  the  South  Vie  namese  generally 
were  reputed  to  have  a  low  regard  for  human  life  and  suffering". 
108 
However,  it  seems  that  the  inhuman  practices  of  the  South  Vietnamese  army  towards 
captured  Viet  Cong  insurgents,  which  were  largely  reported  by  the  mass  media,  have  led 
the  US  staff  advisers  and  comman  personnel  to  persuade  their  Vietnamese  allies  to  change 
their  politics  and  practices.  The  Americans  stressed  to  their  allies  that  they  had  overlooked 
the  value  of  trying  to  gain  military  intelligence  from  their  captives.  209  It  must  also  be  noted 
that  the  Americans  would  greatly  benefit  from  that  change  of  policy  since  American 
prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  insurgents  would  not  be  the  object  of  reprisals  and  it  would 
give  them  a  favourable  international  propaganda. 
Nevertheless,  the  practice  of  the  US  forces  per  se  toward  captured  Viet  Cong  soldiers, 
reveals  two  distinct  periods.  In  the  first  period,  Viet  Cong  soldiers  captured  by  US  forces 
were  simply  turned  over  to  the  South  Vietnamese  in  the  field,  the  latter  resorted  to  acts  of 
2061bid. 
207 
The  evidence  is  abundant.  The  Christian  Science  Monitor  of  Feb.  5th,  1967  reported  that: 
"There  have  been  news  reports  and  pictures  of  rough  treatment  of  prisoners  by  the  South 
Vietnamese  mititary  units  in  the  ffetd.  There  atso  have  been  substantfat  accounts  of  on-the- 
spot  executions  of  prisoners.  Torture  of  prisoners  in  the  fietd  has  not  been  uncommonso. 
208  G.  Lewy:  America  in  Vietnam.  OUP,  New  York,  1978,  p.  285. 
2091n 
this  context,  Lewy  wrote  that: 
"Most  American  advisers,  it  appears  tried  to  get  across  the  proposition  that  the  use  of  force 
was  not  productive  of  retlabte  inteltigence  and  even  though  the  South  Vietnamese  were  not 
aLways  receptive  to  this  advice,  there  is  reason  to  think  on  the  whoLe,  American  InfLuence 
hetped  somewhat  to  mitigate  the  crueLtfes  to  be  encountered  In  any  civf  L  war". 
lbid,  p.  288. 
248 summary  execution  and  maltreatment.  This  led  to  accusations  of  the  US  that  it  had  violated 
Article  12  of  the  third  Geneva  Convention,  210  and  as  result,  captured  North  Vietnamese  and 
Viet  Cong  fighters  were  sent  to  American  divisional  headquarters  and  kept  by  the 
Americans.  They  would  then  be  transferred  to  the  South  Vietnamese  only  when  a  new 
POW's  compound  was  made  ready. 
The  US  Commander  in  Chief  in  Vietnam  stressed  that: 
"These  prisoners  are  not  being  mistreated.  They  are  handled  in  accordance  with  the 
211  Geneva  Convention". 
Moreover,  every  American  soldier  was  issued  with  an  instruction  card  for  the  treatment  of 
prisoners.  It  is  directed  that  prisoners  were  to  be  handled  'firmly,  promptly,  but 
humanely'.  212  Furthermore,  'mistreatment  of  any  captive  is  a  criminal  offence',  213  and  lastly 
it  is  stressed  in  the  same  card  that  'whether  civilians  or  combat  captives'  they  are  to  be 
214  protected  against  'violence,  insults,  curiosity  and  reprisals  of  any  kind' 
. 
It  must  also  be  noted  that  the  US  tried  very  hard  to  encourage  the  North  Vietnamese  and 
the  Viet  Cong  to  treat  its  captured  soldiers  as  POW's  by  indicating  that  it  will  act 
reciprocally.  In  this  context,  Directive  20-5  of  September  21st,  1966  (as  amended  on 
December  16th,  1966),  the  US  Military  Command  in  Vietnam  (MACV)  indicated  that  in 
addition  to  the  persons  qualifying  under  Article  4  of  the  Third  Geneva  Convention,  the 
protection  of  the  latter  Convention  was  to  be  extended  to: 
"I.  Persons  who  are  captured  while  actually  engaging  in  combat  or  a  belligerent  act 
other  than  an  act  of  terrorism,  sabotage  or  spying  against  the  Republic  of  Vietnam 
or  the  United  States  and  other  free  world  military  assistance  force. 
2.  Any  captive  member  of  the  North  Vietnamese  armed  forces  or  of  the  Viet  Cong, 
whether  captured  in  combat  or  not,  except  a  terrorist,  saboteur  or  Spy".  215 
21OArticle  12  of  the  Third  Geneva  Convention  stfputates  that: 
"POW's  are  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy  power,  but  not  of  the  individuals  or  mf  titary  unf  ts  who 
have  captured  them.  Irrespective  of  the  individual  responsibilities  that  may  exist,  the 
detaining  power  is  responsible  for  the  treatment  given  to  them. 
POW's  may  onty  be  transferred  by  the  detaining  power  to  a  power  which  is  a  party  to  the 
convention  and  after  the  detaining  power  has  satisfied  itself  of  the  willingness  and  ability 
of  such  transferee  power  to  apply  the  convention.  When  POW's  are  transferred  under  such 
circumstances,  responsibility  for  the  application  of  the  convention  rests  on  the  power 
accepting  them  white  they  are  in  their  custody. 
Nevertheless,  If  that  power  falls  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of  the  convention  in  any 
important  aspect.  the  power  to  whom  the  POW's  were  transferred  shatt,  upon  being  notified  by 
the  protecting  power.  take  effective  measures  to  correct  the  situation  or  shatt  request  the 
return  of  the  POW's.  Such  requests  must  be  complied  with". 
Friedman,  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  201,  p.  594. 
2110ted  by  H.  S.  Levie:  Mattreatment  of  POW's  in  Vietnam,  in  Fatk  (ed.  ):  The  Vietnam  War  and 
Internationat  Law.  Vot.  2,  PUP,  Princeton,  New  Jersey,  1969,  p.  378. 
212  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  141.  p.  512. 
2131bid. 
2141bid. 
215Whiteman, 
op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1.  n.  5,  Vot.  10,  p.  216. 
249 Similarly,  in  a  reply  to  a  letter  from  the  ICRC  concerning  the  application  of  the  Geneva 
Convention  of  1949  to  the  hostilities  in  Vietnam,  the  US  Secretary  of  State,  Dean  Rusk 
wrote  that: 
"Among  the  particular  measures  being  taken  to  implement  the  convention  at  the 
present  time,  the  United  States  Government  is  developing  plans  to  assist  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  of  Vietnam  to  expand  and  improve  facilities  and 
procedures  to  process  and  care  for  an  increased  number  of  captives  taken  in  combat. 
The  two  Governments  are  also  increasing  programs  of  instruction  for  personnel  in 
the  details  of  the  provisions  of  the  Convention".  16 
However,  despite  this  official  policy,  information  existed,  and  it  is  well  -  documented,  as  to 
the  atrocities  of  American  troops  in  the  field  where  the  policy  of  'body  count'  was 
followed.  217 
As  to  the  insurgents  (the  NLF)  their  policy  was  at  first  Stated  in  general  terms.  It  stated 
that: 
"The  NLF  applies  a  lenient  policy  toward  military  men  and  members  of  the  enemy 
administration  as  well  as  toward  captured  foreigners,  including  Americans".  218 
The  NLF  explained  that  policy  on  the  ground  that  the  majority  of  the  military  men  in  the 
southern  army  were  workers,  peasants  and  labourers  who  came  from  the  poorer  strata  and 
who  have  been  induced  or  forced  to  enlist. 
This  policy  was,  in  fact,  confirmed  by  a  letter  from  90  men  captured  in  June  1962,  they 
wrote: 
"We  have  been  well  treated  by  the  revolutionary  soldiers.  They  appeared  before  us 
with  a  smile,  full  of  clemency  and  humanitarianism 
...  we,  victors  and  vanquished,  have  been  living  together  with  fraternity  and  full  affection".  219 
In  its  programme  of  1967,  the  NLF  made  its  Policy  towards  enemy  prisoners  clearer, 
'captured  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  puppet  army  will  enjoy  humane  treatment  and 
leniency 
...  captured  US  and  satellite  troops  will  receive  the  same  treatment  as  captured 
220  puppet  troops'. 
The  NLF  also  delivered  to  every  captured  American  soldier  a  declaration  in  English 
which  explained  their  policy  toward  them.  The  Declaration  stated  specifically. 
"I.  POW's  are  not  maltreated  or  insulted. 
2.  POW's  shall  receive  sufficient  food,  receive  care  when  they  are  ill  or  wounded. 
3.  They  have  occasion  to  understand  that  the  liberation  forces  are  not  'rebels'  but 
organized  and  disciplined  patriots  struggling  for  peace,  independence  and  democracy, 
for  friendship  with  all  peoples  of  the  world  including  the  American  people,  for  a  free 
and  happy  life  without  the  U.  S.  monopolists  and  their  valets  in  South  Vietnam. 
216  Ibid,  p.  245. 
217 
See  atso  supra.  n.  141,  pp.  512-13,  supra.  n.  10,  p.  172  and  supra.  n.  208,  pp.  50-73. 
218D. 
Pike:  Viet  Cong.  The  MIT  Press,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  London,  1966,  p.  259. 
219  Ibid. 
2200P. 
Ct.,  supra.  n.  183,  p.  174. 
250 "221  4.  They  shall  be  liberated 
. 
Besides,  it  seems  that  primitive  prisons  were  maintained  by  the  NLF.  They  were  small  and 
transient,  their  favourite  place  was  the  jungle  which  was  an  ideal  place  for  hiding.  222  it 
appears  that  US  servicemen  were  treated  humanely.  However,  the  South  Vietnamese  were 
subjected  to  some  indignity.  Treatment  of  prisoners  were  in  general  subject  to  their  co- 
operation  and  participation  in  the  seminars  organized  by  the  political  officers  in  the  camps. 
They  were  in  practice,  courses  of  political  indoctrination. 
The  NLF,  it  must  be  noted,  has  resorted  in  some  instances  to  the  killing  of  American 
prisoners. 
223  The  killings  were  specifically  justified  as  reprisals  against  the  execution  of  the 
Viet  Cong  soldiers  by  the  US  forces.  224  The  US  considered  these  reprisals  as  murder  and 
violations  of  the  third  Geneva  Convention.  225 
On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  made  clear  that  throughout  the  conflict  the  NLF  has  never 
committed  itself  to  be  bound  by  the  obligations  contained  in  the  third  Geneva  Convention, 
Rosas  thinks  that  'the  NLF  committed  itself  to  certain  humanitarian  principles,  presumably 
akin  to  customary  international  law,.  226 
The  conclusion  is  that  in  Vietnam,  the  internal  elements  of  the  struggle  played  a 
significant  role  in  the  conduct  of  the  principal  parties  of  the  struggle,  (the  NLF  and  the 
Government  of  South  Vietnam)  towards  captured  soldiers  of  both  sides.  The  hatred  and 
cruelty  that  accompanied  internal  conflicts  was  obvious  in  the  conduct  of  the  South 
Vietnamese  despite  official  statements  made  under  US  pressure. 
However,  the  insurgents,  for  obvious  political  and  propagandist  reasons,  abstained  from 
massive  inhumane  treatment  of  the  South  Vietnamese  prisoners.  Instead  they  resorted  to 
political  indoctrination  in  the  hope  of  giving  the  newly  captured  prisoners  a  new  outlook 
on  Communism. 
1.3.  The  Wounded  and  Sick 
Article  3  states  simply  that  the  sick  and  wounded  shall  be  cared  for.  In  fact,  it  repeats  in 
general,  the  customary  principle  codified  in  the  1864  Geneva  Convention.  Article  (3) 
contains  no  further  explanation  on  how,  what  and  who  should  give  that  protection.  In 
221C)P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  218,  p.  267. 
222For 
a  det  af  Led  description  of  the  camps  and  daf  Iy  Life  in  them,  see  MiLLer,  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  205, 
pp.  172-174. 
2230p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  218,  p.  267. 
2240p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  205,  p.  332. 
225The  Director  of  the  office  of  News  in  the  US  State  Department  stressed  on  Sept.  27th,  1965  that: 
"These  murders  not  only  violate  the  sense  of  decency  of  all  civilized  men  but  are  also  In 
direct  violation  of  the  prisoners'  provisions  of  the  1949  Geneva  Convention  by  whichthe  Viet 
Cong  masters,  that  is  the  Government  of  Hanoi,  is  bound.  Article  13  of  the  Geneva  Convention 
expressly  prohibits  reprisals  against  prisoners". 
Op.  cit.,  supre.  n.  205,  p.  333. 
2260P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  183,  p.  175. 
251 particular,  there  is  no  protection  of  those  who  try  to  give  assistance  to  the  sick  and 
wounded. 
The  ICRC  in  its  report  submitted  to  the  CGEDHL  in  1972,  summed  up  the  practice  vis- 
i-vis  this  section  of  victims  of  international  wars  as  follows: 
"Improper  knowledge  of  the  rules  of  humanity  combined  with  partisan  quarrels,  too 
often  interfere  with  the  free  exercise  of  the  medical  profession  in  internal  conflicts. 
It  endangers  the  lives  of  doctors  and  nurses  and  hampers  the  availability  of 
medicaments  and  dressings.  In  the  long  run  it  is  jhe  wounded  and  sick  who  suffer, 
while  they  should  be  kept  out  of  the  fighting".  22 
It  must  be  stressed  that  in  practice,  it  was  the  insurgents  who  suffered  most  since  the 
established  Government  had  resorted  to  banning  sale  to  them  of  certain  medicaments.  It  was 
a  crime  to  aid  wounded  and  sick  insurgents.  Moreover,  generally  speaking  the  Government 
had  at  its  disposal  hospitals  to  care  for  its  wounded  personnel. 
Che  Guevara  stressed  that  the  insurgents  must  treat  wounded  enemies  with  care  and 
respect  'unless  his  former  life  had  made  him  liable  to  the  death  penalty  in  which  case  he 
will  be  treated  in  accordance  with  his  desserts'.  228 
1.3.1  In  Vietnam 
Miller  surnmarised  the  situation  as  follows: 
"It  appears  that  concern  for  collection  and  protection  of  the  wounded  and  sick  was 
among  the  few  principles  of  the  Geneva  Convention  honoured  in  spirit,  if  not  the 
229  letter,  of  the  law". 
To  him,  mistreatment  of  the  wounded  combatants  was  not  a  major  characteristic  of  the 
Vietnam  war,  the  explanation  given  is  that: 
"...  [B]oth  Vietnamese  and  US  cultural  values  and. 
3poublished  policies  debate  compassion  for  the  wounded  and  sick  of  any  nationality".  2  0 
Therefore,  US  personnel  were  instructed  not  to  refuse  medical  aid.  23  1  However,  atrocities 
were  not  absent  from  time  to  time.  232 
2270P. 
cit.  #  supra.  n.  100,  p.  53. 
2280p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  187,  p.  49 
2290P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  205,  p.  194. 
2301bid. 
2310P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  141,  p.  512. 
2321t 
appears  that: 
"...  CUInlike  Amer  I  can  casualties,  who  were  taken  direct  ty  by  he  I,  I  copter  to  large  hospit  a  Is  with 
full  surgical  facilities,  it  was  the  practice  to  Interrogate  wounded  Viet  Cong  and  North 
Vietnamese  soldiers  before  evacuation  while  providing  first  aid  for  one  badly  hit  Viet  Cong. 
I  was  told  by  a  senior  officer,  'We  just  need  to  keep  him  alive  for  a  few  minutes  so  we  can 
question  him,  after  that  he  can  die,  it  does  not  matter'.  On  another  occasion,  an  intelligence 
officer,  objected  to  my  giving  morphine  to  a  wounded  prisoner,  saying  II  think  they  talk  better 
when  they  are  in  a  Little  pain". 
252 It  should  also  be  pointed  out  that  aerial  bombardment  resulted  inevitably  and  in  many 
instances,  in  big  numbers  of  civilian  wounded  and  sick  who  were  not  collected  and  cared 
for;  coupled  with  the  inadequacy  and  lack  of  medicaments  this  resulted  in  many  wounded 
and  sick  being  left  to  die. 
1.3.2.  In  Algeria 
France  in  fact  tried  from  the  beginning  of  the  conflict  to  establish  a  'blocus  sanitaire' 
against  the  insurgents.  From  1955,  the  French  Government  forbade  the  sale  of  certain 
medicaments  which  were  used  to  treat  injuries.  Chemists  were  ordered  not  to  deliver 
medicines  or  surgical  instruments  without  medical  prescriptions.  The  identity  of  buyers  and 
their  addresses  had  to  be  taken.  Doctors  too,  who  assisted  an  Algerian  whose  injuries  were 
suspect  had  to  take  all  necessary  information  i.  e.  name,  address,  names  of  those  who 
accompanied  him,  failing  to  do  so  would  result  in  prosecution.  Thus,  an  Algerian  doctor 
(B.  M.  Zemliri)  was  sentenced  to  8  years  imprisonment  for  having  assisted  a  wounded 
insurgent.  233 
Hence,  assistance  to  injured  insurgents  and  the  banning  of  the  free  sale  of  medicine 
which  were  necessary  for  any  effective  protection  of  the  wounded  may  be  used  as  an 
element  of  the  whole  strategy  of  war  against  the  insurgents.  Veuthey  went  even  further 
when  he  suggested  that  'on  ne  cherche  qu'&  blesser  plut6t  qu'a  tuer,  dans  le  but  de 
234  surcharger  la  troupe  et  les  services  sanitaires  adverses'. 
It  must  be  noted  that  it  is  the  insurgents  who  were  the  hardest  hit  by  this  practice  since 
they  lacked  hospitals,  medicines  and  trained  medical  personnel.  In  one  instance,  Fidel 
Castro  in  July  1958  released  without  any  conditions  253  wounded  regular  soldiers;  the  main 
reason  being  that  the  insurgents  were  not  in  a  position  to  care  for  them  because  of  lack  of 
medicines.  235 
The  practice  shows  that  in  many  instances  collaboration  between  the  insurgents,  the 
established  Government  and  the  ICRC  in  respect  of  the  wounded  and  sick  was  possible.  No 
party  used  such  attitudes  to  infer  some  legal  status  for  the  insurgents,  indeed  in  these 
circumstances  it  is  the  humanitarian  ideals  which  play  the  leading  role.  236  On  the  other 
hand,  it  appears  that  in  some  instances,  the  ICRC  medical  teams,  material  and  vehicles 
that  were  used  to  assist  the  wounded  and  sick  were  the  object  of  attack  (especially  in  the 
Lebanon). 
However,  in  general  it  seems  that  the  ICRC  was  able,  despite  these  problems,  to  do  a 
Cited  by  Veuthey,  op.  cit..  supra.  n.  189,  p.  181.  The  Evening  Standard  in  Washington  of  June  30th,  1965 
reported  that: 
"It  is  a  hard  fact  of  war  in  South  Vietnam  that  hospitats  become  a  target  for  both  sides. 
Vietnamese  troops  rate  the  destruction  of  Viet  Cong  hospitaLs  probabLy  higher  than  anything 
short  of  kiLting  Viet  Cong  troops. 
2330p. 
cit.,  supra,  n.  p.  182. 
2341bid, 
p.  181. 
2351bid. 
236The  ICRC  WorLdwide  1986,  pp.  14  &  17. 
253 superb  job  in  this  area  (the  protection  of  the  wounded  and  the  sick).  In  its  worldwide  report 
of  1986  the  ICRC  stressed  that: 
"The  tasks  of  the  ICRC  Medical  Division  have  diversified  to  keep  pace  with  the 
changing  nature  of  warfare  since  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War.  In  addition  to 
meeting  the  priority  need  for  medicines  and  medical  supplies  to  treat  the  wounded, 
a  global  approach  was  adopted  to  the  health  problems  affectinzlhe  victims  such  as 
epidemics,  inadequate  hygiene  conditions  and  poor  nutrition".  "" 
It  seems  to  me,  that  since  all  cultures  of  the  world  encourage  compassion  for  the  sick  and 
wounded,  it  is  difficult,  especially  morally,  to  use  claims  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention  to  bar  the  necessary  assistance  to  such  victims.  Any  such  attempts  must  be 
condemned  as  being  against  the  very  basis  of  the  idea  of  humanity. 
Even  if  Article  3  does  not  expressly  protect  those  persons  involved  in  assisting  and  caring 
for  the  sick  and  wounded,  it  would  be  morally  wrong  to  build  an  argument  on  such  absence 
of  protection  (of  medical  personnel)  in  that  Article,  in  order  to  try  those  persons  as  having 
committed  a  crime  against  the  State.  This  explains  in  part  why  in  Protocol  11,  the  situation 
of  the  wounded  and  the  sick  had  been  improved  dramatically.  Claims  of  sovereignty  and 
non-  intervention  in  this  instance,  go  against  the  idea  of  humanity  itself. 
2.  The  UN  Practice  and  the  Protection  of  the  Victims  of  Internal  Wars 
The  work  of  the  UN  has  been  based  upon  the  extension  of  human  rights  standards  to  all 
kinds  of  armed  conflicts.  However,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  interest  of  the  UN  in  civil 
wars  was  primarily  a  reaction  to  what  was  happening  in  colonial  wars  especially  in  Africa. 
Thus,  it  is  primarily  politics  that  brought  the  attention  of  the  UN  to  this  field. 
The  first  rendez-vous  between  the  UN,  the  Jus  In  bello  in  armed  conflicts  and  human 
rights  took  place  in  Tehran  in  1968  on  the  occasion  of  the  20th  anniversary  of  the  Universal 
Declaration  on  Human  Rights.  Resolution  XXIII  of  May  12th,  1968  stipulated  in  substance 
that  those  who  struggled  against  colonial  and  racist  regimes  should,  upon  capture,  be  treated 
humanely  and  "if  detained  should  be  treated  as  POW's  or  political  prisoners  under 
international  law,.  238  In  the  same  Resolution,  it  was  recognised  that  the  Geneva  Convention 
of  1949  was  not  sufficiently  broad  in  scope  to  cover  all  armed  conflicts. 
However,  from  that  date  the  UNGA  took  it  as  a  custom  to  recommend  each  year  the 
application  of  humanitarian  principles,  human  rights  and  fundamental  rules  of  the  law  of 
war  to  'all  armed  conflict'  which  could  be  interpreted  as  including  not  only  internal 
conflicts  in  colonial  territories,  but  also  internal  conflicts  in  the  strictest  sense  which 
occurred  in  territories  of  an  independent  State.  The  title  of  these  resolutions  'Respect  of 
Human  Rights  in  Armed  Conflicts'  is  revealing.  Human  rights  are  to  be  enjoyed  by 
individuals  and  groups,  in  order  that  these  rights  can  effectively  be  protected,  not  only 
humane  treatment  is  necessary,  but  some  limitations  on  the  methods  of  means  of  warfare 
became  necessary  as  well.  If  these  means  do  not  distinguish  between  combatants  and  non- 
2371bid, 
p.  4. 
238  Final  Act  of  the  international  Conference  on  Human  Rights  1968,  Chap.  3.  Res.  XXIII,  May  12th, 
1968. 
254 combatants,  the  protection  of  the  individual  and  groups  becomes  meaningless. 
Respect  for  human  rights,  such  as  the  right  to  life,  which  is  included  both  in  Article  3 
and  Human  Rights  Instruments,  would  be  useless  if  certain  legal  restraints  on  the  use  of 
certain  methods  of  war  are  not  imposed.  As  we  have  previously  seen  in  this  section,  the 
issue  is  very  important  in  the  context  of  internal  wars,  since  Article  3  does  not  specifically 
impose  any  restraints  on  the  means  and  methods  of  war.  The  UN,  through  its  resolutions, 
has  stressed  the  necessary  link  between  all  these  elements  in  'all  conflicts'. 
In  this  context,  the  UNGA,  despite  the  controversy  around  the  legal  force  of  its 
resolutions,  has  led  to  the  further  limitations  of  the  State  sovereignty  in  the  sense  that  means 
and  methods  of  its  war  against  enemies  of  the  State  are  not  wholly  free  of  limitations,  at 
least  theoretically.  Resolution  2674  (XXV)  of  December  9th,  1970  was  adopted  by  77  in 
favour,  2  against  (Portugal  and  Brazil)  and  36  abstentions.  It  stipulated  that: 
"3.  Considers  [the  UNGA]  the  principles  of  the  Geneva  Protocol  of  1925  and  Geneva 
Convention  of  1949  should  be  strictly  observed  by  all  States.  That  States  violating 
these  International  Instruments  should  be  condemned  and  held  responsible  to  the 
world  community".  239 
The  same  Resolution  in  its  5th  paragraph  considers  that  air  bombardment  of  civilians  and 
the  use  of  gas  and  all  analogous  liquids,  materials,  devices  and  bacteriological  weapons 
constitute  a  flagrant  violation  of  The  Hague  Convention  of  1907,  the  Geneva  Protocol  of 
1925  and  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949.  This  meant  that  all  inhuman  means  of  war 
should  be  prohibited. 
Although  the  Resolution  speaks  about  obligations  between  States  and  not  intra-States, 
there  is  no  question  that  an  effective  protection  of  human  beings  in  times  of  internal 
conflicts  is  not  possible  without  respect  of  the  prohibitions  of  some  methods  and  means  of 
warfare.  This  interpretation  is  somehow  confirmed  by  UNGA  Resolution  2677  (XXV)  of 
December  12th,  1970  that  was  adopted  by  a  majority  of  III  in  favour  to  0  against  and  4 
abstentions.  After  the  proclamation  in  the  Preamble  of  the  continuing  value  of  existing 
humanitarian  rules  to  armed  conflicts,  it  is  stipulated  in  paragraph  I  that: 
"...  [The  UNGA] 
...  calls  upon  all  parties  to  any  armed  conflict  to  observe  the  rules  laid 
down  in  the  Hague  Convention  of  1899  and  1907,  the  Geneva  Protocol  of  1925,  the 
Geneva  Conventions  of  1949  and  other  humanitarian  rules  applicable  in  armed 
conflicts  and  invites  those  States  who  had  not  yet  done  so  to  adhere  to  those 
instrumentS".  240 
No  doubt  an  interpretation  in  good  faith  and  in  accordance  with  the  object  and  the  purpose 
of  the  resolution  (that  is  the  protection  of  human  rights  in  all  conflicts)  would  extend  the 
application  of  the  rules  laid  down  in  the  instruments  cited  in  the  Resolution  on  internal 
conflicts,  since  human  rights  protect  individuals  and  groups,  whatever  their  nationality  and 
without  any  discrimination. 
23924  UNY,  1970,  p.  539. 
240  Mid,  p.  541. 
255 In  Resolution  2853  (XXVI)  of  December  20th,  1971,  after  establishing  the  relationship 
between  the  terrible  suffering  that  armed  conflict  continue  to  inflict  upon  combatants  and 
civilians,  through  the  use  of  cruel  means  and  methods  of  warfare  and  through  inadequate 
restraints  in  defining  military  objectives.  It  stressed  that  the  UNGA: 
"...  [C]alls  upon  all  parties  to  any  armed  conflict  to  observe  the  rules  laid  down  in  The 
Hague  regulations  of  1899  and  1907  and  the  Geneva  Protocol  of  1925 
...  etC.  "241 
In  the  Resolution  3103  (XXVIII)  of  December  12th,  1973,242  an  important  segment  of 
internal  conflicts  that  is  the  colonial  wars  and  wars  against  racist  regimes  and  alien 
domination,  were  elevated  to  the  status  of  international  wars  in  the  sense  of  the  1949 
Geneva  Conventions.  This  means  that  a  very  significant  portion  of  victims  of  internal  wars 
would  get  a  better  protection  than  that  provided  for  in  Article  3. 
In  a  series  of  resolutions,  the  UNGA  tackled  the  question  of  the  protection  of  different 
kinds  of  victims  of  war  in  all  armed  conflicts.  Thus,  in  Resolution  2676  of  December  9th, 
1970,  (paragraph  5),  the  UNGA: 
"...  [U]rges  that  combatants  in  all  armed  conflicts  not  covered  by  Article  4  of  the 
Geneva  Conventions  of  1949  be  accorded  the  saml  humane  treatment  defined  in  the 
principles  of  international  law  applied  to  pOW".  2  3 
Although,  it  is  the  right  of  combatants  in  colonial  wars  which  are  solicited  here,  a  correct 
interpretation  cannot  preclude  the  application  of  the  said  resolution  to  all  combatants  who 
do  not  satisfy  the  conditions  of  Article  4  of  the  Geneva  Convention  of  1949. 
Another  noted  resolution  in  the  field  was  designed  explicitly  for  the  protection  of 
civilians.  Resolution  2675  (XXV)  of  December  9th,  1970  was  adopted  without  any  negative 
vote  (109  in  favour  0  against  and  8  abstentions)  which  indicate  that  there  is  a  general 
consensus  among  States  that  this  group  of  victims  of  war  need  more  protection.  The 
Resolution  contained  the  basic  principles  for  the  protection  of  the  civilian  population  in 
armed  conflicts.  There  is  no  insistence  upon  the  kind  of  conflict  which  leads  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  Resolution  covers  all  internal  wars. 
The  Resolution  contains  8  principleS244  which  are  of  great  importance  in  any  real 
24125  UNY,  1971,  p.  428. 
242ResoLution  3103  (XVIII)  was  adopted  by  a  majority  of  83  in  favour,  13  against  (among  them:  the  US, 
the  UK  and  France).  In  paragraph  3,  it  is  stipuLated  that: 
"The  armed  conflict  involving  the  struggle  of  peoples  against  colonial  and  alien  domination 
and  racist  regimes  are  to  be  regarded  as  International  conflicts". 
27  UNY,  1973,  p.  553. 
2430p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  239,  p.  540. 
244  The  eight  principtes  mentioned  in  the  Resotution  are: 
1.  Fundamental  human  rights,  as  accepted  in  international  taw  and  laid  down  in  International 
instruments  continue  to  apply  fully  in  situations  of  armed  conflicts. 
2.  In  the  conduct  of  military  operations  during  armed  conflicts,  a  distinction  must  be  at  all 
times  between  persons  actively  taking  part  in  hostilities  and  civilian  population. 
3.  The  conduct  of  military  operations  every  effort  should  be  made  to  spare  the  civilian 
population  from  the  ravages  of  war  and  all  necessary  precautions  should  be  taken  to  avoid 
injury,  toss  or  damage  to  civilian  population. 
256 protection  of  civilians.  Among  these  principles,  stress  is  laid  down  that  fundamental  human 
rights  as  found  in  international  instruments  continue  to  apply  fully  in  situations  of  armed 
conflicts.  Hence  the  close  link  between  human  rights  and  humanitarian  law  is  established. 
Moreover,  the  resolution  maintained  and  stressed  the  customary  distinction  between 
combatants  and  non-combatants.  The  latter  are  not  an  object  of  attack,  they  are  to  be 
spared  from  all  ravages  of  war.  Furthermore,  in  Resolution  3318  (XXIX)  of  December  14th, 
1974  which  was  adopted  without  any  negative  vote  (110  in  favour,  0  against  and  14 
abstentions)  methods  and  means  of  war  which  inflict  damage  on  civilians  including  women 
and  children  are  prohibited.  The  following  acts  are  banned: 
A.  Attacks  and  bombings,  inflicting  incalculable  suffering  against  civilians. 
B.  The  use  of  chemical  and  bacteriological  weapons  in  the  course  of  military  operations. 
The  reason  being  that  they  inflict  heavy  losses  on  civilian  population  including  defenceless 
women  and  children. 
245  C.  All  forms  of  repression  and  cruel  treatment  of  women  and  children. 
The  huge  majorities  for  the  adoption  of  these  resolutions  attest,  in  my  opinion,  to  the 
growing  concern  and  acceptance  of  States  that  protection  of  the  victims  of  war,  especially 
civilians,  is  vital  whatever  the  character  of  the  war.  This  has  become  an  issue  of 
international  concern  and  has  been  taken  away  from  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  States.  In 
other  words,  the  defence  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  can  no  longer  be  used  to  bar 
the  demands  of  the  international  community  that  the  civilians  must  be  protected  in  any 
given  situation  of  war  either  internal  or  international. 
It  seems  to  me,  however,  that  the  serious  developments  which  took  place  in  the  UNGA 
did  not  seriously  influence  Protocol  11.  The  reason  is  mainly  political,  since  all  developments 
in  the  UNGA  were  made  under  the  influence  of  Third  World  countries,  with  their  eye  on 
colonial  wars. 
In  the  Diplomatic  Conference  those  same  States  fought  very  hard  for  the  inclusion  of 
wars  of  national  liberation  under  Protocol  1;  once  a  positive  outcome  was  obtained.  these 
States  in  general  were  not  ready  to  continue  the  same  efforts  for  civil  wars  because  they 
were  generally  the  threatre  for  such  conflicts.  Any  far  ranging  extension  of  the  laws  of  war 
to  such  conflict  would  only  bring  foreign  intervention  and  would  weaken  their  monopoly 
of  sovereignty. 
4.  Civilian  population  as  such  should  not  be  the  object  of  military  operations. 
5.  Dwellings  and  other  installations  that  are  used  only  by  civilian  population  should  not  be 
the  object  of  military  operations. 
6.  Places  or  areas  designed  for  the  sole  protection  of  civilians,  such  as  hospitals,  zones  or 
similar  refugees,  should  not  be  the  object  of  military  operations. 
7.  Civilian  population  or  individual  members  thereof,  should  not  be  the  object  of  reprisals, 
forcible  transfers  or  other  assaults  on  their  integrity. 
8.  The  provision  of  International  relief  to  civilian  population  In  conforinity  with  the 
humanitarian  principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN,  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights. 
The  Declaration  of  Principles  for  international  relief  to  the  civilian  population  in  disaster 
situations,  as  laid  down  In  Resolution  XXVI  adopted  by  the  21st  International  Conference  of 
the  Red  Cross  shall  apply  in  situations  of  armed  conflicts  and  all  parties  to  a  conflict  Should 
make  every  effort  to  facilitate  this  application. 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  240,  p.  543. 
245  28  UNY,  1974,  p.  646. 
257 On  the  other  hand,  it  is  necessary  to  point  out  that  the  UN  practice  in  the  form  of  its 
different  resolutions,  has  in  effect  introduced  the  vitally  important  linkage  between  human 
rights  and  armed  conflicts  in  all  their  diversity.  Thus,  it  was  stressed,  either  directly  or 
indirectly,  that  respect  of  the  fundamental  rules  of  the  law  of  war,  is  a  necessary  condition 
for  the  enjoyment  of  human  rights  in  times  of  conflict. 
There  are  those,  however,  who  view  the  UN  approach  with  scepticism.  They  see  in  the 
UN  endeavours  an  attempt  to  revise  the  laws  of  war  through  the  bias  of  human  rights.  A 
typical  opponent  of  such  an  approach  is  Meyrowitz,  who  maintains  that: 
"Le  confusionnisme  West  pas  seulement  un  vice  de  la  pens6e;  il  est  Waste  dans  les 
cons6quences  pratiques  auxquelles  il  conduit,  I'hdtdrog6neit6  du  droit  de  la  guerre  et 
des  droit  de  I'homme  condamne  l'id6e  pronde  de  divers  cot6s,  et  qui  a  trouv6  un  6cho 
aux  Nations  Unis,  d'entrprendre  par  le  bias  des  droit  de  I'homme  la  revision  du  droit 
de  la  guerre".  246 
Dinstein  also  goes  in  the  same  direction: 
"In  any  event  international  humanitarian  law  must  not  be  confused  with  international 
human  rights".  247 
To  Dinstein  many  wartime  human  rights  find  their  basis  in  The  Hague  law  and  not  human 
rights  (such  as  protection  of  private  property).  Humanitarian  law  also  contains  many 
provisions  that  apply  directly  to  individuals.  They  are  also  human  rights.  It  seems  to  me, 
however,  that  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  criticisms  are  valid  in  the  context  of  international 
conflicts  but  not  for  internal  conflicts. 
Thus,  the  efforts  of  the  UN  must  be  welcomed  since  respect  for  fundamental  human 
rights,  leads  logically  and  necessarily,  in  some  instances,  to  the  imposition  of  certain 
restraints  on  methods  and  means  of  war.  These  restraints  do  not  exist  wholly  in  Article  3, 
only  the  idea  of  human  rights  as  developed  by  the  UNGA  can  fill  t  hat  gap. 
The  UN  has  done  what  the  Inter-American  Commission  on  Human  Rights  has  done  in 
Latin  America  where  many  excesses  and  cruelties  of  civil  wars  in  Nicaragua,  El  Salvador 
etc.,  were  condemned  as  violations  of  human  rights.  248  Thus,  the  UN,  in  my  opinion  has 
contributed  to  the  creation  of  the  idea  that  human  rights  are  the  essential  substance  of  the 
rules  of  war.  Therefore,  States  are  obliged  to  respect  the  life  and  freedom  of  their  citizens 
in  the  conduct  of  war  by  choosing  the  means  and  methods  of  their  armed  struggle  carefully. 
This  leads  me  to  support  what  Meron  who  asserts  that: 
"The  idea  of  humanity  has  become  the  common  denominator  of  human  rights  law  and 
of  humanitarian  law".  249 
246  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  126,  p.  1105. 
247Y 
.  Dfnstein:  Human-Rights  in  Armed  Conf  I  icts  in  I  nternat  Iona  t  Human!  tar  I  an  Law,  In  T.  Meron  (ed.  ): 
Human  Rights  and  International  Law:  Legal  Policy  Issues.  Vot.  2,  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  1984,  p.  346. 
248See  N.  Buergenthat:  Human  rights:  The  Inter-American  System.  Binder  3.  Part  3,  Cases  and  Decisions, 
Oceana  Pub.,  Inc.,  Dobbs  Ferry,  New  York  1987.  p.  67. 
249Meron, 
op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  3,  n.  24,  p.  14. 
258 He  concludes  by  stating: 
"The  fact  that  these  two  systems  of  law  [human  rights  and  humanitarian  law]  have 
different  historical  and  doctrinal  origins  and  should  not  obscure  the  tremendous 
rapprochement  between  them  which  has  already  taken  place".  250 
No  doubt  the  UN  was  a  real  force  behind  such  rapprochement,  in  the  context  of  civil  wars, 
since  Article  3  does  not  specifically  contain  any  restraints  on  the  methods  and  means  of 
warfare,  the  contribution  of  the  UN  is  very  important.  It  established  beyond  any  doubt  that 
the  extension  of  the  concept  of  human  rights,  if  acted  upon  in  good  faith  by  the 
belligerents,  will  lead  to  the  imposition  of  restraints  on  methods  and  means  of  war.  This  will 
afford  a  real  protection  of  all  individuals  and  above  all  to  the  victims  of  internal  conflicts. 
3.  The  ICJ  and  Article  3:  the  Nicaragua  Case 
In  the  Nicaragua  Case,  the  ICJ  had,  for  the  first  time,  an  occasion  to  deal  with  Article  3. 
However,  it  must  be  indicated  that  Nicaragua  did  not  invoke  that  Article,  presumably 
because  it  feared  such  a  move  would  be  construed  that  it  regarded  its  war  against  the 
Contras  as  an  'Armed  conflict  not  of  an  international  character',  such  implication  would 
force  the  Nicaraguan  Government  to  abide  by  the  rules  contained  in  Common  Article  3. 
Nicaragua  blamed  the  Americans  for  the  illegal  acts  of  the  Contras,  since  in  its  opinion, 
they  (the  Contras)  were  financed  and  directed  by  the  US.  In  short,  they  were  the  creation 
of  the  US  and  the  latter  must  be  considered  as  the  responsible  party  for  the  Contras' 
violations  of  humanitarian  rules  in  general. 
However,  the  ICJ  rejected  the  Nicaraguan  logic.  It  held: 
"The  Court  does  not  consider  that  the  assistance  given  by  the  United  States  to  the 
Contras  warrant  the  conclusion  that  these  forces  are  subject  to  the  U  to  such  an  I 
extent  that  any  acts  they  have  committed  are  imputable  to  that  Statew.  2ýi 
It  then  added: 
"It  [the  Court]  held  the  view  that  the  Contras  remain  responsible  for  their  acts  and 
that  the  US  is  not  responsible  for  the  acts  of  the  Contras  but  for  its  own  S?  nduct  vis- 
A-vis  Nicaragua,  including  conduct  relating  to  the  acts  of  the  Contras".  2 
The  Court  then  considered  that  the  conflict  as  'not  of  an  international  character'  between 
the  Contras  and  the  Nicaraguan  Government,  'the  acts  of  the  Contras  toward  the 
Nicaraguan  Government  are  therefore  governed  by  the  law  applicable  to  conflicts  of  that 
253  character'.  In  other  words,  it  is  Article  3  that  governs  the  situation.  However,  the  actions 
of  the  US  in  and  against  Nicaragua  were  considered  to  be  of  an  international  character. 
2501bid. 
25lCase  Concerning  Hititary  and  Paramititary  Activities  in  Adjacent  Nicaragua  (Nicaragua  ve  United 
States  of  America),  25  ILK,  1986,  para  110,  p.  1047. 
2521bid, 
para  110,  p.  1047. 
253  lbid,  para  219,  p.  1073. 
259 The  Court  then  made  a  very  important  pronouncement  concerning  the  position  of  the 
rules  contained  in  Article  3,  in  international  law.  It  specifically  stated: 
"Because  the  minimum  rules  applicable  to  international  and  non-international 
conflicts  are  identical,  there  is  no  need  to  address  whether  those  actions  must  be 
looked  at  in  the  congt  of  the  rules  which  operate  for  the  one  or  for  the  other 
category  of  conflict".  4 
It  then  added: 
"The  relevant  principles  are  to  be  looked  for  in  the  provisions  of  Article  3  of  each 
of  the  four  Conventions  of  August  12,1949,  the  text  of  which,  identical  in  each  255  Convention,  expressly  refers  to  conflicts  not  having  an  international  character". 
The  Court  considered  the  fundamental  rules  governing  internal  conflicts  as  substantially  the 
same  as  those  applying  to  international  conflicts;  in  other  words  it  considered  that  the  rules 
contained  in  Article  3  as  the  minimum  standard  that  must  always  be  respected  whatever  the 
nature  of  the  conflict. 
The  Court  also  stressed  that: 
"Article  3  which  is  common  to  all  four  Geneva  Conventions  of  12  August  1949 
defined  certain  rules  to  be  applied  in  the  armed  conflicts  of  a  non-international 
character.  There  is  no  doubt  that,  in  the  event  of  international  armed  conflicts,  these 
rules  also  constitute  a  minimum  yardstick  in  addition  to  the  more  elaborate  rules 
which  are  also  to  apply  to  international  conflicts;  and  they  are  rules,  in  the  Court's 
opinion,  which  reflect  what  the  Court  in  1949  called  'elementary  considerations  of 
humanity'  (Corfu  Channel  Merits,  ICJ  Report,  p.  22).  "256 
Hence,  the  rules  of  Article  3  are  characterized  as  'elementary  considerations  of  humanity'. 
The  latter,  it  must  be  added,  had  been  considered  in  the  Corfu  Channel  case  as  obligatory 
257  in  times  of  war  and  even  in  peace. 
The  Court  seems  to  imply,  in  my  opinion,  that  the  rules  of  Article  3  have  become 
customary  international  law,  or  at  least  general  principles  of  humanitarian  law  which  must 
be  adhered  to  independently  of  the  Geneva  Conventions.  The  view  of  the  Court  is 
therefore,  in  my  opinion,  of  great  importance  since  it  also  establishes  beyond  any  doubt  that 
the  rules  of  Article  3  have  become  a  real  derogation  from  State  sovereignty  and  it  (the 
2541bid. 
2551bid. 
2561bid. 
2571n  the  Corfu  Channet  Case,  the  ICJ  stated  in  fact.  that: 
"The  obligations  incumbent  upon  the  Albanian  authorities  consisted  in  notifying,  for  the 
benefit  of  shipping  in  general,  the  existence  of  a  minefietd  in  Albanian  territorial  waters 
and  in  warning  the  approaching  British  warships  of  the  imminent  danger  to  which  the  minef  jeLd 
exposed  them.  Such  obligations  are  based  not  on  The  Hague  Convention  of  1907,  No.  Vill,  Which 
Is  applicable  in  time  of  war,  but  on  certain  general  and  weLt-recognized  principles,  namely: 
elementary  considerations  of  humanity,  even  more  exacting  in  peace  than  in  war,  the  principle 
of  the  freedom  of  maritime  communications;  and  every  State's  obligation  riot  to  allow  knowingly 
Its  territory  to  be  used  for  acts  contrary  to  the  rights  of  other  Statesel. 
The  Corfu  Charnet  Case  (United  Kingdom  v.  Atabania)  (14erftlL  ICJ  Reports  1949,  p.  22. 
260 Court)  contributed  to  make  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  conflicts  an 
international  issue.  The  established  Government  can  no  longer  claim  a  monopoly  in  this 
area. 
However,  it  must  be  recognized  that  the  Court's  view  concerning  Article  3  has  been  the 
object  of  criticism  by  some  judges  and  lawyers.  Hence,  Judge  Jennings  noted: 
"Even  the  Court's  view  that  the  common  Article  3,  laying  down  a  'minimum 
yardstick'  (paragraph  218)  for  armed  conflicts  of  a  non-international  character,  are 
applicable  as  'elementary  considerations  of  humanity';  is  not  free  from  diffiCUlty".  258 
The  same  view  was  expressed  by  Judge  Ago  in  his  Separate  Opinion,  he  was: 
"...  [M]ost  reluctant  to  be  persuaded  that  any  broad  identity  exists  between  the  Geneva 
Conventions  and  certain  'fundamental  general  principles  of  humanitarian  law'  which, 
according  to  the  Court,  were  pre-existing  in  customary  law  to  which  the  Conventions 
9merely  gave  expression  aragraph  220]  or  of  which  they  are  at  most'  in  some 
respects  a  development". 
A 
Meron  also  was  sceptical  about  the  Court's  view,  he  wrote: 
"It  is  not  certain  that  the  rules  of  Article  3  and  of  those  other  provisions  match  each 
other  perfectly,  or  that  all  of  those  humanitarian  principles  have  necessarily  attained 
the  character  of  customary  rules  of  international  laW".  260 
In  his  view,  elementary  considerations  of  humanity  have  not  attained  the  status  of 
customary  law  and  Article  3  was  viewed  in  1949  as  making  a  "new  step'  in  the  development 
of  humanitarian  law.  It  has  no  antecedents  in  earlier  Geneva  Conventions  and  the  State 
261  practice  is  not  very  clear. 
It  seems  to  me,  that  the  Court  can  find  the  State  practice  not  only  in  concrete  situations, 
where  violations  are  frequent,  as  we  saw  above,  but  also  in  the'practice  of  international 
organizations,  where  representatives  of  States  declare  their  readiness  to  respect  humanitarian 
standards,  also  in  different  resolutions  of  the  UNGA  and  since  no  State  can  voice  its 
opposition  to  respect  humanitarian  principles  contained  in  Article  3,  this  points  to  the 
existence  of  the  element  of  opinto  jurls  of  States. 
Thus,  the  Court  may  be  said  to  have  made  the  obligations  contained  in  Article  3  erga 
omnes.  This  means  that  the  plea  of  'intervention  in  the  internal  affairs,  has  no  relevance 
whatsoever,  when  humanitarian  rules  of  Article  3  are  violated  by  a  given  State'. 
D.  Conclusions 
The  conclusions  concerning  this  section  can  be  summarised  as  follows: 
1.  From  the  theoretical  point  of  view,  Article  3  is  the  first  international  attempt  to 
2580P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  251,  p.  1285. 
2591bid, 
p.  1108. 
260T.  Meron:  The  Geneva  Conventions  as  Customary  Law.  81  AJIL.  1987,  p.  356.  See  atso  the  same  author, 
op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  248,  n.  55  at  p.  48. 
2611bid, 
pp.  356-358. 
261 regulate  internal  wars,  in  the  context  of  an  international  treaty.  Whatever  its  shortcomings 
and  low  impact  in  practice,  it  is  a  fundamental  derogation  from  the  State  sovereignty.  The 
Nicarsaua  Case  seems  to  imply,  as  we  have  seen  above,  that  the  rules  of  Article  3  have 
become  a  part  of  customary  international  law  and  thus  confirmed  as  a  real  derogation  on 
State  sovereignty. 
One  may  even  venture  to  suggest  that  the  humanitarian  rules  of  Article  3,  constitute  rules 
of  jus  cogens,  in  the  sense  of  Article  53  of  the  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties 
(1969).  This  assertion  can  be  justified  partly  on  the  ground  that  there  is  no  record  of  a  State 
which  adopted  a  policy  of  claiming  publicly  that  it  is  not  bound  by  the  humanitarian  rules 
contained  in  the  Article. 
States  can  always  claim  that  the  conflict  does  not  fall  in  the  ambit  of  Common  Article  3, 
but  not  that  the  rules  contained  in  it  are  non-applicable.  That  is  to  say,  no  State  can  claim 
that  torture,  killing,  inhumane  treatment  and  summary  executions  are  justified,  and  are  a 
component  part  of  its  policy  in  dealing  with  insurgents.  I  think  this  is  a  part  of  the  answer 
of  why  the  ICJ  has  not  found  it  difficult  to  consider  the  rules  of  Article  3  as  customary 
rules,  or  at  least  general  principles  of  humanitarian  law. 
2.  As  to  the  content  of  the  rules  of  Article  3,  theoretically  the  influence  of  the  emerging 
law  of  human  rights  is  not  wholly  irrelevant.  The  law  of  New  York  has  a  very  close 
relations  with  the  law  of  Geneva,  in  the  context  of  internal  wars.  Although,  reading  many 
of  the  rules  of  the  law  of  war  in  Article  3,  (such  as  the  prohibition  of  bombardment  of  open 
towns  and  villages,  selection  of  targets  of  attack  and  the  prohibition  of  certain  kinds  of 
weapons),  as  some  experts  in  humanitarian  law  did  (even  the  ICRC),  262  can  be  implicitly 
opposed  by  a  strict  adherence  to  the  rules  of  treaty  interpretation  (Articles  30  to  33  of  the 
Vienna  Convention).  The  UN  was  able  to  make  that  'reading'  by  using  the  human  rights 
approach,  since  respect  for  fundamental  human  Tights  of  persons,  resulted  automatically  in 
restricting  the  discretion  of  States  in  adopting  methods  and  means  of  their  war  against  their 
opponents. 
3.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  practice  shows  that  the  arguments  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention  were  not  used  to  justify  violations  of  humanitarian  rules  contained  in  Article 
3.  Thus,  torture,  inhumane  treatment  and  massacres,  were  never  justified  on  those  two 
pleas. 
Therefore,  when  France  was  confronted  with  the  publication  of  leaked  ICRC  reports 
(which  revealed  the  brutal  truth  of  the  conduct  of  the  French  army  in  Algeria)  in  Le  Monde 
(dated  January  5th,  1960),  the  Government  tried  to  prevent  the  spread  of  the  revelations 
by  stopping  the  distribution  of  the  newspaper.  However,  when  that  failed,  it  tried  to  limit 
the  damage  by  abolishing  the  Fifth  Bureau  which  was  responsible  for  carrying  out  the 
atrocities.  263 
262  ICRC,  League  of  the  Red  Cross  Societies  in  cottaboratfon  with  the  Henry  Dunant  Institute: 
Internationat  Red  Cross  Handbook.  12th  ed.,  Geneva,  Juty  1983,  pp.  641-646. 
263  D.  P.  Forsythe:  Humanitarian  Politics:  The  International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross.  The  John 
Hopkins  Univ  Press,  Baltimore  and  London,  1977,  pp.  149-150. 
262 The  French  Government  never  tried  to  justify  its  actions  as  necessary  for  the 
safeguarding  of  its  sovereignty  in  Algeria.  This  leads  to  an  important  conclusion,  namely 
that  if  Governments  always  use  pleas  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention,  in  the  subject 
of  characterisation  of  the  conflict,  as  we  saw  in  the  third  chapter,  they  are  not  willing  to 
do  the  same  when  the  matter  concerns  the  substantive  rules  of  Article  3.  The  reason  seems 
to  be  that  States  morally  and  politically  cannot  justify  either  in  international  or  internal 
conflicts,  massacres,  torture  and  inhumane  treatment  or  their  sovereign  right  to  use  every 
method  at  their  disposal  to  win  the  war. 
4.  The  practice  which  is  not  always  consistent,  however,  reveals  that  the  insurgents  were 
almost  always  the  first  to  declare  their  readiness  to  extend  more  humanitarian  treatment, 
to  at  least  one  section  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars,  namely,  captured  combatants.  Whereas 
the  established  Governments  are  always  reluctant  to  do  the  same  or,  when  they  do,  only  on 
a  de  facto  basis. 
In  this  area,  I  think  the  plea  of  sovereignty  still  wields  strong  influence,  since  any  action 
of  the  established  Government  in  this  field  may  be  interpreted  as  giving  legal  status  to  the 
insurgents. 
5.  The  practice  also  establishes,  that  loopholes  exist  in  the  substantive  rules  of  Article  3. 
The  generality  of  those  rules  and  their  vagueness,  leaves  to  the  belligerents,  especially  the 
established  Government,  a  wide  room  for  discretion.  The  case  of  the  wounded  and  sick  is 
a  point  where  the  only  obligations  is  to  care  for  them.  This  merely  led  Governments  in 
practice  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  certain  medicines  and  punishment  of  those  who  assisted  the 
wounded  and  sick  insurgents. 
Section  III:  The  Protection  of  the  Victims  of  Internal  Wars  Under  Protocol  11  of  1977 
Introduction 
In  its  documentation  submitted  to  the  First  CGEDHL  (1971),  the  ICRC  pointed  out 
concerning  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars: 
"Indeed,  in  the  course  of  its  practical  activities,  the  ICRC  had  found  that  the  number 
and  scope  of  non-international  conflicts  made  it  immediately  imperative  to  provide 
better  Protection  to  all  victims  of  hostilities.  However,  Article  3  had  proved,  it  had 
been  shown  to  have  numerous  loopholes,  and  this  made  it  no  longer  possible  to  ensure 
"264  sufficient  guarantees  to  the  victims  in  question. 
This  is  the  ICRC's  rationale  behind  its  efforts  in  providing  more  protection  to  the  victims 
of  internal  wars. 
However,  in  practice  the  ICRC  had  at  least  since  1953  signalled  the  need  for  more 
protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  warS.  265  Moreover,  the  Teheran  Conference  of  1968 
signalled  the  beginning  of  the  UN  interest  in  the  question  of  human  rights  in  armed 
conflict.  Thus,  the  UN  added  its  voice  to  the  need  to  update  humanitarian  law,  in  order  to 
give  better  protection  to  all  victims  of  all  armed  conflicts.  The  Teheran  Conference  in  fact 
adopted  the  well  known  Resolution  XXIII,  in  which  it  requested  the  UNGA  to  invite  the 
264  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  100,  p.  T. 
2651bld. 
263 UN  Secretary-  General  to  study: 
"(a)  Steps  which  could  be  taken  to  ensure  the  better  application  of  existing 
humanitarian  international  conventions  and  rules  in  all  armed  conflicts; 
(b)  The  need  for  additional  humanitarian  international  conventions  or  for  possible 
revision  of  existing  conventions  to  ensure  the  better  protection  of  civilians,  prisoners 
and  combatants  in  all  armed  conflicts  and  the  prohibition  and  limitation  of  the  use 
"266  of  certain  methods  and  means  of  warfare. 
This  led  the  UNGA  at  its  23rd  session,  to  adopt  Resolution  2444(XXIII)  of  December  19th, 
1968,  in  which  it  invited  the  UN  Secretary-  General,  in  consultation  with  the  ICRC,  to 
study  the  possible  measures  to  ensure  the  better  protection  of  all  victims  of  all  armed 
conflicts  without  any  distinction.  This  led  in  effect  to  the  efforts  which  resulted  in  the 
adoption  of  the  two  protocols. 
However,  it  must  be  stressed  that  many  other  factors  have  encouraged  the  movement  for 
the  better  protection  of  the  victims  of  war  in  general.  The  whole  atmosphere  of  the  1960s 
(wars  of  national  liberation,  the  adoption  of  the  UN  two  covenants  on  human  rights,  and 
especially  the  atrocities  and  the  sufferings  of  the  Vietnamese  war  which  were  brought  alive 
to  the  world  through  the  media)  have  in  different  degrees  led  to  the  movement  of 
development  and  reaffirmation  of  humanitarian  law,  which  began  in  1969,  the  date  of  the 
first  Red  Cross  Expert  Conference. 
In  this  section  I  will  concentrate  on  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars,  in  the 
context  of  Protocol  IT  of  1977,  in  order  to  see  whether  new  rules  and  new  attitudes  of  States 
have  changed  from  the  rules  and  attitudes  adopted  in  the  conference  of  1949.  However,  my 
main  concern  would  be  to  bring  out  the  influence  of  the  concepts  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention  in  speeding  or  retarding  the  rate  of  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars. 
To  do  this,  my  essential  method  would  be  the  extensive  use  of  the  travaux  pr6paratolres 
of  the  Diplomatic  Conference  (1974-1977)  and  sometimes  even  the  use  of  the  discussions 
which  took  place  in  the  Red  Cross  Experts  Conferences  and  the  CGEDHL. 
To  me,  this  is  the  best  area,  where  we  can  clearly  see  the  working  of  the  two  concepts 
(sovereignty  and  non-intervention)  in  practice,  because  to  my  mind  the  Draft  Protocol  11 
submitted  by  the  ICRC  to  the  Diplomatic  Conference  has  in  essence,  and  in  many  important 
issues,  placed  the  dictates  of  humanity  before  the  demands  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention.  This  led  States  to  the  use  of  these  concepts,  either  to  modify  or  simply 
suppress  many  important  rules  for  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars. 
However,  recourse  to  the  subsequent  practice  in  cases  of  internal  wars  which  are  raging 
now  would  be  undertaken  to  see  whether  what  was  adopted  in  Protocol  11  can  find  a  place 
in  practice.  In  other  words,  whether  Protocol  IT  was  an  exercise  which  was  far  from  reality. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  stressed  that  it  is  only  El  Salvador  which  accepted  the 
application  of  Protocol  11  to  its  internal  conflict  (at  least  in  the  opinion  of  the  ICRQ.  Thus, 
recourse  to  other  cases  like  Nicaragua,  Sri-Lanka,  Angola,  Afghanistan,  Mozambique  and 
others  would  be  on  a  de  facto  basis,  since  no  one  of  them  has  accepted  the  application  of 
the  Protocol  11  to  its  conflict. 
26625th 
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264 However,  before  engaging  in  the  study  of  the  points  included  in  this  section,  a  general 
observation  concerning  the  Drafting  of  Protocol  11  is  in  point,  in  order  to  show  the 
important  role  played  by  the  concepts  of  sovereignty  and  non-intervention  in  the  shaping 
of  many  important  rules  of  Protocol  Il. 
Thus,  two  Red  Cross  Experts  Conferences  and  two  CGEDHL  led  to  the  adoption  by  the 
ICRC  of  the  Draft  Protocol  11,  which  was  submitted  to  the  Diplomatic  Conference  in  1974. 
The  Diplomatic  Conference  after  four  sessions  adopted  a  Draft  Protocol  11  at  the  committee 
level  which  did  not  differ  substantially  from  what  was  proposed  by  the  ICRC. 
However,  at  the  last  session  the  leader  of  the  Pakistani  delegation,  Judge  Hussain, 
submitted  another  version  of  Protocol  11,  the  so-called  'simplified  version',  which  was 
eventually  accepted  by  the  conference  as  Protocol  11.  That  simplified  version  contained 
many  omissions  and  weaknesses,  compared  to  what  had  been  proposed  by  the  ICRC,  or  even 
of  what  had  been  adopted  at  the  committee  level  during  four  years  of  hard  negotiations. 
This  sudden  change  of  mind  was  expressly  justified  on  the  grounds  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
267  intervention. 
Thus,  the  manoeuvring  which  led  to  the  adoption  of  the  simplified  version  or  'the 
Hussain  Draft',  gives  us  some  illuminating  insights  into  the  operation  of  the  two  concepts 
of  sovereignty  and  non-intervention,  in  the  present  development  of  humanitarian  law. 
A.  The  Concept  of  the  Victims  of  Internal  Wars  In  Protocol  11 
As  we  have  seen  in  section  Il  of  the  present  chapter,  Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Conventions 
applies  specifically  to  persons  taking  no  part  in  the  hostilities.  However,  there  is  no  precise 
specification  of  the  categories  involved  in  that  cited  category.  In  other  words,  the  personnel 
field  of  application  of  Article  3  is  not  explicitly  stated. 
Protocol  11  on  the  other  hand  seems  to  me  to  fill  this  lacuna  by  first  indicating  the 
different  categories  of  persons  who  are  to  be  protected,  and  secondly  by  stating  the 
normative  rules  which  would  apply  to  those  categories.  Thus,  it  stipulates  in  its  Article  2/1: 
"This  protocol  shall  be  applied  without  any  adverse  distinction  founded  on  race, 
colour,  sex,  language,  religion  or  belief,  political  or  other  opinion,  national  or  social 
origin,  wealth,  birth  or  other  status,  or  on  any  other  similar  criteria.  To  all  persons 
affected  by  an  armed  conflict  as  defined  in  Article  I.  n268 
267  Thus,  Judge  Hussain.  the  Chairman  of  the  Pakistani  delegation,  explained  the  rationale  behind  his 
Initiative,  In  the  foLlowfng  fashion: 
"Its  provisions  Eof  Protocol  III  must  be  acceptable  to  sit,  and  therefore,  of  obvious  practical 
benefit.  The  provisions  must  be  within  the  perceived  capacity  of  those  involved  to  apply  them, 
and  therefore,  precise  and  simple.  They  should  not  appear  to  affect  the  sovereignty  of  any 
State  party  or  the  responsibility  of  its  Government  to  maintain  Law  and  order  and  defend 
national  unity,  nor  be  able  to  be  invoked  to  justify  any  outside  intervention;  nothing  in  the 
protocol  should  suggest  that  dissidents  must  be  treated  legally  other  than  rebels;  and  Lastly, 
there  should  be  no  automatic  repetition  of  the  more  comprehensive  provisions,  such  as  those 
on  civil  defence,  found  in  Protocol  1.  To  include  such  provisions  would  risk  changing  the 
material  field  of  application  to  such  an  extent  that  States  would  either  fait  to  ratify 
Protocol  11  or  tend  to  argue  for  Its  non-apptication  in  situations  fatting  within  its  scope, 
thereby  Leaving  the  victims  of  those  conflicts  without  adequate  protectionle. 
DRDCHL  (1974-1977).  VII.  CDDH/SR.  49,  para.  11,  p.  61. 
268D. 
Sch  I  ndter  and  J.  Toman  (ads.  ):  The  Laws  of  Armed  Conf  II  cts.  Marti  nus  Nil  hoff,  Dordrecht,  &  Henri 
Dunant  Institute,  Geneva,  1988,  p.  692. 
265 In  fact,  the  protocol  applied  to  the  whole  territory  where  the  internal  conflict  is  taking 
place,  and  without  any  discrimination.  Moreover,  because  in  internal  conflicts  all  elements 
of  the  population  are  affected  in  one  way  or  another  by  the  conflict,  Article  2/1  is  a 
welcome  development,  since  every  human  being  in  a  country  torn  by  civil  strife  can  be 
assumed  to  be  an  actual,  or  potential  sufferer,  whether  he  is  in  the  area  of  the  conflict 
stricto  sensu  or  not. 
Besides,  the  principle  of  non-discrimination  protects  all  civilians  even  foreigners  against 
any  ill  treatment.  Thus,  all  persons,  whether  participating  or  not  in  the  hostilities,  are 
protected  against  any  abuse  of  power,  either  by  the  established  Government  or  the  rebels. 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  ICRC  had  submitted  to  the  second  conference  of 
Government  Experts  a  Draft  Article  2,  on  the  personnel  field  of  application,  which  reads 
as  follows: 
"The  present  protocol  shall  apply  to  all  persons,  whether  military  or  civilian, 
combatant  or  non-combatant,  who  are  in  the  territory  of  one  of  the  high  contracting 
parties,  where  an  armed  conflict  within  the  meaning  of  Article  I  of  this  protocol  is 
occurring  ".  269 
The  ICRC  Expert  explained  that  the  protocol: 
"...  [A]pplied  to  all  persons  who  were  in  the  territory  of  one  of  the  contracting 
partieS".  270 
He  then  added  that: 
"This  provision  seemed  n  cessary  since  the  future  protocol  had  to  contain  provisions 
relating  to  combatantS".  2fi' 
This  mention  of  the  word  'combatants,  led  the  British  Experts  to  submit  a  new  proposal  for 
a  new  version  of  Draft  Article  2,  which  would  restrict  the  personnel  field  of  the  protocol 
to  those  persons  who  are  taking  no  direct  part  in  the  hostilities.  272 
However,  the  ICRC  submitted  to  the  diplomatic  conference  a  Draft  Article  2,  which  did 
not  differ  much  from  its  Draft  Article  2  submitted  to  the  CGEDHL  in  1972.  The  Draft 
Article  2  reads  as  follows: 
"I.  The  present  protocol  shall  apply,  without  any  adverse  distinction,  to  all  persons, 
269CGEDHL,  2rd  Session,  (3  May-3  June  1972),  1.  Report  on  the  Work  of  the  Conference,  Geneva,  pp.  121- 
122. 
2701bid, 
p.  121. 
2711bid. 
272  The  proposed  Draft  Articte  2,  submitted  by  the  British  Experts  reads  as  foitows: 
01.  The  benefits  and  obligations  of  the  present  protocol  shall  apply,  without  any  adverse 
distinction  toatt  persons  taking  no  active  part  Inthehostitftfes,  including  members  of  armed 
forces  who  laid  down  their  arms  and  those  placed  hors  de  combat  by  sickness,  wounds,  detention 
or  any  other  cause,  who  are  in  the  territory  of  a  high  contracting  party  where  an  armed 
conflict  within  the  meaning  of  the  present  protocol  is  occurring,  etc.  08 
2  CGEDHL  2nd  Session,  3  May-3  June  1972,  Report  on  the  Work  of  the  Conference  (Annexes).  Geneva,  Juty 
1972,  p.  46. 
266 whether  military  or  civilian,  combatant  or  non-combatant  affected  by  an  armed 
conflict  within  the  meaning  of  Article  1. 
2.  Even  after  the  end  of  the  armed  conflict,  all  persons  whose  liberty  has  been 
restricted  for  reasons  in  relation  to  the  armed  conflict  and  might  not  have  been 
released,  as  well  as  persons  arrested  for  these  same  reasons,  shall  enjoy  the  protection 
of  Articles  8  and  10  until  released.  m273 
However,  at  the  committee  level  many  Drafting  changes  were  made,  274  with  the  final  result 
that  the  reference  to  'combatants'  was  eliminated.  This  means  in  effect  that  States  are  still 
very  sensitive  to  confer  any  status  upon  their  enemies.  275 
At  the  committee  level  (the  First  Committee)  Draft  Article  2  was  adopted  by  consensus. 
However,  at  least  one  delegation  voiced  its  unhappiness  with  the  new  version  of  that 
Article.  It  was  the  Holy  See  which  stressed  that  it: 
"...  [I]t  did  not  like  the  idea  of  distinguishing  between  various  categories  of  victims 
of  armed  conflicts  and  regretted  that  the  words  'all  person  7g, 
whether  military  or 
27  civilian,  combatant  or  non-combatant'  had  been  dropped". 
Since  in  its  view  they  made  the  scope  of  the  Article  wider  than  that  which  was  adopted. 
In  the  simplified  version  submitted  by  Pakistan,  no  changes  were  made  in  the  Article 
(Article  2)  adopted  by  the  first  committee,  which  meant  that  the  protocol  applies  in  the 
words  of  the  ICRC  representative: 
"...  [T]o  everyone,  without  distinction,  affected  by  armed  conflict  whatever  their 
nationality-  including  refugees  and  stateless  persons:  human  treatment  should  be  the 
"277  same  for  all. 
However,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  personnel  field  of  application  of  Protocol  II  is  wider  than 
that  of  Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Convention  since  it  protects  "all  persons  affected  by  armed 
con  fliCt"278  and  not  only  those  "hors  de  combat"  .  In  this  context,  Rosemary  Abi-Saab 
2731  ORDCHL  (1974-77),  pp.  33-34. 
274see  in  this  context,  10  ORDCHL.  (1974-1977),  CDDH/1/238/Rev.  /l,  pp.  95-96. 
275  In  this  context,  Rosemary  Abf-Saab  has  rightLy  stated: 
"Lee  deLegations  qui  avalent  dmis  des  rdserves  ä  tIegard  du  chmp  d'opptieation  matdriet  de 
t'Articte  premier,  ont  dmis  (es  mimes  rdserves  bas6es  sur  to  souverainet6  et  to  principe  du 
domeine  rdservd  des  Etats  en  matibre  de  droft  p6nat,  particuLlbrement  ä  tlegard  du  second 
paragraphe  de  cet  Art!  cLe  et  de  to  pricision  attach&e  aux  personnes  concerndes  per  to  confLit 
ermd,  ä  savoir  (es  personnes  Imititelres  ou  civites,  combattentes  ou  non-Combattantes',  qui 
pouvalt  taiser  entrevoir  un  statut  de  combattant". 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  103,  p.  454. 
2768  ORDCHL  (1974-1977),  MDH/l/SR,  22,  para.  44,  p.  210. 
2771bid, 
para.  45,  p.  210. 
278M 
.  Et  Kouhene  stressed  In  his  Interpretation  of  the  expression  of  'affected  by  the  confticto  that: 
I'll,  sembLe  quIen  igard  aux  transformations  survenues  dans;  'Llart  de  ta  querrel  (guerre  totaLe, 
participation  des  civiLs  etc.  )  on  ait  vouLu  donner  h  Llexpression  laffect6e  par  Le  conf  Lit  un 
sens  trbs  Large"'. 
Les  quarantfes  fondamentates  de  to  personne  en  droft  humanitafre  et  droits  de  t'homme.  Martinus 
Niihoff,  1986,  p.  21. 
267 rightly  observes: 
"La  suppression  des  termes  'combattants'  est  dvidernment  importante,  dans  la  mesure 
ou  c"dtait  IA  la  distinction  essentielle,  avec  le  champ  d'application  personnel  de 
I'article  3  commun  aux  conventi  ns,  qui  lui  ne  s'applique  qu'aux  personnes  qui  ne 
-- 
'379 
prennent  pas  part  aux  hostilites. 
She  then  adds: 
"On  peut  dire  toutefois  que  les  terms  'toutes  les  personnes  affecties  par  un  conflit 
arm6'  sont  suffisamment  larges  poyr  pouvoir  etres  interprdtds  dans  ce  meme  sens, 
plus  large  que  celui  de  I'Article  3".  80 
In  my  opinion,  the  expression  9persons  affected  by  the  conflict'  means  that  even  combatants 
are  entitled  to  at  least  be  treated  humanely.  This  restricts  the  liberty  of  the  established 
Government  and  also  the  rebels.  They  have  to  respect  the  guarantees  and  obligations, 
especially  those  established  in  Article  4  of  the  Protocol  II,  which  I  will  deal  with  later  in 
greater  detail. 
Therefore,  it  would  seem  to  me  that  Protocol  Il  considered  all  the  population  living  in  a 
country  torn  by  civil  war  as  victims  of  war,  to  which  certain  fundamental  human  rights 
should  apply.  This  restricts  the  sovereignty  of  the  Government  in  dealing  with  its  own 
nationals. 
Thus,  Protocol  11  establishes  the  first  category  of  victims  of  war,  namely  'all  those 
affected  by  the  conflict,  which  is  indeed  very  wide  as  we  explained.  To  this  general 
category,  the  protocol  establishes  a  general  system  of  obligations  and  rights. 
It  also  establishes  a  special  regime  of  protection  for  other  victims,  which  may  be  called 
the  stricto  sensu  victims  of  internal  wars.  They  are: 
A.  Persons  whose  liberty  has  been  restricted  in  connection  with  the  conflict. 
B.  The  civilian  population. 
C.  The  wounded  and  sick,  also  religious  and  medical  personnel  involved  in  their  assistance 
and  care. 
However,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  Protocol  continued  the  tradition  established  by  Article 
3  of  the  Geneva  Conventions.  in  denying  the  status  of  POW's  to  captured  insurgents,  in  this 
point  the  argument  of  sovereignty  carried  the  day  as  we  will  see  later. 
After  this  general  introduction  to  the  concept  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars,  I  will  deal 
with  the  actual  norms  of  protection  for  each  category  as  established  by  the  Protocol,  in 
order  to  see  the  influence  and  the  working  of  the  two  concepts  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention. 
B.  The  Fundamental  Guarantees  of  Article  4,  the  Contents  and  their  Evaluation 
Article  4  of  the  Protocol  11  stipulates: 
*1.  All  persons  who  do  not  take  a  direct  part  or  who  have  ceased  to  take  part  in 
hostilities,  whether  or  not  their  liberty  has  been  restricted,  are  entitled  to  respect  for 
2790P. 
cft.,  supra.  n.  103,  p.  155. 
2801bid, 
p.  155. 
268 their  person,  honour  and  convictions  and  religious  practices.  They  shall  in  all 
circumstances  be  treated  humanely,  without  any  adverse  distinction.  It  is  prohibited 
to  order  that  there  shall  be  no  survivors. 
2.  Without  prejudice  to  the  generality  of  the  foregoing,  the  following  acts  against  the 
person  referred  to  in  para.  1  are  and  shall  be  prohibited  at  any  time  and  in  any  place 
whatsoever: 
(a)  violence  to  life,  health  and  physical  or  mental  wellbeing  of  persons,  in  particular 
murder  as  well  as  cruel  treatment  such  as  torture,  mutilation  or  any  forms  of  corporal 
punishment; 
(b)  collective  punishments; 
(c)  taking  of  hostages; 
(d)  acts  of  terrorism; 
(e)  outrages  upon  personal  dignity,  in  particular  humiliating  and  degrading  treatment, 
rape,  enforced  prostitution  and  any  form  of  indecent  assault; 
(f)  slavery  and  slave  trade; 
(g)  pillage; 
(h)  threats  to  commit  any  of  the  foregoing  acts. 
3.  Children  shall  be  provided  with  the  care  and  air  they  require,  and  in  particular: 
(a)  They  shall  receive  an  education,  including  religious  and  moral  education,  in 
keeping  with  the  wishes  of  their  parents,  or  in  the  absence  of  parents,  of  those 
responsible  for  their  care. 
(b)  All  appropriate  steps  shall  be  taken  to  facilitate  the  reunion  of  families 
temporarily  separated. 
(c)  Children  below  the  age  of  fifteen  years  shall  neither  be  recruited  in  the  armed 
forces  nor  allowed  to  take  part  in  the  hostilities. 
(d)  The  special  protection  provided  by  this  Article  to  children  below  fifteen  years  of 
age  shall  remain  applicable  to  them  if  they  take  a  direct  part  in  hostilities  despite  the 
provisions  of  subpara.  (c)  and  are  captured. 
(e)  Measures  shall  be  taken,  if  necessary,  and  whenever  possible  with  the  consent  of 
their  parents  who  by  law  or  custom  are  primarily  responsible  for  their  care,  to 
remove  children  temporarily  from  the  area  in  which  hostilities  are  taking  place  to  a 
safer  area  within  the  country  and  ensure  that  they  are  accompanied  by  persons 
responsible  for  their  safety  and  wellbeing.  "281 
In  fact,  Article  4  contains  a  very  complicated  set  of  rules,  some  of  them  belong  to  human 
rights,  some  to  the  Geneva  law,  and  even  some  to  The  Hague  law.  Essentially  it  was  Drafted 
as  Article  6  by  the  ICRC,  it  kept  the  same  number  in  the  Draft  drawn  at  the  Committee 
level.  However,  during  the  last  session,  the  simplified  version  eliminated  many  rules 
contained  in  other  articles  of  the  Protocol  11,  especially  those  which  had  any  connection 
with  means  and  methods  of  warfare.  On  the  other  hand,  some  other  rules  were  included  in 
the  present  Article  4. 
The  first  question  which  may  arise  concerning  Article  4  is  who  are  the  persons  protected 
by  it?  and  the  second  concerns  the  content  of  the  rules  involved  in  it. 
1.  Persons  Protected  by  Article  4 
Initially  most  of  the  rules  contained  in  the  present  Article  4  were  to  be  applied  to  all  the 
population  in  the  country  torn  by  civil  strife.  Thus,  the  ICRC  submitted  to  the  second 
CGEDHL  three  Articles  282  which  dealt  in  detail  with  the  rules  contained  now  in  Article  4. 
2818othe 
et  at.,  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  3,  n.  186,  p.  638. 
282 
They  were  Articles  4,5  and  6.  Article  4  (Torture  and  fit  treatment)  provides: 
"In  order  that  the  prohibition  stipulated  in  Article  3(1)  should  obtain  its  fullest  effect, 
the  parties  to  the  conflict  shatt  take  all  necessary  measures  to  ensure  that  their  military 
or  civf  Han  agents  should  not  commit,  nor  Issue  orders  to  commit,  nor  condone  acts  of  torture 
or  brutality.  " 
269 When  the  ICRC  delegate  presented  those  Articles  (4,5  and  6)  which  were  contained  in 
Chapter  11  of  the  ICRC  Draft,  he  expressly  stated  that: 
"Chapter  Il  was  devoted  to  the  general  protection  of  the  population  in  the  territory 
of  a  Sia 
e  place". 
Ae  where  an  armed  conflict  not  of  an  international  character  was  taking 
He  then  added  that: 
"The  subject  of  the  chapter  therefore,  was  not  the  protection  of  the  civilian 
population  as  such  ... 
but  the  prohibition  in  relation  to  the  general  population,  of 
certain  cases  of  ill-treatment  already  forbidden  by  the  four  Geneva  Conventions".  284 
This  means  that  essentially  the  rules  are  to  apply  to  the  whole  population  without  any 
distinction.  It  is  in  reality  the  extension  of  the  principle  of  human  treatment  to  cover  the 
whole  population,  and  not  only  the  victims  of  internal  war  stricto  sensu. 
The  majority  of  the  Experts  supported  the  view  of  the  ICRC  and  stressed  the  need  for 
the  identity  of  the  rules  of  protection  in  internal  and  international  wars.  This  conception, 
in  their  opinion: 
"...  [D]id  not  imply  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  States,  but  that  Governmentý 
should  exercise  their  sovereignty  in  conformity  with  humanitarian  law  standards".  285 
Articie  5  (Terrorism,  reprisats,  pittage),  stipuLates: 
111.  Acts  of  terrorism,  as  wait  as  reprisals  against  persons  and  objects  indispensable  to  their 
survival  are  prohibited. 
2.  Pillage  is  prohibited. 
3.  Women  and  children  shatt  be  protected,  in  particular  against  rape  and  any  form  of  indecent 
assautt.  " 
Articte  6  (Measures  in  favour  of  chitdren)  reads  as  foltows: 
111.  Children  shalt  be  the  object  of  special  protection.  The  parties  to  the  conflict  shalt 
provide  them  with  the  care  and  aid  which  their  age  and  situations  require. 
2.  To  this  end,  the  parties  to  the  conflict  undertake,  at  least: 
(a)  to  ensure  the  identif  ication  of  chi  tdren,  particularly  by  making  them  wear  identity  discs; 
(b)  to  take  care  that  children  who  are  orphaned  or  separated  from  their  families  as  a  result 
of  armed  conflict  are  not  left  abandoned; 
(c)  to  endeavour  to  conclude  local  agreements  for  the  removal  of  children  from  combat  zones; 
such  children  shalt  be  accompanied  by  persons  responsible  for  ensuring  their  safety;  aLt 
necessary  steps  shalt  be  taken  to  permit  the  reunion  of  members  of  families  temporarily 
separated; 
(d)  to  take  care  that  children  under  fifteen  years  of  age  do  not  take  any  direct  part  in 
hostilities. 
3.  The  death  penalty  shalt  not  be  pronounced  on  civilians  below  18  years  of  age  at  the  time 
when  the  offence  was  committed,  nor  on  mothers  of  infants  or  on  women  responsible  for  their 
care.  Pregnant  women  shalt  not  be  executed.  " 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  272,  pp.  16-17. 
2830p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  269,  para.  2.107,  p.  72. 
2841bid, 
para.  2.107,  p.  73, 
2851bid, 
para.  2.110,  p-73- 
270 During  the  Diplomatic  Conference,  the  ICRC  submitted  Draft  Article  6  which  contained 
the  fundamental  guarantees. 
286  In  introducing  the  Draft  Article  to  discussion  at  the  second 
session  in  1975,  the  representative  of  the  ICRC  stressed  that  Part  11  of  Protocol  11,  which 
contained  Draft  Article  6,  was  designated  to  protect  'all  persons  who  took  no  direct  part  or 
who  had  ceased  to  take  a  part  in  hostilitieS'287  and  then  added: 
"It  [Part  11]  set  out  to  protect  all  persons  affected  by  the  armed  conflict  without 
creating  s  ecial  categories  of  protected  persons  enjoying  special  status  or 
treatment". 
988 
This  meant  in  his  opinion  that  combatants  who  were  'hors  de  combat'  and  had  fallen  into 
the  hands  of  the  adverse  party  are  not  to  be  transmuted  into  POW. 
The  conclusion  is  that  the  expression  in  Article  4/1  that  "all  persons  who  do  not  take  a 
direct  part  or  who  have  ceased  to  take  part  in  hostilities,  whether  or  not  their  liberty  has 
been  restricted'  has  to  be  interpreted  to  include  all  persons  in  the  country  where  civil  war 
is  taking  place,  and  not  only  the  civilian  population  stricto  sensu,  including  combatants  who 
either  are  'hors  de  combat'  or  those  who  still  fight,  because  Article  4/1  in  its  last  paragraph 
stipulates  that  'it  is  prohibited  to  order  that  there  shall  be  no  quarter'.  Thus,  even 
combatants  in  the  field  of  operation  have  some  kind  of  protection. 
The  effect  of  this  interpretation  is  once  a  State  accepts  the  applicability  of  Protocol  11, 
or  rather  once  the  Protocol  is  said  to  be  applicable  to  the  internal  conflict,  all  persons  living 
in  the  country  are  protected,  from  any  actions  that  may  violate  their  respect  for  their 
person,  honour  and  their  religious  and  moral  convictions.  This  interpretation  is  valid,  when 
it  is  taken  together  with  Article  2,  which  stresses  as  we  have  seen  that  the  Protocol  applies 
to  all  those  affected  by  the  conflict. 
Thus,  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  safe  to  assume  that  States  are  under  Protocol  11  more  tied 
than  Article  3.  Their  sovereignty  is  restricted  since  all  the  population  is  under  the  protection 
of  an  international  instrument,  and  also  no  plea  of  intervention  can  be  used  against  those 
who  demand  protection  of  the  whole  population. 
286Draft  Articte  6  submitted  by  the  ICRC  to  the  DipLomatic  Conference  stiputates: 
111.  All  persons  who  do  not  take  a  direct  part  or  who  have  ceased  to  take  a  part  in  hostilities, 
whether  or  not  their  liberty  has  been  restricted  are  entitled  to  respect  for  their  person, 
their  honour  and  their  religious  convictions  and  practices.  They  shalt  in  all  circumstances 
be  treated  humanely  without  any  adverse  distinction. 
2.  The  following  acts  against  the  persons  referred  to  in  paragraph  I  are  and  shalt  remain 
prohibited  at  any  time  and  in  any  place  whatsoever: 
(a)  violence  to  life  and  person,  in  particular  murder  of  all  kinds,  mutilation,  cruet  treatment 
and  torture; 
(b)  taking  of  hostages; 
(c)  acts  of  terrorism  In  the  form  of  acts  of  violence  committed  against  those  persons; 
(d)  outrages  upon  personal  dignity,  in  particular  humiliating  and  degrading  treatment; 
(e)  slavery  and  the  stave  trade  in  &It  their  forms; 
(f)  pillage; 
(g)  threats  to  commit  any  of  the  foregoing  acts. 
3.  women  shall  be  the  object  of  special  respect  and  shalt  be  protected  In  particular  against 
rape,  enforced  prostitution,  and  any  other  form  of  Indecent  assautt.  " 
op.  cit.,  supra.,  n.  273,  p.  35. 
2870P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  276,  CDDH/I/SR.  32,  para.  3,  p.  323. 
2881bid, 
para.  5,  p.  323. 
271 2.  The  Content  of  the  Guarantees  of  Article  4 
The  first  observation  concerning  this  point  is  that  the  rules  contained  in  the  Article  do  not 
bar  the  application  of  national  law  to  persons  who  may  have  violated  that  law.  289  This  is  a 
fundamental  concession  to  advocates  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  State,  since  the  Government 
can  always  resort  to  the  punishment  of  those  who  may  try  to  topple  it.  Protocol  11  does  not 
take  away  that  right,  it  is  there.  The  only  obligation  as  we  will  see  later  is  to  treat  them 
humanely,  but  there  is  no  prohibition  to  the  application  of  internal  law,  which  always 
makes  it  a  crime  to  take  arms  against  the  Government,  or  try  to  assist  those  insurgents  who 
are  fighting  the  Government. 
Returning  now  to  the  rules  included  in  this  important  Article  (4).  The  latter  essentially 
tries  to  fill  a  loophole  in  Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Conventions,  that  is  the  definition  of  the 
notion  of  humane  treatment. 
Thus,  the  ICRC  delegate  at  the  Diplomatic  Conference  specifically  stressed  the  intimate 
relationship  between  the  provisions  of  Draft  Article  6,  and  the  United  Nations  Covenant 
on  Civil  and  Political  Rights.  290  and  at  least  one  representative  expressed  the  view  that  the 
rules  included  in  the  Article  came  closer  to  the  subject  of  human  rights  rather  than  that  of 
humanitarian  law.  291 
During  the  discussion  two  views  concerning  Draft  Article  6  become  clear.  The  first  view 
was  happy  with  what  was  proposed  by  the  ICRC,  however  with  some  of  its  supporters 
advocating  some  minor  Drafting  changes.  292 
The  second  view  stressed  that  some  of  the  rules  included  in  the  Draft  Article  6  constitute 
a  violation  of  the  principles  of  sovereignty  and  non-intervention.  Thus,  Nigeria.  who  was 
among  the  leaders  of  the  second  view  maintained  that  Draft  Article  6: 
'...  IW)ould  appear  to  be  an  attempt  to  destroy  the  careful  balance  between  internal 
and  international  jurisdiction*.  293 
To  him,  there  was  no  obvious  reason  why  the  Draft  Article  should  seek  to  lay  down  legal 
rules  that  are  covered  already  in  most  domestic  systems. 
289The  ICRC  representative  made  It  very  ctear  that: 
OAtthough  It  (Part  11)  told  down  rules  regarding  human  treatment  of  protected  persons,  It  in 
no  way  shielded  from  the  application  of  national  tow  any  person  who  might  have  violated  that 
law  in  connection  with  the  arined  conflict". 
Op.  cit..  supro.  n.  267.  p.  323. 
290 
OP.  cit..  upro..  n.  276.  CDON/l/SR.  32.  pars.  6,  p.  324. 
291  lbl.  pars.  18.  p.  326. 
292  Thus,  Pat"  stated  that  It: 
0  (Ely4wessed  satisfaction  with  the  ICRC  Draft  Articte  60. 
Ibid.  pars.  17.  p.  326.  See  stso  the  Statente-ts  of  BeIghmp  (ibid.  pars.  27,  p.  328);  Austratia  C  ibid, 
pars.  26.  p.  328);  Swittertand  (ibid.  pers.  299,  p.  328);  Ukrainian  Soviet  Sociatist  Repubtic  (ibid. 
pers.  33.  p.  329);  UK  (ibid,  pera.  39.  p.  330):  and  New  Zest"  Cibid.  pera.  42.  p.  331). 
2931bid. 
pers.  21.  p.  327. 
272 Argentina  stressed  that  it  shared: 
"...  [T]he  concern  of  some  representatives  whq  considered  that  Article  6  entailed  too 
much  interference  in  national  sovereignty,,.  294 
Thus,  we  see  that  to  some  at  least,  the  inclusion  of  fundamental  human  rights  and 
fundamental  humanitarian  rules  can  be  considered  as  an  intervention  in  their  internal 
affairs. 
However,  Article  6  was  adopted  by  consensus  after  some  minor  changes  had  been 
introduced  by  a  working  group  and  that  by  Committee  I  in  1975. 
In  the  explanation  of  their  votes  on  Article  6,  some  States  continued  to  raise  the  question 
of  the  incompatibility  of  the  rules  of  the  article  with  demands  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention.  A  typical  example  of  this  was  voiced  by  Iraq,  which  strongly  attacked  Article 
6  and  other  Articles  of  Protocol  11.  Its  fundamental  objection  to  those  Articles  is  that  'they 
placed  the  State  and  a  rebel  party  on  an  equal  footing'.  295  However,  Iraq  noted  that  it  was 
not  against  the  principles  included  in  the  Article. 
In  the  simplified  version  Article  6  became  Article  4,  it  did  not  change  much  from  what 
had  been  proposed  by  the  ICRC  and  the  first  committee.  However,  the  Draft  Articles  on 
quarter  and  protection  of  children  (Articles  22  and  32  respectively)  were  included  in  the 
new  Article  4. 
Article  4  as  adopted  is  very  long,  it  is  in  effect  a  small  convention  in  itself.  Compared 
to  common  Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Conventions,  it  is  extensive  in  its  interpretation  of  the 
concept  of  human  treatment. 
The  concept  of  human  treatment  in  the  article  contains  many  rules  which  belong  to 
human  rights  law,  Geneva  law  and  even  Hague  law.  The  main  human  rights  included  are: 
1.  Respect  for  the  person,  his  religious  and  moral  convictions. 
2.  The  right  to  life  for  those  who  do  not  take  a  direct  part  in  the  hostilities.  Murder,  and 
cruel  treatment  such  as  torture,  mutilation  or  any  form  of  corporal  punishments  are  all 
prohibited. 
3.  Protection  of  women  in  their  dignity,  and  the  children  and  their  right  to  protection  and 
education. 
4.  Prohibition  of  slavery  and  slave  trade. 
It  must  be  noted  here  that  many  of  these  rights  are  covered  by  international  instruments 
of  human  rights.  Moreover,  all  the  rights  mentioned  in  the  article  are  concerned  with  the 
personal  and  moral  integrity  of  individuals.  This  means  that  the  article  continues  the 
tradition  of  the  human  rights  instruments  in  providing  that  no  derogation  is  possible  in  the 
application  of  these  fundamental  rights. 
Thus,  the  article  stipulates  that  all  acts  mentioned  in  paragraphs  2  and  3  'are  and  shall 
remain  prohibited  at  any  time  and  in  any  place  whatsoever'.  This  is  very  important  since 
294  lbid,  para.  30,  p.  328. 
295  lbid,  MDH/I.  SR.  40,  para.  28,  p.  426.  On  the  other  hard,  the  Syrian  representative  noted  that  he 
supported  ArtfcLe  6,  because  of  its  humanitarian  ruLes.  but  he  was  not  happy  with  the  wording  of  the 
ArticLe  since  it  imptfed  a  strict  juridicat  equaLity  between  the  Government  and  the  rebets.  lbid, 
CDDH/I. SR.  40,  para.  4,  p.  421. torture,  terrorism,  collective  punishments,  and  the  taking  of  hostages  can  be  resorted  to 
frequently  in  internal  conflicts,  in  order  to  extract  information,  or  as  a  method  of 
intimidating  the  population  and  the  insurgents.  Moreover,  it  must  be  noted  that  many  of 
the  rules  of  the  article  derive  from  the  fourth  Geneva  Convention  of  1949.296 
The  Article  also  contains  in  its  paragraph  1,  a  rule  which  belongs  to  the  law  of  The 
Hague,  it  relates  to  the  question  of  quarter,  and  makes  its  withholding  prohibited.  The 
prohibition  is  based  on  Article  23/D  of  the  regulations  of  The  Hague  respecting  the  laws 
and  customs  of  war  on  land. 
This  is  a  protection  for  the  soldiers  in  the  field  of  combat  and  is  a  vitally  important 
provision  in  the  context  of  internal  wars,  where  the  hatred  between  the  warring  factions  is 
intense.  It  is  argued  that  this  provision  indirectly  places  some  restraints  upon  the  methods 
employed  in  the  conduct  of  military  operations,  which  may  by  their  effects  lead  to  the 
extermination  of  those  who  are  involved  in  the  fighting  in  specific  operations. 
It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  article  not  only  prohibits  the  commission  of  the  acts  listed 
in  it,  but  it  actually  expressly  forbids  even  'threats  to  commit  any  of  the  foregoing  acts' 
which  means  that  the  discretion  of  Governments  in  choosing  the  means  of  combating  the 
insurgents  and  vice-versa  has  been  greatly  curtailed,  in  favour  of  more  extension  of 
297  humanitarian  ideas  to  this  inhuman  experience  (civil  wars  and  their  cruelty)  The  general, 
conclusions  concerning  Article  4  are  as  follows: 
1.  The  Drafting  history  suggests  that  there  is  a  general  agreement  between  States  that  they 
are  not  against  the  extension  of  humanitarian  protection  to  large  segments  of  the  population', 
if  not  to  the  whole  population.  Thus,  the  personnel  field  of  application  of  the  rules  of 
Article  4  must  be  seen  as  wider  than  Common  Article  3. 
This  conclusion  carries  with  it  that  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  has  been,  in  this  field  at 
least,  restricted  since,  nearly  all  the  population  has  certain  fundamental  rights  which  derive 
directly  from  an  international  instrument.  This  in  my  view  is  a  logical  consequence  of 
accepting  human  rights  as  a  fundamental  limitation  on  State  sovereignty. 
2.  Furthermore,  it  is  argued  that  the  plea  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention  were  raised 
not  against  the  rules  involved  in  the  Article,  which  represent  in  fact  some  of  the  most 
generally  accepted  principles  of  civilisation,  against  which  no  civilised  State  can  protest,  at 
least  publicly,  but  rather  against  the  implication  that  the  rebels  stand  as  equals  to  the 
established  Government.  However,  even  that  contention  was  not  pushed  further,  since 
essentially  what  was  proposed  by  the  ICRC  was  accepted  even  in  the  simplified  version  of 
Protocol  11. 
3.  The  extension  of  some  fundamental  rules  of  the  Geneva  law,  especially  those  of  the 
fourth  Geneva  Convention  of  1949,  and  even  of  some  rules  of  Hague  law,  which  were 
applied  only  between  States  in  international  wars,  to  internal  wars  is  obvious  in  Article  4, 
296  Thus,  para.  2/D  is  borrowed  from  Article  33  of  the  fourth  Geneva  Convention  of  1949  (acts  of 
terrorism);  para.  2/E  from  Article  27  (women);  para  2/G  from  Article  33  (Pillage).  The  Preamble  of 
para.  3  from  Article  32/1;  para  3/A  from  Article  24/1  (education  for  children);  para.  3/8  from  Article 
26;  para.  3/C  from  Article  50;  para.  3/E  from  Articles  17,24/2  and  50  of  the  fourth  Geneva  Convention. 
297For 
a  general  discussion  of  Article  4,  see  Sandoz  et  aL.,  OP.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  3.  n.  23, 
pp.  1368-1381. 
274 which  means  that  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  has  been  curtailed  in  some  important  aspects. 
Thus  acts  of  terrorism,  pillage,  taking  of  hostages  and  collective  punishments  are  all 
prohibited. 
B.  Protection  of  Detained  and  Imprisoned  Persons 
Common  Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  did  not  contain  any  special  protection  for 
persons  whose  liberty  has  been  restricted  for  reasons  connected  with  the  internal  conflict. 
However,  as  it  has  been  said  when  dealing  with  Article  3  in  Section  II  of  the  present 
chapter,  the  only  provision  that  applies  to  captured  combatants  is  that  they  are  protected 
against  summary  execution.  This  means  that  the  right  of  the  established  Government  to 
punish  its  enemies  in  accordance  with  its  own  laws  is  by  no  means  restricted  whatever  the 
barbarity  of  such  law. 
However,  it  must  be  stressed  that  the  accordance  of  the  status  of  POW  to  captured 
insurgents  has  very  grave  consequences  for  the  established  Government.  It  gives  the  rebel 
organisation  respectability  and  legal  status,  which  no  Government  dares  to  admit,  because 
it  undermines  its  authority,  and  its  claim  to  the  monopoly  of  representing  the  State. 
The  accordance  of  the  POW  status  to  rebels  is  thus  seen  by  the  established  Government 
as  constituting  a  big  challenge  to  State  sovereignty,  and  as  opening  of  the  doors  of  the  State 
to  foreign  intervention.  It  seems  to  me,  that  the  travaux  prkparatolres  show  in  a  very  clear 
way  how  the  invocation  of  the  principles  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  have  in  fact 
killed  any  attempt  to  extend  POW  status  to  rebels. 
1.  The  Red  Cross  Experts'  View 
The  Red  Cross  Experts  were  not  against  the  extension  of  what  they  termed  'POW  treatment' 
to  captured  insurgents.  They  stressed: 
"The  fact  of  applying  the  humanitarian  rules  to  rebels  did  not  amount  to  a  recognition 
of  belligerency.  In  other  words,  the  fact  that  they  were  treated  as  POW  does  not  give 
them  the  status  of  POW  according  to  the  third  Geneva  Convention,  and  hence  has  no 
effect,  in  international  law,  on  the  status  of  the  collectivity  or  the  authority  to  which 
"298  they  belong. 
Thus,  the  Experts  in  fact  did  ask  for  the  extension  of  'POW  treatment'  to  captured- 
insurgents,  and  not  the  status  of  POW,  in  order  to  avoid  the  question  of  the  legal  status  of 
the  insurgent  party,  since  according  to  the  third  Geneva  Convention  the  status  of  POW  is 
conferred  only  to  captured  combatants  belonging  to  a  State,  as  a  general  rule,  or  to  a 
resistance  movement. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Red  Cross  Experts  wanted  to  stress  that  the  efforts  to  alleviate  the 
sufferings  of  captured  combatants  must  not  prejudice  the  right  of  the  established 
Government  to  withhold  the  granting  of  POW  status,  since  it  will  be  seen  as  a  kind  of 
recognition  of  the  legitimacy  of  the  struggle  of  the  insurgents.  This  means  that  the  Experts 
tried  to  pay  strong  attention  to  the  demand  of  sovereignty. 
2980p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  100,  p.  65. 
275 2.  The  Government  Experts'  View 
It  seems  that  the  ICRC  has  taken  into  account  what  has  been  proposed  by  its  Experts,  since 
it  submitted  to  the  second  conference  of  Government  Experts  a  Draft  Article  25  which 
stipulates: 
"Article  25.  Treatment  of  combatants  who  have  fallen  into  the  power  of  the 
adversary: 
Members  of  regular  armed  forces  and  members  of  those  armed  forces  which  have 
fulfilled  the  conditions  stipulated  in  Article  4A  (2)  of  the  Geneva  Convention 
relative  to  the  treatment  of  POW  of  August  12,1949,  shall  receive,  after  having  fallen 
into  the  power  of  the  adversary,  a  treatment  similar  to  that  provided  for  POW  in  the 
"299  said  convention. 
This  Article  in  fact  has  been  the  subject  of  a  heated  discussion  in  the  conference.  Two 
trends  can  be  detected.  The  first  view,  although  it  was  not  in  principle  against  the  idea  of 
extending  POW  treatment  to  captured  insurgents,  was  sceptical  about  the  exact  meaning  of 
the  notion  of  'similar  treatment'  used  by  the  ICRC.  To  this  view  it  was  a  vague  concept, 
since  in  practice  it  is  very  difficult  to  draw  the  line  between  those  PTOViSions  of  the  third 
Geneva  Convention  to  be  applied  under  the  heading  of  'similar  treatment'  and  those  which 
300  would  remain  peculiar  to  the  said  convention. 
The  second  view  was  espoused  by  the  defenders  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  State.  They 
attacked  the  very  idea  of  either  placing  the  captured  insurgents  on  equal  footing  with  POWs 
captured  in  international  conflicts,  or  indeed  any  regulation  of  their  status  in  an 
international  instrument.  To  them  the  insurgents  had  broken  the  laws  of  allegiance  by 
committing  the  Crime  Of  rebellion,  which  was  condemned  by  every  penal  code  in  the 
WOTId. 
301 
However,  some  Experts  suggested  that  persons  who  had  taken  arms  against  the  regular 
armed  forces  should  be  treated  humanely  'in  accordance  with  the  law',  that  is  the  local  law. 
In  their  opinion,  this  is  the  logical  solution,  since  it  is  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of 
respect  for  territorial  sovereignty  and  in  line  with  the  desire  to  preserve  this  sovereignty 
from  any  outside  intervention  during  an  armed  confliCt.  302 
Thus,  the  general  trend  was  against  the  inclusion  of  any  article  which  may  be  interpreted 
as  giving  some  kind  of  status  to  captured  insurgents.  The  result  was  the  deletion  of  Article 
25  proposed  by  the  ICRC,  which  means  that  demands  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention 
have  carried  the  day. 
3.  The  Diplomatic  Conference  Attitude 
In  proposed  Protocol  11,  submitted  by  the  ICRC  to  the  Diplomatic  Conference,  no  mention 
was  made  of  the  granting  of  the  treatment  of  POW  to  captured  insurgents.  The  arguments 
of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  had  killed  the  ICRC  attempt  at  the  level  of  CGEDHL. 
2990P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  269,  p.  78. 
3001bid, 
para.  2.173.  p-79- 
3011bfd, 
para-2-172,  P-79. 
3021bid, 
pars.  2-171,  P-79. 
276 In  fact,  the  ICRC  delegate  stated  clearly  in  the  Diplomatic  Conference  in  1975  that: 
"...  [C]ontrary  to  its  earlier  proposals  and  in  accordance  with  the  recommendations  of 
the  Experts  it  had  consulted,  the  ICRC  had  given  up  the  idea  of  assimilating 
combatants  who  were  hors-de-combat  and  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  adverse 
party,  to  pOW".  303 
He  then  added  that: 
"A  captured  combatant  would  only  enjoy  the  protection  provided  in  Articles  8,9  and 
10  (Articles  5  and  6  of  the  actual  Protocol  11)  and  if  he  had  committed  an  offence  in 
connexion  with  the  armed  conflict  might  be  prosecuted,  tried  and  sentenced  in 
accordance  with  national  law".  304 
This  means  that  no  POW  treatment  is  to  be  accorded  to  captured  insurgents.  The  latter  are 
still  criminals  under  local  law.  However,  the  Government  is  under  a  duty  to  respect  some 
humanitarian  and  penal  rules  concerning  detention,  judgment  and  sentencing  of  those  rebels 
when  captured,  as  I  will  show  later  when  dealing  with  Articles  5  and  6  of  the  Protocol  II. 
It  must  be  noted  that  the  ICRC,  although  it  ruled  out  the  extension  of  POW  treatment  to 
captured  insurgents  in  its  Draft  Protocol  II  submitted  to  the  diplomatic  conference, 
nevertheless  tried  to  Write  down  in  Protocol  II  some  rules  which  would  mitigate  the 
suffering  of  captured  rebels,  hence  giving  them  some  kind  of  needed  protection.  The 
example  was  Draft  Article  7,305  which  was  essentially  based  on  Article  23/C  of  the 
Reglementation  of  The  Hague  of  1907,306  which  forbids  the  killing  or  wounding  of  an 
enemy  who  laid  down  his  arms. 
At  the  committee  level  it  has  been  upheld  and  even  strengthened,  since  the  category  of 
those  who  compose  the  'hors-  de-  combat'  has  been  clearly  defined.  It  (Draft  Article  7) 
3030p. 
cit.,  supre.  n.  276,  CDDH/l/SR.  32,  para.  5,  pp.  323-4. 
3041bid,  CDDH/I/SR/32,  para.  5,  p.  324. 
305Draft  Article  7  of  the  Protocol  11  submitted  by  the  ICRC  to  the  Diplomatic  Conference  stipulates: 
"Article  7.  Safeguard  of  an  enemy  hors-de-combat: 
1.  In  accordance  with  Article  6,  it  is  forbidden  to  kill,  injure,  M-treat  or  torture  an 
adversary  hors-de-combat.  An  adversary  hors-de-combat  is  one  who,  having  Laid  down  his  arms, 
no  Longer  has  any  means  of  defence  or  has  surrendered.  These  conditions  are  considered  to  have 
been  fulfilled,  In  particular,  in  the  case  of  an  adversary  who: 
(a)  is  unable  to  express  himself,  or 
(b)  has  surrendered  or  has  clearly  expressed  an  intention  to  surrender, 
(c)  and  abstains  from  any  hostile  act  and  does  not  attempt  to  escape. 
2.  If  a  party  to  the  conflict  decides  to  send  back  to  the  adverse  party  those  combatants  it 
has  captured.  it  must  ensure  that  they  are  in  a  fit  State  to  make  the  journey  without  any 
danger  to  their  safety.  "  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  273,  p.  35. 
306Articte  23/C  of  The  Hague  Convention  on  Land  Warfare  of  1907  provides: 
"23.  in  addition  to  the  prohibitions  provided  by  special  conventions  it  is  specifically 
forbidden:  ... 
c.  To  kill  or  wound  an  enemy  who,  having  laid  down  his  arms,  or  having  no  longer  means  of 
defence,  has  surrendered  at  discretion.  " 
op.  cit.,  supra.  n-28,  P-77. 
277 became  Article  22  biS;  307  it  stressed  that  combatants  who  become  hors  de  combat  cannot  be 
the  object  of  an  attack. 
However,  Article  (22  bis)  has  been  deleted  in  the  simplified  version  submitted  by 
Pakistan.  But  it  must  be  noted  that  at  least  one  delegation  (Belgium)  had  made  it  clear  when 
explaining  its  vote,  that  the  deletion  of  Article  22  bis  cannot  mean  that  the  principle 
underlying  it  cannot  be  respected.  In  its  view,  the  principle  still  stands  in  Article  4/1  which 
308 
prohibits  the  withholding  of  quarter. 
In  my  view,  this  is  the  correct  interpretation,  since  it  is  in  harmony  with  the  object  and 
purpose  of  Protocol  11  and  especially  Article  4/1. 
Thus,  the  travaux  pr6paratolres  show  in  a  very  clear  way  that  the  arguments  of 
sovereignty  and  non-  intervention,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  were  responsible  for  the 
elimination  of  any  attempt  at  giving  captured  insurgents  the  status  of  POW. 
4.  Articles  5  and  6  of  the  Protocol  11  and  the  Protection  of  Detained  Persons 
Articles  5  and  6  contain  some  fundamental  human  rights  concerning  the  treatment  of 
detained  persons  in  connection  with  internal  war.  Article  5  concerns  the  rights  of  persons 
interned  or  detained  for  reasons  related  to  the  conflict  and  Article  6  contains  the  rules 
which  must  be  respected  in  the  prosecution  and  punishment  of  persons  who  committed 
criminal  offences  related  to  the  armed  conflict. 
The  two  articles  refer  to  civilian  and  military  persons  interned  or  detained,  who  are  to 
be  prosecuted  for  reasons  related  to  the  conflict.  This  means  that  the  articles  are  not 
confined  only  to  combatants  captured  by  the  Government,  but  also  to  all  civilians  who  have 
committed  offences  relating  to  the  conflict.  Thus,  their  personnel  field  is  wide  and 
corresponds  in  my  view  to  the  real  situations  of  civil  wars,  where  the  rate  of  interned  and 
detained  civilians  is  greater  than  insurgent  combatants,  because  essentially  of  the  guerrilla 
method,  which  is  widely  resorted  to  in  internal  conflicts. 
These  two  articles,  it  must  be  emphasised,  represent  what  States  are  ready  to  grant  to 
their  enemies.  States  made  sure  that  nothing  in  the  articles  will  imply  that  they  recognise 
any  legal  status  to  insurgents. 
In  fact,  the  two  article  imply  that  persons  covered  by  them  have  committed  offences 
against  the  local  law.  Hence  they  are  to  be  punished  under  that  very  law.  On  the  other  hand, 
established  Governments  under  the  two  articles  are  under  a  duty  to  bring  their  national  law 
in  line  with  the  rules  included  in  them.  However,  it  must  be  indicated  that  common  Article 
307Draft  ArticLe  22  bis  entitted  "Safeguard  of  an  Enemy  Hors  de  Combat"  adopted  by  the  third  committee 
at  its  49th  meeting  (4  June  1976)  and  by  consensus,  reads: 
"I.  A  person  who  is  recognised  or  shoutd,  under  the  circumstances,  be  recognised  to  be  hors  de  combat, 
shatL  not  be  made  the  object  of  attack. 
2.  A  person  Is  hors  de  combat  if: 
(a)  he  is  in  the  power  of  an  adverse  party;  or 
(b)  he  cLearty  expresses  an  Intention  to  surrender;  or 
(c)  he  has  been  rendered  unconscious  or  is  otherwise  incapacitated  by  wounds  or  sickness,  and  he  is 
therefore  incapabie  of  defending  himseLf; 
and  in  any  case,  provided  that  he  abstains  from  any  hostite  act  or  does  not  attempt  to  escape.  as 
15  GRDCHL  (1974-77),  Federat  Potiticat  Dept.  (1978).  CDDR/236/Rev.  1,  p.  420. 
308op. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  267,  MDH/SR/52,  p.  139. 
278 3  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  contains  no  special  safeguards  concerning  the  protection  of 
detained  and  interned  persons  and  no  rules  on  the  prosecution  of  offenders. 
In  this  respect,  these  two  articles  constitute  a  welcome  and  important  innovation,  since 
they  limit  the  discretionary  power  of  the  legal  Government  in  dealing  with  its  enemies, 
even  when  the  national  law  still  considers  them  basically  as  common  criminals. 
In  order  to  show  the  influence  of  the  concepts  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  on 
the  Drafting  of  these  two  articles  I  will  study  the  two  articles  separately. 
4.1.  Article  5 
Article  5  of  the  Protocol  Il  provides: 
"5.  Persons  whose  liberty  has  been  restricted: 
1.  In  addition  to  the  provisions  of  Article  4,  the  following  provisions  shall  be 
respected  as  a  minimum  with  regard  to  persons  deprived  of  their  liberty  for  reasons 
related  to  the  armed  conflict,  whether  they  are  interned  or  detained: 
(a)  The  wounded  and  the  sick  shall  be  treated  in  accordance  with  Article  7; 
(b)  The  persons  referred  to  in  this  paragraph  shall,  to  the  same  extent  as  the  local 
civilian  population,  be  provided  with  food  and  drinking  water  and  be  afforded 
safeguards  as  regards  health  and  hygiene  and  protection  against  the  rigours  of  the 
climate  and  the  dangers  of  armed  conflict. 
(c)  They  shall  be  allowed  to  receive  individual  or  collective  relief; 
(d)  They  shall  be  allowed  to  practise  their  religion,  if  requested  and  appropriate,  to 
receive  spiritual  assistance  from  persons,  such  as  chaplains,  performing  religious 
duties; 
(e)  They  shall,  if  made  to  work,  have  the  benefit  of  working  conditions  and 
safeguards  similar  to  those  enjoyed  by  the  local  civilian  population. 
2.  Those  who  are  responsible  for  the  internment  or  detention  of  the  persons  referred 
to  in  paragraph  I  shall  also,  within  the  limits  of  their  capabilities,  respect  the 
following  provisions  relating  to  such  persons: 
(a)  Except  when  men  and  women  of  a  family  are  accommodated  together,  women 
shall  be  held  in  quarters  separated  from  those  of  men  and  shall  be  under  the 
immediate  supervision  of  women; 
(b)  They  shall  be  allowed  to  send  and  receive  letters  and  cards,  the  number  of  which 
may  be  limited  by  competent  authority  if  it  deems  necessary; 
(c)  Places  of  internment  and  detention  shall  not  be  located  close  to  the  combat  zone. 
The  persons  referred  to  in  paragraph  I  shall  be  evacuated  when  the  places  where  they 
are  interned  or  detained  become  particularly  exposed  to  danger  arising  out  of  the 
armed  conflict,  if  their  evacuation  can  be  carried  out  under  adequate  conditions  of 
safety; 
(d)  They  shall  have  the  benefit  of  medical  examinations, 
(e)  Their  physical  or  mental  health  and  integrity  shall  not  be  endangered  by  any 
unjustified  act  or  omission.  Accordingly,  it  is  prohibited  to  subject  the  persons 
described  in  this  article  to  any  medical  procedure  which  is  not  indicated  by  the  State 
of  health  of  the  person  concerned,  and  which  is  not  consistent  with  the  generally 
accepted  medical  standards  applied  to  free  persons  under  similar  medical 
circumstances. 
3.  Persons  who  are  not  covered  by  paragraph  I  but  whose  liberty  has  been  restricted 
in  any  way  whatsoever  for  reasons  related  to  the  armed  conflict  shall  be  treated 
humanely  in  accordance  with  Article  4  with  paragraph  l(a),  (c)  and  2(d)  of  this 
article. 
4.  If  it  is  decided  to  release  persons  deprived  of  their  liberty,  necessary  measures  to 
ensure  their  safety  shall  be  taken  by  those  so  deciding.  "309 
309  H.  S.  Levie  (ed.  ):  The  Law  of  Non-Internationat  Armed  Conftict.  Protocot  11  to  the  1949  Geneva 
Conventfons.  Martfnus  Nilhoff,  1987,  pp.  240-41. 
279 Originally  this  article  was  Drafted  as  Article  8  in  the  proposed  version  of  Protocol  Il 
submitted  by  the  ICRC  to  the  Diplomatic  Conference.  310  However,  the  first  question  which 
arises  concerns  the  personnel  field  application  of  the  article.  In  this  context  the  ICRC 
delegate  in  presenting  the  Draft  Article  8  interpreted  the  key  expression  'persons  whose 
liberty  has  been  restricted'  as  comprising: 
"...  [A]II  persons  without  distinction,  both  civilians  and  militiry,  whose  liberty  has 
been  restricted  for  reasons  in  relation  to  the  armed  conflict".  1 
Thus,  it  appears  that  the  personnel  field  of  application  of  the  Article  seems  to  be  wide,  and 
responds  in  a  way  to  the  needs  of  the  internal  conflicts.  The  commentary  of  the  ICRC  to 
Article  5  in  fact,  stressed  that: 
"The  expression  'persons  whose  liberty  has  been  restricted'  was  chosen  in  preference 
to  more  specific  words  such  as  'prisoners'  or  'detainees'  to  take  into  account  the  full 
extent  of  the  Article's  scope  of  application,  which  covers  all  detainees  and  persons 
whose  liberty  has  been  rgstricted  for  reasons  related  to  the  conflict,  without  granting 
them  a  special  status.  "312 
In  other  words,  all  persons  who  were  captured  or  arrested  in  relation  to  the  conflict, 
although  basically  still  considered  as  criminals  who  break  the  local  law,  would  benefit  from 
the  humanitarian  rules  of  the  article,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  their  number  would  be  big, 
31ODraft  Articte  8  submitted  by  the  ICRC  reads  as  fol.  lows: 
"Article  8.  Persons  whose  liberty  has  been  restricted. 
1.  Ali  persons  whose  liberty  has  been  restricted  by  capture  or  arrest  for  reasons  in  retation 
to  the  armed  conflict  shalt,  whether  they  are  Interned  or  detained,  be  treated  humanely,  in 
accordance  with  Article  6. 
2.  In  addition,  the  parties  to  the  conflict  shalt  respect  at  least  the  following  provisions: 
(a)  The  wounded  and  sick  shalt  be  treated  in  accordance  with  Article  12; 
(b)  The  persons  referred  to  in  paragraph  I  shalt  be  accommodated  in  buildings  safeguarded  as 
regards  hygiene  and  heat  th  and  provided  efficient  protection  against  the  rfgours  of  the  cti  mate 
and  the  dangers  of  the  armed  conflict. 
(c)  They  shalt  be  supplied  with  adequate  supplies  of  drinking  water  and  with  food  rations 
sufficient  to  keep  them  in  good  health.  They  shalt  be  permitted  to  secure  or  to  be  provided 
with  adequate  clothing; 
(d)  Women  shalt  be  held  in  quarters  separated  from  ments  quarters.  They  shalt  be  under 
immediate  supervision  of  women.  This  does  not  apply  to  those  cases  where  members  of  the  same 
family  are  in  the  same  place  of  Internment. 
3.  The  parties  to  the  conflict  shalt  also  respect  the  following  provisions  within  the  limits 
of  their  capabilities: 
(a)  The  persons  referred  to  in  paragraph  I  shalt  be  allowed  to  receive  individual  or  collective 
relief; 
(b)  They  shalt  be  allowed  to  practice  their  religion  and  receive  spiritual  assistance  from 
chaplains  and  other  persons  performing  similar  functions; 
(c)  They  shalt  be  allowed  to  send  and  receive  letters  and  cards.  The  parties  to  the  conflict 
may  limit  the  number  of  such  letters  if  they  deem  it  necessary; 
(d)  Places  of  interment  and  detention  shalt  not  be  set  up  close  to  the  combat  zone.  The 
persons  referred  to  in  paragraph  I  shalt  be  evacuated  when  the  places  where  they  are  detained 
or  Interned  become  particularly  exposed  to  dangers  arising  out  of  the  armed  conflict,  if  their 
evacuation  can  be  carried  out  in  adequate  conditions  of  safety. 
4.  Measures  of  reprisals  against  the  persons  referred  to  in  paragraph  I  are  prohibited. 
5.  Subject  to  temporary  and  exceptional  measures,  the  parties  to  the  conflict  shalt  endeavour 
to  facilitate  visits  to  the  persons  referred  to  in  paragraph  I  by  an  impartial  humanitarian 
body  such  as  the  International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross.  " 
lbid,  pp.  205-206. 
3110P. 
cit..  supra.  n.  276,  MDH/I/SR.  32,  para.  65,  p.  336. 
312  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  297,  p.  1364. 313 
especially  among  civilians. 
On  the  substantive  level,  the  ICRC  Draft  Article  8  was  very  ambitious.  It  sets  two  kinds 
of  obligations.  The  first  are  mandatory,  which  needed  for  their  implementation,  some 
positive  measures.  The  second  category  included  what  may  be  called  'within  the  capacity 
and  if  conditions  permit'  obligations.  The  first  category  included  strict  standards  which 
must  be  complied  with,  such  as  providing  food,  water,  shelter,  health,  hygiene,  adequate 
clothing  and  separate  places  of  internment  for  men  and  women. 
However,  'within  the  capacity  and  if  conditions  permit  obligations'  States  are  to  respect 
the  rights  of  detained  and  interned  persons  to  practise  their  religion,  to  receive  spiritual 
assistance  from  qualified  persons,  to  correspond.  Moreover,  camps  of  detention  and 
internment  are  not  to  be  situated  near  combat  zones. 
Third  World  countries  quickly  challenged  the  idea  of  imposing  any  kind  of  mandatory 
obligations.  In  their  opinion,  they  are  not  in  a  position  to  grant  a  more  favourable  treatment 
than  that  for  the  ordinary  civilian  living  in  the  country.  Thus,  Mexico,  as  an  example, 
considered  that  the  obligations  Stated  in  the  Article  (Article  8/2  (b)  and  (c)  were 
'unrealistic9  and  then  added: 
"...  [M]ost  non-international  armed  conflicts  occurred  in  developing  countries  in  which 
living  conditions  described  in  paragraph  2  would  be  regarded  as  an  ideal".  314 
Nigeria  was  more  explicit.  To  it,  the  mandatory  provisions  of  paragraph  2  appear  to  be 
"incongruous  in  such  an  instrument.  They  seem  to  be  higher  than  those  obtaining  for  law- 
abiding  citizenS".  315  Iraq  and  India  in  fact  hinted  that  the  article  implied  some  kind  of 
external  supervision,  which  would  inevitably  lead  to  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
316  States. 
313This 
wouLd  be  the  imptication  of  the  ICRC  representative's  answer  to  a  question  from  the  UK 
deLegate,  on  the  exact  scope  of  Articte  S.  The  former  (ICRC  deLegate)  stressed  that: 
"The  formuta  retained  (persons  whose  Liberty  has  been  restricted)  has  been  intended  to  cover 
aLl.  persons  whose  Merty  had  been  restricted:  persons  interned  without  judfciaL  proceedings 
and  persons  awaiting  triat  during  the  whoLe  period  of  their  detention  from  the  time  of  their 
arrest  untit,  their  retease.  " 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  309,  p.  217. 
3140p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  276,  CDDH/I/SR.  32.  para.  65,  p.  336. 
315  Ibid,  para.  84,  p.  340. 
316  In  this  context,  India  stated  that  It: 
11...  ECIonsidered  that,  though  Article  8  was  excellent  from  a  humanitarian  point  of  view,  its 
provisions  could  not  be  implemented  by  all  the  forces  concerned-  In  particular,  paragraph  2 
(b)  and  (c)  and  paragraph  3  (c)  and  (d)  could  not  easily  be  implemented  and  therefore 
,  unrealistic.  Any  obligation  to  respect  the  provisions  implied  supervision.  As  his  delegation 
had  already  stated,  Protocol  It  should  not  become  an  instrument  for  interference  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  States". 
Jbid,  para.  87,  p.  340.  See  also  Iraq,  fbid,  CDDH/I/SR.  32.  para.  90,  p.  341. 
281 These  attacks  led  to  the  watering  down  of  the  tone  of  the  ICRC  Draft  at  the  committee 
level.  317  Thus,  the  mandatory  obligations  of  the  parties  in  regard  to  detained  persons  were 
qualified  by  the  phrase  'to  the  same  extent  as  the  local  population'.  In  other  words,  the 
objections  of  Third  World  States  were  taken  into  account;  hence  standards  of  food,  drinking 
water,  health,  hygiene  and  shelter  were  to  take  into  account  the  conditions  of  life  outside 
the  camps  as  guidance. 
Eide  criticised  this  attitude  since  in  his  opinion: 
"...  [W]hile  this  sounds  plausible,  it  may  nevertheless  be  somewhat  misleading  since  the 
local  population,  whose  liberty  is  not  restricted,  has  some  possibilities  on  their  own 
initiative  to  improve  their  conditions  when  in  severe  difficulty,  while  the  detained 
or  imprisoned  pemle  entirely  rely  on  the  conditions  provided  for  them  by  the 
S8 3  detaining  power". 
However,  the  ICRC  commentary  stresses  in  this  respect  that: 
"The  obligation  of  the  detaining  power  remains  an  absolute  ne,  but  its  content  varies 
depending  on  the  living  conditions  prevailing  in  the  area  "  19 
Thus,  food  available  for  the  guards  of  the  detainees  should  also  be  a  criterion;  in  other 
words,  detainees  should  receive  as  much  food  as  those  guarding  them,  the  commentary  adds. 
After  the  introduction  of  this  fundamental  change  (the  inclusion  of  the  phrase  'to  the 
same  extent  as  the  local  population')  it  must  be  noted  that  Draft  Article  8  was  in  fact 
strengthened  by  adding  new  obligations,  both  in  the  mandatory  and  'within  their  possibility 
and  if  conditions  permit'  obligations. 
Thus,  in  the  former  category  of  obligations,  States  are  directed  to  respect  the  working 
conditions  whenever  they  decide  to  make  detainees  and  interned  persons  work.  In  other 
words,  those  persons  should  not  work  in  dangerous  or  unhealthy  conditions.  They  should 
always  benefit  from  the  legal  working  conditions  similar  to  those  which  apply  to  normal 
workers.  This  is  very  important,  since  the  authorities  may  use  work  as  a  real  disguise  for 
humiliating  or  even  torturing  their  captured  enemies. 
In  the  latter  category  (within  their  possibility  and  if  conditions  permit)  States  are  under 
a  duty  to  seek  to  provide  medical  examinations  for  persons  deprived  of  their  liberty.  The 
aim  of  this  important  provision  is: 
"...  [T]o  ensure,  generally,  good  medical  attention  in  places  of  internment  or  detention; 
on  the  one  hand,  so  that  no  one  remains  in  a  condition  of  distress  without  receiving 
care,  and  on  the  other  hand,  to  ensure  that  cont!  4ious  diseases  are  detected  in  time, 
32  in  the  interests  of  detainees  and  guards  alike". 
This  is  very  important,  taking  into  account  the  mental  and  physical  State  of  persons 
317  For  the  work  done  by  the  sub-working  group  and  working  group  B  of  the  Committee,  see  op.  cit., 
supra.  n.  309,  pp.  220-223. 
318A 
.  Elde:  The  New  Humanitarian  Law  in  Non-Internationat  Armed  ConfLicts,  in  A.  Cassese  (ed.  ):  The 
New  Humanitarian  Law  of  Armed  Conftict.  Ed.  Scientifica,  S.  r.  L.  NapoLi,  1979,  p.  284. 
3190P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  297,  p.  1387. 
320  ibid.  p.  1391. 
282 deprived  of  their  liberty,  and  the  State  of  places  of  detention  and  internment  with 
overcrowding  and  sometimes,  the  absence  of  elementary  standards  of  hygiene. 
Moreover,  a  new  paragraph  (3)  was  introduced.  It  concerns  in  fact,  a  special  category  of 
victim  of  internal  conflicts.  They  are  persons  who  are  neither  interned  nor  detained,  but 
nevertheless,  their  liberty  is  restricted  in  connection  with  the  conflict,  such  as  individuals 
who  are  ordered  to  live  under  house  arrest  or  under  surveillance. 
Those  persons,  in  addition  to  the  benefits  of  Article  4  (the  fundamental  guarantees)  can 
enjoy  the  benefits  set  for  detained  and  interned  persons  which  do  not  concern  the  material 
conditions  of  internment  or  detention,  such  as  their  right  to  practise  their  religion,  to 
receive  relief,  to  correspond  and  receive  mail. 
However,  after  the  introduction  of  these  innovations,  which  did  not  appear  in  the  ICRC 
Draft  Article  8,  the  Article  (8)  was  adopted  by  consensus  by  Committee  1.321 
In  their  explanation  of  votes,  one  delegation  at  least  continued  to  view  the  content  of  the 
article  as  an  intrusion  in  the  sovereignty  of  State.  322 
In  the  simplified  version  of  Protocol  11  submitted  by  Pakistan  at  the  last  session  of  the 
Diplomatic  Conference,  the  same  approach  adopted  by  the  first  committee  has  been  upheld. 
However,  all  references  in  the  article  to  'the  parties  to  the  conflict'  or  'authority'  had  been 
omitted.  The  aim  of  course  is  very  clear.  It  is  to  make  it  clear  that  the  insurgents  possess 
no  legal  status  whatsoever,  even  if  they  are  obliged  also  to  carry  out  the  obligations  of  the 
article. 
Furthermore,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  simplified  version  added  a  new  paragraph,  which 
was  not  contained  either  in  the  ICRC  Draft  Article  8  or  Draft  Article  8  adopted  by  the  first 
committee.  The  new  paragraph  (Article  5/2  (e))  in  fact,  reiterates  Article  II  (I)  of  the  First 
323  Protocol.  The  paragraph  sets  the  general  principle  of  the  protection  of  the  physical  and 
mental  health  of  persons  interned  or  detained  in  connection  with  the  conflict,  and  then 
specifies  the  governing  medical  procedures  which  must  be  complied  with.  Thus,  acts  or 
omissions  which  may  endanger  the  physical  or  mental  health  of  persons  are  prohibited, 
and  then  implicitly  medical  experiments  are  prohibited. 
321  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  309,  pp.  222-230. 
3221n  this  respect,  Iraq  made  it  ctear  that: 
0...  [TIhe  fact  that  his  delegation  had  not  called  for  a  vote  on  Articles  6,6  bis  and  8  did 
not  mean  that  it  agreed  with  the  principles  underlying  those  articles  or  the  details  contained 
in  them;  it  thought  that  to  take  a  vote  in  a  conference  on  humanitarian  taw  was  incompatible 
with  the  humanitarian  spirit,  which  should  be  one  of  unanimity  and  general  goodwill". 
lbid,  p.  233. 
323Article 
1111  stfputates  that: 
NThe  physical  or  mental  health  and  integrity  of  persons  who  are  In  the  power  of  the  adverse 
party  or  who  are  interned,  detained  or  otherwise  deprived  of  liberty  as  a  result  of  a  situation 
referred  to  in  Article  I  shall  not  be  endangered  by  any  unjustified  act  or  omission. 
Accordingly,  it  is  prohibited  to  subject  the  persons  described  in  this  article  to  any  medical 
procedure  which  is  not  indicated  by  the  State  of  health  of  the  person  concerned  and  which  is 
not  consistent  with  generally  accepted  medical  standards  which  would  be  applied  under  similar 
medical  circumstances  to  persons  who  are  nationals  of  the  party  conducting  the  procedure  and 
who  are  in  no  way  deprived  of  Liberty". 
lbid,  p.  149. 
283 The  article  then  was  adopted  by  consensus  and  became  Article  5  in  the  final  version  of 
Protocol  11.324 
The  main  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  the  history  and  actual  wording  of  Article  5  are 
in  my  opinion  as  follows: 
1.  There  is  no  doubt  that  it  is  a  very  important  Article,  because  of  the  mere  fact  that  it 
deals  with  the  most  hated  category  of  the  victims  of  the  internal  wars;  captured  insurgents 
and  their  allies  among  the  civilian  population.  This  is  in  itself  an  innovation,  since  common 
Article  3,  as  we  have  been,  nearly  totally  ignores  the  plight  of  those  victims. 
However,  it  must  be  stressed  that  the  article  did  not  go  as  far  as  giving  POW  status  to 
detained  and  interned  persons.  The  reason  is  very  clear.  Sovereignty,  as  the  travaux 
prkparatolres  show,  was  used  systematically  to  eliminate  any  such  prospect,  but  the  article 
which  in  fact  supplements  Article  4  (fundamental  guarantees)  (the  latter  as  we  have  seen 
contains  general  prohibitions)  contains  concrete  measures,  which  would  if  complied  with 
make  the  life  of  those  interned  or  detained  less  harsh  and  more  humane. 
2.  To  me,  the  basic  idea  behind  the  article  is  the  protection  of  the  fundamental  human 
right,  namely  the  right  to  life.  This  right  cannot  be  sustained  in  reality,  in  detention  and 
internment  places,  if  concrete  measures  are  not  taken  concerning  food,  water,  medical  care, 
hygiene  and  shelter.  They  are  in  fact,  the  ingredients  of  the  right  to  life,  especially  in  the 
Third  World,  where  all  of  the  civil  wars  are  taking  place. 
3.  Article  5  is  an  attempt,  in  my  view,  (from  the  moral  and  legal  point  of  view),  to  prove 
that  the  claim  that  in  civil  wars  all  methods  and  means  are  permissible  to  finish  off  the 
enemy,  is  not  accepted,  at  least  on  the  normative  level,  in  the  age  of  human  rights.  Article 
5  in  fact  limits  the  conduct  of  the  warring  factions  vis-i-vis  this  important  category  of 
victims  of  war,  which  means  implicitly  that  the  discretion  of  Governments  has  been 
curtailed  to  a  significant  degree  in  this  sphere. 
4.  It  is  also  interesting  to  n.  that  in  the  travaux  prkparatolres  no  State  has  claimed,  at  least 
publicly,  that  insurgents  and  their  allies  among  the  civilian  population  who  are  detained  or 
interned  need  no  protection,  because  of  the  sole  fact  of  disobeying  their  State's  laws.  In 
fact,  even  sovereignty-  oriented  delegations  conceded  that  humanitarian  rules  were  needed. 
However,  they  were  only  against  giving  the  insurgents  any  legal  status  or  higher  protection 
than  that  given  to  civilian  population.  In  this  sphere  then  the  concept  of  human  rights,  as 
a  limitation  of  State  sovereignty,  was  upheld  and  confirmed. 
4.2.  Article  6  of  Protocol  II  (Penal  Prosecutions) 
Article  6  of  Protocol  11  provides: 
"I.  This  Article  applies  to  the  prosecution  and  punishment  of  criminal  offences 
related  to  the  armed  conflict. 
2.  No  sentence  shall  be  passed  and  no  penalty  shall  be  executed  on  a  person  found 
guilty  of  an  offence  except  pursuant  to  a  conviction  pronounced  by  a  court  offering 
the  essential  guarantees  of  independence  and  impartiality  In  particular: 
(a)  the  procedure  shall  provide  for  an  accused  to  be  informed  without  delay  of  the 
particulars  of  the  offence  alleged  against  him  and  shall  afford  the  accused  before  and 
324 
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284 during  his  trial  all  necessary  rights  and  means  of  defence; 
(b)  no-one  shall  be  convicted  of  an  offence  except  on  the  basis  of  individual  penal 
responsibility; 
(c)  no-one  shall  be  held  guilty  of  any  criminal  offence  on  account  of  any  act  or 
omission  which  did  not  constitute  a  criminal  offence,  under  the  law,  at  the  time  when 
it  was  committed;  nor  shall  a  heavier  penalty  be  imposed  than  that  which  was 
applicable  at  the  time  when  the  criminal  offence  was  committed;  if,  after  the 
commission  of  the  offence,  provision  is  made  by  law  for  the  imposition  of  a  lighter 
penalty,  the  offender  shall  benefit  thereby; 
(d)  anyone  charged  with  the  offence  is  presumed  innocent  until  proven  guilty 
according  to  law; 
(e)  anyone  charged  with  an  offence  shall  have  the  right  to  be  tried  in  his  presence; 
(f)  no-one  shall  be  compelled  to  testify  against  himself  or  to  confess  guilt. 
3.  A  convicted  person  shall  be  advised  on  conviction  of  his  judicial  and  other 
remedies  and  of  the  time-limit  within  which  they  may  be  exercised. 
4.  The  death  penalty  shall  not  be  pronounced  on  persons  who  are  under  the  age  of 
eighteen  at  the  time  of  the  offence  and  shall  not  be  carried  out  on  pregnant  women 
or  mothers  of  young  children. 
5.  At  the  end  of  hostilities,  the  authorities  in  power  shall  endeavour  to  grant  the 
broadest  possible  amnesty  to  persons  who  have  participated  in  the  armed  conflict,  or 
those  deprived  of  ýheir  liberty  for  reasons  related  to  the  conflict  whether  they  are 
interned  or  not.  "32 
In  fact,  this  Article  embodies  the  essentials  of  the  penal  policy  which  the  parties  to  the 
conflict  must  respect  and  apply  to  criminal  offences  committed  in  relation  to  the  armed 
conflict.  It  contains  both  procedural  and  substantive  rules  which  the  parties  must  comply 
with.  The  influence  of  human  rights  is  by  no  means  absent,  especially  of  the  Covenant  on 
Civil  and  Political  Rights  of  1966. 
However,  it  must  be  emphasised  that  the  Article  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  right 
of  the  established  Government  to  prosecute,  try  and  convict  persons  who  committed  crimes 
in  connection  with  the  armed  conflict  was  upheld  and  left  intact.  In  this  particular  and 
important  sphere,  it  is  not  different  from  Article  3.  it  continued  in  fact  the  same  tradition, 
hence  sovereignty  still  holds  the  day. 
On  the  other  hand,  Article  6  must  be  seen  as  going  further  in  its  protection  of  persons 
who  committed  criminal  offences  in  connection  with  the  conflict  than  Article  3.  In  fact 
Article  6  supplements  and  develops  Article  3,  paragraph  2,  sub-pararagraph  I  (d),  which 
prohibits: 
*The  passing  of  sentences  and  the  carrying  out  of  executions,  without  previous 
judgment  pronounced  by  a  regularly  constituted  court,  affording  all  the  judicial 
guarantees  which  are  recognised  as  indispensable  by  civilized  peoples.  " 
Ratione  personae,  the  Article  is  "quite  open  and  applies  equally  to  civilians  and  combatants 
who  have  fallen  in  the  power  of  the  adverse  party  and  who  may  be  subject  to  penal 
"326  prosecution.  The  importance  of  the  Article,  it  must  be  indicated,  springs  from  the  fact 
that  in  most  cases  national  laws  in  emergency  cases  are  very  harsh,  if  not  totally  inhuman 
325 
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3261bid, 
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285 towards  those  who  struggle  against  the  established  Governments,  be  they  military  or 
civilian. 
The  most  common  sentence  imposed  on  them  is  the  death  penalty.  Also  the  tribunals 
which  deliver  such  sentences  (if  they  exist)  are  military  tribunals  which  are  composed 
generally  in  a  way  which  does  not  guarantee  any  chance  of  fair  trial,  and  contains  no 
element  of  independence  and  impartiality. 
4.2.1.  The  Red  Cross  Experts'  Opinion 
It  must  be  noted  from  the  start  that  the  ideas  contained  in  this  important  Article  had  been 
the  subject  of  heated  discussions  from  the  beginning  of  the  ICRC's  attempt  to  codify  rules 
for  non-  international  conflicts. 
In  this  context,  and  at  the  very  beginning,  the  ICRC  suggested  to  the  Red  Cross  Experts 
that  it  intended  to  extend  three  main  substantive  rules  on  the  question  of  penal  prosecution 
of  offences  related  to  the  internal  conflicts,  namely: 
1.  Immunity  to  be  granted  for  the  sole  fact  of  having  taken  part  in  hostilities. 
2.  Deferment,  during  hostilities,  of  the  execution  of  any  death  penalty. 
3.  General  amnesty  at  the  end  of  hostilities.  327 
These  general  rules  were  to  be  applied  to  combatants  who  did  not  commit  grave  breaches 
of  the  laws  of  war,  that  is  combatants  who  conduct  their  operations  in  accordance  with  the 
governing  rules  of  humanitarian  law,  criminals  who  breached  those  rules  have  to  be 
provided  with  necessary  judicial  guarantees. 
The  Red  Cross  Experts  in  general  seem  to  be  reluctant  to  endorse  the  ICRC  suggestions. 
They  pointed  out  the  difficulties  inherent  in  their  application,  especially  in  the  first  period 
of  the  conflict,  where  the  established  Government  would  be  inclined  to  take  energetic  steps 
to  stop  attacks  upon  its  authority  and  existence.  They  stressed  that  the  most  that  can  be 
done  in  those  circumstances  is  to  try  to  get  the  consent  of  the  established  Government  to 
introduce  in  their  penal  laws  provisions  which  stipulate  that  the  mere  fact  of  participation 
in  the  conflict  would  not  be  punished  by  death. 
However,  concerning  the  question  of  granting  amnesty  at  the  end  of  the  hostilities,  they 
pointed  out  that  this  prerogative  belongs  to  the  established  Government,  which  can  accord 
it  as  it  sees  fit.  328 
Thus,  the  Red  Cross  Experts  seem  to  pay  strong  attention  to  the  attitude  of  the 
established  Governments  in  regard  to  the  introduction  of  new  rules  which  are  to  be  applied 
essentially  to  those  who  carry  arms  against  it,  and  those  who  support  them.  implicit  in  their 
argument  is  that  Governments  are  not  likely  to  accept  easily  such  far-reaching  limitations 
upon  their  discretionary  power,  hence  their  sovereignty  to  punish  their  enemies  according 
to  their  laws. 
4.2.2.  The  Governments'  Experts'  View 
3270P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  100,  pp.  56-59. 
328 
Ibid. 
286 At  the  CGEDHL  in  1972,  the  ICRC  submitted  in  fact  two  Articles  (27  and  2S).  329  The  first 
one  contains  of  the  generally  accepted  principles  of  penal  law,  namely,  individual 
responsibility,  and  thus  prohibits  collective  penalties.  The  second  Article,  however,  deals 
specifically  with  the  prosecution  of  combatants.  Its  essential  aim  was  the  prohibition  of  the 
death  penalty  for  the  sole  fact  of  taking  arms  against  the  Government,  by  combatants  who 
generally  satisfy  the  conditions  of  Article  4/A  (2)  of  the  third  Geneva  Convention. 
Draft  Article  28  thus,  touches  a  very  sensitive  point,  namely  the  right  of  legal 
Governments  to  impose  the  death  penalty  on  those  who  defy  its  laws  and  resort  to  force  in 
order  to  topple  it.  Hence,  the  Article  was  the  subject  of  a  heated  discussion,  which  in  fact, 
reveals  that  the  concept  of  sovereignty  has  been  used  extensively  by  some  Experts  to  retain 
the  right  of  the  Government  to  use  the  death  penalty  against  captured  insurgents. 
In  this  context,  some  Experts  simply  proposed  the  deletion  of  the  Article,  the  reason 
being  that  it  'concerns  a  matter  falling  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  the  State'.  330 
Another  Expert  doubted: 
"...  [W]hether  a  State  would  agree,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  protocol  to  be 
drawn  up.. 
1 
to  grant  such  immunity  to  its  nationals  in  the  event  of  an  armed 
conflict.  "" 
Moreover,  it  was  pointed  out  that  no  Government  would  decide  to  comply  with  the  protocol 
by  introducing  changes  in  its  own  legislation  when  it  was  caught  up  in  a  civil  war.  The 
332  death  penalty  would  be  used  as  a  means  of  repression. 
However,  the  majority  of  Experts  seem  to  favour  some  form  of  restricting  the  power  of 
established  Governments,  to  use  the  death  penalty  against  persons  for  the  sole  fact  of  taking 
up  arms  against  it.  Thus,  the  Experts  proposed  the  addition  of  many  important  rules 
concerning  penal  prosecution.  They  suggested  in  fact,  that  the  following  rules  must  be 
respected  by  authorities: 
"I.  No  sentence  shall  be  passed  or  execution  carried  out  against  a  person  who  has 
committed  an  offence  related  to  the  conflict  without  previous  judgment  pronounced 
by  a  regularly  constituted  court  affording  [all]  the  judicial  guarantees  which  are 
329Articte  27  reads  as  fotLows: 
"No  person  may  be  punished  for  an  offence  he  or  she  has  not  personatty  coninitted.  Cottective 
penattles  are  prohibited.  " 
On  the  other  hand,  Article  28,  which  Is  entitled  "Penal  prosecution  against  combatants",  stipulates: 
"After  having  faLLen  into  the  power  of  the  adversary,  combatants  who  wHl  have  fuLfiLLed  the 
conditions  stipuLated  in  ArticLe  25  of  the  present  protocoL,  as  weLL  as  those  combatants  who, 
without  having  fuLfiLLed  the  conditions  stfputated  inArticLe  4A  (2)  of  the  Geneva  Convention 
retative  to  the  treatment  of  POW  of  August  12,1949,  witL  have,  at  teast  in  the  course  of  their 
operations,  distinguished  themseLves  from  the  civ!  Lian  popuLation  by  some  distinctive  sign  or 
by  any  other  means  and  who  have  compLied  with  the  provisions  of  the  present  protocoL,  shaLL 
not  be  punished  by  death  if  they  become  the  object  of  penat  prosecutions  onLy  by  reason  of 
having  taken  part  in  hostiLltles  or  having  been  members  of  armed  forces.  " 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  269,  pp-83-84. 
3301bid, 
para.  2.210,  p.  84.  (This  was  the  view  of  the  Experts  of  Romania). 
331  Jbid,  para.  2.111,  p.  84- 
3321bid, 
para.  2.223,  p.  86- 
287 generally  recognised  [as  indispensable]  by  the  principal  legal  systems  of  the  world. 
2.  A  person  convicted  of  such  an  offence  shall  be  entitled,  in  accordance  with  the 
laws  in  force,  to  avail  himself  of  the  right  of  appeal  or  petition  from  any  sentence 
pronounced  upon  him.  He  shall  be  fully  informed  of  his  right  of  appeal  or  petition. 
3.  At  the  conclusion  of  the  hostilities,  the  parties  to  the  conflict  should  endeavour  to 
grant  amnesty  to  as  many  as  possible  of  those  who  have  participated  in  the  conflict 
or  have  been  convicted  of  offences  or  deprived  of  liberty  in  connection  with  the 
conflict. 
4.  War  crimes  are  prohibited.  Penalties  for  war  crimes  shall  be  imposed  and  carried 
out  in  accordance  with  the  conflict. 
5.  No  execution  shall  take  place  in  public.  "333 
These  rules,  although  they  did  not  rule  out  the  Tight  of  the  legal  Government  to  resort  to 
the  use  of  the  death  penalty,  establish  general  standards  of  fair  trial.  Hence,  they  restrict 
the  discretionary  power  of  established  Governments  in  suspending  or  abolishing  those 
fundamental  standards.  Thus,  the  Experts  in  fact,  tried  to  find  a  balance  between  the 
demands  of  sovereignty  and  those  of  humanity. 
4.2.3.  The  Diplomatic  Conference  Attitude 
At  the  Diplomatic  Conference,  the  ICRC  submitted  two  Draft  Articles  (9  and  10)134  which 
were  largely  based  upon  the  Governments'  Experts  suggestions.  The  former  dealt  with  the 
general  principles  of  penal  law,  and  the  latter  dealt  with  some  procedural  penal  points.  No 
mention  of  the  word  'combatant'  was  used.  These  Articles  were  to  be  applied  to  persons 
who  have  committed  offences  related  to  the  armed  conflict.  They  were  designed  in  fact,  to 
333  lbid,  p.  87. 
334  Article  9,  entitled  "Principles  of  Penal  Law"  stipulates: 
111.  No  one  may  be  punished  for  an  offence  which  he  or  she  has  not  personally  committed; 
collective  penalties  are  prohibited. 
2.  No-one  may  be  punished  on  account  of  any  act  or  emission  contrary  to  a  duty  to  act  which 
was  not  an  offence  at  the  time  when  it  was  committed. 
3.  No-one  shall  be  liable  to  be  prosecuted  or  punished  for  an  offence  for  which  he  has  already 
finally  been  acquitted  or  convicted. 
4.  No-one  shalt  be  held  guilty  of  an  offence  except  under  those  provisions  of  taw  which  were 
in  force  at  the  time  when  the  offence  was  committed. 
5.  Everyone  charged  with  an  offence  is  presumed  innocent  until  proved  guilty  according  to  taw". 
On  the  other  hand,  Article  10  entitled  "Penal.  prosecution"  reads  as  follows: 
111.  No  sentence  shalt  be  passed  or  penalty  inflicted  upon  a  person  found  guilty  of  an  offence 
In  relation  to  the  armed  conflict  without  previous  judgment  pronounced  by  a  court  offering  the 
guarantees  of  independence  and  impartiality  which  are  generally  recognised  as  essential,  in 
accordance  with  a  procedure  affording  the  accused  the  necessary  rights  and  means  of  defence. 
2.  Everyone  shall  have  the  right  of  appeal  against  any  sentence  pronounced  upon  him.  He  shall 
be  fully  informed  of  his  right  to  appeal  and  of  the  time  Limit  within  which  he  may  do  so. 
3.  The  death  penalty  pronounced  on  any  person  found  guilty  of  an  offence  in  relation  to  the 
armed  conflict  shalt  not  be  carried  out  until  the  hostilities  have  ceased. 
4.  The  death  penalty  shall  not  be  pronounced  for  an  offence  in  relation  to  the  armed  conflict 
committed  by  persons  below  eighteen  years  of  age  and  shalt  not  be  carried  out  on  pregnant 
women. 
5.  In  case  of  prosecutions  carried  out  against  a  person  only  by  reason  of  his  having  taken  part 
In  hostilities,  the  court,  when  deciding  upon  the  sentence,  shall  take  into  account,  to  the 
greatest  possible  extent,  the  fact  that  the  accused  respected  the  provision  of  the  present 
protocol. 
6.  At  the  end  of  hostilities,  the  authorities  in  power  shalt  endeavour  to  grant  amnesty  to  as 
many  as  possible  of  those  who  have  participated  in  the  armed  conflict,  in  particular  those 
whose  liberty  has  been  restricted  for  reasons  In  relation  to  the  armed  conflict,  whether  they 
are  Interned  or  detained.  " 
OP-  Cit.,  supra.  n.  309,  pp.  245-46. 
288 limit  excess  in  the  trial  prosecution  and  conviction  of  captured  insurgents  and  civilians  who 
support  them. 
In  the  discussions  which  followed,  many  States  especially  from  the  Third  World,  attacked 
the  Articles  by  using  the  arguments  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention.  It  was  argued  that 
the  penal  rules  contained  in  Article  9  of  the  ICRC  Draft  Protocol  11  have  no  place  in  that 
protocol,  since  they  exist  in  all  legal  systems  of  the  world,  hence  their  inclusion  in  Protocol 
II  is  superflUOUS.  335 
Concerning  the  question  of  the  death  penalty,  which  in  fact  was  prohibited  in  two  cases 
only  according  to  Draft  Article  10,  namely,  offenders  under  the  age  of  18  and  pregnant 
women,  and  despite  the  ICRC  delegate  assurance  that  "with  those  two  exceptions,  Article 
10  left  intact  the  right  of  the  authorities  to  pronounce  the  death  penalty  in  accordance  with 
national  law",  336  some  Third  World  countries  were  not  content.  Thus,  the  Indian  delegate 
stressed  that  Draft  Article  10: 
"...  [W]ould  be  in  conflict  with  his  country's  national  I  w,  and  that  its  provisions 
constitute  interference  in  the  sovereign  right  of  States.  "137 
Thus,  the  precedence  of  national  law  over  international  law  is  advocated  in  order  to  protect 
the  sovereignty  of  the  State. 
Similarly,  Pakistan  after  noting  that  each  country  had  its  own  criminal  laws,  stressed  that 
any  attempt  to  impose  principles  which  differed  from  those  followed  by  national  laws 
would  be  pointless  in  his  country.  He  emphasised  that: 
"...  [I]nsurgents  would  be  executed,  and  any  attempt  to  impose  international 
legislation 
...  would  in  his  opinion  constitute  interference  with  the  sovereign  right  of 
"338  States. 
Thus,  some  States  resist  any  attempt  to  codify,  in  an  international  instrument,  even  some 
general  principles  of  penal  law  accepted  by  all  States  in  their  national  laws.  The  reason  is 
clear,  they  wish  to  be  free  to  deal  with  their  enemy. 
However,  at  the  committee  level,  the  two  Articles  (9  and  10)  were  merged  into  one 
Article  (Article  10).  It  was  adopted  by  the  First  Committee  after  lengthy  Drafting 
335 
In  this  context,  Iraq  argued  that: 
"Article  9  was  of  such  a  general  nature  that  it  was  out  of  place  In  Draft  Protocol  11;  no 
mention  was  made  in  it  either  of  armed  conflicts  or  of  victims.  The  rules  of  penal  taw 
enunciated  therein  could  be  found  in  the  general  practice  of  penal  taw  as  well  as  in  certain 
international  conventions  relating  to  human  rights;  which  could  be  applied  to  everyone  and  in 
all  circumstances". 
OP.  cit.,  supra.  n.  276,  CDDH/I/SR.  33,  para.  51,  p.  351.  Indonesia  also  stressed  that  Article  9  had  a 
very  general  scope  and  contained  provisions  already  existing  in  the  penal  legislation  throughout  the 
world.  For  that  reason  he  considered  It  inopportune  for  the  Article  to  appear  in  protocol  11,  which  had  a  welt-defined  objective.  lbid,  para.  68,  p.  354. 
336 
lbid,  para.  4,  p.  357. 
337 
lbid,  para.  13,  p.  359. 
338 
lbid,  para.  17,  p-360. 
289 changeS.  339  The  new  Article340  can  be  seen  in  fact  as  more  elaborate  than  that  of  the  ICRC. 
Thus,  in  addition  to  what  the  ICRC  submitted,  other  rights  were  included,  and  which  all 
go  in  the  direction  of  strengthening  the  right  to  fair  trial.  Among  the  rights  are  the 
following: 
1.  The  accused  must  be  informed  without  delay  of  the  particulars  of  the  offence  against 
him. 
2.  The  accused  must  have  the  right  to  defence  before  and  during  his  trial. 
3.  No  heavier  penalty  should  be  imposed  on  the  accused,  other  than  the  one  that  was 
applicable  at  the  time  the  criminal  offence  was  committed.  However,  when  lighter  penalties 
are  subsequently  imposed  on  the  same  offence,  the  accused  should  benefit  from  it. 
4.  The  accused  has  the  right  to  be  tried  in  his  presence. 
5.  No-one  can  be  obliged  to  testify  against  himself  or  to  confess  guilt. 
6.  Persons  charged  and  sentenced  for  criminal  offences  in  relation  to  the  armed  conflict 
shall  have  the  right  to  seek  pardon  or  commutation  of  the  death  sentence. 
Thus,  it  seems  that  at  the  committee  level,  despite  the  misgivings  of  a  handful  of  Third 
World  States,  the  majority  supported  the  strengthening  of  the  Article.  Part  of  the  answer 
lies  in  the  fact  that  most  of  these  rights  were  already  included  in  other  international 
agreements,  especially  human  rights  instruments. 
But,  at  the  final  session  of  the  Diplomatic  Conference,  Pakistan  proposed  in  its  simplified 
339For 
a  detalied  version,  see  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  309,  pp.  246-292. 
340New  ArtfcLe  10,  adopted  at  the  committee  tevet.  (First  Committee),  stipuLates: 
"I.  This  Article  applies  to  the  prosecution  and  punishment  of  criminal  offences  relating  to 
the  armed  conflicts. 
2.  No  sentence  shalt  be  passed  or  penalty  executed  on  a  person  found  guilty  of  an  offence 
except  pursuant  to  a  conviction  pronounced  by  a  tribunal  offering  the  essential  guarantees  of 
independence  and  impartiality.  In  particular: 
(a)  The  procedure  shalt  provide  for  an  accused  to  be  Informed  without  delay  of  the  particulars 
of  the  offence  alleged  against  him  and  should  afford  the  accused  before  and  during  his  trial 
all  necessary  rights  and  means  of  defence; 
(b)  no-one  shalt  be  convicted  of  an  offence  except  on  the  basis  of  individual  penat 
responsibility; 
(c)  no-one  shalt  be  held  guilty  of  any  criminal  offence  on  account  of  any  act  or  omission  which 
did  not  constitute  a  criminal  offence  under  national  or  international  taw  at  the  time  when  It 
was  committed;  nor  shalt  a  heavier  penalty  be  Imposed  than  the  one  that  was  applicable  at  the 
time  when  the  criminal  offence  was  committed.  If  subsequent  to  the  commission  of  the  offence 
provision  is  made  by  taw  for  the  imposition  of  a  tighter  penalty,  the  offender  shalt  benefit 
thereby; 
(d)  anyone  charged  with  an  offence  is  presumed  innocent  until  proved  guilty  according  to  taw; 
(e)  anyone  charged  with  an  offence  shalt  have  the  right  to  be  tried  in  his  presence; 
(f)  no-one  shalt  be  compelled  to  testify  against  himself  or  to  confess  guilt. 
3.  A  convicted  person  shalt  be  advised  on  conviction  of  his  judicial  and  other  remedies  and 
of  time  limits  within  which  they  may  be  exercised. 
4.  The  death  penalty  shalt  not  be  pronounced  on  persons  below  18  years  of  age  at  the  time  of 
the  offence  and  shalt  not  be  carried  out  on  pregnant  women  and  mothers  of  young  children. 
5.  In  case  of  prosecutions  carried  out  against  a  person  only  by  his  having  taken  part  in 
hostilities.  the  court,  when  deciding  upon  the  sentence,  shat,  t  take  Into  consideration,  to  the 
greatest  possible  extent,  the  fact  that  the  accused  respected  the  provisions  of  the  present 
protocol.  in  such  a  case  the  death  penalty  shal.  I  not  be  carried  out  unti  t  the  armed  conf  I  Ict. 
6.  Anyone  sentenced  shalt  have  the  right  to  seek  pardon  or  commutation  of  the  sentence  of  death 
in  all  cases. 
7.  At  the  end  of  hostilities  the  authorities  in  power  shalt  endeavour  to  grant  amnesty  to  as 
many  as  possible  of  those  who  have  partf  cf  pated  in  the  armed  conf  I  Ict,  or  those  whose  t  iberty 
has  been  restricted  for  reasons  in  relation  to  the  armed  conflict,  whether  they  are  interned 
or  detained.  " 
OP.  cit.,  supra.  n.  274,  CDDH/234/Rev.  1,  para.  95,  pp.  131-33. 
290 version  of  Protocol  11  the  deletion  of  paragraphs  5.6  and  7  of  Draft  Article  10  as  adopted 
at  the  committee  level.  All  these  three  paragraphs,  it  must  be  noted,  deal  in  one  way  or 
another  with  the  question  of  the  death  penalty  and  therefore  directly  relate  to  the  fate  of 
captured  insurgents. 
Nevertheless,  only  paragraph  7  has  been  retained,  which  means  that  in  practice 
Governments  can  sentence  to  death  their  enemies  and  swiftly  carry  out  the  execution, 
without  having  to  wait  u,  ntil  the  end  of  hostilities.  The  aim  here  is  very  clear.  Governments 
want  to  give  an  example  to  all  those  who  may  wish  to  disobey  its  laws.  It  is  a  way  of 
breaking  the  will  of  an  adversary  by  resorting  to  the  harshest  sentence  -  death.  Also  the 
implication  of  paragraph  6  (the  right  to  seek,  after  the  sentence  of  the  death  penalty, 
commutation  or  pardon)  means  that  the  Government  wants  to  signal  to  its  enemies  that  they 
have  no  hope  of  pardon  or  mercy. 
It  must  be  stressed  that  even  after  the  deletion  of  paragraphs  5  and  6,  some  States 
especially  from  the  Third  World,  continued  their  attacks  upon  the  Article.  Thus,  on  one 
hand,  Kenya  thought  that  the  Article  is 
-'superfluoUS'. 
341  On  the  other  hand,  Nigeria 
emphasised  that  'this  kind  of  provision  constitutes  interference  with  the  internal  systems 
obtaining  in  States,  342  and  then  added  that  the  Article  as  adopted: 
"...  [V]eers  dangerously  towards  imposing  a  kind  of  new  criminal  procedure  for  ýJajes 
parties  thereto,  which  to  us  represents  a  dangerous  trend  in  international  law".  4 
It  then  warned: 
"This  trend,  if  not  arrested  in  time,  will  escalate  and  pad  Ihis  protocol  to  such  an 
extent  that  many  States  would  find  it  difficult  to  ratify  it.  "  44 
Zaire  went  even  further.  In  explaining  its  vote  against  the  retention  of  paragraph  7  of  Draft 
Article  10  (which  became  paragraph  5  of  Article  6  of  the  final  version  of  Protocol  11,  the 
paragraph  concerns  clemency  and  amnesty),  it  considered  the  obligation  contained  in  the 
paragraph  as  a  mere  recommendation  devoid  of  any  mandatory  force.  It  expressly  stated: 
"...  [I]t  is  in  no  way  a  binding  obligation,  nor  even  a  simple  obligation  in  the  technical 
sense;  that  is,  a  legal  bound  requiring  any  sovereign  State  to  amnesty,  no  matter  how 
under  pressure  certain  forces  involvZd,  persons  who  have  done  their  country  serious 
"3  5  harm  by  serving  foreign  interests. 
3410P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  267.  CHHD/SR.  50,  p.  101. 
3421bid, 
p.  102. 
3431bid. 
3441bid. 
345  Ibid.  Similarty,  Spain,  in  exptaining  Its  vote  against  the  retention  of  paragraph  7  of  Articte  10 
stated: 
USuch  measures  (of  ctemency  and  amnesty]  fatt  within  the  exctusive  competence  of  States,  which 
bearing  atways;  in  mind  the  common  good  of  the  community  they  govern,  can  atone  decide  whether 
or  not  an  amnesty  or  conducive  to  the  restoration  of  pubtic  peace.  " 
Ibid,  p.  103. 
291 However,  despite  these  misgivings,  which  it  must  be  confessed  may  explain  the  non- 
ratification  of  Protocol  11  (in  October  1989,  the  number  of  States  which  ratified  Protocol 
11  stands  at  78346)  by  a  significant  number  of  States.  It  seems  that  the  majority  were  in 
favour  of  what  has  been  accepted  in  Draft  Article  10,  which  became  in  the  final  version 
of  Protocol  Il  Article  6  (cited  above). 
I  believe  that  the  adoption  of  Article  6  is  a  very  important  step  towards  the  protection 
of  one  important  category  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars.  Their  number  is  very  high,  since 
it  does  not  only  include  captured  insurgents  but  also  large  numbers  of  civilians  who  may 
assist  them  in  different  contexts  and  situations. 
The  importance  of  the  Article  also  springs  from  the  fact  that  as  a  first  step  in  combatting 
insurgents  and  their  allies  among  the  civilian  population,  States  resort  to  the  suspension  of 
the  constitution  and  the  declaration  of  emergency  or  State  of  seige,  hence  suspending  all 
standards  and  rules  of  fair  trial. 
The  Article  makes  it  clear  at  least  implicitly,  that  no  suspension  of  the  general  penal  rules 
are  possible  in  the  event  of  civil  wars  governed  by  Protocol  11.  This  is  the  effect  of  Article 
6/2.  Then,  no  derogation  from  the  components  of  a  fair  trial  is  possible. 
The  influence  of  human  rights  is  by  no  means  absent  in  this  context.  The  ICRC 
commentary  of  the  two  protocols  stresses: 
"Article  6  reiterates  the  principles  contained  in  the  third  and  fourth  conventions 
[Articles  86,89-108  of  the  former  and  Articles  64-78  of  the  latter]  and  for  the  rest 
it  is  largely  based  on  the  international  covenant  on  political  and  civil  rights, 
particularly  Article  15,  from  which  no  derogation  is  B) 
public  emergency  threatening  the  life  of  the  nation.  "  4vmitted,  even  in  the  case  of 
The  list  of  rights  which  the  Government  cannot  suspend,  or  derogate  from,  in  Article  6  is 
very  wide  indeed,  and  compared  to  Article  3  is  a  real  development  of  humanitarian  law  in 
cases  of  internal  conflicts,  the  list  of  these  rights  include: 
1.  Right  to  fair  trial  in  general  (Article  6/2). 
2.  Right  to  information  (Article  6/2  (a))  (about  the  particulars  of  the  offence,  of  which  the 
accused  is  to  be  tried). 
3.  The  right  to  defence  (Article  6/2  (a)). 
4.  The  principle  of  individual  responsibility  (Article  6/2  (b)). 
5.  The  principle  of  non-retroactivity  (Article  6/2  (c)). 
6.  The  principle  of  presumption  of  innocence  (Article  6/2  (d)). 
7.  The  right  of  the  accused  to  be  present  at  his  own  trial  (Article  6/2  (e)). 
8.  The  right  not  to  be  compelled  to  testify  against  oneself  or  to  confess  guilt  (Article  6/2 
(0). 
9.  The  right  to  be  informed  of  judicial  remedies  and  of  the  time  limits  in  which  they  must 
be  exercised  (Article  6/3). 
10.  The  right  of  persons  aged  under  18,  and  pregnant  women,  not  to  be  sentenced  to  the 
death  penalty  (in  fact,  it  is  prohibited  to  do  so)  (Article  6/4). 
346  IRRC,  1989,29th  year,  No.  272,  p.  490. 
347 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  297,  p.  1397. 
292 These  are  the  essential  guarantees  for  the  protection  of  the  right  to  fair  trial,  and  there 
is  no  doubt  that  if  adhered  to  much  suffering  and  cruelties,  which  are  very  common  in 
internal  conflicts,  would  disappear. 
However,  some  authors  argue  that  despite  the  importance  of  the  provisions  of  Article  6 
they  are  not  wholly  satisfactory.  Eide  stressed  that  Article  6  contained  'no  further  provisions 
as  to  the  way  in  which  the  impartiality  is  to  be  safeguarded'.  348  He  maintained  that  during 
internal  armed  conflicts,  military  tribunals  take  the  place  of  civilian  tribunals.  This  state 
of  affairs,  coupled  with  the  control  of  political  power  by  usually  a  military  regime,  makes 
'these  tribunals  easily  degenerate  into  a  mechanism  for  the  arbitrary  maintenance  of 
political  controlv.  349 
Despite  these  criticisms,  which  seem  to  be  too  general,  Article  6  in  my  opinion,  when 
coupled  with  similar  provisions  of  non-derogable  rights  in  Articles  14  and  15  of  the 
Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights,  establishes  a  desirable  system  of  the  protection  of 
due  process  and  human  rights  in  general  in  internal  conflicts.  Consequently,  it  contributes 
to  the  safeguard  of  the  fundamental  rule  of  right  to  life,  which  is  not  only  threatened  by 
killings  and  massacres  in  the  field  of  combat,  but  especially  through  lack  of  respect  for  the 
due  process  of  law  and  fair  trial. 
For  all  this,  it  seems  to  me,  to  be  correct  to  indicate  that  Article  6  constitutes  a  real 
derogation  from  State  sovereignty.  In  the  last  analysis,  it  curtails  to  a  great  extent  the 
discretionary  power  of  established  Governments,  which  is  greatly  used  in  cases  of  state  of 
emergency  to  suspend  and  even  abolish  any  prospect  of  fair  trial. 
4.2.4.  Conclusions  concerning  the  Evaluation  of  Article  6 
1.  It  is  postulated  that  the  influence  of  the  idea  of  human  rights  is  clearly  present,  especially 
in  Article  6.  Some  of  its  provisions  were  taken  nearly  verbally  from  Articles  14  and  15  of 
the  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  RightS.  350  In  fact,  even  at  the  Diplomatic  Conference 
some  States  linked  the  contents  of  the  present  Article  6  to  the  law  of  human  rightS.  351 
This,  in  my  view,  seems  to  explain  in  part  at  least,  the  acceptance  of  States  of  the 
important  rules  of  Article  6,  since  if  they  were  adhered  to  in  one  international  instrument, 
there  is  basically  no  reason  why  they  should  not  accept  them  in  another  such  instrument. 
3480P. 
cit..  supra.  318,  p.  285. 
3491bid. 
3501n  this  respect,  it  is  indicated  that:  Article  6/2  (a)  corresponds  to  Article  14/3  (a)  and  14/3 
(b)(d);  Article  6/2  (b)  corresponds  to  Article  14/3  and  14/3  (b)(d);  Article  6/2  (c)  corresponds  to 
Article  15/1;  Article  6/2  (d)  corresponds  to  Article  14/2;  Article  6/2  (e)  corresponds  to  Article  14/3 
(d);  Article  6/2  (f)  corresponds  to  Article  14/3  (g).  Cited  by  Bothe  et  at.,  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  281, 
p.  651. 
3511n 
this  context,  Belgium  indicated  during  the  discussion  of  Draft  Articles  9  and  10  that  the 
principles  contained  in  them  'fall  in  the  realm  of  international  taw  and  human  rights',  op.  cit., 
supra.  n.  276,  CDDH/I/SR.  33,  para.  41,  p.  350.  Similarly,  some  delegations  referred  to  the  Covenant  in 
order  to  take  from  it  the  correct  wording.  Thus,  East  Germany  for  instance  explained  the  aim  of  its 
amendment  (CDDH/I/89)  to  Draft  Article  9  as: 
...  Mo  harmonise  that  text  (Article  9/2  of  the  ICRC  Draft  Protocol  III  with  Article  15  of 
the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rightsel. 
lbid,,  para.  38,  p.  349. 
293 2.  Moreover.  it  seems  fair  to  state  that  humanitarian  law  has  been  extended  and 
strengthened  to  an  area  which  was  barely  regulated,  since  Article  3  of  the  Geneva 
Convention  purports  only  the  general  principle  that  it  is  prohibited  to  pass  sentences  and 
carry  out  execution  without  a  previous  judgment  pronounced  by  a  regularly  constituted 
court,  affording  all  the  judicial  guarantees  which  are  recognised  as  indispensable  by 
civilised  peoples.  The  generality  of  the  provision  constituted  the  main  weakness  in  Article 
3.  Furthermore,  in  Article  6  the  details  of  fair  trial  are  well  put  and  clear.  Meron  rightly 
noted  that: 
"These  provisions  of  common  Article  3  have  been  greatly  strengthened  by  those  of 
Article  6  of  Protocol  11.  "352 
3.  However,  it  must  be  conceded  that  the  argument  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention 
still  holds  the  balance,  since  captured  combatants  and  civilians  tried  for  offences  related  to 
the  armed  conflict  have  no  POW  status.  They  are  still  considered  as  common  criminals,  tried 
for  the  simple  fact  of  taking  up  arms  against  the  established  Government. 
Besides,  the  travaux  prkparatolres  establish  that  the  limitation  of  State  sovereignty  in  the 
context  of  Article  6  is  that  these  'criminals'  are  not  to  be  tried  and  sentenced  according  to 
what  the  Government  want,  but  in  accordance  with  some  general  rules  and  some  specific 
TUIes  and  measUTes  fTOM  which  no  derogation  is  possible. 
The  mere  codification  of  these  general  principles,  and  these  specific  rules  in  an 
international  instrument  is  by  itself  an  important  intrusion  into  State  sovereignty. 
D.  The  Protection  of  the  Civilian  Population  In  Protocol  11 
The  protection  of  the  civilian  population  from  the  sufferings  and  cruelties  of  internal  wars 
has  become  a  matter  of  urgence,  since  they  are  the  main  victims  of  internal  wars.  Their 
protection  was,  it  must  be  emphasised,  an  essential  aim  of  the  Protocol  Il  from  the  start. 
Common  Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  as  it  has  been  shown  in  section  11  of  this 
chapter,  was  not  enough.  It  left  many  loopholes  in  the  protection  of  the  civilian  population 
from  the  cruelties  of  internal  conflicts. 
The  fourth  Geneva  Convention  which  deals  specifically  with  the  protection  of  civilians, 
was  based  on  concepts  which  are  not  present  by  any  means  in  internal  conflicts. 
Thus,  at  the  Conference  of  Red  Cross  Experts,  the  majority  expressed  their  doubts  as  to 
the  feasibility  of  the  application  of  the  fourth  Geneva  Convention.  Their  argument  was  that: 
"The  Fourth  Convention  is  based  on  concepts  of  sovereignty,  nationality  and 
occupation,  and  these  concepts  are  not  consistent  with  the  nature  of  non-  international 
armed  conflicts.  *353 
Despite  this  fundamental  reservation,  the  Experts  felt  that  they: 
352  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  249,  p.  22. 
353 
Op.  cft.,  supra.  n.  100,  p.  69. 
294 "...  [D]esired  to  find  restated  in  an  additional  protocsl  all  the  provisions  which  could 
logically  be  applied  in  non-  international  conflicts.  "  54 
Thus,  implicitly  the  Experts  argued  for  the  extension  of  humanitarian  rules  concerning  the 
protection  of  civilians,  which  do  not  conflict  with  the  concept  of  sovereignty  of  the  State. 
At  the  second  CGEDHL,  the  ICRC  submitted  four  Draft  Articles  dealing  with  the 
civilian  population  (Articles  14-17  ).  355 
In  general,  it  tried  to  establish  in  the  sphere  of  civil  war  the  fundamental  distinction 
between  combatants  and  non-combatants.  It  gave  a  very  broad  definition  which  in  fact 
perfectly  responds  to  the  needs  of  internal  conflicts.  It  proposed  that  the  presence  of 
354  Ibid. 
355Thus,  Draft  ArticLe  14:  "Definition  of  the  CivMan  PopuLation"  reads  as  folLows: 
"I.  Any  person  who  is  not  a  member  of  the  armed  forces  and  who,  moreover,  does  not  take  a 
direct  part  in  hostilities  Is  considered  to  be  a  civilian. 
2.  The  civilian  population  is  composed  of  all  civilians  fulfilling  the  conditions  in  paragraph 
1. 
3.  Proposal  1:  The  presence,  within  the  civilian  population,  of  individuals  who  do  not  conform 
to  the  definition  given  in  paragraph  1,  does  not  prevent  the  civilian  population  from  being 
considered  as  such. 
Proposal  11;  The  presence,  within  the  civilian  population  of  individual  combatants  does  not 
prevent  the  civilian  population  from  being  considered  as  such.  " 
op.  cit.,  supra.  269,  p.  113.  Draft  Article  15  entitled  "Respect  for  and  Safeguarding  of  the  Civilian 
Population"  stipulates: 
111.  The  civilian  population  as  such,  as  welt  as  individual  civilians,  shalt  never  be  made  the 
object  of  attack. 
2.  in  particular,  terrorisation  attacks  shalt  be  prohibited. 
3.  Attacks  which  by  their  nature  are  Launched  against  civilians  and  miLItary  objectives 
indiscriminately,  shalt  be  prohibited.  NevertheLess,  civilians  who  are  within  a  military 
objective  run  the  risks  consequent  upon  any  attack  Launched  against  this  objective. 
4.  The  civilian  population  or  individual  civilians  shalt  never  be  used  in  an  attempt  to  shield, 
by  their  presence,  military  objectives  from  attack.  " 
Ibid,  p.  114.  Draft  Article  16  entitled  "Respect  for  and  Safeguarding  of  Objects  IndispensabLe  to  the 
Survival  of  the  Civilian  Populations'  reads  as  follows: 
"Proposal  1: 
1.  Objects  indispensable  to  the  survival  of  the  civilian  population  shall  not  be  the  object 
of  attack. 
2.  The  parties  to  the  conflict  under  whose  control  objects  indispensable  to  the  survival  of 
the  civilian  population  are  placed,  shatL  refrain  from: 
Ca)  using  them  in  an  attempt  to  shield  military  objectives  from  attack; 
Cb)  destroying  them,  except  in  cases  of  unavoidable  military  necessity  and  only  for  such  time  as 
that  necessity  remains. 
ProposaL  II: 
1.  objects  indispensable  to  the  survival  of  the  civilian  population  shaLL  not  be  the  object 
of  attack. 
2.  The  parties  to  the  conflict  under  whose  control  objects  indispensable  to  the  survival  of 
the  civilian  population  are  placed  shall,  refrain  from  destroying  them  or  using  them  in  an 
attempt  to  shield  military  objectives  from  attack.  U 
lbid,  p.  115.  Lastty,  Draft  Articie  17  entitted  "Precautions  when  Attacking"  stipuLates: 
"So  that  the  civilian  population,  as  welt  as  objects  Indispensable  to  Its  survival  who  might 
be  in  proximity  to  a  military  objective  be  spared,  those  who  order  or  launch  an  attack  shall, 
when  planning  and  carrying  out  the  attack,  take  the  following  precautions: 
(a)  They  shatt  ensure  that  the  objectives  to  be  attacked  are  not  civilians,  nor  objects  of  a 
civilian  character,  but  are  identified  as  military  objectives;  if  this  precaution  cannot  be 
taken,  they  shalt  refrain  from  launching  the  attack. 
(b)  They  shatt  warn,  whenever  circumstances  permit,  and  sufficiently  in  advance,  the  civilians 
threatened,  so  that  the  tatter  may  take  shelter". 
lbid,  p.  117. 
295 individual  combatants  within  the  civilian  population,  does  not  prevent  the  latter  from  being 
considered  as  civilian.  Articles  15,16  and  17  introduced,  for  the  first  time,  some 
fundamental  rules  of  jus  In  bello  to  the  arena  of  internal  conflicts. 
The  discussions  which  took  place  at  the  CGEDHL  revealed  that  there  was  some 
difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  feasibility  of  defining  the  civilian  population.  Some  Experts 
felt  the  necessity  and  importance  of  such  definitions,  and  stressed  that  the  distinction 
between  civilians  and  combatants  must  be  kept,  whatever  the  nature  of  the  conflict  internal 
or  international. 
Others  felt  that  because  of  the  nature  of  internal  conflict,  combatants  and  non- 
combatants  are  involved,  either  as  full  or  part-time  combatants.  Hence,  any  attempt  to 
356 
uphold  the  distinction  is  unrealistic.  The  practice  in  their  view  is  very  vague. 
On  other  issues  concerning  the  protection  of  civilians,  the  general  picture  of  the  debates 
of  the  Governments'  Experts  shows  that  the  latter  did  not  challenge  the  position  of  the 
ICRC,  in  the  introduction  of  the  main  principles  of  The  Hague  law  to  internal  conflicts, 
since  the  rules  suggested  would  in  practice  tend  to  make  internal  conflicts  more  humane. 
At  the  Diplomatic  Conference,  the  ICRC  submitted  a  complete  6  ArticleS357  which 
356See 
op.  cit.,  ibid,  p.  113  for  the  details  of  the  discussions. 
35  TDraft  Article  24  submitted  by  the  ICRC  to  the  Diplomatic  Conference  which  is  entitled  "Basic 
Rules",  stipulates: 
"I.  In  order  to  ensure  respect  for  the  civilian  population,  the  parties  to  the  conflict  shall 
confine  their  operations  to  the  destruction  or  weakening  of  the  military  resources  of  the 
adversary  and  shall  make  a  distinction  between  the  civilian  population  and  combatants,  and 
between  civilian  objects  and  military  objectives. 
2.  Constant  care  shall  be  taken,  when  conducting  military  operations,  to  spare  the  civilian 
population  and  civilian  objects.  These  rules  shatt.  in  particular,  apply  to  the  planning, 
deciding  or  launching  of  an  attack". 
Draft  Articte  25  entitted  "Definition",  reads: 
01.  Any  person  who  is  not  a  member  of  armed  forces  is  considered  to  be  a  civilian. 
2.  The  civilian  population  comprises  all  persons  who  are  civilians. 
3.  The  presence,  within  the  civilian  population,  of  individuals  who  do  not  fait  within  the 
definition  of  civilians  does  not  deprive  the  population  of  its  civilian  character.  H 
Draft  Articte  26  entitted  I'Protection  of  the  Civitian  Poputation",  reads  as  foLtows: 
01.  The  civilian  population  as  such,  as  well  as  individual  civilians,  shall  not  be  made  the 
object  of  attack.  in  particular,  methods  intended  to  spread  terror  among  the  civilian 
population  are  prohibited. 
2.  Civilians  shall  enjoy  the  protection  afforded  by  this  Article  unless  and  for  such  time  as 
they  take  a  direct  part  in  hostilities. 
3.  The  employment  of  means  of  combat,  and  any  methods  which  strike  or  affect  indiscriminately 
the  civilian  population  and  combatants,  or  civilian  objects  and  military  objectives,  are 
prohibited.  in  particular,  it  is  forbidden: 
(a)  to  attack  without  distinction,  as  one  single  objective,  by  bombardment  or  any  other  method,  a 
zone  containing  several  military  objectives,  which  are  situated  in  populated  areas  and  are  at  some 
distance  from  each  other; 
(b)  to  Launch  attacks  which  may  be  expected  to  entail  incidentat  tosses  among  the  civilian 
population  and  cause  the  destruction  of  civilian  objects  to  an  extent  disproportionate  to  the  direct 
and  substantial  military  advantage  anticipated. 
4.  Attacks  against  the  civilian  population  or  civilians  by  way  of  reprisals  are  prohibited. 
5.  The  parties  to  the  conflict  shail.  not  use  the  civilian  population  or  civilians  in  attempts 
to  shield  military  objectives  from  attacks.  " 
Draft  Article  27  entitled  "Protection  of  Objects  Indispensable  to  the  Survival  of  the  Civilian 
Population",  reads  as  follows: 
Nlt  is  forbidden  to  attack,  destroy  or  render  usetess  objects  indispensabte  to  the  survivat 
of  the  civiLian  poputation,  namety  foodstuffs  and  food-producing  areas,  crops,  Livestock, 
296 regulate  the  protection  of  the  civilian  population.  The  ICRC  tackled  the  question  of  the 
protection  of  the  civilian  population  by  introducing  detailed  rules  which  would  restrict  the 
right  of  the  belligerents  to  choose  the  means  and  methods  of  combat. 
However,  it  seems  that  this  approach  was  not  favoured  by  the  majority  of  States,  for 
different  reasons.  For  some  States,  the  detailed  regulation  would  limit  the  freedom  of  the 
Government  in  dealing  with  its  enemies.  To  other  States,  the  ICRC  approach  brings  a 
detailed  regulation  to  a  domaine  where  it  seems  only  simple  rules  would  suffice. 
In  general,  it  appears,  as  Rosemary  Abi-Saab  rightly  observes: 
"Les  discussions  en  commissions  des  Articles  du  projet  du  CIRC  concernant  la 
protection  de  la  populaton  civile,  ont  mis  A  nouveau  en  dvidence,  et  cela  de  faqon 
particuliýrement  nette,  le  clivage  entre  les  d6fensseurs  des  principes  d'une  protection 
humanitaire  essentielle,  et  les  ardents  d6fenseurs  du  principe  de  la  souverainetd 
"358  6tatique 
. 
It  must  also  be  pointed  out  that  before  the  official  opening  of  the  Diplomatic  Conference, 
the  US  Deputy  Legal  Adviser  of  the  State  Department,  Mr.  G.  H.  Aldrich,  attacked  the 
philosophy  behind  the  ICRC  proposals  on  the  protection  of  the  civilian  population  in 
general.  He  stated: 
"...  [These]  proposals  for  revolutionary  change  which  would  require  a  fundamental 
reordering  of  national  security.  However  desirable  they  may  be,  I  submit  that  they 
demand  more  than  lawyers  and  diplomats  who  attend  the  conference  to  supplement 
the  Geneva  Conventions  can  be  expected  to  produce,  and  we  must  see  them  as  longer 
"359  range  objectives. 
He  thought  that  improvement  in  civilian  protection  can  be  achieved  by  concentrating  on 
'proposals  that  are  more  limited.  360  He  gave,  as  example,  the  devising  of  rules  that  would 
drinking  water  suppLies  and  irrigation  works,  whether  it  Is  to  starve  out  civitfans,  to  cause 
them  to  move  away  or  for  any  other  reason.  " 
Draft  ArtlcLe  28,  entitted  "Protection  of  Works  and  InstaLtations  Containing  Dangerous  Forces",  reads 
as  fol.  Lows: 
"I.  It  is  forbidden  to  attack  or  destroy  works  or  installations  containing  dangerous  forces, 
namely,  dams,  dykes  and  nuclear  generating  stations,  whenever  their  destruction  or  damage  would 
cause  grave  Losses  among  the  civilian  population. 
2.  The  parties  to  the  conflict  shall  endeavour  to  avoid  Locating  any  military  objectives  In 
the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  objects  mentioned  In  paragraph  1.0 
Draft  Article  29,  entitled  I'Prohibition  of  Forced  Movement  of  Civilians"  reads  as  follows: 
mi.  The  displacement  of  the  civilian  population  shatt  not  be  ordered  unless  the  security  of 
the  civilians  involved  or  imperative  military  reasons  so  demand.  ShouLd  the  parties  to  the 
conflict  undertake  such  displacements,  they  shaL  I  take  at  L  poss  I  bte  measures  In  order  that  the 
civilian  population  be  received  under  satisfactory  conditions  of  hygiene,  health,  safety  and 
nutrition. 
2.  Civilians  shatt  not  be  competted  to  leave  their  own  national  territory.  " 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  273,  pp.  40-41. 
3580p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  103,  p.  177. 
359A.  W.  Rovine:  Digest  of  United  States  Practice  in  International,  Law.  (1973),  Dept.  of  State, 
Washington,  D.  C.,  p.  504. 
3601bid. 
297 promote  care  by  the  armed  forces  in  avoiding  unnecessary  injury  to  civilians,  protect  their 
property  and  to  make  safety  zones  a  workable  concept  in  the  real  world. 
He  believed  that  prohibiting  attacks  on  hydroelectric  dams  and  power  stations  was 
'unrealistic'.  He  also  specified  the  prohibition  of  starvation  as  a  method  of  warfare  as 
desirable.  Nevertheless,  he  defended  the  crop  destruction  practised  by  the  US  in  Vietnam. 
It  was  justified  and  legal,  since  'the  evidence  was  strong  that  the  crops  were  intended  for 
enemy  troopS.,  361 
It  must  be  noted  here  that  the  American  position  was  not  confined  to  the  protection  of 
civilians  in  internal  wars.  It  was  in  fact,  a  general  statement  which  covered  the  protection 
of  civilians  whatever  the  character  of  the  conflict. 
What  is  clear  from  the  statement,  however,  is  that  the  US  wanted  in  advance  to  declare 
that  it  was  not  ready  to  accept  any  substantial  limitation  on  the  use  of  some  weapons  whose 
legality  is  doubtful,  and  that  this  question  was  not  part  of  the  business  of  the  Diplomatic 
Conference  on  humanitarian  law. 
It  seems  that  the  Soviet  Union  held  virtually  the  same  position,  at  least  concerning 
internal  wars.  In  this  context,  it  stressed  that: 
"There  were  differences  between  international  and  internal  conflicts  With  regard  to 
the  latter  it  was  essential  to  make  rules  that  everyone  could  accept.  "  62 
Canada  in  a  way  explained  what  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  majority  of  States  would  accept. 
It  stated  that: 
"It  was  important  that  Draft  Protocol  II  should  embody  rules  that  were  practical.  It 
could  already  be  foreseen  that  some  of  the  rules  in  the  present  Draft  based  on  moral 
principles  would  be  unworkable.  They  must  'ý,  -  omitted,  to  avoid  the  danger  of  &63 
adopting  a  code  which  could  not  be  respected. 
Thus,  the  approach  favoured  by  the  big  powers,  and  many  other  States,  was  against  the 
similarity  of  rules  concerning  the  protection  of  civilians  in  internal  and  international  wars. 
To  them,  the  articles  on  the  protection  of  civilian  population  in  internal  conflicts  should  be 
short,  cogent  and  direct  in  order  that  the  parties  might  clearly  see  their  obligations. 
However,  the  minority  favoured  the  ICRC  approach.  Norway,  supported  by  Italy,  the 
Holy  See  and  others,  advocated  forcefully  that  the  civilian  population  must  be  given  the 
same  protection  irrespective  of  the  nature  of  the  conflict.  They  defended  the  need  for  the 
codification  of  detailed  rules  on  the  protection  of  civilians  on  the  following  basis: 
"The  concept  of  military  necessity  has  lost  much  of  its  meaning  in  many  modern 
conflicts,  where  one  side  is  often  technologically  superior  to  the  other  and  where  at 
least  one  of  the  sides  is  often  fighting  not  for  survival  but  for  other  reasons.  It  would 
therefore  be  neither  unrealistic  nor  impossible  to  lay  down  very  trict  criteria 
64  providing  the  greatest  possible  protection  for  the  civilian  population. 
3611bid. 
362  14  ORDCHL  (1974-1977),  Federat  PoLitfcal  Dept,  Bern  (1978),  CDDH/lll/SR.  q,  para.  14,  p.  73. 
3631bid, 
para.  11.  p.  72. 
364  lbid,  MDH/ll[/SR.  8,  pars.  3,  p.  59. 
298 It  seems  to  me,  that  the  two  views,  both  favoured  the  regulation  of  the  protection  of  the 
civilian  population  in  internal  wars.  However,  they  differed  as  to  degree  of  such  protection 
and  as  to  the  best  method  of  achieving  that  protection. 
In  my  view,  some  favoured  an  approach  which  emphasised  the  element  of  human  rights 
in  that  protection,  whereas  others  preferred  an  approach  which  would  place  rigorous  limits 
on  the  methods  and  means  of  conducting  war  as  the  only  way  of  providing  real  protection 
to  the  civilian  population  against  the  rigours  of  war. 
It  seems  that  the  former  approach  won  the  day,  as  we  will  see  later  when  analysing 
different  rules  relating  to  the  protection  of  the  civilian  population. 
To  me,  this  state  of  affairs  reflects  that  States  can  accept  the  validity  of  the  concept  of 
human  rights  as  a  limitation  upon  their  sovereignty,  since  to  them  that  concept  can  be  used 
safely  as  a  real  means  of  the  protection  of  civilians  in  time  of  internal  wars. 
However,  I  will  tackle  the  question  of  the  protection  of  civilians  by  studying  different 
rules  proposed  by  the  ICRC,  and  how  in  every  case  States  reacted,  especially  when  using 
the  concepts  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention,  to  stop  sometimes  some  fundamental 
rules  proposed  by  the  ICRC. 
1.  The  Distinction  Between  Combatants  and  Non-Combatants 
Draft  Article  24  submitted  by  the  ICRC  restates  the  customary  rules  of  the  obligation  to 
distinguish  between  combatants  and  non-combatants,  and  the  duty  to  confine  military 
operations  to  the  weakening  of  the  military  might  of  the  enemy,  also  the  duty  that  when 
planning,  deciding  or  launching  attacks,  civilians  and  civilian  possessions  must  be  avoided. 
The  ICRC  delegate,  when  presenting  draft  Article  24,  specifically  and  explicitly  referred 
to  some  UNGA  resolutions  such  as  Resolutions  2444  (XXIII)  and  2675  (XXV)  which 
stressed,  among  other  things,  the  duty  of  all  belligerents  to  make  distinctions  between  the 
365  civilian  population  and  combatants,  and  between  civilian  and  military  objectives. 
These  resolutions  in  fact,  referred  to  the  application  of  such  distinctions  to  'all  armed 
conflicts'  which  was  presumably  interpreted  by  the  ICRC  to  apply  also  to  internal  conflicts. 
Moreover,  it  must  be  recalled  that  those  resolutions  had  been  adopted  unanimously  or 
almost  unanimously,  which  would  indicate  that  there  is  a  general  consensus  that  the 
customary  concepts  contained  in  them  must  be  extended  to  internal  wars. 
365  lbid,  MDH/Ill/SR.  2,  para.  14,  p.  15. 
299 At  the  committee  level  (the  Third  Committee)  Article  24  was  adopted  easily,  and  without 
any  fundamental  change  of  the  ICRC  proposal.  366  However,  the  Article  was  deleted  in  the 
simplified  version  submitted  by  Pakistan. 
It  would  seem  to  me,  that  the  essentials  of  Article  24  are  to  be  found  especially  in  Article 
411  of  the  final  version  of  Protocol  II,  which  provides  that: 
"All  persons  who  do  not  take  a  direct  part  or  who  have  ceased  to  take  part  in 
hostilities,  whether  or  not  their  liberty  has  been  restricted,  are  entitled  to  respect  for 
their  person,  honour  and  convictions  and  religious  practices.  They  shall  in  all 
circumstances  be  treated  humanely,  without  any  adverse  distinction,  etc.  " 
The  travaux  prkparatolres  support  this  view.  The  latter  in  fact  show  that  there  are  two 
versions  concerning  the  effect  of  the  deletion  of  draft  Article  24.  The  minority  contended 
that  it  had  no  counterpart  in  other  Articles  of  Protocol  11.  Norway  stated  explicitly  that: 
"Article  24  made  a  fundamental  distinction  between  the  civilian  population  and 
combatants  and  between  civilian  objects  and  military  objectives.  Those  distinctions, 
which  were  essential  for  the  proper  protection  of  the  civilian  population  and  Vian  C  ý6 
objects,  were  not  made  in  Article  7  [which  became  Article  4  in  Protocol  11].  " 
Norway  was  strongly  supported  by  Italy,  368  and  the  Holy  See.  369 
However,  the  majority,  it  seems  stressed  that  the  essentials  of  Article  24  were  included  in 
draft  Article  7  (Article  4/1).  Thus,  Pakistan  argued  that: 
"...  [I]t  was  not  in  favour  of  retaining  Article  24  as  a  whole.  Article  7  of  e  simplified 
draft  submitted  by  his  delegation  was  intended  to  replace  Article  24A110 
Pakistan  was  Supported  by  France,  371  Canada,  372  USA,  373  Iraq,  374  Iran,  375  Ghana376  and 
366Draft  ArticLe  24  (Basic  RuLes)  as  adopted  by  consensus  by  the  Third  Comittee  on  ApriL  24th,  1975 
reads  as  foLLows: 
01.  In  order  to  ensure  respect  and  protection  for  the  cfviL  Ian  popuL  at  ion  and  cfviL  Ian  objects, 
the  parties  to  the  confLfct  shatt  at  aLL  times  distinguish  between  the  civitlan  poputatfon  and 
combatants  and  between  Ovitfan  objects  and  mititary  objectives  and  shatL  direct  their 
operations  onLy  against  mfLftary  objectives. 
2.  Constant  care  shaLL  be  taken,  when  conducting  mRltary  operations,  to  spare  the  civRian 
popuLation,  cfvfLians  and  cfv!  Lfan  objects.  This  ruLe  shaLL  in  particutar  appLy  to  the 
ptannfng,  deciding  or  taunching  of  an  attack.  " 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  307,  CDDH/215/Rev.  1,  p.  319. 
3670p. 
cit.,  supra  n.  267,  CDDH/SR.  52,  para.  68,  p.  133. 
3681bid, 
paras.  30-32,  p.  129. 
3691bid, 
para.  33,  p.  129. 
3701bid, 
para.  53,  p.  131. 
3711bld, 
paras.  65-66,  p.  133. 
3721bid, 
para.  38,  p.  130. 
373  lbid,  para.  63,  p.  132. 
374  [bid,  para-72,  p.  133. 
375  lbid,  para.  69,  p.  133. 
300 Cameroon.  The  latter  in  fact,  stated  that  Article  24  would  be  superfluous  when  Article  7 
was  accepted.  377 
It  is  my  opinion,  that  the  fundamental  distinction  between  civilians  and  combatants,  and 
civilian  objects  and  military  objectives,  survives  in  Protocol  11.  Indeed  any  contention  to 
the  contrary  would  be  against  the  object  and  purpose  of  the  whole  Protocol  11,  which  is 
essentially  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars.  Such  protection  will  never  be 
fulfilled  in  the  absence  of  those  distinctions. 
2.  The  Definition  of  Civilians 
The  definition  of  civilian,  as  is  well  known,  is  a  vitally  important  question  in  the  context 
of  internal  wars,  where  the  use  of  the  guerrilla  method  of  warfare  often  obscures  the 
criteria  of  distinguishing  between  a  civilian  and  a  combatant.  In  the  discussions  of  draft 
Article  25  of  the  ICRC,  no  State  suggested  the  restriction  of  the  definition  of  civilian.  On 
the  contrary,  nearly  all  States  who  either  submitted  amendments  or  intervened  in  the 
378  discussions,  favoured  the  broadening  of  the  definition. 
This  situation  led  to  the  adoption  at  the  committee  level  of  Draft  Article  25,  entitled 
'Definition',  which  provides  that: 
"I.  A  civilian  is  anyone  who  is  not  a  member  of  the  armed  forces  or  of  an  organised 
armed  group. 
2.  The  civilian  population  comprises  all  persons  who  are  civilians. 
I  The  presence,  within  the  civilian  population,  of  individuals  who  do  not  fall  within 
the  definition  of  civilians  does  not  deprive  the  population  of  its  civilian  character. 
4.  In  case  of  doubt  as  to  whether  a  person  is  a  civilian,  he  or  she  shall  be  considered 
"379  to  be  a  civilian. 
In  fact,  this  article  is  broader  in  its  definition  of  the  civilian  population  than  the  Draft 
Article  25  submitted  by  the  ICRC.  The  example  is  the  addition  of  the  important  paragraph 
4,  which  was  proposed  by  Egypt. 
This  means  that  at  that  stage  humanitarianism  won  the  day.  The  discretion  of 
Government  has  been  greatly  curtailed.  Its  freedom  to  indicate  who  is  and  who  is  not  a 
civilian  is  not  without  limitation.  But,  it  seems  that  the  tide  has  been  reversed  at  the  final 
session  of  the  Diplomatic  Conference,  since  the  simplified  version  submitted  by  Pakistan 
deleted  Draft  Article  25. 
3761bid, 
para.  36,  p.  130. 
3771bid, 
para.  59,  p.  132. 
378Thus,  Egypt  in  its  amendment  (CDDH/111/33  of  15/3/74)  to  Article  25  proposed  a  new  paragraph,  which 
reads: 
114.  In  case  of  doubt  as  to  whether  any  person  is  a  civilian  he  or  she  shalt  be  presumed  to  be 
so.  81 
4  ORDCHL  C1974-1978),  Federal.  PoLftical.  Dept,  Bern,  1978,  pp.  73-74. 
379  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  307,  MDH/215/Rev.  1,  p.  320. 
301 It  seems  to  me,  that  in  this  respect  defenders  of  the  sovereignty  of  State  and  non- 
intervention  in  its  internal  affairs  triumphed,  since  at  least  implicitly  it  is  up  to  the 
established  Government  to  define  the  scope  of  civilians.  Nevertheless,  it  is  argued  that  this 
determination  must  take  into  account  the  object  and  purpose  of  the  protocol  and  especially 
Article  4.  This  will  in  effect,  restrict  any  dictatorial  attempt  from  the  established 
Government  to  determine  arbitrarily  who  is  a  civilian. 
3.  The  Protection  of  the  Civilian  Population 
Article  13  of  Protocol  Il  covers  the  subject  of  the  protection  of  the  civilian  population.  It 
stipulates: 
"I.  The  civilian  population  and  individual  civilians  shall  enjoy  general  protection 
against  the  dangers  arising  from  military  operations.  To  give  effect  to  this  protection 
the  following  rules  shall  be  observed  in  all  circumstances. 
2.  The  civilian  population  as  such,  as  well  as  individual  civilians,  shall  not  be  the 
object  of  attack.  Acts  or  threats  of  violence,  the  primary  purpose  of  which  is  to 
spread  terror  among  the  civilian  population.  are  prohibited. 
3.  Civilians  shall  enjoy  the  protection  afforded  by  this  part  unless  and  for  such  time 
"380  as  they  take  a  direct  part  in  hostilities. 
In  fact,  the  ICRC  Draft  Article  26  was  more  ambitious  in  its  drive  to  protect  the  civilian 
population.  It  introduced  some  fundamental  rules  on  methods  and  means  of  warfare,  such 
as  the  rule  that  civilians  shall  not  be  the  object  of  an  attack,  and  especially  paragraph  3, 
which  literally  prohibits  the  use  of  methods  and  means  of  combat  which  do  not  discriminate 
and  distinguish  in  their  effects  between  civilians  and  combatants,  and  between  civilian  and 
military  objects. 
Thus,  bombardment  of  military  objectives,  which  are  in  a  zone  which  is  populated  is 
prohibited.  Similarly,  attacks  which  may  incidentally  cause  damage  to  civilians  and  their 
objects,  which  are  not  proportionate  to  the  military  advantages  gained  are  prohibited. 
During  the  discussions  a  minority  of  States  considered  that  especially  paragraph  3  of 
Draft  Article  26  should  be  deleted.  Their  reason  was: 
"No  paragraph  3  was  needed  at  all,  on  the  ground  that  the  intermingling  of  civilians 
and  combatants  in  non  -international  conflicts  makes  a  rule  against  methods  or  means 
of  combat  which  affect  civilians  indiscriminately  or  a  rulS  against  indiscriminate 
attacks  unsuitable  for  application  in  international  conflicts.  81 
However,  other  delegations  stressed  that  the  provisions  concerning  the  protection  of 
civilians  should  be  the  same  whatever  the  nature  and  character  of  the  confliCt.  382 
380 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  309,  pp.  469-470. 
381  OP.  cit.,  supra.  n.  307,  MDH/111/275,  pp.  363-364. 
3821n 
this  respect,  Norway  was  represented  by  Professor  Eide,  who  noted  that: 
11...  ETI  hat  the  civitf  an  poput  at  I  on  must  be  given  the  same  protect  Ion  irrespect  I  ve  of  the  nature 
of  the  confLict". 
He  then  added: 
302 At  the  end  the  Third  Committee  adopted  Article  26,383  which  did  not  differ  much  from 
the  ICRC  proposal.  The  Committee  even  went  further  by  adopting  a  completely  new 
Article384  (Article  26  bis)  which  contained  a  general  prohibition  against  attacks  on  objects 
of  a  civilian  character.  Thus,  attacks  were  only  to  be  directed  against  objects  which  by  their 
own  nature,  location,  purpose  or  use  make  an  effective  contribution  to  armed  action  by  the 
parties  to  the  conflict. 
Moreover,  at  the  committee  level,  it  seems  that  humanitarianism  was  very  present,  and 
eventually  opened  the  way  for  the  regulation  of  one  of  the  most  difficult  problems  of 
internal  conflict,  namely  the  effective  protection  of  the  civilian  population. 
However,  the  triumph  was  not  long,  Pakistan  in  its  simplified  version  simply  deleted  the 
two  Articles  (26  and  26  bis).  It  seems,  that  considerations  of  sovereignty,  military  planning 
and  security,  and  the  obsession  of  many  States  to  delete  any  detailed  regulation  in  matters 
touching  internal  conflicts  have  all  in  different  degrees  contributed  to  that  deletion.  The 
statement  of  the  US  Deputy  Legal  Adviser  to  the  State  Department,  and  the  Pakistani 
delegate  when  introducing  his  simplified  version  of  Protocol  IT,  cited  above,  confirm  the 
correctness  of  this  assessment. 
The  deletion  of  Articles  26  and  26  bis  have  in  fact,  led  Bothe  and  others  to  contend  that 
Protocol  11,  and  especially  its  Article  13: 
"...  [D]oes  not,  however,  explicitly  provide  protection  against  indiscriminate  or 
disproportionate  attacks,  nor  does  it  prohibit  explicitly  the  use  of  civilians  to  shield 
military  operations.  Moreover,  it  omits  any  direct  reference  to  the  prohibition  against 
11...  10]bLigations  undertaken  under  a  ProtocoL  11  which  gave  full  protection  to  the  civilian 
population  would  hardly  go  further  than  those  already  undertaken  by  Governments  with  respect 
to  the  civilian  population  under  general  principles  of  humanitarian  Law,  which  had  now  become 
customary  taw.  Governments  would  simply  have  the  benef  It  of  more  precise  rules  that  would  make 
it  possible  for  them  to  defend  themselves  against  unfounded  criticism". 
Op.  cit.,  supra  n.  309,  pp.  456-57.  The  same  argument  atso  has  been  used  by  ItaLy,  ibid,  p.  459. 
383Articte  26  as  adopted  by  Committee  III  on  May  5th,  1977  stiputates: 
111.  The  civilian  population  and  individual  civilians  shalt  enjoy  general  protection  against 
the  dangers  arising  from  military  operations.  To  give  effect  to  this  protection  the  following 
rules  shalt  be  observed  in  aLt  circumstances. 
2.  The  civilian  population  as  such,  as  well  as  individual  civilians,  shalt  not  be  the  object 
of  attack.  Acts  or  threats  of  violence,  the  primary  purpose  of  which  is  to  spread  terror  among 
the  civilian  population,  are  prohibited. 
3.  Civilians  shalt  enjoy  the  protection  afforded  by  this  chapter,  unless  and  for  such  time  as 
they  take  a  direct  part  in  hostilities. 
4.  The  employment  of  methods  or  means  of  combat  which  strike  or  affect  indiscriminately  the 
civilian  population  and  combatants,  or  civilian  objects  andmiLitary  objectives,  is  prohibited. 
5.  An  attack  by  bombardment  by  any  methods  or  means  which  treats  as  a  single  military  objective 
a  number  of  clearly  separated  and  distinct  military  objectives  located  in  a  city,  town,  village 
or  other  area  containing  a  similar  concentration  of  civilians  or  civilian  objects  is  to  be 
considered  as  indiscriminate. 
6.  The  parties  to  the  conflict  shalt  not  use  the  civilian  population  or  civilians  in  order  to 
attempt  to  shield  military  objectives  from  attacks.  " 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  307,  MDH/407/Rev.  1,  p.  503. 
384 
The  Article  (26  bis)  (General  Protection  of  Civilian  Objects),  stipulates: 
"Civitian  objects  shatt  not  be  the  object  of  attack.  Attacks  shatt  be  timited  strictty  to  those 
objects  which  by  their  nature,  tocation,  purpose  or  use  make  an  effective  contribution  to  the 
armed  action  of  the  parties  to  the  conftict". 
lbid,  p.  504. 
303 direct  attacks  of  disproportionate  collateral  damage  with  respect  to  civilians.  "385 
In  my  opinion,  this  negative  picture  is  not  wholly  correct.  Firstly,  the  distinction  between 
combatants  and  non-combatants  is  implicitly  included  in  the  protocol,  and  clearly  one 
fundamental  effect  of  such  distinction  is  prohibition  of  the  acts  listed  by  Bothe.  Secondly, 
the  travaux  pr6paratoires,  of'either  the  discussions  in  the  committees  or  working  groups, 
do  not  support  the  contention  advanced  by  Bothe,  no  State  has  clearly  and  publicly  stated 
that  it  considered  that  the  acts  listed  by  the  above  writer  were  legal.  Thirdly,  even  Bothe 
speaks  about  Article  13  as  not  providing  'explicitly'  for  the  acts  he  listed,  which  means  in 
effect,  he  does  rule  out  the  possibility  that  those  acts  are  implicitly  prohibited. 
Finally,  the  commentary  on  the  two  protocols  produced  by  the  ICRC  stresses  that: 
"Article  13  sets  out  first  of  all  the  general  principle  of  protection,  i.  e.  the  immunity 
to  which  the  population  is  entitled  under  the  law.  This  in  particular,  implies  an 
absolute  prohibition  of  certain  methods  of  combat:  direct  attacks  against  the  civilian 
"386  population  and  intimidation. 
Further,  the  commentary  stated  that: 
* 
...  [Rjadical  simplification  does  not  reduce  the  degree  of  protection  which  was 
initially  envisaged,  for  despite  its  brevity,  Article  13  reflects  the  most  fundamental 
rules.  How  to  implement  them  is  the  responsibility  of  the  parties,  and  this  means  that 
the  safety  measures  they  are  obliged  to  take  under  the  rule  on  protection  will  have 
to  be  developed  so  as  to  best  suit  each  situation,  the  infrastructure  available  and  the 
means  at  their  disposal.  "387 
In  my  view,  an  interpretation  in  good  faith,  and  which  takes  into  account  the  object  and 
purpose  of  the  protocol  as  a  whole  of  Article  13,  would  instantly  reveal  that  many  important 
rules  on  the  protection  of  civilians  can  be  said  to  exist. 
In  this  context,  paragraph  2  of  Article  13  speaks  about  the  enjoyment  of  the  civilian 
population  of  'general  protection  against  the  dangers  arising  from  military  operations'.  This 
means  that  the  obligation  'does  not  consist  only  in  abstaining  from  attacks,  but  also  in 
avoiding,  or  in  any  case  reducing  to  a  minimum,  incidental  losses  and  in  taking  safety 
,  388  measures. 
Moreover,  to  ensure  such  general  protection  of  the  civilian  population  many  measures 
should  be  tak.  -I  en  by  the  parties  when  planning  or  deciding  to  attack.  Among  them,  the 
parties  to  the  conflict  should  not  intentionally  place  military  installations  within  the  vicinity 
of  populated  places,  in  order  to  avoid  the  use  of  civilians  as  a  shield  against  attacks  of  the 
enemy. 
In  fact,  to  bring  real  protection  to  the  civilian  population  many  customary  rules  may  be 
said  to  apply,  such  as: 
1.  Minimum  force  is  required  to  harm  the  enemy,  otherwise  any  contrary  action  would  be 
3850p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  281,  p.  676. 
3860p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  297,  p.  1446. 
3871bid, 
p.  1448. 
3881bid, 
p.  1449. 
304 considered  terror,  which  is  explicitly  prohibited  by  Article  13/2. 
2.  The  principle  of  distinction  and  proportionality  would  make  it  forbidden  to  attack  where 
such  an  action  would  result  in  harming  the  civilians  and  their  objects,  without  resulting  in 
clear  military  advantages. 
Thus,  despite  its  brevity  Article  13  can  be  said  to  contain  a  good  many  rules  for  the 
protection  of  the  civilian  population,  and  thus  places  many  restrictions  on  the  liberty  of  the 
parties  to  the  conflict  to  choose  the  means  of  combat.  Hence,  the  Article,  indirectly  at  least 
places,  some  fundamental  limits  on  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  in  this  field. 
4.  Protection  of  Objects  Indispensable  to  the  Survival  of  the  Civilian  Population 
Starvation  is  an  old  method,  which  was  used  in  times  of  war  in  order  to  defeat  the  enemy. 
It  played  a  very  important  role  in  influencing  the  outcome  of  civil  wars.  The  American 
Civil  War,  the  Boer  War  and  the  Biafran  War  are  good  examples. 
Starvation  as  a  method  of  war  may  take  three  ways,  as  Rosenblad  affirms.  The  first 
involves  the  destruction  of  objects  indispensable  to  the  survival  of  the  civilian  population, 
e.  g.  foodstuffs  and  food-producing  areas,  crops,  livestock,  drinking  water  resources  within 
an  area,  e.  g.  by  means  of  devastation  or  destruction  of  food  supplies.  The  second  way  aims 
at  cutting  the  adversary  off  from  supplies  of  food  or  water  from  outside,  e.  g.  by  means  of 
siege,  contraband  measures  or  blockade.  The  third  way  envisages  scorched  earth  tactiCS.  389 
On  the  legal  level  there  is  no  indication  that  starvation  is  prohibited.  In  fact,  the  Lieber 
Code  specifically  stresses  its  legality.  Thus,  Article  17  stipulates: 
"War  is  not  carried  on  by  arms  only.  It  is  lawful  to  starve  the  hostile  belligerent, 
armed  or  unarmed,  so  that  it  leads  to  the  speedier  subjection  of  the  enemy.  "'90 
Article  3  is  silent,  although  the  concept  of  humane  treatment  may  be  said  to  prohibit  such 
practice  because  it  is  essentially  an  extreme  form  of  inhumane  treatment. 
However,  Article  14  of  the  second  protocol  provides: 
"Starvation  of  civilians  as  a  method  of  combat  is  prohibited.  It  is  therefore  prohibited 
to  attack,  destroy,  remove  or  render  useless,  for  that  purpose,  objects  indispensable 
to  the  survival  of  the  civilian  population,  such  as  foodstuffs,  agricultural  areas  for 
the  production  of  foodstuffs  crops,  livestock,  drinking  water  installations  and 
supplies  and  irrigation  works.  ".  391 
The  ICRC  submitted  to  the  conference  Draft  Article  27,  which  dealt  with  the  subject  of 
starvation.  The  aim  of  the  Article  was  to  prohibit  a  particular  cruel  method  of  war,  namely 
the  destruction  of  essential  means  of  survival  of  the  population  and  the  destruction  of  the 
environment. 
From  the  discussions  and  many  amendments  submitted  by  State  representatives,  two 
positions  can  be  clearly  distinguished.  The  majority  stressed  the  importance  of  the  Article, 
389E.  Rosenblad:  International,  Humanitarian  Law  of  Armed  ConfLict:  Some  Aspects  of  the  PrincipLe  of  Destruction  and  Retated  Probtems.  Geneva,  Institut  Henry  Durant,  1979,  p.  103. 
390  OP.  cit.,  supre.  n-28,  P.  6. 
391  OP.  Cit.,  supra.  n.  309,  p.  4aS. 
305 and  even  demanded  the  extension  of  the  means  covered  by  the  prohibition,  such  as  food 
producing  areas,  crops,  objects  of  national  economic  value,  houses,  installations  and  means 
of  transport.  392  Others  demanded  that  civilian  objects  should  not  be  the  object  of  reprisals 
and  any  form  of  attack.  393 
However,  the  minority  view  which  was  advocated  by  Canada  and  supported  only  by  the 
US,  simply  demanded  the  deletion  of  Draft  Article  27.  Canada  invoked  the  ground  of 
394 
sovereignty  specifically  to  suggest  such  deletion.  The  US  delegate  supported  Canada  s 
attitude,  and  further  stressed  that  the  Article  constituted  an  intervention  in  the  internal 
395  affairs  of  States.  Ireland  and  the  Soviet  Union,  among  others,  specifically  argued  against 
the  Canadian  approach,  and  stressed  the  importance  of  the  Article  in  Protocol  11.396 
This  atmosphere  led  to  the  adoption  of  Article  27  at  committee  11  without  any  major 
modification  as  to  the  ICRC  proposal.  397  This  means  that  at  that  stage  there  was  a  widely 
392For 
an  exampte  of  this  trend,  see  the  Romanian  amendment  (CDDH/111/12  of  12/3/1974),  ibid,  p.  473. 
See  atso  Austratia  (CDDH/111/47  of  15/3/74),  ibid,  p.  474. 
393  Seethe  amendments  submitted  by  Egypt,  Iraq,  Ma  Ii  and  Syr  ia  (MDH/111/62/Rev/  I  /add.  1  of  19/3/1974), 
ibid,  p.  474. 
394  Thus,  Canada's  detegate  argued  that: 
11  ...  EN3  is  deLegati  on  proposed  that  Art  icte  27  should  be  deleted  ECDDH/111/36  of  15/3/741  &rose 
from  its  conviction  that,  If  Draft  protocol  11  was  to  represent  an  Important  evolution  of 
humanitarian  taw,  the  effect  its  provisions  would  have  on  the  sovereignty  of  States  must  be 
carefully  weighed.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  both  parties  to  non-  international  armed  conflict 
were  generally  fighting  on  their  own  territory,  it  would  perhaps  be  inappropriate  to  suggest 
to  them  that  they  could  not  deal  with  certain  objects  as  they  saw  fit.  u 
He  then  added: 
11...  [Als  the  Canadian  proposal  might  appear  to  run  counter  to  the  aims  of  the  conference,  he 
wished  to  make  it  clear  that  his  delegation  was  not  in  favour  of  attacks  on  the  types  of 
objects  inquestion.  However,  the  situation  Innon-Internationat  armedconfLicts  was  oftenvery 
different  from  that  obtaining  in  international  conflicts  and  would  be  inappropriate  to 
overburden  Draft  Protocol  11  with  provisions  that  were  merely  copies  of  those  in  Protocol  111. 
op.  cit.,  supra  n.  362,  CDDH/111/SR.  17,  para.  41,  pp.  149-150. 
395The  US  delegate  pointed  out  that: 
"In  his  delegation's  opinion,  Draft  Protocol  11  should  be  based  entirely  on  the  principle  of 
the  sovereignty  of  States  within  their  borders  and  should  be  limited  to  humanitarian 
considerations.  He  agreed  with  the  Canadian  representative  that  the  wording  of  Article  27 
amounted  to  interference  in  internal  affairs  of  States.  Those  provisions  should  be  modified 
for  they  were  too  broad.  Their  scope  should  be  limited  to  a  simple  ban  on  starving  out  the 
civilian  population". 
lbid,  MDH/111/SR.  18,  para.  7,  p.  152. 
3961retand  indicated  that: 
"It  did  not  share  the  opinion  expressed  by  Canada  ...  that  such  prohibition  wouLd  affect  the 
sovereignty  of  States,  and  the  USSR  emphasised  that  there  coutd  be  no  question  of  deLeting 
ArtlcLe  27  for  that  wouLd  endanger  the  civiLian  popuLation  and  the  objects  IndispensabLe  to 
their  survivaLl'. 
Op.  cit.,  supra  n.  309,  p.  478. 
3971)raft 
Articte  27  was  adopted  by  Committee  11  by  consensus  on  June  4th,  1976  (MOH/111/359),  It 
stiputates  that: 
"Starvation  of  civilians  as  a  method  of  combat  is  prohibited  and  therefore  it  is  forbidden  to 
attack,  destroy,  remove  or  render  useless  objects  indispensable  to  the  survival  of  the  civi  Han 
population,  such  as  foodstuffs  and  food  producing  areas,  crops,  livestock.  drinking  water 
306 shared  consensus  that  the  essential  means  of  survival  of  the  civilian  population  must  be 
spared,  and  that  there  is  no  real  military  advantage  can  be  said  to  come  from  their 
destruction.  Despite  this,  the  Pakistani  simplified  version  listed  Article  27  among  the  list 
of  Articles  which  were  proposed  to  be  deleted. 
At  that  point  the  delegate  of  the  Holy  See  intervened,  and  made  a  very  emotional 
statement  in  order  to  spare  the  Article.  After  observing  that  he  was  watching  with 
increasing  concern  the  dismantling  Article  by  Article  of  Draft  Protocol  11.  He  declared: 
"Now  that  the  conference  was  being  called  on  to  decide  whether  or  not  to  delete 
Article  27,  which  was  essentially  concerned  with  food  and  water  supplies  for  the 
civilian  population,  the  delegation  of  the  Holy  See,  as  well  as  others,  had  to  face  a 
problem  of  conscience,  for  the  protection  of  civilians  was  one  of  the  aims,  possibly 
even  the  main  aim,  of  the  two  protoCOIS.  "398 
Many  delegations  supported  the  Holy  See,  among  them:  Sweden,  the  USSR,  Ecuador, 
Algeria,  Libya  and  Italy.  399  France,  in  order  to  dispel  the  fears  of  sovereignty-oriented 
these  States  pointed  out: 
"All  Article  27  contained  was  a  purely  humanitarian  provision,  which  no-one  should 
oppose.  The  text  did  not  authorise  any  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  a  State 
"400  and  in  no  way  ran  counter  to  the  requirement  of  national  defence. 
These  efforts  led  finally  to  the  sparing  of  Article  27,  which  was  adopted  by  consensus.  It 
became  Article  14  in  the  final  version  of  Protocol  11.  Thus,  starvation  as  a  cruel  and 
inhuman  method  of  warfare  against  civilians  is  finally  prohibited.  Article  14  in  fact 
prohibits  the  different  ways  through  which  starvation  can  be  brought  about,  such  as  the 
destruction  of  foodstuffs  and  areas  which  produce  foodstuffs,  crops,  livestock,  drinking 
water  installations  and  supplies  and  irrigation  works. 
The  list  is  not  exhaustive,  since  as  the  commentary  of  the  two  protocols  of  the  ICRC 
stated,  starvation  can  also  result  from  omission.  It  stressed: 
"To  deliberately  decide  not  to  take  measures  to  supply  the  population  with  objects 
indispensable  for  its  survival  in  a  way  would  b  come  a  method  of  combat  by  default, 
"481  and  would  be  prohibited  under  this  Article. 
Moreover,  the  use  in  Article  14  of  the  verbs  'attack,  'destroy',  'remove'  and  'render  useless' 
was  aimed  at  covering  all  eventualities.  This  indicates  that  it  is  prohibited  to  pollute  the 
water  supplies  by  whatever  means,  and  to  destroy  the  harvest  by  using  any  kind  of 
chemicals. 
The  Article  in  my  view  is  another  positive  step  in  the  direction  of  real  protection  of 
instaLLatfons  and  suppLies,  and  frrfgation  works,  for  that  purpose". 
lbid,  p.  482. 
3980P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  267,  MDH/SR.  52,  para.  82,  p.  136. 
3991bid, 
paras.  84,87,91,93  and  94,  pp.  136-137. 
4001bid,  MDH/SR.  52,  para.  86,  p.  137. 
4010p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  297,  p.  458. 
307 fundamental  human  rights,  the  right  to  life.  MacAlister-Smith  stressed  in  this  respect: 
"Article  14  establishes  without  reservation  the  prohibition  of  starvation  as  a  method 
of  warfare  and  its  terms  assume  particular  iMj2ortance  in  the  light  of  weaknesses  in 
the  remaining  provisions  concerning  relief.  """' 
He  then  indicated  that: 
"...  [Flailure  to  provide  relief  may  constitute  a  violation  of  the  prohibition  of 
starvation  of  civilians  laid  down  in  Article  14.  "403 
In  conclusion,  Article  14  constitutes  a  welcome  development  in  an  area  where  it  is  most 
wanted,  internal  conflict,  placing  as  it  does  a  real  restriction  on  the  discretion  of  the 
warring  factions. 
5.  The  Protection  of  Works  and  Installations  Containing  Dangerous  Forces 
Article  15  of  the  Protocol  11  provides: 
"Works  or  installations  containing  dangerous  forces,  namely  dams,  dykes  and  nuclear 
electrical  generating  stations,  shall  not  be  made  the  object  of  attack,  even  where  these 
objects  are  military  objectives,  if  such  attack  may  cause  the  release  of  dangerous 
"404  forces  and  consequently  severe  losses  among  the  civilian  population. 
Resort  to  the  use  of  natural  and  artificial  forces  to  combat  the  enemy,  and  achieving 
victory,  is  an  inhuman  act,  since  its  main  victims  are  always  civilians.  The  representative 
of  Vietnam  in  the  Diplomatic  Conference  said  that  during  the  war  in  Vietnam  661  sections 
of  dyke  had  been  either  damaged  or  destroyed,  and  it  had  been  calculated  that  the  bombing 
of  the  dykes  in  North  Vietnam  carried  out  systematically  with  explosives  and  penetration 
bombs,  could  have  effects  comparable  to  those  of  a  hydrogen  bomb.  The  flooding  of  the 
delta  and  other  acts  led  to  the  death  of  two  or  three  million  inhabitants  by  drowning  or 
starvation.  405  However,  the  substance  of  Article  15  cited  above,  was  included  in  Article  28 
of  the  ICRC  Draft  Protocol  11. 
During  the  discussions  at  the  committee  level,  and  from  the  amendments  submitted  to  the 
Article,  we  can  deduce  three  positions.  The  first  supported  the  ICRC's  position,  like  the 
latter,  it  was  in  favour  of  the  prohibition  of  attacks  against  objects  which  contain  dangerous 
forces,  but  only  when  such  attack  may  cause  the  release  of  dangerous  forces  and 
consequently  cause  severe  losses  among  the  civilian  population.  This  means  at  the  end,  that 
406  the  prohibition  is  not  wholly  absolute,  since  the  possibility  of  attacks  remains. 
The  second  view  stressed  that  the  prohibition  must  be  absolute.  It  suggested  the  deletion 
402  P.  MacAlister-Smith:  International,  Hunanitarlan  Assistance:  Disaster  Retfef  Actions  in 
International,  Law  and  Organisation.  Martfnus  Wfjhoff,  Dordrecht/Boston,  Lancaster,  1985,  p.  31. 
4031bid, 
P.  31. 
404  OP-  Cit.  *  supra.,  n.  307,  p.  505. 
405  OP-  Cit.,  supra.  n.  362,  CDDN/111/SR.  19,  para.  2,  p.  161. 
406This 
was  the  position  of  Australials  amendment  (CDDH/111/46  of  March  19th,  1974),  op.  cit.,  supra  n.  309,  p.  490. 
308 of  any  qualification  in  the  Article  which  may  be  interpreted  that  attacks  are  sometimes 
permitted,  and  further  suggested  that  those  objects  which  contain  dangerous  forces  shall  not 
407  be  the  object  of  reprisals. 
The  third  view  simply  proposed  the  deletion  of  Article  28  on  the  ground  that  it  had  no 
place  in  Protocol  11,  because  it  constitutes  an  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  States.  408 
However,  at  the  committee  level  it  was  the  first  position  which  won  the  day,  and  the 
Draft  Article  28  adopted  seems  to  afford  a  better  protection  than  that  which  was  envisaged 
in  the  ICRC  Draft  Article  28.  In  this  context,  paragraphs  2  and  3  were  added.  The  first 
made  an  obligation  for  the  parties  to  endeavour  to  avoid  locating  military  installations  and 
objectives  in  the  vicinity  of  works  or  installations  containing  dangerous  forces.  And  the 
latter  (third  paragraph)  induces  the  parties  to  mark  such  works  and  installations  with  special 
409  marks.  However,  Article  28  was  adopted  after  the  imputation  of  paragraphs  2  and  3.  In 
other  words,  a  return  to  what  had  been  proposed  in  the  ICRC  Draft  Protocol  11. 
On  balance,  it  seems  that  Article  15  is  an  innovation  in  the  context  of  Protocol  11,  no  such 
provision  can  be  found  in  Article  3.  It  obliges  the  parties  to  the  conflict  not  to  attack 
objects  which  contain  dangerous  forces,  whenever  severe  losses  of  civilians  would  result 
from  such  attacks.  In  that  respect,  the  Government  cannot  claim  that  these  works  and 
installations  are  in  the  national  territory,  and  it  is  only  the  legal  authority  which  can  decide 
what  to  do  with  them  in  the  event  of  internal  conflict.  Its  sovereignty  in  that  respect  is 
curtailed  at  least  to  a  certain  degree. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  conceded  that  the  Article  contains  many  loopholes.  Thus, 
the  list  of  installations  and  works  which  cannot  be  the  object  of  attack  is  exhaustive,  since 
the  Article  uses  the  term  'namely',  which  means  that  many  installations  and  works  which 
contain  in  effect,  dangerous  forces  are  not  immune  from  attack,  such  as  facilities  and  works 
used  for  the  storage  of  crude  oil  products,  and  chemical  agents.  Moreover,  the  protection 
of  civilians  in  the  Article  is  not  absolute  since  the  prohibition  is  qualified  by  'severe  loss' 
which  means  when  there  is  no  severe  loss  then  civilians  must  bear  the  horrors  of  attacks  on 
those  installations. 
S.  Protection  of  Cultural  Objects  and  Places  of  Worship 
Article  16  of  the  Protocol  11  provides: 
"It  is  prohibited  to  commit  any  acts  of  hostility  directed  against  historic  monuments, 
works  of  art  or  places  of  worship  which  constitute  the  cul  ural  or  spiritual  heritage 
of  peoples,  and  to  use  them  in  support  of  military  effort.  "110 
The  ICRC,  it  must  be  indicated,  submitted  nothing  concerning  this  important  question.  The 
407  This  was  the  effect  of  the  Romanian  amendment  to  Article  28  (MDH/111/327  of  April  30th,  1970), 
ibid,  p.  489. 
408 
This  was  the  opinion  of  Canada.  It  demanded  the  deletion  of  Article  28  for  the  same  reasons  which 
it  had  advanced  for  the  deletion  of  Article  27.  In  fact  it  advanced  grounds  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention.  Op.  cit.,  supra  n.  362,  CDDH/III/SR  20,  para.  20,  p.  176. 
409 
See  op.  cit.,  supra  n-309,  pp.  501-502. 
410  Mid,  p.  526. 
309 Article  originated  in  an  amendment  tabled  by  II  States,  which  proposed  the  addition  of  new 
Article  20  bis4l'  dealing  with  the  subject  of  the  protection  of  cultural  objects  and  places 
of  worship. 
During  the  discussions  at  the  committee  level,  the  majority  did  not  see  any  problem  in 
adding  a  new  Article  dealing  with  that  subject.  However,  at  least  the  US  and  Japan  pointed 
out  that: 
1  "...  [T]he  incorporation  in  Draft  Protocol  11  of  such  executive  international  remlations 
of  internal  conflicts  did  not  enhance  the  protocol's  chances  of  acceptance.  12 
413 
However,  Article  20  bis  was  adopted  by  consensus  at  the  level  of  the  Third  Committee. 
In  its  simplified  version,  Pakistan  proposed  the  deletion  of  Draft  Article  20  bis.  But,  the 
majority  of  States  led  by  Greece  appealed  to  the  Pakistani  delegate  not  to  insist  on  that 
deletion,  since  many  of  the  world's  treasures  were  in  danger  of  being  destroyed  in  the 
course  of  internal  armed  confl  iCt.  414  Iraq  was  against  the  majority,  its  delegate  stated  that: 
"its  Government  and  people  need  not  an  Article  in  Draft  protocol  11  to  tell  them  that 
"415  such  acts  as  those  mentioned  in  Article  20  bis  were  prohibited. 
The  US  also  stressed  that,  if  adopted,  the  Article  would  be  bound  to  prevent  some  States 
from  becoming  parties  to  Protocol  11,  and  signalled  its  willingness  to  vote  against  the 
inclusion  of  the  Article  in  Protocol  11.416  However,  at  the  plenary  meeting  of  6  June  1977, 
the  Article  (20bis)  was  adopted  by  35  votes  to  15,  with  32  abstentionS.  417  Even  after  the 
vote,  India  explained  its  negative  vote  for  Article  20  bis  on  terms  of  its  contradiction  with 
State  sovereignty.  418 
411  Amendment  (MDH/I  I  I/GT/95  of  May  25th,  1976)  f  ormutated  by  Af  ghanf  stan,  Egypt,  Ghana,  Greece,  Noty 
See,  Itaty,  Japan,  Jordan,  Spain  and  Yugostavfa.  lbid,  p.  509. 
4121bid, 
p.  512. 
413The  ArtlcLe  adopted  reads: 
"Without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  of  The  Hague  Convention  on  the  protection  of  cultural 
property  in  the  event  of  armed  conflict  of  14  May  1954,  it  is  prohibited  to  commit  any  acts 
of  hostility  directed  against  those  historic  monuments  or  works  of  art  which  constitute  the 
cultural  heritage  of  peoples,  and  to  use  them  in  support  of  the  military  effort". 
Ibid,  p.  514. 
414 
Greece  was  supported  by  Iretand,  the  HoLy  See,  France,  ItaLy,  Austria,  Spain,  Cotombla  and  Turkey. 
See  ibid,  pp.  515-516. 
415  Ibid,  p.  515. 
416  Ibid,  p.  515. 
417  Ibid,  p.  523. 
418  It  stressed  that: 
"The  Indian  delegation  objects  strongly  to  the  reference  to  any  International  convention  to 
which  only  sovereign  States  can  be  parties,  in  Protocol  11,  which  will  apply  to  internal 
conflicts". 
lbid,  p.  524. 
310 The  adoption  of  Article  16  is  a  very  welcome  development.  In  a  way,  if  compared  with 
Article  19419  of  The  Hague  Convention  for  the  protection  of  cultural  property,  it  grants 
more  comprehensive  protection,  thus,  it  covers  also  places  of  worship.  Also  Article  16 
contains  no  possibility  of  derogation  from  the  prohibitions  listed  there,  even  where  the 
imperatives  of  military  necessity  so  require,  whereas  Article  19  contains  such  possibility. 
To  that  extent,  I  think  that  Article  16  brings  a  further  limitation  on  the  sovereignty  of  the 
State,  as  such,  it  is  indeed  an  innovation. 
7.  Prohibition  of  Force  Movements  of  Civilians 
Article  17  of  Protocol  Il  provides: 
"I.  The  displacement  of  the  civilian  population  shall  not  be  ordered  for  reasons 
related  to  the  conflict  unless  the  security  of  the  civilians  involved  or  imperative 
military  reasons  so  demand.  Should  such  displacements  have  to  be  carried  out,  all 
possible  measures  shall  be  taken  in  order  that  the  civilian  population  may  be  received 
under  satisfactory  conditions  of  shelter,  hygiene,  health,  safety  and  nutrition. 
2.  Civilians  shall  not  be  compelled  to  leave  their  own  territory  for  reasons  connected 
with  the  con  fliCt.  "420 
It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  forced  displacement  of  the  civilian  population  during  civil  wars 
still  causes  untold  sufferings.  The  examples  of  Algeria,  Vietnam,  and  recently  of  Cyprus, 
Nicaragua  and  El  Salvador  among  others  reveal  clearly  the  correctness  of  such  assertion. 
On  the  normative  level,  there  was  no  international  regulation  of  the  question.  Article  3 
is  silent  on  the  point,  which  meant  in  practice  States  were  free  to  order  such  relocation  for 
whatever  reason  they  see  fit.  This  important  loophole  had  to  be  filled.  The  ICRC  had  just 
done  that  by  submitting  Draft  Article  29,  which  deals  with  the  subject. 
The  Article  in  fact,  poses  the  general  principle  that  the  relocation  of  the  civilian 
population  for  reasons  related  to  the  conflict  is  prohibited.  However,  such  relocations  can 
take  place  exceptionally  in  two  cases.  The  first,  is  when  the  safety  of  the  population  itself 
is  in  danger.  Secondly,  when  imperative  military  necessity  so  demands  in  that  these  cases 
are  necessary  actions  and  measures  must  be  taken  to  make  such  displacements  smooth  and 
humane.  Paragraph  2  indicates  that  civilians  must  not  be  forced  to  leave  their  national 
territory. 
The  travaux  pr6paratolres  show  that  the  Article  was  seen  as  touching  a  very  sensitive  point, 
4  19Article  19  (Conflicts  not  of  an  International  Character)  stipulates: 
01.  In  the  event  of  an  armed  conftict  not  of  an  Internationat  character  occurring  within  the 
territory  of  one  of  the  high  contracting  parties,  each  party  to  the  conftfct  shatt  be  bound 
to  appLy,  as  a  minimum,  the  provisions  of  the  present  convention  which  retates  to  respect  for 
cutturat  property. 
2.  The  parties  to  the  conftfct  shatt  endeavour  to  bring  into  force,  by  means  of  special, 
agreements,  att  or  part  of  the  other  provisions  of  the  present  convention. 
3.  The  UN  Educational,  Scientific  and  Cutturat  Organisation  may  offer  its  services  to  the 
parties  to  the  conftict. 
4.  The  apptication  of  the  preceding  provisions  shatt  not  affect  the  tegat  status  of  the  parties 
to  the  conftict.  " 
Op.  cit..  supra..  n.  28,  pp.  679-70. 
420 
Op.  cft.,  supra.  n.  309,  p.  543. 
311 namely  the  right  of  the  established  Government  to  take  all  necessary  measures  to  maintain 
public  order.  Two  views  concerning  the  Article  can  be  said  to  emerge  from  reading  those 
travaux  prkparatolres. 
1.  The  first  view,  which  is  the  majority  view,  welcomed  the  idea  of  covering  the  subject 
of  deportations  and  displacements  in  Protocol  11,  then  supported  the  ICRC  Article.  Some 
delegations  went  even  further.  Thus,  it  was  proposed  that  the  prohibition  of  displacements 
must  not  only  cover  the  civilian  population,  it  must  be  extended  to  cover  any  transfer  of 
civilian  objects  or  installations.  421  Cyprus,  which  according  to  its  delegation  had  the  greatest 
proportion  of  displaced  persons,  since  2  out  of  5  had  been  uprooted  in  inhuman  conditions, 
supported  strongly  the  strengthening  of  the  Article  and  its  preservation  in  the  context  of 
Protocol  11.  In  its  eyes  displacement  constitutes  'an  inhuman  and  unacceptable  practice,  422 
and  it  stressed  also  that: 
"...  [O]f  all  inhumanities  of  an  armed  conflict  the  Government  of  Cyprus  coniiders  the 
23  displacement.  of  the  civilian  population  to  be  among  the  most  deplorable". 
The  second  view  explicitly  invokes  the  concepts  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention,  to 
state  the  dissatisfaction  with  the  inclusion  of  anything  concerning  the  question  of 
displacement  in  Protocol  11.  Canada  led  this  group.  It  proposed  the  deletion  of  the  Article. 
The  rationale  behind  this  is  that: 
"In  case  of  insurrection  or  non-  international  conflict,  Governments  had  the  right  to 
transfer  part  of  the  civilian  population  from  one  region  to  another  if  they  considered 
it  necessary.  The  prohibition  of  forced  movement  of  civilians  was  justified  in  Draft 
Protocol  111,  which  applied  to  international  conflicts,  but  in  the  case  (?  f  an  internal 
"424  conflict  it  becomes  interference  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  a  country. 
The  US  supported  Canada425  Indonesia  also  indicated  that: 
*  ...  Article  29  could  be  interpreted  as  leading  to  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
sovereign  States,  which  had  the  right  to  decide  on  the  measures  required  for  their 
safety  and  that  of  the  population  even  where  the  displacement  of  the  civilian 
population  was  concerned.  *426 
During  the  discussion  at  the  committee  level,  Norway  answered  indirectly  those  who  raised 
421this  is  the  effect  of  the  Romanian  amendment  (MDR/111/12  of  March  12th,  1974).  The  Soviet  Union, 
Switzeriand,  Norway  and  Cyprus.  See  lbid,  pp.  529-35. 
422  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  307,  CDDH/111/327,  p.  95. 
4230p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  267,  CDDH/SR.  53,  p.  156. 
424  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  309,  p.  531. 
425The  US  argued  that: 
"...  Article  29,  as  Drafted,  would  undoubtedly  lead  to  the  non-appLicatfon  of  Protocol  11.  Wo 
State  was  likely  to  acknit  that  existing  authority  within  Its  territory  was  challenged  to  the 
point  at  which  the  provisions  of  Protocol  11  would  apply". 
lbid,  p.  534. 
4261bid, 
p.  534. 
312 the  issue  of  sovereignty  in  these  terms: 
"Of  course,  sovereignty  was  important  in  that  it  afforded  protection  against  outside 
interference,  but  it  had  ceased  to  be  a  screen  behind  which  Governments  had 
unrestricted  freedom  to  act  in  their  relations  with  the  nationals  of  the  country.  The 
development  of  international  humanitarian  law  had  shown  that  Governments  were 
"427  ready  to  accept  restrictions  on  their  freedom  of  action. 
428  At  the  committee  level,  Article  29  was  adopted.  Basically,  it  did  not  depart  from  what 
has  been  proposed  by  the  ICRC.  The  only  change  was  in  paragraph  2,  which  although  it  had 
upheld  the  principle  that  civilians  shall  not  be  compelled  to  leave  their  own  territory  for 
reasons  related  to  the  conflict.  It  opened  an  exception,  and  that  is  in  the  case  in  which 
individuals  convicted  by  final  judgment  of  crimes  are  required  to  leave  the  territory,  or 
when  they  elected  to  do  so  when  offered  that  opportunity;  and  finally  in  cases  of 
extradition  which  must,  however,  be  in  conformity  with  the  law. 
In  the  simplified  version  in  which  the  Article  was  kept,  it  was  not  suggested  for  deletion. 
The  only  change  is  the  deletion  of  the  expression  'the  parties  to  the  conflict'  which  aims  at 
not  giving  any  chance  of  legal  status  to  the  insurgents. 
The  main  conclusions  to  be  drawn  concerning  this  important  Article  are: 
1.  There  is  no  doubt  that  Article  17  fills  an  important  gap,  namely  the  question  of 
displacements,  which  are  becoming  a  normal  means  of  conducting  the  war  in  internal 
conflicts,  as  the  practice  in  Nicaragua,  El  Salvador,  Mozambique  and  Afghanistan  among 
others  will  show  later.  Article  17  is  an  innovation,  since  Article  3  is  silent  on  the  point.  In 
429  fact,  the  article  was  specifically  inspired  by  Article  49  of  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention, 
4271bid, 
p.  533. 
428ArticLe  29  as  adopted  by  the  Third  Committee  on  May  10th,  1977  stiputates  that: 
"  I.  The  displacement  of  the  civiLi  an  poput  at  ion  shalt  not  be  ordered  by  a  party  to  the  conf  Lict 
for  reasons  relating  to  the  conflict  unless  the  security  of  the  civilians  involved  or 
imperative  military  reasons  so  demand.  Should  a  party  to  the  conflict  undertake  such 
displacements,  it  shatt  take  att,  possible  measures  in  order  that  the  civilian  population  may 
be  received  under  satisfactory  conditions  of  shelter,  hygiene,  health,  safety  and  nutrition. 
2.  Civilians  shatL  not  be  compelled  to  leave  their  own  territory  for  reasons  connected  with 
the  conf  Lf  ct  except  in  the  case  in  which  individuals  convicted  by  f  inat  judgment  of  crimes  are 
required  to  leave  that  territory  or,  having  been  offered  the  opportunity  of  leaving  the 
country,  elect  to  do  so,  or  in  the  case  of  individuals  extradited  in  conformity  with  taw". 
lbid,  pp.  541-542. 
429See  the  comment  of  the  ICRC  representative,  when  he  presented  Articte  29,  ibid,  p.  530.  Articte  49 
stiputates: 
"individual  or  mass  forcible  transfers,  as  well  as  deportations  of  protected  persons  from 
occupied  territory  to  the  territory  of  the  occupying  power  or  to  that  of  any  other  country, 
occupied  or  not,  are  prohibited,  regardless  of  their  motive. 
Nevertheless,  the  occupying  power  may  undertake  total  or  partial  evacuation  of  a  given  area 
If  the  security  of  the  population  or  imperative  military  reasons  so  demand.  Such  evacuations 
may  not  involve  the  displacement  of  protected  persons  outside  the  bounds  of  the  occupied 
territory,  except  when  for  material  reasons  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  such  displacements. 
Persons  thus  evacuated  shall.  be  transferred  back  to  their  homes  as  soon  as  hostilities  in  the 
area  in  question  have  ceased. 
The  occupying  power  undertaking  such  transfers  or  evacuations  shall  ensure,  to  the  greatest 
practical  extent,  that  proper  accommodation  is  provided  to  receive  the  protected  persons,  that 
the  removals  are  effected  in  satisfactory  conditions  of  hygiene,  health,  safety  and  nutrition, 
and  that  members  of  the  same  family  are  not  separated. 
The  protecting  power  shalt,  be  Informed  of  any  transfers  and  evacuations  as  soon  as  they  have 
taken  place. 
313 and  in  that  respect  the  protection  of  civilians  from  displacement  is  similar  in  internal  and 
international  wars,  which  is  in  itself  a  fundamental  change  from  the  thinking  of  the  1949 
Conference. 
This  leads  one  to  conclude  that  the  assertion  that  the  established  Government  enjoys  a 
complete  freedom  of  action  vis-A-vis  its  population,  especially  in  times  of  emergencies,  has 
been  restricted  and  even  curtailed  to  a  great  degree.  The  majority  of  States  felt  that  the 
inhuman  tragedies  of  displacement  must  be  prohibited  as  a  general  principle.  The  discretion 
of  the  Government  in  this  domain  is  limited. 
2.  Moreover,  it  can  be  safely  advanced  that  on  the  subject  of  displacements,  it  seems  that 
humanitarian  ideals  have  overcome  demands  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention.  The  non- 
inclusion  of  Draft  Article  29  in  the  list  of  the  Articles  demanded  for  deletion  by  Pakistan 
in  its  simplified  version  of  Protocol  11  is  a  case  in  point. 
3.  Furthermore,  we  must  not  be  over-optimistic,  since  Article  17  contains  some  important 
loopholes.  Thus,  the  prohibition  of  displacements,  according  to  the  Article,  ceases  to  be 
operative  when  'the  security  of  the  civilians'  is  involved,  and  when  'imperative  military 
reasons'  so  demand.  These  grounds  may  be  used  and  interpreted  to  justify  massive 
displacements. 
However,  it  seems  that  an  interpretation  in  good  faith,  and  in  accordance  with  the  object 
and  purpose  of  the  protocol  would  limit  excesses  to  a  significant  degree.  In  this  context,  the 
commentary  of  the  ICRC  stresses  in  connection  with  the  expression  'imperative  military 
reasons"  that  "the  situation  should  be  scrutinised  most  carefully  as  the  adjective  'imperative' 
reduces  to  a  minimum  cases  in  which  displacements  may  be  ordered".  430  The  commentary 
also  indicates  that: 
"...  [C]learly,  imperative  military  reasons  cannot  be  justified  by  political  motives.  For 
example,  it  would  be  prohibited  to  move  a  population  in  order  to  exercise  more 
effective  control  over  a  dissident  ethnic  group.  "431 
However,  as  concerns  the  notion  of  'the  security  of  civilians',  it  seems  that  a  good  faith 
interpretation  requires,  as  the  Norwegian  delegate  rightly  pointed  out  during  the 
conference,  that  'the  security  of  civilians  should  not  require  their  forced  displacement, 
because  if  their  security  was  genuinely  threatened  civilians  would  be  prepared  to  move  off 
of  their  own  accord.  432 
The  occupying  power  shalt  not  detain  protected  persons  in  an  area  particularly  exposed  to  the 
dangers  of  war  unless  the  security  of  the  population  or  imperative  military  reasons  so  demand. 
The  occupying  power  shalt  not  deport  or  transfer  parts  of  its  own  civilian  population  into  the 
territory  it  occupies". 
Op.  cit..  supra.  n.  28,  p.  448. 
4300P. 
cft.,  supra.  n.  297,  p.  1473. 
4311bid. 
432  op.  cit..  supra.  n.  362,  MDH/111/SR.  25,  para.  4,  p.  229. 
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1.  The  general  impression  is  that  Articles  13-17  constitute  the  biggest  contribution  of 
Protocol  11  to  humanitarian  law  applicable  in  non-  international  conflicts.  Compared  with 
Article  3,  Protocol  11  has  indeed  filled  many  normative  gaps,  which  were  not  regulated  by 
any  international  instruments.  Thus,  civilians  cannot  be  the  object  of  attack.  Objects 
necessary  for  the  survival  of  those  civilians  are  also  protected  from  attack  or  manipulation, 
and  civilians  are  protected  from  starvation  etc. 
2.  Moreover,  it  is  asserted  that  the  deletion  of  many  important  rules,  such  as  Draft 
Articles  24  and  25  of  the  ICRC  Draft,  which  established  the  distinction  between  combatants 
and  non-combatants,  and  established  a  general  presumption  in  favour  of  the  civilian 
population  in  cases  of  doubt,  has  to  some  extent  limited  the  importance  of  the  rules 
contained  in  Articles  13-17.  Although,  an  interpretation  in  good  faith  and  in  accordance 
with  the  object  and  purpose  of  Protocol  Il  would  reveal  that  those  rules,  and  even  some 
rules  on  methods  and  means  of  warfare,  can  be  found  in  Article  4  and  Articles  13-17. 
3.  It  is  asserted  here  that  the  arguments  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  have  played 
a  major  role  in  the  imputation  of  many  important  rules  for  the  protection  of  civilians. 
Indeed  Pakistan,  the  author  of  the  simplified  version  of  Protocol  11,  had  advanced  them  as 
the  main  reason  for  making  the  protocol  'simple'  and  capable  of  being  accepted  by  States 
and  also  being  practical. 
However,  it  is  clear  also  that  considerations  of  humanity  have  pjayed  a  major  role  in 
persuading  States  to  accept  many  rules  for  the  protection  of  civilians.  Indeed,  the  mere  fact 
of  the  acceptance  of  those  rules  is  a  challenge  to  the  sovereignty  of  States. 
Furthermore,  it  must  be  noted  the  group  of  States  which  favoured  an  extension  of  rules 
of  humanitarian  law  concerning  civilians  to  internal  wars  (which  was  led  by  Norway,  Italy 
and  the  Holy  See,  and  was  supported  by  many  other  States),  had  the  upper  hand  at  the 
committee  level.  Their  strategy  was  to  stress  the  humanitarian  nature  of  the  provisions  and 
emphasise  that  they  did  not  in  any  way  amount  to  intervention  or  breach  of  sovereignty. 
However.  at  the  last  session  it  seems  that  defenders  of  State  sovereignty  made  it  clear  there 
must  be  either  simplification  (which  means  that  many  rules  had  to  go)  or  abandonment  of 
Protocol  Il.  This  blackmail  left  no  alternative  but  'something  is  better  than  nothing. 
4.  Further,  I  think  that  the  philosophy  of  human  rights  has  facilitated  the  effort  to 
produce  more  rules  for  the  protection  of  civilians.  Since  after  all,  Articles  13-17  are  all 
designed  in  a  way  to  protect  the  fundamental  human  rights  of  right  to  life  and  the  right  to 
be  treated  humanely  in  all  circumstances.  No  State  has  challenged  at  least  explicitly  the  use 
of  human  rights  in  that  direction.  Indeed  no  State  has  argued  against  the  relevance  of  the 
concept  of  human  rights  to  the  question  of  the  protection  of  civilians  in  times  of  war. 
E.  The  Protection  of  the  Wounded  and  Sick  In  Protocol  11 
As  has  been  indicated  in  Section  11,  Article  3,  apart  from  posing  the  general  principle  that 
the  sick  and  wounded  shall  be  collected  and  cared  for,  did  not  give  any  details  on  how  it 
was  to  be  implemented. 
Thus,  no  protection  is  given  to  the  medical  personnel  or  civilians  who  try  to  assist  and 
care  for  the  wounded  and  sick,  nor  is  there  protection  for  medical  establishments  and 
315 vehicles.  These  omissions  do  not  facilitate  the  protection  of  victims  of  internal  wars. 
In  fact,  the  ICRC  has  signalled  the  need  for  a  thorough  protection  for  the  wounded  and 
sick,  as  far  back  as  1957,  when  it  adopted  in  the  XIX  International  Red  Cross  Conference 
in  New  Delhi,  Resolution  XVII,  in  which  the  wish  was  expressed  that: 
"That  a  new  provision  be  added  to  the  existing  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949 
extending  the  provisions  of  Article  3  thereof  so  that: 
(a)  The  wounded  may  be  cared  for  without  discrimination  and  doctors  in  no  way 
hindered  when  giving  the  care  which  they  are  called  upon  to  provide  in  these 
circumstances. 
(b)  The  inviolable  principle  of  medical  professional  secrecy  may  be  respected. 
(c)  There  may  be  no  restrictions,  other  than  those  provided  by  international 
legislation,  on  the  scale  and  free  circulation  of  medicines,  it  being  understood  that 
these  will  be  used  exclusively  for  therapeutic  purposes". 
The  Resolution  then  made  "an  urgent  appeal  to  all  Governments  to  repeal  any  measures 
which  might  be  contrary  to  the  present  resolution., 
433  Moreover,  the  UN  Secre  tary-  General, 
in  his  second  report  on  human  rights  in  armed  conflicts,  advocated  the  same  course  of 
434  action. 
1.  The  Red  Cross  Experts'  View 
When  the  Red  Cross  experts  were  consulted  on  the  question  of  the  protection  of  the 
wounded  and  the  sick  in  their  conference  in  1971,  they  unanimously  recognised  the  need 
for  more  effective  protection  of  this  helpless  category  of  the  victims  of  internal  conflicts. 
They  were  for: 
"...  [I]ncreasing  the  respect  shown  to  the  emblem  of  the  Red  Cross,  for  strengthening 
the  protection  of  medical  personnel,  whether  military  or  civilian,  as  well  as  for  the 
immunity  of  hospitals.  Furthermore,  they  expressed  the  wish  that  the  civilian 
population  would  not  be  punished  simply  for  having  aided  or  assisted  the  wounded 
"435  and  sick.  as  well  as  refugees. 
Thus,  no  question  of  sovereignty  or  non  -intervention  was  raised  either  implicitly  or 
explicitly. 
2.  The  Governments'  Experts'  View 
The  ICRC,  encouraged  by  the  view  of'its  experts,  and  by  its  experience  in  the  field, 
submitted  a  whole  seven  Articles  dealing  with  all  aspects  of  the  question  of  the  protection 
433 
ICRC-and  League  of  Red  Cross  Societies,  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  266,  pp.  642-643. 
434 
The  LIN  Secretary-General  stated  in  fact  that: 
"It  may  therefore  be  suggested  that  an  additional  provision  be  adopted,  under  which  personnel 
such  as  that  of  the  Red  Cross  carrying  out  medical  and  relief  activities  and  displaying  the 
appropriate  emblem  should  be  protected  from  killing,  Ill  treatment  In  all  circumstances,  and 
given  the  necessary  facilities,  whenever  available,  to  perform  their  mission.  Such  a  provision 
should  also  cover  persons  acting  In  an  individual  capacity  solely  for  the  purpose  of  giving 
medical  aid  and  relief,  provided  their  identity  and  whereabouts  are  made  known  to  all 
participants  to  the  conflict". 
Report  of  the  Secretary-Generat,  UW  Doc  A/8052,  para.  150. 
435 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n-100,  P.  54. 
316 of  the  sick  and  wounded  . 
436  The  ICRC  in  fact,  made  it  clear  that  it  was  important  to  use 
the  same  wording  in  these  provisions  as  in  the  first  protocol,  since  those  provisions  only 
refer  to  purely  humanitarian  aspects,  and  hence  implicitly,  they  do  not  touch  the 
sovereignty  of  States,  and  open  no  way  to  foreign  intervention. 
However,  two  experts  at  least  were  not  happy  with  the  ICRC  approach.  In  their  view, 
%ituations  in  non-  international  armed  conflicts  differed  widely  from  those  in  international 
armed  conflicts  to  the  State  and  the  role  of  the  civilian  population.,  437  Thus,  they  were  not 
opposed  to  the  widening  of  the  protection  of  the  wounded  and  the  sick,  but  the  use  of  the 
same  wording  in  the  two  protocols.  However,  the  majority  were  of  the  opinion  that  the 
same  wording  should  be  adopted  in  the  two  protocols. 
It  is  interesting  that  no-one  questioned  the  validity  of  extensive  protection  for  the 
wounded  and  sick,  which  means  that  humanitarianism  was  the  master  of  the  situation  in  this 
important  field. 
3.  The  Diplomatic  Conference  Attitude 
At  the  Diplomatic  Conference,  the  ICRC  submitted  8  Articles  (11-18)  which  cover, 
essentially,  the  whole  problems  raised  by  the  need  for  effective  protection  of  the  wounded 
and  the  sick  and  the  shipwrecked.  438 
At  the  beginning  of  the  discussions  of  the  ICRC  Articles,  Bothe,  the  West  German 
delegate,  doubted  "whether  the  issue  of  sovereignty  really  arose  with  regard  to  Articles 
dealing  with  the  wounded  and  sick  o439  To  him,  the  ICRC  was  only  fulfilling  a  basic 
humanitarian  need  by  providing  better  protection  for  the  most  unfortunate  and  weakest  of 
victims  of  armed  conflicts.  Hence  he  failed  to  see  how  the  requirements  of  State  sovereignty 
could  be  construed  to  prevent  that.  Sweden  also  pointed  out  that  it. 
"...  [A]ppreciated  the  importance  of  State  sovereignty,  non  -interference  and  so  forth, 
but  believed  that  these  considerations  should  not  prevail  over  the  application  of 
humanitarian  law,  especially  in  cases  involving  the  protection  of  the  wounded  and 
sick.  "440 
These  comments  were  true  to  a  large  extent,  no  State  has,  in  fact,  made  a  statement  to  the 
effect  that  the  extension  of  the  rules  on  the  protection  of  the  wounded  and  sick  can  be  seen 
as  an  infringement  of  State,  or  an  intervention  in  its  internal  affairs.  In  this  context,  Solf 
summarised  correctly  the  situation  vis-h-vis  protection  of  the  wounded  and  the  sick,  at  the 
436 
Thus,  Articles  7-13  deal  respectively  with  Protection  and  Care;  Search;  the  Role  of  the  Population; 
Medical  and  Religious  Personnel;  MedicaL  Establishments  and  Transport;  Evacuation;  and  the  Distinctive 
Emblem.  For  their  content,  see  op.  cit.,  supra  n.  269,  pp.  100-104. 
4370p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  100,  para.  2.359,  p.  100. 
438Articles  11-18  deal  respectively  with  Definitions.  Protection  ard  Care;  Search  and  Evacuation;  Role 
of  the  Civilian  Population;  Protection  of  Medical  and  Religious  Personnel;  GeneraL  Protection  of 
MedicaL  Duties;  Medical  Units  and  Transports;  and  the  Distinctive  Emblem.  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  273, 
pp.  37-38. 
4391, 
ORDCHL  (1974-1977),  Bern  (1978),  CDDH/Il/SR.  21,  para.  38,  p.  207. 
440ibid, 
para.  44.  p.  210.  - 
317 committee  level,  he  noted: 
"Insofar  as  its  [Part  Il  of  Protocol  11  dealing  with  the  wounded  and  sick]  scope  deals 
only  with  the  humanitarian  obligations  to  provide  protection  to  the  wounded,  sick 
and  shipwrecked,  the  committee  believed  that  this  part  does  not  involve  the  political 
n441  problems  of  status  and  sovereignty  which  may  have  been  involved  in  other  parts. 
However,  at  least  one  Article  (Article  16:  General  Protection  of  the  Medical  DutieS),  442 
roused  a  great  deal  of  discussion  at  the  committee  level,  and  the  arguments  of  sovereignty 
and  non-intervention  were  used  extensively. 
Article  16/3  especially,  was  the  focus  of  attack,  since  it  envisages  a  complete  protection 
of  the  medical  personnel  involved  in  the  assistance  to  the  wounded  and  sick.  They  were  not 
obliged  to  report  to  the  parties  to  the  conflict  any  information  that  would  endanger  the  lives 
of  their  patients  or  their  families. 
Canada,  and  the  US  to  a  lesser  extent,  argued  for  the  deletion  of  the  Article,  or  at  least 
its  paragraph  3.  The  former  stressed  that  paragraph  3  'could  be  regarded  as  an  infringement 
9443  of  sovereignty  and  should  be  deleted 
. 
Indonesia  endorsed  Canada's  view,  because  it 
'would  have  difficulty  in  accepting  paragraph  3  of  Article  16,  whose  provisions  were 
,  444 
contrary  to  existing  law  in  Indonesia. 
However,  another  view  was  advocated  by  the  Ukrainian  Soviet  Republic  and  was 
supported  by  Sweden,  Cuba  and  the  USSR.  It  stated  that: 
"...  [Paragraph  3]  had  nothing  to  do  with  sovereignty;  it  was  a  question  of  providing 
protection  to  medical  personnel  in  the  case  of  an  internal  conflict.  T  delete  the 
paragraph  would  seriously  weaken  the  impact  of  the  whole  protocol.  .  4143 
This  divergence  Of  views  led  to  the  creation  of  a  working  group  to  deal  with  paragraph  3, 
which  produced  two  texts  of  the  paragraph. 
The  first  text  stressed  that  medical  personnel  have  full  discretion  concerning  giving 
information  on  the  sick  and  wounded  under  their  care  'except  as  provided  form  in  the  law 
441  W.  A.  SoLf:  Development  of  the  Protection  of  the  Wounded,  Sick  and  Shipwrecked  under  the  Protocol 
Ils  Additional  to  the  1949  Geneva  Conventions,  in  Swinnarski  (ad.  ),  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  1^1, 
p.  239. 
442 
Draft  Articte  16  as  submitted  by  the  ICRC  provides: 
"I.  in  no  circumstances  shatt  any  person  be  punished  for  carrying  out  medical  activities 
compatible  with  professional  ethics,  regardless  of  the  person  benefiting  therefrom. 
2.  Persons  engaged  in  medical  activities  shaU  not  be  compelled  to  perform  acts  or  to  carry 
out  work  contrary  to  rules  of  professional  ethics  or  to  abstain  from  acts  required  by  such 
rules. 
3.  No  persons  engaged  'in  medical  activities  may  be  compelled  to  give  to  any  authority 
information  concerning  the  sick  and  wounded  under  his  care  should  such  information  be  likely 
toproveharmfut  to  thepersons  concernedor  to  their  families.  Compulsory  medical  regulations 
for  the  notification  of  communicable  diseases  shall  however  be  respected.  " 
op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  309,  p.  363. 
4430p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  439,  CDDH/I[/SR.  28,  para.  14,  p.  283. 
4441bid. 
445  This  was  the  statement  made  by  the  Ukrainian  Soviet  Socialist  Republic.  Ibid,  para.  22,  p.  284.  See 
also  ibid,  para.  25,  p.  284  (USSR).  para.  27,  p.  285  (Sweden)  and  para.  30,  p.  285-86  (Cuba). 
318 in  force  prior  to  the  beginning  of  the  conflict'.  This  version  which  attempted  to  be  a 
compromise  between  the  advocates  of  sovereignty  and  humanitarianism  was  not  acceptable 
to  sovereignty  oriented  delegations.  Indonesia  seems  in  fact,  to  state  the  majority  view, 
when  it  stated: 
"It  considered  the  text  a  great  improvement  on  the  ICRC  text,  particularly  since  it 
provided  an  exception  with  respect  to  the  'law  in  force'.  It  feared,  however,  that  the 
phrase  'prior  to  the  beginning  of  the  conflict'  might  constitute  an  interference  with 
the  right  of  a  Government  to  enact  legislation  at  any  time,  even  after  the  outbreak 
of  an  internal  con  fliCt.  "446 
Then  the  working  group  produced  another  version  of  Article  16/3  which  paid  great 
attention  to  the  considerations  of  sovereignty,  since  the  obligation  not  to  give  information 
on  the  sick  and  the  wounded  was  respected  'subject  to  national  law',  which  means  among 
other  things,  that  the  door  is  open  for  Governments  to  enact  laws,  even  after  the  outbreak 
of  internal  conflicts,  to  reduce  that  obligation. 
The  Draft  Article,  as  adopted  at  the  committee  level,  takes  into  account  the  second 
version  of  the  working  group  texts.  No  deletion  or  modification  was  proposed  for  that 
Article  in  the  simplified  version.  In  the  final  Protocol  11,  it  became  Article  10,  and  it 
provides  that: 
"I.  Under  no  circumstances  shall  any  person  be  punished  for  having  carried  out 
medical  activities  compatible  with  medical  ethics,  regardless  of  the  person  benefiting 
therefrom. 
2.  Persons  engaged  in  medical  activities  shall  neither  be  compelled  to  refrain  from 
acts  required  by  the  rules  of  medical  ethics  or  other  rules  designed  for  the  benefit 
of  the  wounded  and  sick,  in  this  protocol. 
3.  The  provisional  obligations  of  persons  engaged  in  medical  activities  regarding 
information  which  they  may  acquire  concerning  the  wounded  and  sick  under  their 
care  shall,  subject  to  national  law,  be  respected. 
4.  Subject  to  national  law,  no  person  engaged  in  medical  activities  may  be  penalised 
in  any  way  for  refusing  or  failing  to  give  informalion  concerning  the  wounded  and 
"4  7,  sick  who  are,  or  who  have  been,  under  his  care. 
However,  it  must  be  noted  that  two  important  Articles,  12  bis  and  14,  have  been  deleted 
in  the  simplified  version  of  Protocol  11  submitted  by  Pakistan.  The  first  concerns  the 
protection  of  persons  in  their  mental  and  health  integrity.  Thus,  it  prohibits  physical 
mutilation,  medical  experiments  or  removal  of  organs  for  transplantation  (this  Article  was 
not  proposed  by  the  ICRC;  it  had  been  Drafted  at  the  committee  level).  448  The  second, 
4461bid, 
CDDH/II/SR.  39,  para.  33,  pp.  424-425. 
4470P. 
cit..  supra.  n.  309,  p.  402. 
44BArticte 
12  bis  as  Drafted  ard  adopted  by  Committee  11  which  stipulates: 
"I.  The  physical  or  mental  health  and  integrity  of  persons  who  are  Interned,  detained  or 
Otherwise  deprived  of  Liberty,  by  any  of  the  parties  to  an  armed  conf  Lict  for  reasons  relating 
to  that  conflict,  shatt  not  be  endangered  by  any  unjustified  act  or  omission.  Accordingly,  it 
Is  prohibited  to  subject  the  persons  described  in  this  Article  to  any  medical  procedure  which 
is  not  Indicated  by  the  State  of  health  of  the  person  concerned,  and  which  is  not  consistent 
With  the  generally  accepted  medical  standards  applied  to  free  persons  under  similar  medical 
319 which  deals  with  the  role  of  the  civilian  population,  concerns  their  assistance  to  the  sick  and 
wounded. 
But,  it  seems  that  their  essentials  and  spirit  can  be  found  in  other  Articles  of  Protocol  11. 
Thus,  on  one  hand,  it  is  argued  that  the  spirit  of  Article  12  bis  is  found  in  Article  511  (e). 
449  Indeed,  such  was  the  intention  of  the  Pakistani  delegate.  On  the  other  hand,  civilians  are 
protected  by  virtue  of  Article  18/2  which  provides  that: 
"The  civilian  population  may,  even  on  its  own  initiative,  offer  to  collect  and  care  for 
the  wounded,  sick  and  shipwrecked.  "450 
Moreover,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  ICRC  has  proposed  a  very  important  Article 
(Draft  Article  11)  concerning  definitions  of  the  terms  'sick'  'wounded'  and  'shipwrecked'. 
At  the  committee  level,  some  delegations  voiced  their  opposition  to  the  inclusion  of  such 
definitions,  because  they  feared  that  the  complex  sets  of  such  definitions  might  make 
Protocol  11  difficult  to  read  and  understand  . 
45  1  The  UK  representative  even  suggested  that: 
"There  was  also  a  psychological  consideration:  rebel  leaders  might  be  discouraged 
from  observing  the  protocol  if  their  first  glimpsS  of  it  was  a  lengthy  list  of  technical 
definitions  of  apparently  commonplace  terms.  *4  2 
However,  the  majority  of  States  at  the  committee  level  were  of  different  opinion.  They 
supported  the  inclusion  of  such  definitions,  which  led  the  committee  to  adopt  Draft  Article 
11.453 
But,  in  the  simplified  version  of  Protocol  11,  Article  II  was  deleted,  the  reason  being  the 
simplification  of  Protocol  11  in  order  to  make  it  effective.  The  ICRC  commentary  on  the 
two  protocols,  suggests  that  the  definitions  used  in  Protocol  I  (Article  8),  although  not 
binding  in  Protocol  IT,  'nevertheless  constitute  a  guide  for  the  interpretation  of  the 
,  454  terms. 
circumstances. 
2.  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  paragraph  1,  It  is,  In  particular,  prohibited  to  carry  out  on 
such  persons,  even  with  their  consent: 
(a)  physical  mutilations; 
(b)  medical  or  scientific  experiments; 
(c)  removal  of  tissue  or  organs  for  transplantation.  " 
Ibid,  p.  320. 
449See  his  comment  on  introducing  his  proposal  for  the  deletion  of  Article  12  b1s.  Ibid,  p.  320. 
4501bid, 
p.  601. 
45112  ORDCHL  (1974-1977),  Federal.  Political  Dept,  Bern  1978,  CDDH/II/SR.  79,  pare.  18,  p.  260. 
4521bfd, 
para.  32,  p.  262. 
453For  the  text  of  this  very  tong  Article  see:  13  ORDCHL  (1974-1977),  FederaL  Political  Dept,  Bern, 
1978,  CDDH/406/Rev.  1,  pp.  421-422. 
454  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  297,  p.  1405.  At  least  the  US  seems  to  support  such  a  course  of  action,  since 
it  expressed  its  understanding  was  that: 
"It  is  the  understanding  of  the  United  States  of  America  that  the  terms  used  in  Part  III  of 
this  protocol  1111  which  are  the  same  as  the  terms  defined  in  Article  8  of  Protocol  III  shat  L 
so  far  as  relevant  be  construed  in  the  same  sense  as  those  definitions". 
320 The  general  impression,  however,  is  that  many  important  rules  have  been  adopted 
concerning  the  protection  of  the  wounded  and  the  sick.  They  indeed  fill  the  loopholes  and 
gaps  which  practice  has  shown.  The  rules  adopted  afford  protection  to  the  sick,  wounded 
and  shipwrecked,  and  also  protection  for  those  who  assist  them,  either  medical,  religious 
or  civilian  personnel;  and  lastly  protection  for  the  material  means  necessary  for  the  real 
protection  of  this  category  of  victims  of  internal  conflicts.  These  rules  may  be  summarised 
as  follows: 
1.  The  wounded,  sick  and  shipwrecked  are  to  be  collected,  searched  for  and  cared  for, 
whatever  they  may  be,  insurgents,  soldiers  of  the  Government,  civilians  or  military.  No 
discrimination  on  whatever  ground  can  be  resorted  to. 
2.  Medical  and  religious  personnel  have  full  protection,  when  engaging  in  their  assistance 
and  caring  of  the  wounded,  sick  and  shipwrecked.  It  is  no  longer  a  crime  to  do  so.  The 
parties  are  under  strict  obligation  to  grant  all  the  means  available  for  those  personnel  in 
order  that  their  task  is  fulfilled  properly. 
3.  Medical  units  such  as  hospitals,  and  means  of  transport  whatever  their  nature,  cannot 
be  the  object  of  attack,  unless  they  have  deviated  from  their  humanitarian  mission. 
4.  The  distinctive  emblem  of  the  Red  Cross,  Red  Crescent  or  Red  Lion  and  Sun  has  to 
be  displayed  by  medical  and  religious  personnel  and  medical  units  and  transport.  It  must 
be  respected. 
These  are  essential  rules  for  any  effective  protection  of  the  sick,  wounded  and 
shipwrecked.  They  constitute  in  fact  a  real  development  of  Article  3  of  the  Geneva 
Conventions.  In  general,  there  was  a  wide  consensus  that  they  must  be  respected,  since 
they  are  far  from  touching  any  questions  of  sovereignty  or  intervention.  They  are  purely 
humanitarian  rules,  which  all  cultures  and  religions  of  the  world  accept.  This  explains  in 
part  why  Pakistan,  in  its  simplified  version,  did  not  basically  operate  fundamental  changes 
of  what  was  accepted  at  the  committee  level. 
F.  The  Practice  after  the  Adoption  of  the  Two  Protocol  Ils  vis-i-vis  the  Protection  of  the 
Victims  of  Internal  Wars 
Although  no  State  experiencing  an  internal  conflict  has  yet  recognised  the  application  of 
455  Protocol  11,  except  may  be  El  Salvador,  it  seems  to  me  very  interesting  to  review  the  State 
practice  after  the  adoption  of  Protocol  IT,  in  order  to  see  whether  its  innovation's  concerning 
the  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars  has,  at  least  indirectly,  influenced  the  conduct 
of  such  conflicts.  By  the  same  token,  we  intend  to  show  whether  the  rules  adopted  in 
Protocol  IT  can  stand  a  good  chance  of  application  or  not. 
1.  The  Practice  In  Relation  to  the  Protection  of  Civilians 
It  seems  that  the  civilian  population  is  still  by  and  large  the  main  victim  of  internal 
conflicts.  All  its  horrors  still  fall  on  them.  The  practice  supports  such  a  contention  in  a  very 
clear  way. 
Op.  cft.,  supra  n.  439,  p.  240. 
455 
At  teast  the  ICRC  seems  to  support  this  view.  See  The  ICRC  WorLdwide,  1988,  p.  11. 
321 1.1.  El  Salvador 
In  El  Salvador  it  seems  that  the  civilians  had  in  many  instances  become  a  military  target 
themselves.  Ground  and  air  forces  are  involved  in  such  practices,  especially  in  the  areas 
suspected  to  harbour  insurgents.  Thus,  the  Commission  of  the  Church  on  International 
Affairs  stated  that: 
"...  [W]e  can  no  longer  speak  of  the  mere  violation  of  human  rights  in  El  Salvador.  The 
statistics  prove  that  in  quantitative  and  qualitative  terms  I 
6pol 
icy  of  systematic 
extermination  has  been  designed  and  is  constantly  updated.  " 
In  a  report  of  a  fact-finding  mission  to  El  Salvador  led  by  two  members  of  the  US 
Congress,  it  is  alleged  that  'El  Salvador  is  engaged  in  a  civil  war  but  more  people  die  by 
murder  than  in  combat.  '457 
Besides,  the  New  York  Tribunal  on  Central  America  and  the  Caribbean  emphasized  that 
attacks  against  civilian  targets  are  an  almost  inevitable  component  of  a  military 
,  458  campaign  ,  and  then  it  adds: 
"That  is  a  large  part  of  what  military  counterinsurgency  strategy  in  El  Salvador  is 
about:  air  attacks  and  ground  troop  sweeps  through  'contested  areas,  areas  where 
Government  control  is  not  secure;  attacking  villages,  destroying  homes,  burning 
crops,  massacring  civilians,  and  tearing  apart  the  social  fabric,  causing  people  to  leave 
their  villages  and  run  for  their  lives,  fleeing  through  the  mountains  and  the  jungle 
for  months  without  food  or  medicine  until  they  are  prostrate,  until  they  give  up 
running  and  turn  themselves  in  to  the  apthorities  and  live  as  refugees  in  the 
relocation  centers  run  by  the  Government.  n459 
Similarly,  it  was  reported  that: 
"It  is  now  plain  that  the  Salvadoran  armed  forces  are  attempting  to  win  the  war  by 
forcing  out  of  zones  controlled  by  the  guerrillas.  Apparently  the  purpose  is  to  deprive 
the  guerrillas  of  access  to  the  civilian  population  from  which  they  may  obtain  food 
"460  and  other  necessities. 
Moreover,  The  American  Watch  and  the  Lawyers  Committee  for  International  Human 
Rights  in  El  Salvador  arrived  at  the  same  conclusion.  It  revealed  that: 
"The  evidence  we  have  gathered  makes  it  clear  to  us  that  the  armed  forces  of  El 
Salvador,  ground  and  air,  are  engaged  in  indiscriminate  attacks  upon  the  civilian 
population  on  conflict  zones,  particularly  in  guerrilla  controlled  conflict  zones  of  El 
456 
Commission  of  the  Church  on  International  Affairs,  Jan.  1981,  Background  Information,  EL  Salvador: 
One  Year  of  Repression,  p.  28. 
457 
J.  Jeffords,  S.  Richardson,  J.  Oberstar  CUS  Representatives):  Report  of  a  Fact-Finding  Mission 
Sponsored  by  the  Unitarian  Universalist  Service  Committee,  p.  3. 
458 
P.  Ramshaw  and  T.  Steers  Ceds.  ):  Intervention  on  Trial:  The  New  York  Crimes  Tribunal  on  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean.  Praeger,  New  York,  Westport,  Connecticut,  London,  1984,  p.  17. 
459  Wd,  p.  18. 
460 
An  American  Watch  Report:  Draining  the  Sea,  6th  Supplement  to  the  Report  on  Human  Rights  in  El 
Salvador,  March  1985,  p.  l. 
322 "461  Salvador. 
It  seems  that  the  military  view  the  civilians  living  in  zones  under  guerrilla  control  as  fair 
game.  Thus,  according  to  Col.  J.  Adalberto  Cruz  Reyes,  Commander  of  the  Garrison  in  San 
Francisco  Gotera,  Morazan,  when  the  FLMN  (the  insurgents)  is  present,  civilians'who  don't 
want  to  cooperate  leave  the  area,  and  those  who  remain  are  collaborating'462  which  means 
that  bombings  of  civilianS463  and  the  use  of  prohibited  weapons  were  used  extensively 
against  civilians.  In  the  latter  case,  the  air  force  commander  stated  expressly  that  'before 
the  US  started  helping  us,  we  had  to  use  napalm,  because  we  did  not  have  any  other 
equipment'.  464 
Resort  to  aerial  bombardments  of  civilians  in  particular  has  been,  it  must  be  stressed, 
criticised  even  by  the  Americans  who  by  their  assistance  have  made  the  Salvadoran  air  force 
the  most  powerful  air  force  in  Central  America.  Thus,  a  classified  report  by  the  US  Defence 
Advisory  Panel  reportedly  criticised  those  air  forces.  Retired  Major  General  John  Singlamb, 
the  panel's  head,  emphasised  in  an  interview  thatdropping  500  pound  bombs  on  insurgents 
is  not  the  way  to  go,  '465  and  added  'there  is  a  tendency  to  escalate  to  a  higher  level  of 
,  466  violence  than  is  appropriate. 
However,  the  bombing  tactics  have  placed  the  Government  in  a  very  uncomfortable 
position,  which  led  the  President  (Duarte)  to  issue  a  set  of  guidelines  for  air  force  pilots. 
The  Directive  C.  1  11.03.1984,  permits  aerial  attacks  only  on  mobile  guerrilla  forces,  which 
are:  (1)  actually  engaged  in  fighting  with  Government  troops;  (2)  attacking  a  Government 
installation;  or  (3)  moving  supplies  or  personnel. 
467 
In  practice,  the  military,  in  order  to  give  lip  service  to  the  presidential  directive,  have 
resorted  to  what  they  call  'softening  up  bombardments'  (bombardo  de  ablan  damiento)468 
which  are  aimed  at  moving  the  guerrillas  from  areas  where  it  is  supposed  that  they  have 
contact. 
461 
J-W.  Hopkins  (ad.  ):  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  Contemporary  Record.  Vol.  3,1983-84,  HoLms  & 
Heir,  New  York  and  London,  1985,  p.  526. 
462 
Ibid. 
463 
In  this  regard,  see  Christian  Science  monitor  of  March  26th,  1984,  p.  1  and  32. 
464 
OP.  cit.,  supra.  n.  457,  p.  4. 
465 
OP.  cit.,  supra.  n.  461,  p.  526. 
466 
Ibid. 
467 
For  the  actual.  text  of  the  Directive,  see  op.  cit.,  supra  n.  460,  pp.  29-30. 
468 
As  an  exampte  of  such  exercise,  the  Press  Office  of  the  Satvadoran  Armed  Forces  (COPREFA)  made  some 
statements  which  were  reported  by  the  Satvadoran  press.  It  is  asserted  that: 
"The  armed  forces  reported  that  artittery  units  are  participants  in  efforts  to  soften  the 
position  of  the  FKLN  in  the  hitts  of  San  Pedro  and  La  Camparra  In  the  Canton  La  Joya  (San 
Vicente),  white  ptanes  and  heticopters  of  the  air  force  are  providing  reconnaissance, 
observation  and  sometimes  bombing  services...  The  armed  forces  count  on  the  support  of  the 
artittery  and  whenever  they  deem  it  convenient,  that  of  aviation,  in  order  to  soften  the 
positions  of  the  guerritteros". 
lbid,  pp.  27-28. 
323 However,  even  the  Americans  claim  that  such  groupings  and  fixed  rebel  installations  are 
469  Opractically  non-existent',  which  means  that  the  civilians  are  the  main  victims  in  the  end 
of  such  tactics. 
The  terror  tactics  of  the  military  have  resulted,  according  to  a  US  Senate  staff  report,  in 
there  being  currently  about  half  a  million  internally  displaced  persons  in  El  Salvador.  In 
addition,  there  are  estimated  to  be  another  quarter  million  either  in  refugee  camps  in 
Honduras,  Nicaragua  or  Costa  Rica,  or  in  Mexico.  Approximately  half  a  million  more  are 
believed  to  have  fled  to  the  US.  These  figures  represent  25%  of  El  Salvador's  total 
470  population. 
Moreover,  the  International  Commission  of  Jurists  estimated  in  December  1986  that 
700,000  Salvadorans  had  fled  the  countryside  to  the  cities,  another  700,000  have  taken 
refuge  in  other  States.  It  also  stated  that  human  rights  violations  which  spring  from  the 
conflict  itself,  including  massacres  in  rural  areas  to  indiscriminate  bombings  and  death 
squad  killings,  have  resulted  in  the  killing  of  more  than  40,000  persons.  All  this  in  a 
471  population  of  not  more  than  5  million. 
Furthermore,  the  guerrillas  also  are  accused  of  some  serious  human  rights  violations. 
Thus,  during  1985  the  Justice  and  Peace  Commission  of  the  Archbishop  reported  173  cases 
of  persons  killed,  disappeared  or  kidnapped  by  the  guerrillas.  It  was  the  highest  number 
ever  recorded  since  the  start  of  the  civil  war.  472  However,  many  of  the  deaths  attributed 
to  the  insurgents  are  due  to  land  mines  laid  without  proper  precautions  to  protect  guerrilla 
controlled  territories.  473 
The  overall  impression  is  that  the  provisions  concerning  the  protection  of  civilians  are  not 
respected,  especially  by  Government  forces.  Attacks,  displacements,  harassments  and 
killings  are  widely  reported. 
The  Government  has  tried  in  vain  to  mitigate  the  sufferings  of  the  civilian  population  by 
introducing  guidelines  to  action,  especially  of  the  air  force.  However,  the  military  in  the 
field  do  not  seem  to  be  disposed  to  apply  them.  In  their  view,  anyone  living  in  an  area 
suspected  of  harbouring  the  guerrillas  must  bear  the  responsibility  for  the  actions  of  the 
insurgents.  Legal  restraint  seems  to  play  no  significant  role  in  their  decisions  and  acts. 
1.2.  Nicaragua 
In  the  context  of  the  Nicaraguan  civil  war,  two  important  issues  of  humanitarian  law  arise. 
First,  the  attacks  of  the  insurgents  of  essential  objects  of  living  of  the  civilians.  Secondly 
the  question  of  forced  relocation  of  the  Miskito  Indians. 
As  to  the  first  issue,  there  is  enough  evidence  to  the  effect  that  the  insurgents  seem  to  see 
469  Cited  by  R.  Weiner:  The  Agony  and  the  Exodus:  Reporting  Salvadorfans  in  Viotatfon  of  the  Fourth 
Geneva  Convention".  18  NYUJILP.  1986,  p.  721. 
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324 civilians  and  civilian  objects  as  a  legitimate  object  of  attack.  In  this  context,  the  New  York 
Tribunal  on  Central  America  and  the  Caribbean  revealed  that: 
"The  Contras  have  conducted  a  campaign  of  terror  against  the  civilian  population  of 
Nicaragua.  The  Contras  pick  out  teachers,  health  workers  and  religious  leaders  as 
special  targets  of  their  terr 
.?. 
rist  attacks.  Some  they  kidnap,  torture  and  Tape,  some 
they  murder  and  mutilate.  "  74 
It  added: 
"Over  sevenýfive  hundred  Nicaraguans  have  been  killed,  wounded  or 
disappeared.  " 
The  Contras  also  concentrated  their  attacks: 
"...  [O]n  schools,  clinics,  grain  storage  facilities,  and  agricultural  cooperatives.  In 
addition  they  attack  targets  important  to  the  country's  economy,  such  as  major 
bridges  and  the  fuel  storage  facilities.  These  att;,  $ks  have  disrupted  agricultural 
production  and  exacerbated  hardship  and  hunger.  "4  6 
As  an  example  of  the  Contras'  behaviour,  it  was  reported  that  in  the  village  of  Abisinia 
residents  watched  the  burning  of  40  houses,  the  cooperative  store,  the  community  kitchen, 
the  educational  ministry  building  etc.  After  that,  the  Contras  gathered  people  and  their 
Leader  said: 
"They  [the  civilians]  should  leave  here  or  they  could  come  back  and  do  worse  thin  M' 
he  said  even  if  they  rebuilt  Abisinia  100  times  they  could  destroy  it  100  times..  4 
Similarly,  it  was  reported  that  in  the  northwestern  mountain  areas  in  Nicaragua,  the  FDN 
(Frente  Democratico  Nicaraguense)  has  engaged  repeatedly  in  kidnappings,  torture  and 
murder  of  unarmed  civilians,  mostly  in  villages  or  farm  cooperatives.  Peasants  have  also 
complained  of  mortar  shelling  by  FDN  forces  against  villages  and  on  cooperatives  that  have 
resulted  in  the  destruction  of  property  and  the  death  of  civilians.  478  Likewise,  it  was  stated 
that: 
"In  combination,  the  Contra  forces  have  systematically  violated  the  applicable  laws 
of  war  throughout  the  conflict.  They  have  attacked  the  civilians  indiscriminately. 
They  have  tortured  and  mutilated  prisoners.  They  have  murdered  those  placed  hors 
de  combat  by  their  wounds.  They  have  taken  hostages;  and  they  have  committed 
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325  , outrages  against  personal  dignity.  "479 
A  clear  conclusion  could  be  deduced  from  the  above:  'Violations  of  non-combatants' 
protection  under  the  laws  of  war  have  been  committed  by  all  Contra  groups,  evidently  as 
a  matter  of  policy  since  1980  and  continue  to  the  present.,  480 
On  the  second  question  of  the  relocation  of  the  Miskito  Indians,  the  matter  seems 
interesting,  since  the  case  of  such  relocations  was  taken  to  the  Inter-American  Commission 
of  Human  Rights.  It  illustrates  clearly  how  in  the  context  of  a  civil  war  the  instruments  of 
human  rights  may  play  a  useful  role  in  diminishing  the  sufferings  of  the  civilian  population. 
The  Miskito  population  as  a  whole  is  roughly  70,000.  When  the  counter-revolutionary 
activity  began  the  Government  decided  to  relocate  some  8,000  civilians  who  lived  in  the  Rio 
Coco.  The  evacuation  began  in  1982.  It  is  alleged  that  the  Government  resorted  to  burning 
houses  and  livestock  in  order  lo  move  the  population  quickly.  The  rationale  behind  the 
Government  decision  was  that: 
"...  [Tlhe  resettlement  will  safeguard  the  Miskito  population  from  attacks  of  counter- 
revolutionary  bands,  and  ensures  protection  of  their  principal  human  right:  the  right 
"481  to  life  and  the  right  to  work  in  peace. 
However,  the  plan  was  envisaged  to  be  voluntary,  but  circumstances  changed,  mainly 
because  of  the  military  situation,  which  led  the  Junta,  in  the  words  of  Commander 
Campbell,  to: 
"...  [D]eclare  this  strip  [of  Rio  Coco]  territory  of  a  high  security  military  zone,  and 
proceed  to  reinforce  detachment.  This  situation  meant  that  the  civilian  population  was 
trapped  between  military  forces.  9482 
In  other  words,  it  was  imperative  military  reasons  and  the  safety  of  the  population  itself 
which  was  the  reason  behind  the  Government  decision  to  relocate  the  Miskito  Indians. 
Nevertheless,  it  seems  that  the  Government  assessment  of  the  situation  was  right.  Thus,  an 
American  Watch  Report  considered  that: 
"...  [U]nder  these  circumstances,  we  cannot  conclude  that  the  decision  to  evacuate 
these  villages  was  not  justified  by  the  military  need  to  defend  borders  and  facilities 
against  attack".  483 
Then  it  concluded  that: 
"Our  opinion  on  this  matter  [of  relocation]  is  consistent  with  what  we  stated  about  the 
first  evacuation  in  our  report  of  May  1982.  We  believe  it  is  also  consistent  with  the 
479An  American  Watch  Report:  Violations  of  the  Laws  of  War  by  both  Sides  in  Nicaragua,  1981-1985,  R.  K. 
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326 "484  standards  of  the  international  convention  on  the  law  of  war. 
The  Inter-American  Commission  on  Human  Rights  also  approved  the  contention  of  the 
Government  that  there  was  indeed  a  genuine  case  of  emergency,  since  the  security  of  the 
State  was  threatened.  However,  it  found  that  many  violations  of  human  rights  had  been 
committed,  many  Miskitos  being  illegally  detained  under  vague  accusations  of  counter- 
revolutionary  activities,  and  that  many  persons  had  been  illegally  killed.  4115 
The  Commission  in  fact  stressed  that  even  if  the  Government  had  a  right  to  relocate  the 
Miskitos  due  to  the  military  situation,  it  emphasised  that  in  accordance  with  Article  27/1 
of  the  American  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  the  measures  should  be  adopted  for  'a 
,  486  period  of  time  strictly  required  by  the  exigencies  of  the  situation  . 
The  Commission  then  indicated  that: 
"The  Government  should  expressly  declare  that  the  Tsba  Pri  project  [which  envisaged 
the  relocation  of  the  Miskitos]  may  only  be  carried  out  with  the  Miskitos  who 
voluntarily  choose  to  remain  there,  and  in  addition,  should  declare  that  it  will  assist 
in  resettling  other  Miskitos  who  wish  to  return  to  the  Coco  region,  which  entails 
granting  them  adequate  compensation  for  the  loss  of  their  property.  "487 
On  the  question  whether  the  relocation  process  was  discriminatory  because  it  was  aimed  at 
a  specific  ethnic  minority,  the  Commission  observed: 
"In  this  case,  the  commission  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  relocation  for  military  reasons 
was  not  carried  out  in  discriminatory  fashion,  but  if  the  Miskitos  are  not  helped  to 
return  to  the  Coco  river  region  once  the  military  emergency  is  over,  their  prolonged 
"488  stay  in  Tasba  Pri  will  become  a  form  of  discriminatory  punishment. 
However,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  in  a  note  dated  15th  June,  1982,  addressed  by  the 
Nicaraguan  Government  to  the  Commission,  the  former  stated  that: 
"When  the  danger  on  the  border  is  over  those  who  wish  to  return  to  their  places  of 
origin  may  do  so,  and  the  Government  of  Nicaragua  has  surpassed  the  adequate 
compensation  suggested  by  giving  these  Nicaraguan  citizens  land  homes,  seeds, 
"48V  fertilizers  and  farm  tools,  and  medical  attention  without  charge. 
Moreover,  the  ICRC  Worldwide  1986  observes  that: 
4841bid. 
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327 "These  people  [Miskitos]  who  had  been  displaced  in  1981  because  of  the  conflict  had 
returned  to  their  homes  near  the  Honduran  border,  but  were  completely  destitute".  490 
This  means  that  many  promises  were  not  kept.  Nevertheless,  there  is  tangible  evidence  that 
the  Government  has  done  its  best  to  improve  its  relations  with  the  Miskito  population. 
Thus,  certain  officials  who  were  involved  in  the  violations  of  human  rights  were  dismissed 
and  replaced.  Also  on  I  December  1983  the  Government  issued  Decree  No.  1352,  granting 
amnesty  to  all  Miskitos  who  had  been  accused  of  violent  activities  taking  place  after 
December  I  st,  198  1;  and  in  its  Decree  No.  1353  of  December  4th,  1983,  all  Nicaraguans  (not 
limited  therefore  to  Miskitos)  who  had  left  the  country  were  offered  the  opportunity  to 
return  without  fear  of  prosecution,  whether  they  had  actively  participated  in  'counter- 
revolutionary'  activities  or  not.  491 
This  case  shows  clearly  how  an  approach  based  on  human  rights  law  may  very  well,  and 
indeed  can,  solve  real  problems  of  humanitarian  law,  in  this  case  the  question  of  relocation 
and  displacements  which  are  dealt  with  in  Article  17  of  Protocol  IL 
The  Commission  argued  the  problem  on  the  basis  of  the  right  of  residence  and  movement, 
and  the  suspension  of  guarantees  during  the  State  of  emergency.  The  Commission  did  not 
refer  at  all  to  Protocol  11,  which  is  understandable  since  Nicaragua  has  not  indicated  its 
acceptance.  The  Government  in  fact  chose  an  approach  based  on  human  rights,  which 
means  that  it  accepts  wholeheartedly  human  rights  as  a  limitation  on  its  sovereignty. 
An  approach  based  on  human  rights  is  preferred  in  this  case  by  the  Government  because 
it  does  not  involve  either  directly  or  indirectly,  the  implication  of  recognising  the  insurgents 
or  giving  them  any  legal  status.  In  fact  its  claim  to  be  the  sole  legitimate  and  legal  authority 
within  the  State  is  preserved. 
1.3.  Other  Cases 
The  Practice  after  the  adoption  of  Protocol  11  offers  many  instances  in  ongoing  civil  wars 
that  civilians  were  simply  considered  as  a  lawful  object  of  attack.  This  is  due  in  my 
opinion,  mainly  to  two  reasons.  Either  because  the  weapons  or  the  methods  of  war  are 
indiscriminate  in  their  effects,  or  it  is  a  deliberate  attempt  to  break  the  will  and  morale  of 
the  civilians  in  order  to  force  the  Government  to  negotiate. 
In  Angola  and  Mozambique,  the  insurgents,  respectively  UNITA  and  RENAMO 
especially,  lead  a  terrible  war  against  civilians.  The  latter  become  the  first  target  of  attack 
and  military  objectives  are  in  second  place. 
Thus,  as  concerns  Angola  it  is  reported  that: 
"The  most  disturbing  aspect  of  UNITA's  campaign  ... 
is  the  degree  to  which  it 
increasingly  resembles  the  brutal  st%tegy  employed  by  RENAMO  in  Mozambique, 
with  similarly  devastating  effectS.  "49 
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328 Angola  in  fact,  has  become  the  home  of  the  largest  number  of  amputees  in  the  world.  It  is 
estimated  that  20,000  civilians  have  lost  arms,  legs  or  both.  493  Moreover,  clinics,  schools, 
grain  storage  facilities  and  other  infrastructure  essential  to  a  functioning  rural  life  have 
been  systematically  destroyed  by  the  insurgents.  Land  mines  laid  along  fields  and  roads  have 
made  cultivation  impossible  in  very  large  areas  of  the  country,  which  led  to  a  massive 
displacement  of  civilians.  Their  number  is  estimated  to  be,  as  a  minimum,  between  600,000 
494  and  700,000  persons. 
Furthermore,  the  insurgents  in  Angola  are  using  terror  tactics  against  the  civilians,  in 
contravention  of  the  spirit  and  the  letter  either  of  Protocol  11  or  Article  3,  or  indeed  any 
legal  or  humanitarian  standard. 
In  Mozambique  the  situation  is  worse.  Renamo,  the  insurgents  organisation,  has  been  said 
by  Chester  Crocker,  the  top  US  State  Department  specialist  on  Africa,  to  be  'the  creation 
495  of  alien  forces"  and  a  'largely  destructive  army  with  little  homegrown  legitimacy'. 
Thus,  in  a  Government  assessment  of  the  situation  in  early  1988  it  is  revealed  that  in 
addition  to  the  destruction  of  roads,  railways  and  bridges,  the  insurgents  destroyed  1800 
health  centres,  720  schools,  900  rural  shops,  1300  lorries  and  44  agricultural  enterprises, 
496  including  major  tea  and  sugar  factories. 
In  addition,  there  is  strong  evidence  that  rebels  operate  slave  labour  camps.  In  this 
context,  it  was  reported  that  rebels  hold  tens  of  thousands  of  peasants  in  slave  labour  camps, 
which  operate  as  supply  bases  for  therebels.  It  was  stated  that: 
"The  existence  of  the  camps,  ea  containing  as  many  as  3000  prisoners,  has  been  'Y' 
reported  by  escaping  inmates".  49 
It  is  estimated  that  by  the  beginning  of  1988  a  total  of  5,000,000  subsistence  farmers  had 
been  forced  from  their  lands;  rebels  slaughtered  livestock,  burned  grain  stocks  and  even 
blocked  springs  and  wells,  sometimes  with  corpses.  498 
Moreover,  Bob  Geldof,  who  visited  Mozambique,  was  reported  as  saying  that  'the  right- 
wing  Renamo  forces  have  terrorised  the  economy,  attacking  mainly  civilian  targets.  '499  He 
revealed  that: 
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329 *...  [Ilf  a  town  is  dependent  on  a  sugar  refinery  they  will  blow  that  u  They  I 
specifically  go  in  and  kill  huge  numbers  of  people  in  the  most  brutal  way.. 
360 
He  concluded  by  stating  that  the  rebels  'think  it  out  in  a  very  clear-cut  way  how  to 
brutalise  and  terrorise  a  people  and  render  the  economy  a  shambles.  '501 
However,  the  tragedy  of  Homoine  village,  which  occurred  in  July  1987,  in  fact,  revealed 
beyond  any  doubt  the  tactics  of  Renamo.  According  to  official  figures  386  people  were 
killed  within  5  hours.  The  majority  were  civilians.  The  attackers,  according  to  eye 
witnesses,  went  from  'straw  hut  to  straw  hut,  kicking  and  killing  people  inside.,  502  They 
also  opened  fire  on  patients  of  the  local  hospital  and  on  women  and  children  who  had 
sought  refuge  there  when  the  shooting  started.  Following  the  massacre  3,000  people  fled 
from  the  town  in  fear.  503 
It  seems  that  in  Angola,  and  especially  in  Mozambique,  the  insurgents  respect  no 
restraints  whatsoever.  They  conduct  a  viciously  bloody  war  against  the  entire  population 
with  no  respect  for  basic  humanitarian  norms.  This  makes  any  attempt  to  apply 
humanitarian  law  unlikely,  since  Governments  in  power  view  these  organisations  as  bands 
of  criminals  financed  and  directed  by  outsiders,  specifically  South  Africa. 
In  Afghanistan,  it  seems  that  the  massacre  of  civilians  has  attained  record  levels. 
According  to  the  Bibliotheca  Afghanica  (a  research  institute  in  Switzerland)  one  million 
Afghan  civilians  are  believed  to  have  died  in  the  war  so  far.  Moreover,  some  80,000 
guerrilla  and  15,000  to  20,000  Soviet  troops  are  believed  to  have  been  killed.  504  Thus,  the 
proportion  of  civilian  deaths  is  immensely  higher.  According  to  one  source,  the  cause  of 
such  huge  numbers  of  victims  is  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that: 
"Moscow  and  Kabul's  policy  of  so-called  "migratory  genocide'-  massacres,  bombing 
of  villages  and  destruction  of  crops  has  created  the  world's  largest  refugee  population. 
Some  5  million  Afghans,  from  a  pre-war  population  of  15  to  17  million  have  fled  the 
country.  "505 
Similarly,  in  a  report  for  preseniation  to  the  UNCHR,  it  is  alleged  that  the  Afghan 
Government  forces  and  'foreign  forces'  were  waging  a  campaign  of  'systematic  brutality 
against  the  rural  civilian  population  as  a  scorched  earth  policy  was  radically  altering  the 
country's  demographic  structure.,  506 
Moreover,  in  another  report,  it  was  revealed  with  concrete  examples  the  tactics  used  by 
the  Government  and  its  Soviet  allies  in  conducting  the  war.  It  is  alleged  that  they  have 
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330 resorted  to  indiscriminate  bombings,  reprisal  killings  and  massacres,  summary  executions 
and  random  killings,  killing  of  farmers,  destruction  of  food  supplies,  destruction  of 
irrigation  works,  arrest,  forced  conscription,  torture  and  the  use  of  anti-personel  mineS.  507 
It  must  be  indicated  that  the  Government  forces  are  not  alone  in  committing  horrible  acts 
against  the  civilians.  The  insurgents  frequently  attack  civilian  targets,  especially  in  the 
cities.  508  Finally,  a  report  prepared  to  the  UNCHR  in  1988  seems  to  suggest  that  there  is 
'some  improvement  in  the  human  rights  situation'509  '-  and  then  added  that  'serious 
contraventions  of  humanitarian  law  and  human  rights  had  taken  place  in  combat  areas. 
In  Lebanon,  a  report  published  by  the  Government  on  Ist  October,  1987  estimated  the 
total  number  of  people  killed  as  a  result  of  12  years  of  civil  war  as  130,000  with  14,000 
kidnaps  being  reported.  The  situation  in  Lebanon  is  unique.  The  Government  is  helpless  in 
the  face  of  warring  factions  occupying  different  parts  of  the  country,  together  with  Syria 
and  Israel.  Fighting  is  endless;  civilians  are  caught  in  the  middle  and  they  are  the  greatest 
victims. 
Thus,  in  the  war  of  camps  between  Amal  organisation  and  the  Palestinians,  the  former 
held  the  occupants  of  the  camps  responsible  until  those  who  carried  arms  gave  up  their 
weapons.  They  were  in  fact  held  as  hostages.  This  policy,  combined  with  preventing  all 
relief  to  the  camps  and  preventing  even  women,  children  and  the  elderly  from  leaving  the 
camps,  seems  to  indicate  that  a  policy  of  genocide  and  total  war  was  going  on.  Only  the 
entry  of  the  Syrian  troops  seems  to  have  brought  this  unhappy  situation  to  an  end. 
To  conclude,  it  seems  fair  to  me,  to  say  that  the  situation  of  civilians  in  internal  conflicts 
is  worsening  all  the  time,  due  especially  to  the  increased  availability  of  highly  sophisticated 
and  destructive  weapons.  This  state  of  affairs  is  compounded  by  the  total  absence  of 
adherence  of  the  warring  parties  to  any  humanitarian  standard.  There  is  an  all  too  frequent 
assumption  that  in  internal  conflicts  all  means  of  crushing  the  enemy  are  legitimate. 
Moreover,  it  is  evident  that  foreign  assistance  to  some  insurgent  movements.  such  as  the 
Contras,  RENAMO  and  UNITA,  which  observe  few  limits  on  their  military  actions,  has 
given  them  all  the  means  to  pursue  a  policy  of  real  terror  against  civilians. 
These  cases  indicate  that  if  the  parties  to  the  conflict  adhered  to  the  basic  rules  laid  down 
in  Protocol  Il  concerning  civilians,  many  cases  of  human  suffering  would  be  prevented,  and 
human  lives  would  be  spared.  However,  the  case  of  the  Nicaraguan  civil  war  seems  to 
suggest  that  the  Government  has  tried  to  adhere  to  certain  humanitarian  rules,  not  through 
the  recognition  of  the  application  either  of  Article  3  or  Protocol  11,  but  through  a  human 
rights  approach.  The  reason  is  in  order  to  escape  the  implication  that  the  Government 
regards  the  insurgents  as  having  a  legal  status. 
2.  The  Practice  vis-i-vis  the  Protection  of  Captured,  Interned  -and  Detained  Persons  In 
connection  with  Internal  Conflicts  after  the  Adoption  of  Protocol  II 
507 
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331 The  situation  of  detained  and  interned  persons  in  connection  with  internal  conflicts  is 
mixed.  The  emergency  legislation  of  many  States  which  was  adopted  after  Protocol  II,  at 
least  on  paper,  affords  the  necessary  standards  of  due  process  and  fair  trial.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  practice  in  the  field  of  combat  and  in  detention  centres  and  courts  is  a  little 
different. 
2.1.  Emergency  Legislation  and  Detained  and  Interned  Persons  In  Connection  with  the 
Conf  lict 
In  Nicaragua  the  Junta  of  National  Reconstruction  promulgated  the  Fundamental  Statute 
on  20  July  1979,  that  is  before  the  outbreak  of  the  civil  war.  This  statute  protects  the  right 
to  life,  liberty  and  security  of  person,  also  the  right  not  to  be  subjected  to  arbitrary  arrest 
or  detention  and  the  right  of  everyone  charged  with  a  penal  offence  to  all  the  guarantees 
necessary  for  his  defence.  Article  5  in  fact  provides  that: 
"The  right  to  life  is  inviolable  and  inherent  in  the  human  person.  There  shall  be  no 
death  penalty  in  Nicaragua.  "510 
The  abolition  of  the  death  penalty  was  established  even  in  the  Law  on  Military  Offences, 
(Decree  No.  600).  Thus,  the  death  penalty  does  not  exist,  even  in  the  case  of  internal  war. 
Moreover,  Article  6  of  the  Fundamental  Statute  deals  with  the  rights  of  defendants.  It 
stipulates  that: 
"All  persons  shall  be  entitled  to  respect  for  their  physical,  mental  and  moral  integrity. 
Punishment  shall  not  extend  beyond  the  offender  himself.  No  one  shall  be  subjected 
to  torture  or  to  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment.  It  shall  not  be 
permitted  to  impose  a  penalty  which,  either  severally  or  collectively,  lasts  for  over 
30  years.  "S" 
These  rights,  according  to  Article  49  of  the  Statute,  are  protected  even  in  cases  of 
emergencies  which  threaten  the  life  of  the  nation. 
The  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act  (Decree  No.  5  of  29  August  1979)  established  special 
courts  to  deal  with  questions  of  order  and  security.  However,  these  courts  have  never  been 
created,  which  means  that  even  offences  related  to  the  conflict  are  dealt  with  by  the 
ordinary  courts,  which  affords  all  the  guarantees  necessary  for  fair  trial. 
This  means  that  the  situation  in  Nicaragua;  at  least  according  to  its  laws,  guarantees  all 
the  rights  of  those  who  committed  offences  in  relation  to  the  conflict.  Its  laws  are  in  total 
accordance  with  human  rights  instruments,  and  even  better  than  Protocol  11,  since  the  death 
penalty  is  not  prohibited  in  the  latter. 
In  Sri-Lanka  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act,  which  came  into  operation  on  20  July 
1979,  was  enacted  to  deal  with  the  situation  of  civil  war.  It  con  tains  some  safeguards  for 
persons  arrested  or  detained  for  offences  related  to  the  conflict. 
Thus,  according  to  the  Act's  section  6  the  power  of  arrest  is  given  only  to  a  speclific 
person  (the  superintendent),  provided  that  he  is  authorised  in  writing  to  do  so.  The  arrested 
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332 person  must  be  informed  duly  for  the  reason  of  his  arrest,  and  when  he  is  taken  to  custody, 
he  is  served  with  a  copy  of  the  detention  order.  The  latter  must  contain  the  reason  for  his 
detention  and  the  place  of  such  detention.  512 
However,  the  act  was  criticised  by  Leary,  in  her  view,  certain  of  its  provisions  were 
unduly  vague,  created  offences  retroactively  and  provided  for  detention  Incommunicado 
contrary  to  internationally  accepted  standards.  513 
In  El  Salvador  cases  of  treason,  espionage,  rebellion,  sedition  and  other  offences  against 
the  peace  or  independence  of  the  State,  according  to  the  emergency  legislation,  are  dealt 
with  by  military  courts,  514  which  are  generally  severe,  and  afford  no  guarantees  of  due 
process  and  fair  trial. 
In  December  1980,  under  another  Decree  No.  507,  even  the  Military  Code  procedures 
were  seen  as  not  meeting  the  needs  of  the  situation.  A  special  regime  was  brought  into 
operation.  Thus,  even  persons  under  the  age  of  16  years  may  be  tried  for  the  crimes  cited 
above. 
Moreover,  under  the  above  decree,  those  suspected  of  crimes  against  the  State  could  be 
held  incommunicado  for  up  to  180  days.  If  no  proof  of  guilt  had  been  established  by  the 
end  of  this  period  a  sentence  of  four  months  corrective  detention  could  nevertheless  be 
515  imposed.  This  means  that  even  in  the  legislation  itself,  the  elementary  rules  of  penal  law 
were  not  respected,  in  contravention  of  all  international  instruments  on  human  rights. 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  many  States  facing  civil  wars  have  in  recent  times  resorted 
frequently  to  the  use  of  amnesty,  by  releasing  those  who  were  charged  with  crimes  and 
offences  in  relation  to  the  conflict.  However,  the  motivation  is  always  political,  e.  g.  to 
encourage  national  conciliation.  516 
2.2.  The  Practice  In  the  Field 
The  practice  shows  that  in  many  instances  persons  captured  and  detained  for  offences  in 
connection  with  the  conflict  are  harshly  treated.  In  Angola,  the  death  penalty  awaits  all 
those  who  commit  crimes  against  State  security  and  endangering  the  revolution.  The  penalty 
applies  to  civilians  as  well  as  foreigners.  The  crimes  involve:  treason,  spying,  the  exposure 
of  the  country  to  armed  aggression  or  the  spreading  of  false  information  damaging  to  the 
good  name  of  Angola.  517  The  Government  had  resorted  to  the  execution  of  UNITA 
members  frequently.  and  UNITA  resorted  to  reprisals  and  executed  captured  Angolan 
soldiers.  518 
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333 In  El  Salvador,  it  seems  that  the  situation  of  captured  combatants,  either  of  the 
Government  or  the  insurgents,  is  slightly  better.  Thus,  it  was  stated  that: 
"...  [In  respect  of  treatment  of  captured  soldiers]  the  practice  of  the  FMLN  compares 
very  favourably  with  the  practice  of  the  Salvadoran  armed  forces.  As  best  as  we  can 
determine,  the  Salvadoran  armed  forces  rarely  take  POW  from  among  guerrilla 
combatantS.  "519 
Then  it  was  added  that: 
"There  are  apparently  no  prisoner  of  war  camps  in  El  Salvador  nor  are  there  captured 
"520  guerrilla  combatants  in  Marrona  prison. 
Moreover,  it  was  revealed  that  the  FMLN  continued  to  release  captured  soldiers  through 
the  ICRC,  and  that  a  handful  of  guerrilla  combatants  are  known  to  have  been  taken  alive 
and  exchanged  for  high  ranking  prisoners  captured  by  the  FMLN.  521 
Thus,  in  El  Salvador,  it  is  the  civilians  who  are  accused  of  collaborating  with  the 
insurgents  who  are  the  victims  of  the  violations  of  the  most  elementary  principles  of  fair 
trial  and  justice. 
In  Nicaragua,  the  insurgents  especially  are  accused  of  resorting  simply  to  the  killing  of 
any  Government  soldiers  who  fall  into  their  hands,  especially  the  FDN  and  the  Misura- 
522  Misurasata  have  summarily  executed  prisoners. 
As  to  the  Government,  according  to  American  Watch  reports,  the  most  serious  complaints 
about  the  treatment  of  detainees  refer  to  detention  centres  that  are  not  under  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  penitentiary  system,  but  of  the  security  police  centres.  The  abuses  are 
mainly  present  in  the  interrogation  period. 
However,  the  reports  confirm  that  the  procedures  before  the  courts  which  deal  with 
detainees  for  offences  in  relation  to  the  conflict,  conform  to  the  due  process  requirements. 
Thus,  defendants  are  given  an  opportunity  to  be  confronted  with  evidence  against  them, 
to  make  personal  appearances  before  the  court,  to  present  evidence  on  their  own  behalf,  and 
to  be  assisted  by  counsel.  Sentences  seem  to  be  based  on  evidence.  The  courts  must  explain 
523  their  findings. 
In  Afghanistan,  the  situation  is  very  bad  for  detained  persons,  either  civilian  or  military. 
It  is  revealed  that  'widespread  and  systematic'  abuses  of  human  rights  exist.  Civilian 
detainees  in  the  country's  prisons  were  regularly  subjected  to  electric  shocks,  beatings  and 
other  forms  of  torture.  Moreover,  the  general  conditions  in  prisons  were  severely  criticised. 
It  was  reported  that  extra-judicial  executions  and  detention  without  trial  of  people 
"90p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  460,  p.  58. 
5200p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  460,  p.  58. 
5211bid. 
5220p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  478,  pp.  40-43. 
5230p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  479,  pp.  4-48. 
334 524 
suspected  of  sympathising  with  the  rebels  had  occurred  . 
There  is  also  evidence  that  the  Government  forces  and  the  Soviet  Union  do  not  take 
prisoners.  They  just  kill  them.  In  this  context.  a  Soviet  soldier  was  asked  how  the  Soviets 
treated  Afghan  prisoners  and  he  replied  'they  destroy  theM.  '525 
It  is  reported  that  prisoners  accused  of  offences  relating  to  the  conflict  wait  some  months 
without  charge  or  trial.  They  cannot  meet  family  or  lawyers,  confront  witnesses  or  prepare 
a  defence.  In  many  cases,  the  main  evidence  is  a  confession  obtained  under  torture.  The 
accused  are  judged  bya  revolutionary  court".  The  latter,  in  fact,  always  confirms  the  Khad 
(the  secret  police)  verdict.  Moreover,  no  appeals  from  the  decision  of  the  revolutionary 
court  are  allowed.  The  death  penalty  may  be  imposed  and  carried  out. 
526 
The  conclusion  in  regard  to  prisoners,  detained  and  interned  persons  in  connection  with 
offences  in  relation  to  internal  conflicts  is  mixed.  In  a  few  cases,  like  in  Nicaragua  there 
is  enough  evidence  that  the  Government  has  tried  its  best  to  conform  to  the  general 
standards  concerning  the  treatment  of  detained  and  interned  persons.  The  main  reason 
seems  to  be  political.  The  Government  seeks  to  prove  to  the  world  that  it  is  respectful  of 
human  rights,  even  in  extreme  circumstances  of  internal  conflict.  However,  in  the  other 
cases,  it  seems  that  detained  persons,  who  are  in  the  majority  civilians,  suffer  greatly  from 
the  conditions  of  detention  which  are  very  bad,  and  especially  from  outright  violations  of 
the  most  fundamental  rules  of  due  process  and  fair  trial. 
It  seems  that  Governments  in  these  instances  use  the  non-respect  of  the  basic  standards 
of  penal  law  and  the  suspension  of  rights  and  freedoms  of  individuals  as  a  real  tactic  of 
terror  in  order  to  make  the  population  abandon  its  collaboration  with  its  enemies.  However, 
these  tactics,  as  experiences  show  in  Algeria,  Vietnam  and  other  cases,  are  counter- 
productive,  since  many  innocent  people  become  victims.  Hence,  it  is  the  Government  which 
makes  them  new  recruits  of  the  insurgents. 
Besides,  it  seems  that  the  patient  policies  of  the  ICRC  have  led  many  Governments  in 
recent  times  to  allow  the  representatives  of  the  Red  Cross  to  visit  the  detainees  and 
detention  centres.  Those  visits  generally  end  with  promises  from  Governments,  and  even 
insurgent  movements,  to  make  their  situation  better.  During  those  visits,  the  ICRC 
endeavour  to  distribute  relief,  and  facilitates  the  problem  of  correspondence  between  the 
detainees  and  their  families.  This  happened  in  Afghanistan,  El  Salvador,  Lebanon  and 
527  Mozambique. 
It  seems  that  the  new  international  climate,  in  which  the  super-powers  seem  to  be  willing 
to  resolve  many  outstanding  conflicts  by  encouraging  negotiation  between  the  warring 
factions  in  countries  faced  by  civil  wars,  goes  towards  explaining  why  the  established 
Governments  in  those  countries  are  trying  to  amend  their  positions.  This  state  of  affairs 
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335 may  help  pave  the  way  towards  an  ultimate  solution;  tragedy  and  suffering  will  never  aid 
such  that  course  of  action. 
Again  it  is  very  clear  that  the  rules  of  the  protection  of  detained  and  interned  persons  for 
offences  relating  to  the  conflict,  contained  in  Protocol  11,  seem  to  offer  (if  adhered  to  by 
the  parties  to  the  conflict)  a  solid  humanitarian  ground  for  solving  many  problems  and 
plights  of  that  category  of  victims  of  internal  conflicts. 
3.  The  Practice  and  the  Protection  of  the  Sick  and  Wounded 
The  practice  concerning  the  protection  of  the  wounded  and  sick  is  in  general  favourable. 
There  are  no  systematic  violations  of  the  basic  rules  relating  to  the  protection  of  that 
category.  However,  there  are  some  examples,  especially  of  violation  of  some  basic 
obligations  in  relation  to  the  protection  of  medical  personnel,  medical  units  and 
transportation;  the  non-respect  of  the  Red  Cross  emblem,  and  even  of  killing  the  wounded 
and  sick  and  preventing  their  assistance. 
Thus,  in  Lebanon  the  ICRC  delegate  was  kidnapped  in  December  1988.  Death  threats 
were  made  against  those  who  work  with  the  ICRC,  which  led  to  the  suspension  of  its 
valuable  activities  for  seven  weeks  in  1989.  However,  in  March  1989,  and  after  intensive 
contacts,  it  was  able  to  resume  its  activities.  528  Moreover,  the  ICRC  in  its  Worldwide  Report 
of  1986  indicated  that  some  workers  of  the  Red  Cross  were 
" 
killed  and  some  injured  because 
the  Red  Cross  emblem,  which  was  supposed  to  protect  them,  was  not  respected.  529 
Furthermore,  vehicles  and  relief  supplies  were  stolen,  and  on  several  occasions  the  ICRC 
delegates  were  prevented  from  assisting  the  wounded.  530 
Further,  in  its  Worldwide  Report  of  1988  the  ICRC  noted  that  "ICRC  delegates  together 
with  volunteers  from  the  Lebanese  Red  Cross,  evacuated  and  cared  for  the  wounded, 
distributed  food  and  relief  and  returned  the  dead  to  their  families.  "531  In  its  Bulletin  of 
June  1989,  the  ICRC  indicated  that  its  delegates  continued  to  provide  medicines  and 
medical  material  for  hospitals  treating  victims  of  the  conflict.  A  medical  programme  for 
over  140  dispensaries  was  set  up  in  the  south  to  deal  with  the  influx  of  refugees  coming 
from  Beirut.  532 
In  Nicaragua,  there  are  some  indications  that  especially  the  Contras  resorted  in  some 
instances  resorted  to  the  killing  of  wounded  opponents.  In  fact  the  American  Watch  attested 
to  that.  533  However,  the  same  report  made  clear  that  the  ICRC  vehicles  that  were  clearly 
marked  did  not  experience  any  difficulties  in  their  mission  of  assisting  the  wounded  and 
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336 534  displaced  persons. 
In  El  Salvador  its  seems  that  the  situation  is  in  general  very  positive.  The  ICRC  and  the 
local  Red  Cross  organisation  work  in  the  conflict  area,  evacuating  the  wounded  from  the 
combat  zones  to  hospitals.  Moreover,  they  constituted  medical  mobile  teams.  Their  work 
535  consisted  in  giving  medical  aid  and  dental  consultation  and  vaccinations. 
Furthermore,  it  is  reported  by  the  ICRC  that  at  the  end  of  June  1987  an  agreement  was 
signed  by  both  parties  to  the  conflict  authorising  the  ICRC  to  organise  the  transfer  abroad 
for  medical  treatment  of  98  war  invalids  opposed  to  the  Government.  536 
The  ICRC  Worldwide  of  1988  indicates  that  the  ICRC  is  working  without  any  major 
difficulties  in  assisting  medically  those  in  need,  especially  in  areas  where  violence  is  taking 
537  place. 
In  Afghanistan  during  the  first  years  of  the  conflict,  the  situation  for  the  sick  and 
wounded  was  bad.  There  is  in  fact,  evidence  that  the  Soviet-Afghan  military  units  have 
searched  for  and  arrested  civilian  medical  personnel,  who  assisted  and  cared  for  the 
wounded  insurgents.  Further,  Soviet  aircraft  bombed  hospitals.  Nor  was  ICRC  allowed  to 
provide  medical  care  for  victims  of  the  confliCt. 
538 
According  to  the  ICRC,  the  situation  is  becoming  more  promising  for  the  wounded  and 
sick.  The  ICRC  works  without  difficulty.  Many  hospitals  were  opened,  through  the 
invaluable  help  of  the  ICRC,  to  care  for  the  wounded.  Thus,  it  was  reported: 
"Despite  extremely  precarious  security  conditions,  ICRC  delegates  and  doctors  made 
several  trips  to  the  provinces  of  Balkh  in  the  north  of  the  country,  and  Herat  in  the 
north  west,  where  they  provided  mergency  medical  assistance  to  the  regional 
hospitals  caring  for  war  casualties.  115S9 
In  1989,  the  ICRC  embarked  on  large-scale  operation,  in  setting  up  bases,  first  aid  posts 
and  surgical  hospitals  to  deal  with  the  increased  number  of  wounded  and  sick.  540 
In  Angola,  despite  the  crash  of  one  of  its  aircraft  in  October  1987,  and  the  eventual 
killing  of  8  of  its  delegates,  which  led  to  the  suspension  of  all  its  activities  in  the  country, 
the  ICRC  in  February  1988  has  resumed  its  activities  to  deal  especially  with  the  wounded, 
where  there  is  an  increased  influx  of  people  wounded  by  the  fighting. 
The  conclusion  is  that,  in  relation  to  the  protection  of  the  wounded  and  sick, 
Governments  and  insurgents  alike  are  in  general  ready  to  cooperate,  at  least  on  an  ad  hoc 
basis,  or  through  the  ICRC,  to  deal  with  the  problems  of  that  category  of  victims  of  war, 
these  being  the  most  helpless  victims  of  war.  Governments  in  fact,  do  not  resort  to  the  use 
5341bid, 
p.  82. 
5350p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  490,  p.  14. 
5361RRC,  1987,27th  year,  No.  259,  p.  391. 
5370P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  527,  p.  11. 
538See 
op.  cit.,  supra.  n-507,  pp.  174-180. 
5390p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  527,  p.  13. 
5401CRC  Buttetin,  1989,  No.  157,  p.  3. 
337 of  the  argument  of  sovereignty  and  in  that  respect  humanitarianism  seems  to  win  the  day 
in  this  important  aspect  of  internal  war. 
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COMPLIANCE  WITH  AND  IMPLEMENTATION 
OF  HUMANITARIAN  LAW  IN  INTERNAL  CONFLICTS 
Introduction 
One  of  the  most  difficult  problems  of  international  law  is  the  question  of  its  enforcement 
and  implementation.  Unlike  domestic  law,  where  there  is  an  authority  which  monitors  its 
application  and  has  the  material  and  legal  capabilities  which  makes  it  capable  of  punishing 
those  who  may  breach  its  provisions.  In  international  law,  there  is  no  such  authority  above 
the  States  obliging  them  to  conform  to  the  law,  which  means  that  violations  may  go 
unpunished. 
This  state  of  affairs,  led  in  legal  theory  to  a  lively  discussion  on  the  nature  of  international 
law.  Some  writers  had  simply  claimed  that  international  law,  is  not  a  law  at  all,  to  them  it 
is  a  mere  moral,  devoid  of  any  obligatory  force.  ' 
However,  the  majority  opinion  acknowledges  that  international  law  is  law;  but  its 
elaboration  and  application  methods  differ  from  domestic  law,  since  it  is  a  law  between 
States  and  not  above  them.  Thus,  in  an  arbitration  between  the  O.  S.  K.  and  the  owners  of 
the  S.  S.  Prometheus.  The  acting  Chief  Justice  stated  in  a  case  involving  a  charter-party 
stipulation  that  the  vessel  was  not  to  carry  contraband  of  war  (during  the  Russo-Japanese 
war): 
"It  was  contended  on  behalf  of  the  owner  of  the  Prometheus  that  the  term  law  as 
applied  to  this  recognised  system  of  principles  and  rules  known  as  international  law 
is  an  inexact  expression,  that  there  is,  in  other  words  no  such  thing  as  international 
law;  that  there  can  be  no  such  law  binding  upon  all  nations  inasmuch  as  there  is  no 
sanction  of  the  law,  that  is  to  say  that  there  is  no  means  by  which  obedience  to  such 
law  can  be  imposed  upon  any  given  nation  refusing  obedience  thereto.  "2 
However,  the  acting  Chief  Justice  did  not  support  this  assertion,  he  stressed: 
"I  do  not  concur  in  that  contention.  In  my  opinion  a  law  may  be  established  and 
become  international  law,  that  is  binding  upon  all  nations  by  the  agreement  of  such 
nations  to  be  bound  thereby,  although  it  may  be  i  T3POSSible  to  enforce  obedience 
thereto  by  any  given  nation  party  to  the  agreement.  " 
He  then  added: 
"...  [T]he  resistance  of  a  nation  to  a  law  to  which  it  has  agreed  does  not  derogate  from 
the  authority  of  the  law  because  that  resistance  cannot  perhaps,  be  overcome.  Such 
resistance  merely  makes  the  resisting  nation  a  breacher  of  the  law  to  which  it  has 
given  its  adherence  but  leaves  the  law,  to  the  establishment  of  which,  the  resisting 
'See  J.  Austin:  Lectures  on  Jurisprudence.  4th  ed.  Rev.  &  ed.  by  R.  Campbell.  John  Murray,  London, 
1873,  pp.  81-106;  and  for  a  thorough  discussion  of  the  question  whether  International  taw  is  taw,  see: 
A.  D'Amato:  International  Law:  Process  and  Prospect.  Transnationat  Pub.,  Inc.  Dobbs  Ferry,  New  York 
1987,  pp.  1-26. 
2W.  Bishop:  International.  Law:  Cases  and  Materiats.  3rd  ed.  Brown,  Boston  Littte,  1971,  p.  10. 
31bid. 
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In  other  words,  the  absence  of  means  of  redress  in  case  of  the  breach  of  rules  of 
international  law,  does  not  affect  its  claim  that  it  is  law. 
However,  such  assertion  does  not  solve  the  question  of  how  then  international  law  is  to 
be  made  effective.  Hackworth  notes  in  this  respect,  that  it  is  the  will  of  the  State  which  can 
make  law  effective  and  also: 
"...  [I]n  the  State's  ultimate  responsibility  for  its  own  action  or  failure  to  act,  in  its  fear 
of  war  or  reprisals  in  the  effect  of  world  opinion,  or  in  the  combination  of  any  two 
or  more  of  these.  "' 
Thus,  it  is  essentially  such  means  as  reprisals  and  wars  which  are  mutual  in  character  (in 
other  words  which  depend  directly  on  the  will  of  the  States)  which  serve  to  enforce  the  law. 
To  me,  this  is  due  to  the  important  influence  of  ideas  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention, 
which  exclude  third  party  or  centralised  machinery,  which  can  supervise  the  application  of 
international  law.  This  opinion  has  been  clearly  stated  by  Lauterpacht,  who  writes: 
"...  [T]he  function  of  law  is  to  regulate  the  conduct  of  men  by  reference  to  rules  whose 
formal-as  distinguished  from  their  historical-  source  of  validity  lies,  in  the  last  resort, 
in  a  precept  imposed  from  outside.  Within  the  community  of  nations  this  essential 
feature  of  the  rule  of  law  is  constantly  put  in  jeopardy  by  the  conception  of  the 
sovereignty  of  States  which  reduces  the  binding  force  of  international  law  from  the 
will  of  each  individual  member  of  the  international  community.  "6 
In  practice,  this  meant  that  the  conception  of  sovereignty,  has  blocked  any  significant 
development,  in  the  area  of  providing  adequate  means  for  supervising  the  implementation 
of  international  law. 
Returning  now  to  humanitarian  law,  which  is  a  part  of  international  law,  it  is  asserted 
that  the  question  of  enforcement,  supervision,  control  and  implementation  of  its  rules,  is 
of  fundamental  value,  since  lives  of  human  beings  are  at  stake  in  the  event  of  its  breach. 
Thus,  if  the  belligerents  do  not  respect  the  principle  of  distinction  between  combatants 
and  non-combatants,  then  it  is  clear  that  the  right  to  life  would  be  fair  game,  since 
innocents  can  be  attacked,  women  and  chilren  would  be  murdered. 
However,  despite  the  urgency  and  great  need  for  suitable  machinery  which  can  be  used 
to  supervise  the  application  of  law  in  times  of  war  hence,  reducing  the  risk  of  gross 
violations  of  the  law.  Forsythe  has  observed  that: 
"The  practice  of  supervising  the  law  of  armed  conflict  has  been  little  known,  little 
"7  understood,  and  little  studied  . 
4  Ibid.  p.  10. 
5  Nackworth:  Digest  of  International.  Law.  Vol.  1,  Government  Printing  Off  Ice,  Washington,  D.  C.,  1940, 
p.  12. 
6  H.  Lauterpacht:  The  Function  of  Law  in  the  Internationat  Community.  Ciarendon  Press.  oxford,  1933, 
p.  3. 
TD.  Forsythe:  Who  Guards  the  Guardians.  76  AJIL,  1976,  p.  41. 
340 A  very  similar  point  has  been  stressed  by  Aldrich  the  US  Deputy  Legal  Advisor  to  the  State 
Department,  who  maintained  in  April  13th,  1973  that: 
" 
... 
[D]eficiencies  are  found  in  both  substance  of  existing  law  [humanitary  law]  in  its 
application  and  enforcement.  Of  the  two  the  latter  is,  in  our  view,  the  more 
"8  important  and  probably  correct. 
Then,  the  question  of  compliance  has  been  considered  as  one  of  the  most  difficult  questions 
of  humanitarian  law.  This  applies  to  both  international  and  non-  international  conflict. 
However,  to  me,  the  question  must  be  seen  as  acute  in  non  -international  conflicts.  Since  if 
even  in  international  wars  compliance  poses  great  and  complicated  problems  between 
subjects  of  international  law,  then  in  civil  wars,  the  question  is  even  worse.  The  reason 
for  this  being  that  one  of  the  parties  is  considered  by  the  other  as  no  more  than  a  band  of 
criminals,  which  results,  in  many  cases,  that  no  standards  are  to  be  respected  when  dealing 
them. 
Moreover,  compliance  in  practice  may  involve  first,  some  kind  of  third  party  control  over 
the  actions  of  the  parties,  for  the  established  Government,  this  would  restrict  its  freedom 
of  action  in  dealing  with  its  enemies,  since  its  acts  would  be  under  international  scrutiny. 
Secondly  the  mere  fact  of  accepting  such  machinery,  is  bound  to  give  certain  legal  status 
to  its  enemies,  and  in  any  event  it  would  be  seen  as  intervention  in  its  internal  affairs. 
My  aim  in  this  chapter,  is  to  reveal  the  role  of  the  principles  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention  in  blocking  any  attempt  at  the  normative  level  for  bringing  any  obligations  on 
the  field  of  ensuring  respect  for  humanitarian  law.  That  is  the  stopping  of  any  machinery 
for  the  control  of  the  application  of  humanitarian  law  in  internal  conflicts.  It  must  be 
stressed  at  the  outset  that  the  term  compliance  as  used  in  this  chapter,  includes  the  ideas  of 
implementation,  enforcement  and  supervision.  9  In  general  all  means  of  ensuring  respect  for 
the  law. 
SECTION  I:  Customary  International  Law,  and  the  Question  of  Compliance  with  the  Laws 
of  War  In  General 
A.  Introduction 
Thr  rule  is  that  customs  and  usages  of  war  are  applicable  only  between  States.  Their  respect 
was  not  based  on  any  system  of  third  party  machinery,  it  was  exclusively  based  on  the  idea 
of  self-help. 
By  reason  of  its  sovereignty,  each  actor  on  the  international  stage  was  authorised  to 
respond  in  its  own  way  to  any  alleged  violations  of  the  laws  of  war.  Pictet  summed  up  the 
practice  in  the  antiquity  concerning  the  sanctioning  of  those  who  commit  crimes  during  the 
war.  He  observed: 
8A.  W.  Rovine:  Digest  of  United  States  Practice  in  'Internationat  Law.  (1973),  State  Dept  Pub., 
Washington,  D.  C.,  1976.  pp.  492-493. 
9  Draper  defines  Implementation  as  'those  devices,  Institutions  and  rules  designed  to  monitor  and 
ensure  its  observance'  and  defines  enforcement  as  $the  collection  of  mechanisms  and  rules  available 
to  the  taw  of  war  to  secure  the  restoration  of  observance  when  that  taw  has  been  violated.  1  G.  I.  A.  D. 
Draper:  The  Implementation  and  Enforcement  of  the  Geneva  Convention  and  the  Additional  Protocols  of  1978.  RCADI,  1979/111,  P-9. 
341 "Dans  I'antiquit6,  on  chatiait  parfois  des  capitaines  pour  avoir  trahi  a  -failli,  mais  on 
ne  songait  gu6re  A  leur  reprocher  leur  cruaut6".  10  -ýY 
Thus,  sanctions  of  soldiers  occured  only  when  they  violate  their  allegiance  to  their 
sovereign,  whereas  committing  horrible  crimes  against  enemy  soldiers  or  civilians  were  not 
considered  worthy  of  punishment.  This  appears  to  me  the  logic  of  absolute  sovereignty. 
However,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  mere  development  of  a  body  of  rules  concerning  the 
conduct  of  war  jus  In  bello  must  be  considered  in  itself  as  a  means  of  restricting  the  horrors 
of  war,  and  implicitly  a  primitive  way  of  ensuring  respect  for  lives  of  human  beings  and 
their  property. 
History  also  gives  us  some  examples  of  primitive  methods  of  controlling  the  application 
of  what  is  called  'the  laws  of  arms.  '  The  latter  has  been  defined  by  Keen  as: 
"...  [T]he  law  of  arms  was  an  international  law,  but  the  middle  ages  knew  of  no 
permanent  international  court  in  which  international  cases  could  be  tried.  "" 
He  cited  many  cases  which  had  been  brought  before  courts  especially  in  France  and  Britain, 
concerning  the  question  of  ransom. 
The  'law  of  arms'  in  the  Middle  Ages  allowed  the  freeing  of  captured  soldiers  on  the 
condition  of  paying  ransom.  However,  some  captives  upon  their  return  just  forgot  about 
their  deals.  Permanent  courts  were  established  to  deal  with  the  problem  and  many  cases 
were  brought  before  them.  12 
In  England,  it  was  the  Court  of  Chancery  which  dealt  with  such  matters,  and  was 
presided  by  the  Earl  Marshall  and  the  High  Constable,  and  sat  at  the  White  Chamber  at 
Westminster,  and  heard  cases  at  least  from  the  reign  of  Edward  111.13  The  courts  of  these 
Constables  and  Marshals  were  permanent  courts  because  they  were  permanent  tribunals  with 
14  settled  jurisdiction.  They  were  open  to  suitors  who  wished  to  bring  cases  at  any  time. 
The  main  weakness  of  such  system  was,  in  my  opinion,  that  the  courts  were  essentially 
only  open  to  disputes  between  knights.  They  involved  high  costs,  delays  and  travel.  The 
questions  raised  in  front  of  them  were  mainly  concerned  financial  dealings  and 
undertakings,  humanitarian  motives  toward  the  wider  population  were  not  involved. 
The  military  law  which  developed  thereafter,  in  the  16th,  17th  and  18th  centuries 
responded  essentially  to  the  changes  which  took  place  in  the  organisation  of  armies.  Armies 
based  largely  on  feudal  levies  were  replaced  by  more  professional  armies,  many  being 
composed  largely  of  mercenaries  and  commanded  by  nobles  and  condottiere.  The  latter 
subjected  their  mercenary  armies  to  harsh  discipline. 
10  J.  Pictet:  Evolution  du  droit  international  p6nat,  in  Hangartner  at  at.,  (eds.  ),  op.  cit.,  supra. 
chapter  3,  n.  167,  p.  206. 
"M. 
N.  Keen:  The  Laws  of  War  in  the  Middle  Ages.  Routtedge  &  Paul,  London.  Univ.  of  Toronto  Press, 
Toronto.  1965,  p.  23. 
12 
Examples  of  such  cases  can  be  found  In  see  Keen,  Ibid,  p.  24-44. 
13  Ibid,  p.  27. 
14 
Ibid,  p.  28. 
342 Many  States  resorted  to  enactment  of  military  laws,  in  order  to  keep  discipline  and  thus, 
effectiveness  in  the  field.  The  Swedish  Kings  Gustavus  Adolphus,  Charles  X  and  Charles 
XI  as  well  as  Czar  Peter  the  Great  issued  'War  Articles'  which  contained  severe  punishments 
for  certain  crimes  committed  during  war. 
Under  the  Czar  Peter  the  Great  War  Articles  of  1716  mutiny,  killing  of  prisoners  of  war, 
women,  children,  clergymen  and  the  aged,  and  the  burning  of  churches,  Schools  and 
hospitals,  were  heavily  punished. 
However,  Rosenblad  rightly  observed: 
"...  [T]he  military  law  thus  implemented  was  as  a  rule  not  enacted  for  humanitarian 
considerations.  Rather  it  was  proclaimed  for  military  reasons,  inasmuch  as 
maintaining  strict  discipline  was  rightly  held  to  be  an  indispensable  key  to  success 
in  warfare".  15 
This  system  basically  serves  the  practical  interests  of  the  State  concerned  in  maintaining  a 
disciplined  and  strong  army.  The  State  was  the  judge  in  its  own  case,  there  was  no  room  for 
third  party  control.  The  main  conclusion  is  that  there  is  no  system  of  control  beyond  the 
will  of  the  State,  which  reflects  accurately  the  weight  of  the  concept  of  sovereignty  at  that 
time. 
Moreover,  it  is  maintained  that  military  law  was  enacted  essentially  to  rule  the  army  in 
times  of  war  against  other  States,  that  is  in  international  wars  and  not  in  internal  wars, 
which  means  there  were  no  normative  or  procedural  rules  concerning  such  wars.  The 
absolute  concept  of  sovereignty  was  totally  ascendent  in  such  situations  with  all  its  grave 
practical  consequences  vis-AL-vis  rebels  and  those  who  assist  them. 
B.  Classical  Writers  and  the  Question  of  Compliance  with  the  Laws  of  War 
The  importance  of  classical  writers  views  and  writings  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  influenced 
the  theoretical  foundations  and  the  subsequent  development  of  the  laws  of  war.  Thus,  it  is 
necessary  to  return  to  them  to  trace  the  beginning  of  ideas,  rules  and  procedures  of  the  laws 
of  war. 
It  can  be  safely  stated  at  the  outset  that  no  writer  dealt  directly  with  the  questions  of 
implementation  and  enforcement  of  the  laws  of  war.  This,  in  my  opinion,  was  a  logical 
situation,  since  at  that  time  the  most  important  issue  was  to  provide  substantive  rules  which 
mitigate  the  sufferings  of  the  victims  of  war.  They  concentrated  on  proving  the  usefulness 
of  accepting  a  body  of  rules  of  Jus  In  bello,  in  conducting  wars,  rather  than  providing 
means  of  ensuring  respect  for  such  rules. 
However,  to  this  general  observation,  it  is  necessary  to  make  some  exceptions,  since 
indirect  references  to  the  quest  of  compliance  can  be  found  from  time  to  time. 
1.  Franciscus  De  Victoria 
He  developed  certain  limits  to  the  idea  of  just  war  and  made  recourse  to  war  restricted. 
Thus,  diversity  of  religion,  extension  of  an  Empire  and  personal  glory  or  advantage  were 
not  just  causes  of  war.  According  to  him  'seule,  une  injustice  peut  constituter  une  juste 
15Rosenbiad, 
op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  4,  n.  389,  p.  9. 
343 cause  de  la  guerre'.  16  Once  the  justice  of  war  is  clear,  he  argued: 
"ll  est  permis  de  faire  tout  Ce  qui  est  n6cessaire  pour  ddfendre  le  bien  public.  Cest 
6vident,  car  le  but  de  la  guerre  est  de  d6fendre  et  de  prot6ger  I'Etat".  1 
Accordingly,  he  adds  that: 
"ll  est  permis  de  recouvrir  tous  les  biens  perdus  ou  leur  6quivalent.  Cela  est  tTOP 
6vident  pour  avoir  besoin  de  preuves,  car  c'est  dans  ce  but  que  l'on  entreprent  ou  que 
l'on  fait  la  guerre.  "  18 
Moreover,  the  Prince  may  in  his  view: 
"...  [M]8me  aller  plus  loin,  dans  la  m6sure  oü  c'est  n6cessaire  pour  obtenir  des  enemis 
la  paix  et  la  securit6".  19 
These  sweeping  pronouncements  would  imply  that  once  the  just  cause  of  a  war  is 
established,  then  every  means  of  conducting  the  war  is  justified  which,  in  fact,  negates  the 
essence  of  the  Jus  In  bello,  and  hence  there  is  no  rule  to  observe  in  just  war.  This  means  in 
other  words  since  there  are  no  rules  to  be  respected,  logically  there  is  no  system  of 
enforcing  them. 
However,  Victoria  made  several  references  to  unlawful  actions  even  in  just  wars-20  He 
envisaged  even  in  just  wars,  a  possible  punishment  for  those  soldiers  who  may  loot  or  burn 
21 
without  authority.  In  this  case,  they  are  bound  to  make  restitution. 
Victoria  also  admitted  the  possibility  of  the  claim  that  the  war  may  be  just  on  both  sides, 
which  in  his  view  may  be  attributed  to  ignorance.  In  these  circumstances,  only  god  knows 
which  side  is  fighting  a  just  war.  In  such  a  situation,  Johnson  stressed  that  Victoria  was  of 
the  opinion  that: 
"...  [T]he  belligerent  should  be  chastened  in  the  realisation  that  both  sides  might  seem 
to  be  equally  in  the  right,  and  so  be  especially  scrupulous  in  observing  the  jus  In 
"22  bello,  the  rules  of  war. 
16D. 
cle  Victoria:  Lecons  sur  Les  fncliens  et  sur  te  drolt  de  guerre.  Introduction,  tracluction  et  notes 
par  M.  Barbler,  Librairie  Droz,  Gen6ve,  1966,  p.  122. 
171bid, 
p.  123. 
181bid. 
191bid, 
p.  124. 
20He 
stressed: 
"De  soi,  it  West  jwwis  permis  de  tuer  votontafrement  un  Innocent". 
He  then  added  that: 
"It  West  pas  permis  de  punir  des  Innocents  pour  tes  fautes  des  m6chants". 
lbid,  p.  139. 
211bid, 
p.  151. 
22j.  J.  Turner:  Ideotogy,  Reason  and  the  Limitation  of  War:  ReLlgious  and  SecuLar  Concepts  1200-1740. 
PUP,  Princeton,  1975,  p.  20. 
344 Thus,  the  doctrine  of  'simultaneous  ostensible  justice',  plays  a  fundamental  role  in  making 
the  parties  observe  and  comply  with  the  rules  of  war.  Ferencz  observed  concerning 
Victoria's  contributions  to  the  laws  of  war  and  its  enforcement: 
"Many  of  Victoria"s  ideas,  articulated  in  the  first  half  of  the  16th  century,  such  as 
elements  of  a  definition  of  aggression,  the  limits  of  permissible  self-defence, 
proportionality,  restraints  on  wanton  destruction,  the  notion  of  military  necessity, 
responsibility  of  heads  of  State  and  the  unavailability  of  superior  orders  as  a  defense, 
were  early  forerunners  of  doctrines  that  were  to  become  accepted  principles  of 
"23  international  criminal  law  four  centuries  later. 
Thus,  some  ideas  relating  to  enforcement  of  the  laws  of  war  can  be  found  in  Victoria's 
writings,  especially  in  relation  to  actions  and  declaration  of  unjust  wars,  were  the 
criminality  of  leaders  for  waging  the  war,  and  ordering  violations  of  the  laws  of  war,  were 
seen  as  crimes. 
2.  Balthazar  Ayala 
He  noted: 
"Cicero  lays  it  down  that  in  a  well-ordered  State  the  laws  of  war  should  be 
scrupulously  observed.  Alike  in  beginning  a  war  and  in  carrýjng  it  on  and  in  ending 
it,  law  has  a  most  important  position  and  so  has  good  faith.  24 
He  then  adds: 
"War,  therefore,  is  justifiable  when  its  object  is  to  procure  peaceful  existence  and 
freedom  from  outrage,  and  when  begun  in  such  a  way  as  that  peace  may  appear  to 
be  its  sole  objeCt.  "25 
The  implication  of  these  two  important  statements  is  that  the  belligerent  must  make  it  their 
duty  to  respect  the  law  in  their  wars  in  good  faith,  that  is  to  abstain  from  intentional 
violations  of  the  laws  of  war,  since  that  would  undermine  any  subsequent  gains.  Because 
the  situation  of  peace,  which  has  been  established  after  violations  of  the  law  of  war  cannot 
be  permanent,  the  sense  of  vengeance  and  injustice  will  lead  the  vanquished  to  seek 
recourse  to  war. 
Ayala  relies  on  the  advantages  which  the  belligerent  can  gain  from  observing  the  laws  of 
war,  as  an  effective  means  of  inducing  them  to  respect  them. 
3.  Alberico  Gentill 
He  observed: 
"I  said  "a  just  strife'  for  I  maintain  that  the  war  must  be  just  and  that  all  the  acts  of 
war  must  be  just.  In  this  sense  one  speaks  of  a  just  and  righteous  war  and  of  just  and 
238.6.  Ferencz:  Enforcing  International  Law.  Vol.  1,  Oceana  Pub.,  Dobbs  Ferry,  New  York,  1983,  p.  8. 
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Disciptfne.  Vot.  2,  transtated  by  J.  P.  Bate,  The  Carnegie  Institution  of  Washington,  Washington,  D.  C., 
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In  fact,  Gentili  introduces  an  important  idea,  that  the  just  war  must  be  just  in  its  resort  and 
its  conduct,  in  other  words  justice  must  be  adhered  to  in  Jus  ad  bellum  and  Jus  In  bello. 
This  idea  would  have  important  effect  for  the  observance  of  the  law,  since  violations  of  the 
rules  of  war  is  seen  as  violations  of  the  just  war  as  a  whole. 
Gentili  like  the  majority  of  writers  of  that  period  stressed  that  peace  is  the  real  aim  of 
the  war,  justice  in  conducting  the  war,  that  is  the  observance  of  the  law  of  war,  is  the 
essential  condition  for  a  real  condition  of  peace.  In  this  regard  he  observes: 
"Therefore  there  is  but  one  enduring  principle,  namely  justice  which  has  been 
observed  in  punishment  and  should  be  preserved  also  in  taking  vengeance  and  making 
conditions  for  the  future.  For  one  who  has  been  injured  beyond  his  deserts  will  not 
be  tranquil,  but  will  continually  deserve  revenge;  and  one  who  is  forced  to  accept 
pitiless  conditions  will  carry  the  burden  only  so  long  as  he  is  under  the  necessity  of 
"27  obedience. 
Thus,  Gentili  introduces  the  idea  of  justice  as  an  element  which  encourages  respect  for  the 
laws  of  arms.  Since,  when  there  is  no  justice,  that  is  when  there  are  violations  of  the  law, 
there  is  consequently  no  real  basis  of  a  future  permanent  peace.  This  would  not  be 
implicitly  in  the  interest  of  the  belligerent. 
4.  Grotius 
According  to  him,  it  is  false  to  assume  that  in  wars  all  laws  are  in  obeyance,  on  the  contray- 
"War  ought  not  to  be  undertaken  except  for  the  enforcement  of  rights;  when  on 
undertaken  it  should  be  carried  on  only  within  the  bounds  of  law  and  good  faith. 
"SS 
In  his  view,  compliance  with  and  observance  of  the  laws  of  war  must  be  seen  as  an  integral 
part  of  the  doctrine  of  just  war.  In  effect,  he  advocated  that  just  cause  must  be  served  by 
just  means.  Thus,  respect  for  the  laws  of  war  in  good  faith  is,  according  to  Grotius,  a 
necessary  ingredient  of  the  just  war  doctrine. 
However,  it  is  in  the  event  of  unjust  wars  that  Grotius  has  made  a  very  important 
contribution  to  the  subject  of  enforcement  of  the  laws  of  war.  He  introduced  the  element 
of  responsibility  of  those  who  brought  the  unjust  war'either  by  the  exercise  of  their  power, 
or  through  their  advice.  '29  He  then  makes  clear  the  extent  of  their  responsibility: 
"Their  accountability  concerns  all  those  things,  of  course,  which  ordinarily  follow  in 
the  train  of  war;  and  even  unusual  things,  if  they  have  ordered  or  advised  any  such 
26A.  GentHl:  De  Jura  BeLti  Libri  Tres.  Vot.  2.  transLation  of  the  1612  by  J.  C.  RoLf,  CLarendon  Press, 
Oxford,  Humprey  MiLford,  London,  1933,  p.  13. 
27  lbid,  p.  354. 
28Grotfus, 
op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  3,  n.  50,  p.  18. 
291bid, 
p.  719. 
346 thing,  or  failed  to  prevent  it  when  they  might  have  done  So.  "30 
What  Grotius  in  fact,  advocates  does  not  differ  much  from  what  the  tribunals  at  Nuremburg 
and  Tokyo  have  said,  when  in  establishing  the  responsibility  of  political  leaders  for  waging 
an  aggressive  war;  that  is  crimes  against  peace  and  also  for  war  crimes  they  have  ordered 
or  failed  to  stop  from  being  committed. 
Grotius,  stressed  that: 
"Generals  are  responsible  for  the  things  which  have  been  done  while  they  are  in 
command;  and  all  soldiers  that  have  participated  in  some  common  act,  as  the  burning 
of  a  city,  are  responsible  for  the  total  damage.  In  the  case  of  separate  acts  each  is 
responsible  for  the  loss  of  which  he  was  the  sole  cause,  or  at  any  rate  was  one  of  the 
causes.  "31 
Here  Grotius  introduces  the  concept  of  criminal  responsibility  of  commander  and  soldiers 
who  violate  the  laws  of  war,  implicitly  the  idea  of  superior  orders  may  not  be  used  as  a 
valid  defence. 
As  to  the  punishment  of  those  crimes,  Grotius  advocates  two  kinds  of  punishment.  The 
first  finds  it  roots  in  the  concept  of  'moral  justice'  which  is  in  fact  a  religious  punishment. 
Thus,  the  punishment  of  those  who  'knowingly  perform  such  acts,  or  co-operate  in  them, 
are  to  be  considered  of  the  number  of  those  who  cannot  reach  the  kingdom  of  heaven 
without  repentance.  '32 
Moreover,  the  second  form  of  punishment  which  it  seems  is  preferred  by  Grotius,  is  that 
"true  repentance  again,  if  time  and  means  are  adequate,  absolutely  requires  that  he  who 
inflicted  the  wrong,  whether  by  killing,  by  destroying  property  or  by  taking  booty,  should 
make  good  the  wrong  done.  "33  In  other  words,  Grotius  considers  that  religious  and  moral 
punishment  is  not  enough,  legal  punishment  (by  implication  courts  and  tribunals)  is 
preferable,  since  the  guilty  would  be  obliged  to  repair  the  wrong  he  has  done. 
Grotius"  ideas  in  the  field  of  enforcing  the  laws  of  war  are  more  clear.  His  contribution 
can  be  seen  as  a  forerunner  to  what  has  been  established,  especially  after  the  Second  World 
War,  in  the  form  of  trial  of  leading  officials  for  their  role  in  committing  crimes  against 
peace  and  war  crimes.  However,  it  is  clear  that  his  ideas  were  to  apply  between  States,  since 
in  his  opinion  just  and  unjust  wars  are  public  wars  between  sovereign  princes,  which  means 
internal  wars  are  without  any  regulation. 
5.  Vattel 
He  was  the  first  jurist  who  tried  to  discuss  the  question  of  the  application  and  observance 
of  the  laws  of  war  in  civil  wars.  In  this  respect,  Siotis  writes: 
"Les  iddes  avancdes  de  Vattel  tranchant  nettement  avec  la  practique  aussi  bien  que 
301bid. 
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Vattel  in  fact,  likened  civil  wars  to  international  wars,  and  argued  for  the  application  of  all 
rules  of  war  to  such  eventS.  35  Consequently,  he  holds  the  two  parties  to  be  bound  by  those 
rules  which  are  applicable  between  States. 
Nevertheless,  Vattel  who  champions  the  application  of  laws  of  war  to  civil  wars  (a  very 
advanced  stand  in  his  own  time),  did  not  attempt  to  elaborate  on  ways  of  ensuring  respect 
for  the  law  of  war,  apart  from  the  goodwill  and  free  acceptance  of  the  parties  themselves 
to  do  so. 
He  did,  however,  write  extensively  on  means  of  enforcing  international  law,  but  his  all 
references,  it  seems  were  made  to  the  law  of  peace  rather  than  the  laws  of  war.  He  in  fact, 
concontrated  on  means  of  ensuring  respect  for  obligations  laid  down  in  treaties.  He  was 
sceptical  about  reliance  on  good  faith  of  the  parties  as  a  sufficient  guarantee  against  the 
breach  of  obligations. 
He  stressed  the  importance  of  introducing  methods  which  are  independent  from  the 
parties  themselves  such  as  the  institution  of  'guaranty'  where  a  powerful  sovereign  acts  as 
a  guarantor,  to  ensure  the  respect  of  the  treaty  between  two  States,  which  means  this  did 
not  exclude  the  possibility  of  a  third  party  machinery. 
6.  Conclusions  as  to  the  Views  of  Classical  Writers 
In  my  opinion,  the  following  conclusions  can  be  made: 
(i)  All  the  references  to  the  necessity  of  observing  the  laws  of  war  were  made  in 
connection  with  "public  wars'  that  is  wars  between  sovereigns  and  princes,  and  not  civil 
wars.  The  exception  being  Vattel  who  in  this  matter  does  not  differentiate  between  civil  and 
international  wars  which  means  that  in  civil  wars,  in  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of  writers, 
the  question  is  left  entirely  to  the  discretion  of  the  rulers. 
(ii)  They  stressed  the  necessary  of  compliance  with  the  laws  of  war  by  linking  the  concept 
of  just  wars  to  Jus  In  bello  which  made  the  resort  to  just  wars,  connected  with  the  necessity 
of  conducting  justly,  that  is  to  observe  the  laws  and  customs  of  war. 
This  is  a  very  important  element  which  can  induce  the  belligerents  to  respect  the  laws  of 
war,  since  the  hatred  and  violations  of  those  rules  may  be  mitigated  if  the  belligerents 
believe  deeply  that  observance  of  the  laws  of  war  is  a  duty  imposed  by  just  war  itself. 
Thus,  the  doctrine  of  just  war,  which  is  essentially  a  doctrine  aiming  at  limiting  resort 
to  war,  has  been  made  the  very  vehicle  through  which  we  can  impose  compliance  with  the 
rules  of  warfare. 
(iii)  Self-interest  has  been  advanced  as  a  very  important  means  of  encouraging 
belligerents  to  respect  the  laws  of  war.  All  classical  writers  stress  the  importance  of  the  idea 
that  the  object  of  war  is  to  live  in  peace.  This  means  among  other  things,  that  we  must 
observe  the  laws  when  conducting  our  wars,  since  victory  by  means  contrary  to  the  laws  of 
war  will  not  bring  a  real  base  for  permanent  peace.  The  vanquished  would  wait  for  any 
34Softis, 
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348 occasion  to  avenge  their  losses.  This  will  not  be  in  the  interest  of  those  who  won  the  war, 
whereas,  on  the  contrary  by  observing  the  laws  of  war,  enemies  can  be  converted  to  friends. 
(iv)  In  connection  with  unjust  wars,  it  seems  that  classical  writers  condemn  any  resort  to 
them,  since  they  are  against  the  law  of  nature,  however  whenever  they  erupted  all  acts  are 
to  be  considered  unjust,  especially  actions  contrary  to  the  law  of  war.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  in  the  context  of  unjust  wars  that  classical  writers  tried  to  develop  certain  means  of 
ensuring  respect  for  the  laws  of  war  and  develop  also  certain  fundamental  principles 
concerning  criminal  justice  in  general.  Thus,  the  first  reference  to  the  need  to  punish  those 
guilty  of  waging  unjust  wars,  and  those  who  order  or  commit  violations  of  the  laws  of  war, 
and  also  the  non  -availability  of  the  plea  of  superior  orders,  as  a  defence  in  connection  with 
the  committing  of  such  crimes  can  be  observed. 
(v)  However,  generally  classical  writers  rested  the  need  to  ensure  respect  of  the  laws  of 
war  on  the  good  faith,  justice,  and  self-interest.  There  was  no  attempt  to  introduce  third 
party  control,  which  leads  me  to  speculate  that  the  evolving  notion  of  sovereignty  had  made 
such  an  attitude  unworthy  of  consideration  at  that  time. 
C.  Internal  Wars  and  Compliance  with  the  Laws  of  War  In  Customary  International  Law 
It  has  been  said  in  the  third  chapter  that  customary  international  law,  considered  civil  wars 
to  fall  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  States,  which  means  that  it  is  criminal  law  and 
not  international  law  which  regulate  the  relation  between  the  established  Government  and 
the  rebels.  The  question  of  compliance  then  finds  no  place,  since  there  is  nothing  to  comply 
with. 
However,  the  legal  device  through  which  customary  international  law  allowed  the 
application  of  the  laws  of  war  to  internal  conflict  was  the  institution  of  recognition  of 
belligerency.  Thus,  once  that  recognition  has  been  obtained  the  civil  war  becomes  in  effect 
an  international  conflict  which  means  that  the  question  of  compliance  and  observance  of 
the  laws  of  war  arises  in  these  circumstances.  On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  noted  that  the 
cases  of  recognition  of  belligerency  are  very  rare,  and  the  majority  of  civil  wars  were  not 
conducted  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  war. 
There  is  a  wide  consensus  between  writers  that  one  of  the  major  legal  effect  of 
recognition  of  belligerency  is  the  obligation  on  both  parties  to  comply  with  the  laws  of  war. 
Castren  observes  that: 
"...  [Slubsequent  to  the  recognition  (of  belligerency)  the  lawful  Government  is  under 
an  obligation  to  comply  with  the  international  rules  of  war  in  warfare  against  the 
insurgents,  and  is  likewise  entitled  to  expect  the  insurgents  to  observe  theM.  "36 
Consequently  then,  it  is  not  only  the  Government  which  is  obliged  to  respect  the  laws  of 
war,  the  insurgents  also  are  bound  to  do  so. 
The  question  which  arises  in  this  context  is  how  to  justify  the  application  of  rules,  which 
are  meant  to  regulate  the  relation  between  two  States,  to  insurgents  who  are  not  subjects 
36  E.  Castren:  Cfvft  War.  Suomatafnen  Tfedeakatema,  HeLainkf,  19, 
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349 of  international  law.  In  this  context,  Zorgbib  observes: 
"Le  parti  insurge,  une  fois  reconnu,  possbde  une  compdtence  spicialisie  projitee  vers 
une  finaliti  particuliere:  la  conducte  des  hostilitis-comp8tence  specialisee  mais 
intigrale,  gui  le  met  vis-i-vis  de  sdä-a'J-versaire  dans  lý,  meme  situation  d'un  ennemi 
itranger.  $@  7 
Thus,  at  least  in  the  matter  of  application  of  the  laws  of  war  the  insurgents  are  regarded  as 
having  the  status  of  a  subject  of  international  law.  Castren  makes  this  very  point,  he  notes: 
"...  [Ilnsurgents  recognised  as  belligerent  are  nonetheless  sub  ects  of  the  law  of  nations 
"3j  to  some  extent,  particularly  in  regard  to  the  law  of  war. 
Therefore,  the  insurgents  are  obliged  to  respect  too  the  laws  of  war  like  the  established 
Government. 
This  is  the  most  important  legal  effect  of  the  recognition  of  the  status  of  belligerency. 
Zorgbibe  observes  in  this  regard  that: 
"La  communauti  bellig8rente  jouit  donc  des  'pouvoirs  implicites'  n8cessaires  ä  la 
conduite  des  hostilit8s.  Elle  doit  appliquer  les  lois  de  la  guerre  et  a  le  droit  ä  leur 
so39  application. 
State  practice  also  suggests  that  once  the  recognition  of  belligerency  has  been  given,  the 
insurgent  movement  is  entitled  to  'exercise  complete  sovereign  authority  within  the  territory 
actually  within  its  authority,  40.  This  means  that  the  legal  personality  of  insurgents  is  here 
extended  to  other  branches  of  the  law,  other  than  the  laws  of  war. 
The  conclusion  then  at  this  stage  is  that  once  the  recognition  of  belligerency  has  been 
granted,  the  two  parties  are  international  persons,  at  least  in  connection  with  the  duty  to 
adhere  to  the  laws  of  war.  The  question  of  compliance  by  implication,  then,  is  the  same  as 
in  international  wars  which  leads  us  to  raise  the  question,  what  are  the  means  of  securing 
observance  of  the  laws  of  war  in  the  context  of  customary  international  law. 
1.  The  Means  of  Compliance  In  Customary  International  Law 
The  traditional  means  of  ensuring  respect  for  the  laws  of  war  apply  in  the  context  of 
international  wars  and  civil  wars,  when  the  recognition  of  belligerency  is  accorded. 
According  to  Oppenheim: 
"...  [S]ince  war  is  not  a  condition  of  anarchy  and  lawlessness,  international  law  requires 
that  belligerent  shall  comply  with  its  rules  in  carrying  on  their  military  and  naval 
operations.  vv41 
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350 In  the  opinion  of  these  learned  jurists,  war  conducted  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  the 
laws  of  war  is  'legitimate  warfare'  and  the  measures  which  constitute  such  legitimate 
warfare  in  customary  law  are  classified  under  three  heads  as  follows:  (i)  The  first  class 
comprises  measures  of  self-help,  reprisals;  punishment  of  war  crimes  committed  by  enemy 
soldiers  and  other  enemy  subjects  and  the  taking  of  hostages.  (ii)  The  second  class  includes 
complaints  lodged  with  the  enemy  and  with  neutral  States;  good  offices;  mediation  and 
intervention  by  a  third  and  neutral  State.  (iii)  The  third  class  comprises  the  right  to 
compensation,  42 
However,  it  seems  that  the  first  class  of  means  of  enforcing  the  laws  of  war  constitutes 
the  means  which  the  parties  resorted  to  frequently  in  practice,  and  even  among  the  means 
mentioned  in  that  class,  it  is  reprisals  which  stood  as  the  real  means  of  ensuring  respect  for 
the  laws  of  war. 
Regarding  the  general  position  on  the  observance  of  the  laws  of  war  Schwarzenberger 
pointed  out  that  this  'rests  primarily  on  the  expectation  of  their  self-  enforcement.  '43  In 
other  words,  reciprocity  governs  the  attitude  of  belligerents  concerning  observance  and 
compliance  with  the  laws  of  war. 
According  to  him,  the  rules  of  war  which  do  not  interfere  seriously  with  the  necessities 
of  war  benefit  greatly  from  the  principle  of  reciprocity,  such  as  rules  relating  to  the 
protection  of  the  wounded  and  sick.  In  this  sphere,  the  principle  of  reciprocity  benefits 
both  sides  and  hence,  operates  as  a  very  positive  means  of  ensuring  respect  for  the  rules  of 
war. 
However,  the  real  problem  of  observance  is  represented  by  those  rules  of  warfare  in 
which  the  standard  of  civilization  overrides  the  necessities  of  war  or a  true  compromise  is 
achieved  between  thern.  44  In  that  case  two  hypothesis  exist.  The  first  is  that  the  belligerent 
party  instruct  their  army  to  observe  the  laws  of  war,  and  would  punish  any  violations  of  the 
laws  of  war,  in  that  case  no  problem  can  arise,  since  law  is  respected. 
In  the  second  hypothesis,  it  is  the  authorities  of  the  belligerent  power  themselves  who 
order,  or  connive  at  large-scale  violations  of  the  laws  of  war.  In  this  case,  which  more 
closely  reflects  the  practice  of  States  (as  the  two  world  wars  reveal),  international  law  does 
not  provide  any  means  of  stopping  such  violations. 
According  to  Schwarzenberger  in  this  case,  the  belligerent  victim  of  such  violations  has 
either: 
blic  opinion  "...  [T]o  bide  his  time,  rely  on  the  effects  of  his  enemy's  lawlessness  on  pu  45  in  allied  and  neutral  countries  and  settle  accounts  when  victory  is  won.  " 
However,  if  that  belligerent  prefers  immediate  action,  the  only  means  provided  by 
international  law  is  reprisals,  which  in  the  opinion  of  Schwarzenberger  'reverse  the 
operation  of  the  chief  working  principle  behind  the  laws  of  war  from  positive  to  negative 
42  lbid,  p.  558. 
43  Op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  4,  n.  44,  VoL.  2,  p.  452. 
44  Ibid. 
45 
lbfd,  p.  453. 
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Because  of  the  prominent  role  played  by  the  institution  of  reprisals  in  the  domaine  of 
ensuring  respect  for  the  laws  of  war,  I  propose  to  deal  with  them  briefly. 
1.1.  Reprisals 
Reprisals  constitute  in  customary  international  law  the  main  means  of  enforcing  the  law  of 
war;  in  the  words  of  Draper. 
"It  is  probably  the  oldest  and  most  primitive  mechanism  for  the  application  of  the  law 
of  armed  confliCt.  "47 
They  were  known  and  practised  by  States  for  a  long  time.  Nahlik  maintained  the  reason  for 
this  is  that: 
"Dans  un  presque-vide  juridique  et  organisationel  il  6tait  bien  naturel  de  ne  compter 
que  sur  ses  propres  forces  et  ses  propres  moyens  pour  dissuader  I'adversaire  de 
poursuivre  les  atrocitds  auquelles  il  6tait  livr6  A  1'encontre  des  personnes  ou  des  biens 
"48  d6pendant  de  celui  qui  voulait  protdger. 
This  means  that  in  the  absence  of  a  centralised  agency  which  supervise  the  application  of 
the  law,  individual  members  have  to  take  the  law  into  their  hands  and  seek  revenge.  Thus, 
unlawful  acts  are  remedied  by  unlawful  acts. 
Many  judgments  especially  by  prize  courts,  upheld  the  right  of  belligerent  to  resort  to 
reprisals.  49  Lord  Sterndale  in  the  Noordam-Case  stressed  that: 
"A  Convention  of  this  kind  [Hague  Convention  No.  XII  cannot  deprive  one 
belligerent  of  the  right  of  reprisal  against  anoth 
is  breaking  every  canon  of  international  laW.  "59 
r,  especially  if  that  other  belligerent 
The  Oxford  Manual  of  1880  maintained  the  legality  of  reprisals  as  a  mode  of  ensuring 
respect  for  the  laws  of  war,  however,  under  strict  conditions  of  necessity  and 
proportional  ity.  51 
On  the  other  hand  Lauterpacht-Oppenheim  observed  that: 
"...  [R]eprisals  between  belligerent  cannot  be  dispensed  with,  for  the  effect  of  their 
use  and  of  the  fear  of  their  being  used  cannot  be  denied.  Every  belligerent  and  every 
member  of  his  forces,  knows  for  certain  that  reprisals  are  to  be  expected  in  case  they 
461bid. 
47G.  I.  A.  D.  Draper:  Implementation  and  Enforcement  of  International  Hunanitarian  Law  in  Armed 
Conflicts.  28  International  Affairs,  1972.  p.  49. 
48S 
E.  Nahtik:  Les  probt6mes  des  ripresaities  A  ta  tumi6re  des  travaux  de  is  Conf6rence  DipLomatique 
sur  te  droit  humanitaire.  82  RGDIP,  1978,  p.  130. 
49See 
the  Annual  Digest  and  Reports  of  International  Law  (1919-22),  Case  No.  288.  See  also  Case  No.  297. 
Longmans  Green  &  Co.,  London.  New  York,  Toronto,  1932. 
50 
Ibid,  p.  430. 
5'See  Articles  85  and  86  in  Schindler  and  Toman  (eds.  ),  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  2,  n.  63,  p.  48. 
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Some  writers  doubted  the  efficacy  of  reprisals  in  practice,  to  them  reprisals  have  been  used 
as  a  'convenient  cloak  for  violations  of  international  law.  '53  The  majority  of  writers 
especially  since  the  end  of  the  19th  century  and  the  advent  of  the  First  World  War  have 
54  become  increasingly  critical  of  reprisals. 
The  general  picture  is  that  reprisals  were  admitted  in  customary  international  law  as  an 
effective  means  of  ensuring  respect  for  the  laws  of  war.  However,  because  in  practice  they 
usually  hit  the  innocent,  a  growing  body  of  opposition  to  their  use  has  arisen.  55 
Moreover,  it  seems  to  me  that  reprisals  in  effect  represent  a  very  good  instance  of  the 
operation  of  the  unlimited  notion  of  sovereignty,  since  the  intervention  of  a  third  party  for 
the  enforcement  of  the  laws  of  war  and  hence  repression  of  violations  of  such  laws)  was  not 
allowed  at  that  period. 
2.  Case  Studies 
It  is  very  important  to  try  to  find  in  the  practice  of  civil  wars,  in  which  recognition  of 
belligerency  has  been  granted,  the  means  by  which  the  belligerent  tried  to  secure  the 
observance  of  the  laws  of  war. 
2.1.  The  American  War  of  Independence  (1774-83) 
In  that  war  the  institution  of  recognition  of  belligerency,  as  a  legal  institution  has  not 
appeared  yet.  However,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  Sir  James  Robertson,  the  British  Chief 
Commander,  wrote  to  General  Washington  of  his  readiness  to  conduct  the  war  according 
to  the  rules  of  humanity,  56  and  inviting  him  to  take  the  necessary  measures  to  punish 
violations  of  the  rules  of  war.  General  Washington  accepted  the  offer. 
It  seems  in  general  that: 
520p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  41,  p.  562. 
531bid, 
p.  563. 
54For 
a  different  opinion  on  the  subject,  see  R.  G.  Blerzanek:  Reprisats  as  a  Means  of  Enforcing  the 
Laws  of  War:  the  OLd  and  the  New  Law,  in  Cassese  (ed.  ),  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  4,  n.  94,  p.  237  ff. 
551n  this  context,  Kalshoven  writes: 
wThere  are,  however,  two  main  drawbacks:  beltigerent  reprisats  tend  to  constitute  an  over- 
reaction  to  the  originat  wrong,  and  they  are  HkeLy  to  hit  innocent  peopte". 
F.  KaLshoven:  The  Law  of  Warfare.  A.  W.  Sijhoff  &  Henry  Dunant  Institute,  Geneva,  1973,  p.  111. 
56  Sir  J.  Robertson  wrote: 
"Monsieur,  ayant  reýu  une  commission  du  rot  qui  me  norwe  commandant  en  chef  de  ses  forces  dans 
te  pays,  un  des  premiers  soins  que  le  prends,  clest  de  vous  convaincre  de  mon  d6sire  de  faire 
ta  guerre  conform6ment  aux  r6gles  trac6es  par  ilhumanit6,  et  aux  exemptes  que  nous  recommandent 
tes  nations  tes  ptus  civitis6es.  Je  vous  fais  cette  dicLaration  de  ma  rksotution  dans  tlespoir 
de  trouver  une  disposition  anatogue  de  votre  c8t6.  Pour  attaindre  ce  but,  convenons  de  privenir 
ou  de  punir  les  viotations  des  rkgLes  de  in  guerre,  chacun  dans  la  sph6re  de  notre 
coiTuiandement.  u 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  34,  p.  60. 
353 ny  a  aucun  doute  qu'en  rýgle  g6n6rale,  les  lois  de  la  guerre  furent  observ6 
de  part  et  d'autre  dans  les  hostilitds  entre  les  troupes  Britaniques  et  Americanes.  "; 
'ý 
This  means  that  reciprocity  in  adherence  to  the  laws  of  war  was  essential  for  compliance 
with  the  law  in  that  case.  The  history  of  that  war  also  affords  us  with  examples  of  the 
desire  of  the  belligerent  to  punish  violations  of  the  usages  of  war.  Thus,  General 
Washington  on  September  24th,  1776  wrote  against  the  practice  of  plundering  and  ordered 
punishment  for  those  guilty  of  its  use: 
"I  have  ordered  instant  corporal  punishment  upon  every  man  who  passes  our  lines, 
or  is  seen  with  plunder,  that  the  offenders  may  be  punished  for  disobedience  of 
orders;  and  I  have  enclosed  to  you  (Joseph  Reed)  the  proceedings  of  a  court-martial 
held  upon  an  officer  who  with  a  party  of  men  robbed  a  house  a  little  beyond  our  line 
of  a  number  of  valuable  goods...  He  was  met  by  a  brigade  major  who  ordered  him  to 
return  the  goods  taken  contrary  to  orders;  which  he  not  only  refused  to  do  but  drew 
up  his  party  and  swore  he  would  defend  them  at  the  hazard  of  his  life;  on  which  I 
ordered  him  to  be  arrested  and  tried  for  plundering,  disobedience  of  orders  and 
mutiny.  For  the  result  I  refer  to  the  proceedings  of  the  court,  whose  judgment 
appeared  so  exceedingly  extraordinary  that  I  ordered  a  reconsideration  of  the  matter, 
upon  which,  and  with  the  assistance  of  fresh  evidence,  they  made  shift  to  cashier 
hiM.  "58 
It  is  clear  that  there  is  a  real  will  on  the  part  of  General  Washington  to  abide  by  the  laws 
and  customs  of  war  and  enforce  them  when  they  are  broken.  In  my  opinion,  this  serves  two 
important  purposes;  first  to  make  the  troops  conform  to  what  he  agreed  with  the  British, 
and  secondly  to  keep  discipline  within  his  army. 
However,  the  first  attempt  to  issue  orders  which  make  some  acts  war  crimes  and  establish 
tribunals  of  adjudication  was  during  the  Mexican  War  when  the  famous  General  Order  20 
of  February  19,1847  was  issued  by  General  Winfield  Scot.  The  order  states  that: 
"Assassination,  murder,  poisoning,  rape  or  the  attempt  to  commit  either,  malicious 
stabbing  or  maiming,  malicious  assault  and  battery,  robbery,  theft,  the  wanton 
desecration  of  churches,  cemeteries,  or  other  religious  edifices  and  pictures,  the 
interruption  of  religious  ceremonies,  and  the  destruction,  except  by  order  of  a 
superior  officer,  of  public  or  private  property,  whether  committed  by  Mexicans  or 
other  civilians  in  Mexico  against  individuals  of  the  US  military  forces,  or  by  such 
individuals  against  other  such  individuals  or  against  Mexican  or  civilians  should  be 
brought  before  military  commissions.  "59 
These  commissions  were  used  extensively,  they  dealt  mainly  with  criminal  offences  which 
would  be  tried  in  civilian  courts.  General  Scot  also  established  a  'Council  of  War'  which 
tried  violations  of  the  laws  of  war  proper.  The  main  charges  referred  to  this  council  were 
guerilla  warfare  or  violations  of  the  laws  of  war  by  guerillas,  and  enticing  or  attempting  to 
60  entice  soldiers  to  desert  their  service. 
57 
Ibid. 
58 
Cited  by  E.  Coiby:  War  Crimes.  23  MLR,  1924-1925,  pp.  500-501. 
59 
W.  Winthrop:  Mititary  Law  and  Precedents.  2nd  ed.,  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.  C., 
1920,  para.  1298,  p.  832. 
60 
Ibid,  para.  1299,  p.  832. 
354 The  importance  of  the  creation  of  military  commissioners  lays  in  the  fact,  that  they  were 
the  originals  of  the  military  courts  created  later  in  the  American  Civil  War. 
2.2.  The  American  Civil  War 
In  this  case  I  will  concentrate  on  the  means  of  enforcing  the  rules  of  war,  stipulated  in  the 
Lieber  Code,  and  also  the  real  practice  vis-&-vis  this  subject  in  the  conduct  of  the 
belligerents. 
It  is  to  be  stressed  at  the  outset  that  the  mere  fact  of  codifying  the  rules  of  war  in  an 
official  act,  and  the  instruction  of  the  army  to  follow  its  rules,  is  in  itself  a  real  means  of 
ensuring  respect  for  the  laws  of  war,  since  ignorance  of  the  law  often  leads  to  barbarity. 
The  main  means  envisaged  by  the  Code  to  ensure  compliance  with  the  law,  reflect  in 
essence  what  customary  international  law  says  about  the  matter,  reprisals,  punishment  of 
war  crimes  and  lastly  the  taking  of  hostages. 
2.2.1.  Reprisals 
The  Code  admits  of  reprisals,  as  a  clear  legal  means  of  ensuring  respect  for  the  laws  of  war. 
Article  27  states: 
"The  law  of  war  can  no  more  wholly  dispense  with  retaliation  than  can  the  law  of 
nations,  of  which  it  is  a  branch.  Yet  civilized  nations  acknowledge  retaliation  as  the 
sternest  feature  of  war.  A  reckless  enemy  often  leaves  to  his  opponent  no  other  means 
"61  of  securing  himself  against  the  repetition  of  barbarous  outrage. 
This  is  an  exposition  of  the  general  principle.  The  Code  then  lists  the  criteria  to  which 
resort  to  reprisals  must  be  adhered  to.  Article  28  indicates  that  reprisals  are  never  'measures 
of  revenge!  They  are  only  'means  of  protective  retribution'.  Hence,  reprisals  may  be 
resorted  to  only  'after  careful  inquiry  into  the  real  occurrence,  and  the  character  of  their 
,  62  misdeeds  that  may  demand  retribution. 
It  is  clear  here  that  resort  to  reprisals  does  not  depend  on  the  free  will  of  the  belligerent, 
but  on  stringent  criteria,  which  if  adhered  to  in  practice,  would  make  recourse  to  it  very 
rare. 
The  Code'contains  specific  cases  where  reprisals  are  permitted  and  instances  where  it  is 
forbidden.  As  to  the  first,  they  are  permitted  in  Articles  58,59,63  and  65.63  This  is  an 
example.  ATtiCle  58  PTOvides: 
"The  law  of  nations  knows  of  no  distinction  of  colour  and  if  an  enemy  of  the  US 
should  enslave  and  sell  any  captured  persons  of  their  army,  it  would  be  a  case  for  the 
severest  retaliation,  if  not  redressed  upon  complaint.  "64 
As  to  the  second,  the  Code  prohibits  reprisals  in  case  of  Article  70,  which  states  that: 
61  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  51,  p.  7. 
621bid. 
63  lbid,  pp.  11-12. 
64  Jbid,  p.  11. 
355 "The  use  of  poison  in  any  manner.  be  it  to  poison  wells,  or  food,  or  arms,  is  wholly 
excluded  from  modern  warfare.  He  that  uses  it  puts  himself  of  the  pale  of  the  law 
"65  and  usages  of  war. 
However,  the  practice  shows  that  many  examples  of  reprisals  existed.  On  July  30th,  1863, 
President  Lincoln  issued  an  order  of  'counter-  retaliation.  In  it  was  stipulated  that: 
"...  [F]or  every  Union  soldier  killed  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  war  a  rebel 
soldier  ...  (was  to'  be  placed  at  hard  labour-and  (so) 
6gontinued  ...  until  the 
other...  (should)  receive  the  treatment  due  a  prisoner  of  war.  " 
Moreover,  when  the  Confederate  forces  executed  two  Union  prisoners  as  retaliation  for  the 
execution  of  the  Union  of  two  of  its  officers  for  espionage  charges,  Present  Lincoln  ordered 
the  immediate  seizure  of  General  Lee's  son  and  a  Confederate  prisoner  and  hanged  them 
67  the  moment  authentic  information  was  received  of  the  execution  of  the  Union  officers. 
Furthermore,  in  1862  President  J.  Davis  declared  that  in  retaliation  for  the  use  of  slaves 
by  the  Union  forces,  Union's  Generals  Phelps  and  Hunter  were  to  be  tried  as  outlaws  and 
68  executed  upon  capture. 
The  cruelty  especially  of  the  Confederate  army  vis-&-vis  prisoners  of  war  they  captured 
led  Congress  to  adopt  a  resolution  recommending  retaliation  to  stop  such  acts.  Discussions 
in  the  Congress  reveals  that  the  general  mood  was  with  the  adoption  of  an  open  policy  of 
retaliation,  as  the  only  means  of  inducing  the  Confederates  to  conform  to  the  laws  of  war. 
Thus,  Senator  Lane  supporting  such  policy,  argued: 
"Now,  sir,  if  this  is  to  be  a  war  of  extermination  let  not  the  extermination  be  all  upon 
one  side.  Mercy  to  felons  and  traitors  is  cruelty  to  our  own  soldiers  in  southern 
prisons  ...  they  now  indulge  in  a  system  of  warfare  the  most  barbarous  and  atrocious 
known  to  the  history  of  modern  civilisation,  and  they  can  do  no  worse  if  we  resolve,  in  justice  to  our  soldiers  to  mete  out  to  those  we  have  captured  from  the  rebel  army 
their  own  measure;  at  least  until  they  shall  reform  their  conduct  in  reference  to  our 
men.  Will  any  acts6?  f  ours  further  exasperate  those  felons  and  traitors  and  demons, 
in  human  shape.  "  Congressman  Wade  argued  for  giving  the  same  inhuman 
treatment  of  Union  prisoners,  he  stressed  "I  have  no  doubt  that  a  prompt  and  stern 
resort  to  retaliation  will  have  ...  beneficial  effect.  w70 
However,  a  minority  of  senators  and  congressmen  argued  against  such  course.  Congressman 
Hendricks  stated: 
"I  am  free  to  say  I  do  not  feel  that  the  condition  of  my  friends  in  the  southern  prisons 
will  be  made  any  better,  and  they  be  made  any  happier,  by  seeing  some  men  in  our 
651bid,  p.  13. 
66Cfted  by  R.  Arens:  Vicarious  Punishment  and  War  Crimes  Prosecutions:  The  Civil.  War  or  Mice  Through 
the  Looking  Gtass.  WULO,  1951,  p.  75. 
671bid. 
681bid, 
p.  74. 
691bid, 
p.  78. 
701bid,  p-79. 
356 prisons  here  in  the  North  starved  to  death.  "71 
Senator  Summer  observed  that: 
"I  believe  that  the  Senate  will  not  undertake  in  this  age  of  christian  light,  under  any 
inducement,  under  any  provocation,  to  counsel  the  executive  Government  to  enter 
*72  into  any  such  competition  with  barbarism. 
However,  on  January  31st,  1865.  the  US  Senate  passed  a  resolution  which  generally  leans 
towards  advocating  a  policy  of  retaliation.  It  stated: 
"The  executive  and  military  authorities  of  the  US  are  hereby  directed  to  retaliate 
upon  the  prisoners  of  the  enemy  in  such  manner,  in  conformity  with  the  laws  and 
usages  of  war  among  civilised  nations,  as  shall  be  effective  in  deterring  him  from 
the  perpetration  in  future  of  cruel  and  barbarous  treatment  of  our  soldiers.  "73 
The  conclusion  is  that  reprisals  which  were  originally  seen  in  the  Lieber  Code  with 
suspicion  and  distrust  since  they  may  lead  belligerent  in  the  words  of  Article  28  'nearer  to 
the  intercine  wars  of  savages',  have  become  in  practice  an  accepted  Federal  and  Confederate 
policy  in  dealing  with  what  they  see  in  each  other's  conduct  as  violations  of  accepted  rules 
of  war. 
The  two  belligerent  claimed  that  the  purpose  for  resorting  to  retaliation  and  counter- 
retaliation  was  to  enforce  respect  for  rules  of  warfare.  However,  the  practice  shows  clearly 
that  it  is  the  innocent  who  became  the  victim,  and  that  instead  of  stopping  violations 
reprisals  have  led  to  more  violations. 
2.2.2.  Punishment  of  War  Crimes: 
The  second  method  used  in  the  American  Civil  War  to  enforce  the  laws  of  war,  was  the 
creation  of  what  is  called  'military  commissions'  with  the  mandate  to  try  criminals  of  war. 
The  practice  shows  that  even  before  the  Lieber  Code  some  instances  of  creating  'military 
commissions'  to  deal  with  violations  of  the  laws  of  war  can  be  found.  In  1861,  at  Yorktown, 
General  McClellan  ordered  that: 
"All  acts  committed  by  either  officers,  soldiers  or  other  persons,  connected  with  the 
army,  or  by  inhabitants  or  other  persons,  which  are  commonly  recognized  as  crimes 
against  society;  or  which  may  be  done  in  contravention  of  the  established  rules  of 
"74  war,  shall  be  punished  by  a  court  or  military  commission. 
The  Lieber  Code  contains  a  series  of  crimes  punishable  by  death  penalty  (Articles  44,46, 
47,88,89,91,95.96  and  101).  Generally,  the  acts  punishable  by  death  penalty  concern  acts 
of  treason  by  citizens  and  spying  by  enemy  subjects.  Military  commissions  which  grew 
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357 essentially  from  custom  and  use75  had  jurisdiction  to  deal  with  the  following  persons: 
(i)  Individuals  of  the  enemy's  army  who  have  been  guilty  of  illegitimate  warfare  or  other 
offences  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  war;  (ii)  inhabitants  of  enemy's  country  occupied  and 
held  by  the  right  of  conquest;  (iii)  inhabitants  of  places  or  districts  under  martial  law;  and 
(iv)  officers  and  soldiers  of  our  own  army,  or  persons  serving  with  it  in  the  field  who,  in 
time  of  war,  become  chargeable  with  crimes  or  offences  not  recognisable  or  triable  by 
76  criminal  courts  or  under  the  Articles  of  war. 
During  the  period  of  the  Civil  War  and  until  the  end  of  reconstruction  these  commissions 
77  tried  nearly  2000  cases. 
The  main  offences  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  war  dealt  with  by  these  commissions  were: 
breaches  of  the  law  of  non-intercourse  with  the  enemy,  engaging  in  illegal  warfare  as  a 
guerrilla,  spying,  taking  life  or  obtaining  any  advantage  by  means  of  treachery,  abuse  or 
violation  of  a  flag  of  truce,  etc. 
78  The  US  Supreme  Court  upheld  the  decisions  of  such 
courts  in  many  instances.  It  also  stressed  that  one  of  its  duties  is  the  application  of  the  laws 
of  war.  Thus,  in  the  Ex  Party  Oulng  Case,  it  stated: 
"...  [F]rom  the  beginning  of  its  history  this  court  has  recognised  and  applied  the  law 
of  war,  for  the  conduct  of  war.  The  status,  rights  and  duties  of  enemy  nations  as  well 
"79  as  of  enemy  individuals. 
After  the  end  of  the  war,  however,  President  Johnson  decreed  on  May  29th,  1865  a  general 
amnesty  for  all  with  the  exception  of  the  leaders  of  the  rebellion.  The  Lieber  Code  did  not 
in  fact  prohibit  trial  of  rebels  after  the  war  for  treason  (Articles  154  and  157).  Indictments 
were  issued  against  President  J.  Davis  and  his  Cabinet.  He  was  held  for  two  years  in  prison 
and  the  members  of  his  Cabinet  for  shorter  periods.  None  were  tried.  Only  Henry  Wirtz  was 
tried  and  hanged for  his  brutal  treatment  of  Union  prisoners  of  war.  80 
The  practice  of  the  American  Civil  War  shows  that  very  modest  steps  were  taken  to 
ensure  respect  for  the  laws  of  war,  reprisals  in  theory  were  restricted  within  certain  limits 
of  necessary.  However,  the  practice  did  not  conform  fully  to  that  stipulation. 
As  to  the  use  of  military  courts,  it  seems  that  their  practice  confined  itself  in  the  big 
majority  of  cases  to  enemy  violations  and  also  of  citizens  who  helped  the  enemy.  In  other 
words,  the  majority  of  cases  turned  around  spying  and  treason  which  can  be  explained 
easily  by  the  desire  of  the  Union  to  protect  its  armed  forces.  Hence  self-interest  was  the 
obstacle  to  a  real  extension  of  the  powers  of  these  tribunals. 
Moreover,  there  is  no  indication  whatsoever  that  the  established  Government,  in  this  case 
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358 the  Federal  Government,  had  contemplated,  or  thought  of  the  introduction  of  third  party 
machinery,  for  the  control  of  the  application  of  the  laws  of  war.  This  would  I  suspect,  have 
been  considered  a  direct  violation  of  its  sovereignty.  Thus,  reprisals  and  military 
commissions  were  in  a  way  the  means  of  enforcing  the  laws  of  war,  which  were  in 
accordance  with  the  requirements  of  sovereignty  and  non-intervention. 
2.3.  Other  Cases 
The  general  picture  is  that  in  other  cases  of  civil  wars  which  occurred  during  the  19th  and 
early  20th  century,  no  recognition  of  belligerency  has  been  granted,  except  perhaps  in  the 
Boer  war,  which  meant  that  no  respect  has  been  shown  by  the  belligerents  to  the  laws  of 
war,  since  especially  in  the  view  of  the  established  Government  the  matter  is  solely 
regulated  by  criminal  law  and  thus  sovereignty  overrides  any  other  consideration. 
In  the  Paris  Commune,  which  lasted  only  70  days,  and  resulted  in  30,000-35,000  deaths, 
the  established  Government's  view  was  that  criminal  and  military  law  regulated  relations 
between  themselves  and  the  rebels  It  declared  in  one  instance  that: 
"Quelques  hommes  reconnus  pour  appartenir  ä  l'arm6e  saisis  les  armes  ä  la  main,  ont 
ite  pass8s  par  les  armes,  suivant  la  rigueur  de  la  loi  militaire  qui  frappe  les  soldats 
combattant  leur  drapeau  w.  81 
This  meant  that  they  were  tried  and  executed  for  treason,  not  according  to  the  laws  of  war, 
but  according  to  the  military  law  of  the  French  army.  This  stand  of  the  established 
Government  led  the  insurgents  to  follow  a  policy  of  reprisals,  which  meant  a  serious 
escalation  in  atrocities. 
The  insurgents  declared  that: 
"le  gouvernement  de  Versailles  se  met  en  dehors  des  lois  de  la  guerre  et  de  I'humanitd; 
force  nous  sur  d'user  de  r6presailles.  Si,  continuant  A  m6connaitre  les  conditions 
habituelles  de  la  guerre  entre  peuples  civiles  nos  ennemis  massacrent  encore  un  seul 
de  nos  soldats,  nous  rdpondons  par  1ex6cution  d'un  nombre  igal  au  double  de 
"82  prisoniers. 
The  result  was  horrible,  prisoners  killed,  hostages  taken  and  executed  by  the  two  sides. 
There  was  a  complete  absence  of  laws  of  war,  which  meant  that  the  question  of  compliance 
had  no  place.  Thus  sovereignty  led  in  the  end  to  the  absence  of  humanity. 
The  same  picture  prevailed  in  other  cases  of  civil  wars,  in  the  Spanish  Latin  American 
wars,  violations  of  the  laws  of  war  was  systematic,  especially  by  the  Spanish  troops.  83  The 
Greek  war  of  independence  also  witnessed  the  most  flagrant  violations  of  the  laws  of  war 
by  both  sides,  total  disregard  for  the  laws  of  war  prevailed  in  these  instances.  Siotis 
concluded  in  regard  to  this  war  that: 
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359 "Sans  donner  Nnum6ration  d'ailleurs  inutile  des  crimes  les  plus  cruels  nous  pouvon$ 
conclure  que  les  lois  de  la  guerre  ne  furent  nullement  appliqu6es  dans  le  confli  t.  "84 
It  seems  that  in  these  cases  established  Governments  saw  themselves  as  acting  in  a  manner 
which  was  consistent  with  their  sovereignty,  hence  their  right  to  put  down  rebellion  by  any 
means  at  their  disposal,  the  concept  of  absolute  sovereignty  was  still  at  its  height. 
In  the  Boer  War,  the  answer  as  to  whether  the  British  troops  were  conducting  the  war 
according  to  the  laws  of  war,  is  by  no  means  clear.  At  least,  it  is  certain  that  no  official 
instruction  to  the  army  to  conform  to  the  Hague  Regulations  of  1899,  to  which  Britain  was 
a  party,  had  been  issued.  However,  statements  from  British  officials  were  contradictory. 
Field  Marshall  Lord  Wolseley,  the  Commander-  in-Chief  at  the  War  Office,  wrote: 
"I  know  the  Boers  of  all  classes  to  be  most  untruthful  in  all  their  dealings  with  us  and 
even  amongst  themselves.  They  are  very  cunning,  a  characteristic  common  to  all 
untruthful  races  ... 
To  accept  to  tie  our  hands  in  any  way,  no  matter  how  small,  by  the 
'laws  and  customs  of  war'  proposed  for  civilized  nations  at  the  peace  conference 
would  in  rný  opinion  be  suicidal,  for  the  Boers  would  not  be  bound  by  any  such 
amenities.  "8 
He  then  added: 
"I  cannot  conceive  how  any  notifications  by  us  during  the  present  war,  that  we  shall 
act  upon  the  above  referred  to  'laws'  etc.  would  help  us,  but  I  can  imagine  many 
positions  and  circumstances  where  any  such  one-sided  adherence  to  those  laws  could 
be  prejudicial  to  our  military  interests  of  the  moment.  "86 
The  heart  of  this  argument  is  that  the  British  cannot  apply  rules  of  war  because  that  would 
be  against  the  military  advantages  which  may  be  gained  by  non-adherence. 
However,  in  total  opposition  to  this  stand,  Major-General  Sir  John  Ardagh,  the  Director 
of  Military  Intelligence  (1896-1901)  who  acted  as  an  expert  on  land  warfare  to  the  British 
delegate  at  the  Hague  Conference  of  1899  stressed: 
"Although  the  Boers  have  not  acceded  formally  to  the  Hague  Conventions  and  its 
provisions  are  not  binding  technically  in  a  war  between  a  contracting  and  a  non- 
contracting  power,  the  consequence  of  this  condition  is  to  relegate  the  conditions 
upon  what  is  and  is  not  permissible  to  the  general  body  of  international  law,  in  which 
principles  identical  with  the  above  have  for  many  years  been  incorporated.  For 
practical  purposes,  therefore,  the  Hague  Convention  may  be  properly  applied  to  by 
"87  both  sides. 
However,  it  seems  that  there  was  a  general  consensus  that  even  if  the  Hague  Convention  of 
1899  did  not  apply  (since  the  insurgents  also  did  not  issue  any  declaration  that  they 
recognised  this  convention)  usages  and  customs  of  war  apply  in  the  context. 
The  practice  shows  that  gross  violations  occurred  and  that  Lords  Roberts  and  Kitchener 
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360 used  methods  which  were  against  the  usages  of  war.  They  resorted  to  reprisals,  the  taking 
of  hostages  and  collective  responsibility  not  as  means  of  enforcing  respect  for  the  laws  of 
war,  but  in  order  to  induce  the  insurgents  to  lay  down  their  arms  and  surrender. 
When  Lord  Roberts  on  May  3rd,  1900  occupied  the  locality  of  Brandford,  he  issued  the 
following  warning: 
"I  shall  hold  Brandford  responsible  for  any  damage  done  to  the  railway  from  this 
point  to  Karee  Siding  (south  of  Brandford).  You  can  make  what  arrangements  you 
like  for  the  protection  of  the  line  and  telegraph,  but  if  either  are  damaged  the  six 
principal  inhabitants  of  Brandford  will  be  made  prisoners  of  war  and  dealt  with  by 
martial  law.  "88 
Thus,  collective  punishment  as  a  reprisal  for  any  attacks  of  trains  and  telegraph  lines,  has 
been  resorted  to,  this  is  in  flagrant  violation  of  customs  of  war,  since  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
belligerents  to  protect  such  objects  and  not  the  civilians.  Roberts  also  ordered  that  civilians 
should  be  sent  on  trains  as  hostages  to  prevent  attacks  by  the  insurgents. 
The  Boar's  official  account  of  the  negotiations  with  the  British  at  the  end  of  the  war, 
stressed  that: 
"...  [N]ot  the  arms  of  the  enemy  which  directly  compelled  us  to  surrender,  but  another 
sword  which  they  had  stretched  out  over  us-namely,  the  sword  of  hunger  and 
nakedness,  and  what  weighted  most  heavily  of  all  the  awful  mortality  amongst  our 
women  and  children  in  the  concentration  camps. 
ý9 
It  is  by  all  accounts  clear  that  concentration  camps  were  against  the  customs  of  war. 
However,  there  is  evidence  that  the  British  have  convened  war  crimes  in  some  instances  to 
punish  flagrant  violations  of  laws  and  customs  of  war.  90 
The  general  conclusion  is  that  the  British  Government  by  failing  to  instruct  its  forces  to 
adhere  to  the  Hague  regulations  to  which  it  was  a  party,  has  in  fact  opened  the  way  for  the 
non-respect  of  the  laws  of  war  which  followed.  Demands  of  military  advantage  had 
Prevailed  over  demands  for  respect  of  the  law  and  humanity. 
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connection  with  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  The  benefit  of  this  clause  will  not  extend  to 
certain  acts,  contrary  to  usages  of  war  which  have  been  notified  by  Commander-  in-Chief  to  the 
Boer  Generals,  and  which  shall  be  tried  by  court-martial  Immediately  after  the  close  of 
hostiLities.  " 
The  second  sentence  of  this  ctause  had  not  been  in  the  originat  draft.  It  has  been  added  upon  a 
request  of  the  Cabinet,  since  in  the  words  of  Chambertain  it  Is  necessary: 
0...  [T]o  bear  in  mind  that  we  have  inf  tI  cted  death  penalty  on  our  own  officers  and  men  for  acts 
contrary  to  the  usages  of  war  and  that  the  exemption  of  Boers  from  liability  to  prosecution 
for  such  offences  might  arouse  strong  feelings  here  and  in  colonies.  " 
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361 3.  The  Effects  of  Codification  of  the  Laws  of  War  and  Means  for  Compliance  with  Them. 
The  efforts  which  began  as  from  1864  to  codify  the  laws  and  customs  of  war,  did  not  in 
general  bring  important  changes  to  the  question  of  implementation,  enforcement  and 
supervision.  In  fact,  all  the  conventions  concluded  were  expressly  to  apply  only  to  wars 
between  States,  civil  wars  were  excluded,  the  State  retained  its  freedom  in  dealing  with  its 
enemies.  The  conventions  relied  for  their  application  on  the  good  will  of  the  parties  to  carry 
out  their  obligations  in  the  spirit  of  reciprocity. 
The  first  Geneva  Convention  of  1864  dealt  with  the  amelioration  of  the  condition  of  the 
wounded  in  the  armies  in  the  field.  Pictet  observes  in  connection  with  that  convention: 
"The  Convention  was  the  point  of  departure  for  the  great  movement  in  international 
law  for  the  protection  of  war  victims  represented  by  the  Geneva  Convention  as  a 
whole.  "91 
However,  Article  8  concerning  implementation  stipulates  that: 
"The  implementing  of  the  present  convention  shall  be  arranged  by  the  commanders- 
in-chief  of  the  belligerent  armies  following  the  instructions  of  their  respective 
Governments  and  in  accordance  with  the  general  principles  set  forth  in  this 
"92  Convention. 
Therefore,  the  Convention  is  not  self-executing.  The  Government  must  enact  the  necessary 
instructions  to  their  armies  to  comply  with  it.  Local  legislation  is  a  necessary  means  of 
implementing  the  Convention.  There  is  no  mention  of  reprisals  in  it,  this  can  be  interpreted 
that  they  were  excluded.  That  interpretation  would  be  in  accordance  with  the  object  and 
purpose  of  the  treaty  which  is  the  protection  of  the  weakest  victims  of  war,  namely  the 
wounded.  However,  the  Convention  does  not  contain  any  sanction  clause  which  may  be 
applied  against  soldiers  and  officers  who  may  breach  its  rules. 
The  Declaration  of  St.  Petersburg  of  1868  (Declaration  Renouncing  the  Use,  in  Time  of 
War,  of  Explosive  Projectiles  under  400  grammes  weight)  also  relies  on  the  goodwill  of  the 
parties  to  respect  their  obligations.  Further,  it  contains  what  is  called  'the  general 
participation  clause'  which  in  practice  reduces  the  obligation  of  the  parties  to  nothing,  when 
a  non-party  enters  the  war.  It  stipulates: 
"This  engagement  is  compulsory  only  upon  the  contracting  or  acceding  parties  thereto 
in  case  of  war  between  two  or  more  of  themselves;  it  is  not  applicable  to  non- 
contracting  parties,  or  Parties  who  shall  not  have  acceded  to  it.  " 
It  then  added: 
"It  will  cease  to  be  compulsory  from  the  moment  when,  in  a  war  between  contracting 
or  acceding  arties,  a  non-contracting  or  a  non-acceding  party  shall  join  one  of  the 
belligerent.  "Fý 
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362 Thus,  the  obligation  to  observe  the  Declaration  is  very  fragile  indeed,  since  it  can  be  ended 
at  any  time,  when  a  non-contracting  or  non-acceding  State  enters  the  war. 
The  two  Conventions  of  1864  and  1868  contain  no  clause  dealing  with  the  prosecution  of 
their  violations.  This  led  Monyier,  one  of  the  founding  fathers  of  the  ICRC,  to  say  that  the 
two  Conventions: 
"...  [N]e  sont  pas  une  loi  imposde  par  une  autorit6  supdrieure  A  ses  subordonn6es 
mais...  seulement  un  contrat,  dont  les  signataires  ne  peuvent  6dicter  des  peines  contre 
"94  eux-m8mes. 
However,  following  the  adoption  of  the  Geneva  Convention  of  1864,  a  general  practice 
developed,  whereby  the  belligerents  began  to  admit  voluntary  medical  personnel  sent  by  the 
ICRC  in  order  to  assist  regular  medical  services.  Domb  observes  in  this  respect  that: 
"Obviously  the  mere  presence  of  personnel  belonging  to  the  ICRC  constituted  a 
I  deterrent  for  the  potential  violations  of  the  Convention.  "95 
In  fact,  the  Convention  of  1864  was  very  useful  in  the  Franco-German  War  of  1870.  Relief 
activities  were  undertaken  on  behalf  of  the  wounded  by  the  national  societies  of  the 
belligerents  and  neutral  States.  The  ICRC  coordinated  such  activities,  and  created  and 
managed  the  first  'international  agency  for  the  relief  of  sick  and  wounded  personnel',  better 
known  as  the  "Base]  AgenCy.  '96 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Hague  Conventions  of  1899  and  1907  regulate  essentially  the 
conduct  of  war.  They  were  not  vigorous  enough  concerning  means  of  ensuring  respect  for 
them.  However,  they  contained  some  measures  which  in  general  were  modest  and  rest 
primarily  on  the  will  of  the  party  itself.  The  main  means  included  are: 
(i)  Instruction  to  the  armed  forces  (enacting  manuals):  It  must  be  noted  that  even  before 
the  Hague  Conventions,  many  States  have  in  fact,  issued  manuals  which  embody  the  rules 
and  customs  of  war,  for  example,  France  in  1877,  Portugal  in  1890,  Spain  in  1882  and  Italy 
in  1896.97 
However,  the  new  factor  in  the  Hague  Convention  is  that  the  enacting  of  such  manuals 
has  become  obligatory,  and  also  the  substance  of  the  rules  have  been  defined  in  the 
regulations  themselves.  Thus,  it  establishes  unity  in  this  field.  Article  I  of  the  IV  Hague 
Convention  on  Land  Warfare  of  1907  stipulates: 
"The  contracting  powers  shall  issue  instructions  to  their  armed  forces  which  shall  be 
in  conformity  with  the  regulations  rtlpecting  the  laws  and  customs  of  war  on  land, 
annexed  to  the  present  Convention.  "" 
94  Op.  cit..  supra.  n.  10,  p.  206. 
95  F.  Domb:  Supervision  of  the  Observance  of  International  Humanitarian  Law.  8  IYHR,  1978,  p.  181. 
96  See  in  this  respect,  G.  Wiltemin,  R.  Heacock  and  J.  Freymond:  International  Organisation  and 
Evolution  of  World  Society.  Vol.  2,  ICRC,  Geneva,  1984,  p.  20. 
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363 Accordingly.  new  manuals  were  issued  by  many  States  in  application  of  this  Article,  such 
as  Germany  in  1902,  France  in  1913,  the  UK  in  1914,  and  the  US  in  1914.  Draper  observes 
in  connection  with  the  German  Manual  that  'the  work  was  in  fact  a  polemic  for 
inhumanity.  '99  However,  it  seems  that  the  measure  of  enacting  manuals,  is  a  very  important 
element  in  the  efforts  of  dissemination  of  the  laws  of  war,  which  can  reduce  violations. 
(ii)  Relief  societies  for  prisoners  of  war:  this  is  in  my  view  an  indirect  means  of  ensuring 
respect  of  the  laws  of  war,  since  they  assist  the  parties  to  the  conflict  to  fulfil  their 
obligations  under  the  conventions.  Article  15  of  the  1907  IV  Convention  of  the  Hague,  opens 
the  way  for  the  possibility  of  creating  relief  societies,  which  can  undertake  charitable 
activities  for  POWs  such  as  distributing  relief  in  places  of  internment. 
However,  such  societies  must  be  established  in  accordance  with  he 
, 
laws  of  their  country, 
which  means  that  only  national  societies  can  act.  In  practice,  it  seems  that  the  ICRC  was  not 
banned  from  acting  under  the  same  Article  (7). 
(iii)  Compensation:  Article  3  of  the  IV  Hague  Convention  of  1907  stipulates  that: 
"A  belligerent  party  which  violates  the  provisions  of  the  said  regulations  shall,  if  the 
case  demands,  be  liable  to  pay  compensation.  It  shall  ýe  responsible  for  all  acts 
committed  by  persons  forming  part  of  its  armed  forces.  "  00 
Generally  compensation  can  be  claimed  after  the  end  of  the  conflict,  which  may  mean  that 
only  the  victor  can  claim  it.  Despite  this,  tribunals  have  been  set  up  to  deal  with  some 
problems  relating  to  compensation.  Thus,  Gray  listed  435  Arbitral  tribunals  set  up  between 
1792  and  1972.  She  found  that  at  least  261  had  dealt  with  claims  for  damages,  45  of  these 
concerned  international  wars  and  36  concerned  civil  wars.  101 
In  the  context  of  civil  wars,  it  must  be  made  clear  that  all  claims  were  connected  with 
damages  to  alien  property  during  civil  wars,  rebellions  and  insurrections.  The  application 
of  Article  3  to  civil  wars  was  not,  however,  uniform.  It  has  sometimes  been  held  to  be 
applicable  to  internal  conflict  on  other  occasions,  not. 
In  the  Calre  Case,  the  Franco-Mexican  Claims  Commission's  President  Verzijl  noted: 
"Je  crois  tout  de  m6me  devoir  admettre  que,  les  Etats,  en  s'accordant  sur  le  principe 
pour  la  guerre  internationale  l'ont  consideri  encore  comme  un  principe  nouveau, 
d'application  restreinte,  et  qu'ils  Wont  point  voulu  en  reconnaitre  l'applicabilit6 
ginirale  dans  tous  les  ýas  oü  la  responsabilit6  internationale  pour  les  actes  d'une  force 
arm6e  serait  en  jeu.  "'u2 
In  fact,  he  refrained  from  the  application  of  Article  3,  to  civil  wars,  his  main  argument  as 
it  appears  implicitly  from  the  passage  cited  above,  is  that  it  applies  only  between  States. 
However,  Judge  Max  Huber  in  the  British  Claims  in  the  St)anish  Zone  of  Nlorocco  Case, 
maintained  that  at  least  the  general  principle  contained  in  Article  3  of  the  IV  Hague 
99  Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  47,  p.  55. 
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364 Convention,  applies  to  civil  wars.  He  pointed  out: 
"...  [S]ans  doute,  cette  convention  [IV  Hague  Convention)  West  directement  applicable 
A  aucune  des  situations  dont  le  rapport  doit  s'oecuper,  mais  le  principe  quelle  etablit 
mdrite  d'etre  retenu  6galement  en  ce  qui  concerne  1'6ventualitd  d'une  action  militaire 
en  dehors  de  la  guerre  proprement  dite.  "10 
However,  Schwargenberger  stressed  that: 
"[It  is] 
... 
doubtful  whether  such  a  restrict  view  of  Article  3  of  the  IV  Hague 
Convention  is  any  longer  accurate.  It  is  probably  pref  rable  now  to  treat  this  Article 
as  being  declaratory  of  customary  international  law.  "TO4 
It  seems  to  me  that  the  importance  of  this  Article  in  the  context  of  civil  wars,  is  fading 
away,  since  it  protects  generally  alien  property.  It  belongs  to  an  era  when  foreigners 
especially  of  powerful  States,  enjoyed  special  treatment.  Nowadays  the  picture  has  changed 
dramatically,  since  foreign  owned  property  is  regulated  by  local  law,  which  makes 
compensation  very  hard  to  attain. 
(iv)  Reprisals:  The  Hague  Conventions  are  silent  on  the  question  of  the  legality  of 
reprisals.  This  led  to  different  positions  on  the  level  of  doctrine.  Some  rely  on  Article  50 
of  the  IV  Hague  Convention,  which  condemns  collective  penalties  on  civilian  population, 
as  a  very  important  limit  on  recourse  to  reprisals.  105  However,  the  practice  during  the  two 
world  wards  witnessed  widespread  recourse  of  the  belligerents  to  reprisals. 
The  general  picture  concerning  the  Hague  Conventions  of  1899  and  1907  is  that  no  real 
progress  has  been  made  in  the  area  of  developing  means  for  ensuring  respect  for  the  laws 
of  war,  to  match  what  has  been  done  at  the  substantive  level.  All  the  means  mentioned 
depended  in  their  implementation  on  the  will  of  the  parties.  States,  it  seems,  wanted  to 
protect  their  sovereignty  in  its  absolute  form,  since  no  third  party  control  is  envisaged. 
Also  Article  2  limits  the  obligations  of  the  parties  to  a  great  extent,  since  it  maintained  the 
'General  Participation  Clause'  whereby  the  conventions  would  apply  only  between 
contracting  parties,  and  then  only  if  all  the  belligerents  are  parties  to  the  Convention. 
However,  it  was  in  the  case  of  the  Geneva  law  that  the  beginning  of  new  ideas 
concerning  means  of  ensuring  respect  for  humanitarian  law,  can  be  traced.  This  is,  in  my 
view,  due  partly  to  the  subject-matter  of  such  conventions,  which  dealt  with  the  protection 
of  war  victims.  In  this  area,  States  were  in  general  ready  to  accept  some  obligation 
concerning  the  means  of  application,  since  the  victims  do  not  constitute  a  real  danger  to  the 
conduct  of  war.  Secondly,  they  do  so  because  it  is  in  the  interests  of  their  own  soldiers. 
The  Geneva  Convention  of  1906,  which  was  a  revision  of  1864  Convention  on  the 
amelioration  of  the  situation  of  the  wounded  and  the  sick  continued  the  tradition  of 
including  the  clause  of  'General  participation'  (Article  24)  which  goes  against  the  object  of 
103  Affalre  des  Biens  Britaniques  au  Maroc  Espagnot  (Espagne  contre  Royaume  Uni)  (1925),  2  UNRIAA, 
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365 the  Convention  itself,  in  my  opinion.  However,  it  contained  a  very  important  provision, 
which  concerns  the  enforcement  of  the  Convention. 
Article  28  indicates  that  the  parties  have  to  take  the  necessary  legislative  measures  to 
repress  'individual  acts  of  robbery  and  ill  treatment  of  the  sick  and  wounded'.  Thus,  it 
introduced  the  element  of  punishment  of  violation  of  humanitarian  law,  as  a  means  of 
enforcing  the  law.  In  practice  only  two  States'06  have  given  effect  to  that  provision  in  the 
form  of  enacting  laws. 
Of  two  Geneva  Conventions  of  1929  the  first  concerned  the  Sick  and  Wounded  and  was 
a  revision  of  the  1906  Convention.  The  second  was  wholly  concerned  with  prisoners  of  war. 
These  two  Conventions  brought  some  fundamental  elements  of  progress  in  the  area  of 
implementation,  enforcement  and  control  of  application  of  humanitarian  law.  These 
elements  are: 
(i)  The  infamous  'general  participation  clause'  has  been  done  away  with.  Thus,  Article 
25  of  the  Wounded  and  Sick  Convention  and  identical  Article  82  of  the  Prisoners  of  War 
Convention  provide: 
"The  Present  Convention  shall  be  respected  by  the  high  contracting  parties  in  all 
CiTCumstances.  If,  in  time  of  war,  a  belligerent  is  not  a  party  to  the  Conventions,  its 
provisions  shall  nevertheless,  be  binding  as  between  all  the  belligerents  who  are 
parties  thereto.  "'  07 
This  is  a  real  triumph  of  the  idea  of  humanity  over  military  concerns,  since  the  entrance 
of  a  non-party  to  the  war  does  not  affect  the  obligation  of  the  belligerents  to  continue  to 
apply  the  Convention.  This  may  in  fact,  encourage  the  non-party  State  to  respect  the 
Conventions. 
(ii)  Reprisals  were  expressly  prohibited  in  the  Prisoners  of  War  Convention  the  last 
sentence  of  Article  2  stipulates: 
[M]easures  of  reprisals  against  them  [POW's]  are  forbidden". 
This  is  the  first  instance  of  prohibiting  this  inhuman  method  in  an  international  instrument. 
However,  the  First  Convention  (Sick  and  Wounded)  contained  no  such  provision.  Nahlik 
observes  that: 
"...  [Q]uant  aux  bless6s  et  malades,  on  croyait  en  toute  dvidence  qu'une  interdiction 
expresse  des  r6presailles  serait  superflue.  " 
He  then  quickly  notes: 
"...  [O]r,  les  exp6riences  Wastes  de  la  seconde  guerre  mondiale  ont  d6montr6 
qu'aucune  limitation  de  la  licence  du  belligdrent  ne  pouvait  etre  prdsum6e".  109 
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366 In  fact,  during  the  second  world  war  the  practice  showed  that  the  belligerents  did  not 
respect  these  provisions. 
(iii)  The  System  of  Protecting  Power-  The  Convention  on  POW's,  introduces  for  the  first 
time  in  an  international  instrument  the  idea  that  States  at  war  should  entrust  the  mission  of 
controlling  the  implementation  of  their  obligations  contained  in  the  Convention  to  a  third 
party  machinery. 
The  idea  of  protecting  power  is  an  old  institution  in  international  law.  However,  its  use 
in  the  context  of  the  laws  of  war  is  traced  to  the  Franco-German  war,  when  Prussia 
requested  the  USA  to  protect  its  interests  in  France.  110 
Article  86  introduces  this  institution  formally  into  the  Law  of  Geneva.  Thus,  the 
guarantee  of  the  regular  application  of  the  Convention  'will  be  found  in  the  possibility  of 
collaboration  between  the  protecting  powers  charged  with  the  protection  of  the  interests  of 
the  belligerent!  The  main  functions  of  the  protectors  are: 
(a)  Lending  good  offices  in  any  case  of  dispute  regarding  the  application  of  the 
Convention  (Article  87). 
(b)  Receiving  complaints  from  POW's  (Article  42). 
(c)  Conferring  with  representatives  of  POW's  (Articles  43-  44). 
(d)  Supervising  judicial  prosecutions  against  POW's  (Articles  60,62,  and  66). 
In  practice,  the  institution  worked  very  well  in  the  First  World  War,  before  its  formal 
insertion  in  a  treaty.  In  the  Second  World  War,  the  number  of  neutral  States  who  could  act 
as  protecting  powers  was  reduced  dramatically.  Switzerland  represented  at  the  end  of  the 
war  35  States,  Sweden  and  Spain  also  acted  as  protecting  powers.  "' 
Article  86  worked  well  during  the  Second  World  War.  However,  Pictet  who  recognised 
the  value  of  this  Article  especially  for  the  protection  of  POW's  saw  'the  drawback  of  the 
Article  was  that  it  abandoned  though  it  did  not  altogether  exclude  the  idea  of  obligatory 
control  by  a  neutral  and  independent  agency.  '112  In  fact,  the  acceptance  of  the  services  of 
the  protecting  power  was  not  mandatory,  Article  88  also  allowed  the  ICRC  to  perform  its 
function  in  protecting  the  POW's.  But,  this  also  was  not  mandatory,  since  the  consent  of  the 
belligerents  was  required. 
The  general  conclusion  is  that  despite  these  developments  in  the  field  of  strengthening 
means  of  enforcement  of  the  laws  of  war,  especially  that  of  Geneva.  It  seems  to  me  that 
even  in  cases  of  international  wars,  States  were  still  hesitant  to  bind  themselves  especially 
by  the  control  of  third  parties.  They  still  prefer,  as  the  Hague  Conventions  witnesses,  means 
which  depend  entirely  on  their  consent  and  will. 
Thus,  until  1929,  no  obligatory  third  party  machinery  has  been  arrive  at  in  the  context 
of  international  war. 
In  civil  wars,  the  situation  is  worse,  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  Conventions  were 
"OSee 
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367 expressly  to  be  applied  between  contracting  States.  Secondly,  the  recognition  of 
belligerency,  which  was  the  only  device  through  which  the  laws  of  war  can  be  applied  in 
civil  war,  had  become  obsolete;  no  recourse  to  it  was  made  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
Conventions  at  the  Hague  and  Geneva. 
This  leads  me  then  to  deal  with  two  points,  which  in  my  view,  may  throw  some  light  on 
how  in  practice  the  question  of  observance  of  the  law  of  war  in  internal  conflict  has  been 
coped  with,  the  two  points  being:  (i)  The  role  of  the  ICRC  in  internal  conflicts  up  to  the 
Second  World  War;  and  (ii)  the  Spanish  Civil  War  and  the  question  of  compliance. 
(i)  The  role  of  the  ICRC  in  internal  conflicts  up  to  the  Second  World  War: 
It  must  be  made  very  clear  that  in  the  context  of  civil  wars,  the  ICRC  lacked  any  legal 
basis  upon  which  to  claim  to  control  the  application  of  the  laws  of  war.  States  were  not 
ready  to  give  any  third  party,  be  it  the  ICRC  or  any  other  organ  or  institution,  any  power 
to  control  their  actions  during  civil  wars.  Indeed,  even  in  international  wars,  the 
intervention  of  the  ICRC  can  be  made  only  with  the  consent  of  the  belligerents. 
Moreover,  States  generally  claim  that  insurrection  is  a  purely  domestic  affair  and  there 
is  no  room  for  the  application  of  the  laws  of  war.  Hence,  there  is  nothing  to  control. 
However,  despite  these  enormous  legal  handicaps,  the  ICRC  managed  on  many  occasions 
to  intervene  by  lending  its  relief  and  assistance  to  the  victims  of  war.  Thus,  it  did 
contribute  at  least  implicitly  to  induce  the  belligerents  to  conform  to  certain  basic  standards 
and  rules  of  the  laws  of  war. 
In  the  Russian  Civil  War,  the  ICRC  delegate  after  meeting  Lenine,  succeeded  in  obtaining 
an  agreement  to  create  what  was  known  as  the  'political  red  cross'  which  consisted  of  a 
group  of  neutral  red  cross  societies  and  the  Russian  Red  Cross.  Its  mission  consisted  of 
visiting  political  prisoners  and  providing  them  with  relief  and  assistance.  113 
It  seems  that  in  general,  the  application  of  the  laws  of  war  were  absent.  Magliazza 
observed  that: 
"...  [L]a  guerre  civile  Russe  1917-1920  permit  d'ailleurs  de  constater  non-seulement 
I'absence  de  toute  application  des  lois  de  la  gu  711  e,  mais  encore  I'absence  de  toute 
protestation  contre  une  pratique  de  telle  sorte.  " 
Therefore,  the  very  modest  contribution  of  the  ICRC  was  overshadowed  by  the  gross 
violations  of  basic  humanity. 
At  the  Xth  International  Conference  of  the  Red  Cross  in  Geneva  in  1921  the  intervention 
of  the  ICRC  was  given  a  'legal  basis'  at  least,  in  the  context  of  the  law  of  the  Red  Cross 
movement  which  is  not  binding  on  Governments.  It  was  given  the  'mandate  of  intervening 
in  the  work  of  relief  in  the  event  of  civil  war'.  115  Acting  on  this  new  mandate,  the  ICRC 
succeeded  in  1932  in  obtaining  from  the  warring  factions  in  the  civil  war  in  Upper  Silesia, 
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368 an  authorization  to  visit  the  camps  of  the  prisoners,  and  give  the  necessary  relief  and  care 
to  women  and  children. 
However,  the  most  important  thing  was  the  agreement  of  the  two  parties  to  apply  the 
whole  Geneva  Conventions  to  the  conflict,  thanks  to  ICRC  efforts.  This  was  the  first 
instance  in  history  where  the  parties  to  civil  war  accepted  the  application  of  the  Geneva 
Conventions  in  their  totality  to  the  conflict.  116 
In  my  opinion,  the  importance  of  this  case  must  not  be  exaggerated.  None  of  the 
belligerents  was  the  legal  Government;  Upper  Silesia  was  administered  by  an  international 
commission  representing  the  League  of  Nations  and  finally  it  was  not  a  State  in 
international  law  hence,  the  conflict  cannot  be  said  to  have  the  legal  characteristics  of  a  real 
civil  war. 
The  ICRC  also  intervened  in  the  Hungarian  Revolution  in  1919  by  giving  relief  and 
assistance  to  the  victims.  However,  its  offers  of  aid  have  been  rejected  by  both  belligerents 
in  the  Irish  Civil  War,  as  being  hostile.  117 
The  conclusion  is  that  the  ICRC  acted  in  an  area  where  only  State  sovereignty  was 
predominant.  It  tried  to  accommodate  itself  to  that  demand  by  acting  in  practice,  only  when 
the  consent  of  the  belligerent  was  given,  and  even  when  it  was  authorised  to  offer  its 
services,  its  mandate  was  not  to  supervise  the  application  of  the  laws  of  war  (since  in  many 
cases  the  established  Government  does  not  recognise  their  application  at  all)  and  its 
observance  by  the  belligerents,  but  was  confined  only  to  activities  of  visitation  of  POW's 
and  distributing  relief  and  news.  In  that  sense  the  ICRC  was  pragmatic.  It  was  not  a 
guardian  of  the  law  but  a  rather  timid  assistant  in  inducing  the  established  Government  to 
apply  a  minimum  of  fundamental  rules  of  humanity,  which  cannot  be  seen  in  any  way  as 
a  violation  of  its  sovereignty. 
(ii)  The  Spanish  Civil  War  and  the  Question  of  Compliance: 
In  this  war,  no  recognition  of  belligerency  was  granted.  The  main  reason  was  political. 
The  powerful  States  during  this  period  (the  UK,  France  and  the  US)  were  against  such 
course,  because  it  would  internationalise  the  conflict  which  they  wished  to  remain  purely 
local.  The  legal  Government,  however,  considered  that  it  was  fighting  an  international  war 
against  Germany  and  Italy.  118 
The  practice  of  war  shows  that  despite  the  absence  of  recognition  of  belligerency  which 
is  the  key  to  the  operation  of  the  laws  of  war  in  internal  conflicts,  the  general  view  of  third 
States,  the  League  of  Nations  and  the  ICRC,  was  that  certain  fundamental  rules  of 
humanitarian  law  should  be  applied  to  the  conflict.  Cassese  considered  that  this  attitude 
116Schtoget, 
op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  4,  n.  96,  p.  126. 
117  Ibid. 
11%lhen 
the  Spanish  Goverment  raised  the  question  of  the  situation  prevalLing  in  the  country  to  the 
League  of  Nations,  it  justified  this  on  the  ground  that: 
"If  the  Spanish  Government  has  now  asked  for  a  meeting  of  the  Council,  it  Is  sotety  for  the 
reason  that  an  international.  war  exists  in  fact,  and  that  this  war,  if  it  Is  stitt  ignored, 
may  when  it  is  teast  expected,  produce  a  situation  which  can  no  tonger  be  controtted.  11 
Minutes  of  the  49th  Extraordinary  Session  of  the  Councit  of  Geneva  (Dec.  10-16th,  1936),  op.  cit., 
supra.  n.  23,  p.  388. 
369 cannot  be  considered  as: 
"...  [A]  partial  recognition  of  belligerency  since  the  State  concerned,  all  too  clearly, 
emphasised  they  withheld  any  such  recognition  but  rather  as  indicative  of  the 
gradual  development  of  customary  rules  concerning  civil  war".  9 
Cassese  found  that  the  Spanish  case  produced  an  interesting  development  in  the  law  of  civil 
wars,  namely  that  even  in  the  absence  of  recognition  of  belligerency,  four  rules  of 
humanitary  law  are  applicable  to  the  civil  war  on  the  condition  however  that  its  intensity 
must  match  the  Spanish  civil  war.  These  rules  are: 
(i)  The  rules  on  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  the  war,  especially  the  wounded  and  sick. 
The  two  parties  declared  to  the  ICRC  their  intention  to  apply  the  1929  Geneva  Convention 
on  the  subject. 
(ii)  The  prohibition  of  the  intentional  bombing  of  civilians.  Many  States  declared  the 
illegality  of  such  practice.  120  The  League  Assembly  adopted  a  resolution  on  September  30th, 
1938  which  states  that  'the  intentional  bombing  of  civilian  population  is  illegal"21  in  the 
context  of  the  Spanish  Civil  War. 
(iii)  The  rule  forbidding  attacks  on  non-military  objectives  especially  of  open  towns.  The 
122  Assembly  and  the  Council  adopted  resolutions  condemning  such  practice. 
(iv)  The  rule  authorising  reprisals  against  enemy  civilians,  in  the  event  where  the  enemy 
has  previously  attacked  civilians.  The  last  point  concerns  of  course  the  methods  by  which 
humanitarian  law  is  enforced,  it  shows  that  the  brutal  means  Of  reprisal  was  accepted. 
In  fact,  the  Spanish  Civil  War  witnessed  many  acts  of  reprisals,  in  which  many  innocents 
were  the  victims.  The  taking  of  hostages  was  also  resorted  to.  123  The  trails  and  executions 
carried  out  by  both  sides,  especially  by  the  rebels,  were  not  for  violations  of  laws  of  war, 
but  for  fighting  with  the  other  side.  The  policy  of  trial  and  execution  continued  even  after 
the  end  of  the  war.  124  Thus,  reprisals,  taking  of  hostages  and  summary  executions  were 
frequently  used  by  the  belligerents,  in  my  view  they  were  not  employed  as  a  means  of 
ensuring  respect  for  the  laws  of  war  but  simply  as  a  means  of  prosecuting  the  war,  through 
11  9 
A.  Cassese:  The  Spanish  Civil  War  and  the  Development  of  Customary  Law  Concerning  International 
Armed  Conflicts,  in  Cassese  (ed.  ),  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  4,  n.  1,  p.  293-4. 
120  The  British  PM  specifically  mentioned  the  Illegality  of  intentional  bombing  of  the  civilians.  See 
House  of  Commons  Debates.  VoL.  337,  June  21st,  1938,  Col.  937.  Similarly,  the  French  and  British 
Governments  drew  the  attention  of  the  Franco  Administration  that: 
"Direct  and  deliberate  attacks  on  civilian  populations  are  contrary  to  the  principles  of 
international  Law  as  based  on  the  established  practices  of  the  civitised  nations,  to  the  taws 
of  humanity  and  the  dictates  of  public  opinion". 
Cited  by  Cassese,  ibid,  p.  299. 
121  Ibid. 
122  Ibid,  p.  305. 
123  For  details,  see  M.  Junod:  Warrior  without  Weapons.  Translated  bY  E.  Fitzgerald,  Jonathan  Cape, 
London,  1951,  pp-98  ff. 
124 
A.  V.  W.  Thomas  and  A.  J.  Thomas  Jr.:  International  Legal  Aspects  of  the  CiviL  War  in  Spain  (1935- 
39),  in  Falk  (ed.  ),  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  2,  n.  8,  p.  125. 
370 which  the  will  of  the  other  party  to  fight  is  broken. 
However,  the  protests  of  the  League  of  Nations  against  the  violations,  and  the  work  of 
the  ICRC  can  be  considered  as  modest  steps  in  the  field  of  inducing  the  parties  to  respect 
the  law.  The  League,  in  reality,  protested  verbally  but  no  concrete  actions  to  stop  the 
violations  were  taken. 
The  ICRC  on  the  other  hand  was  in  the  field  and  helped,  with  its  customary  silence,  to 
contribute  modestly  to  improve  the  situation  of  the  victims.  Moreover,  it  distributed  relief 
125  and  acted  as  an  intermediary  in  the  exchange  of  prisoners  which  sometimes  took  place. 
D.  The  General  Conclusions 
(i)  From  the  beginning,  it  seems  that  the  laws  of  war  were  based  on  the  assumption  that 
they  are  applicable  between  States  and  not  within  them.  The  rise  of  the  concept  of  State, 
with  its  inevitable  Westphalian  components  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention,  closed  any 
attempt  to  give  the  insurgents  legal  status.  Thus,  by  reason  of  that  sovereignty,  States  were 
free  to  do  as  they  saw  fit.  Hence,  the  attention  of  classical  writers  was  basically 
concentrated  on  the  subject  of  the  law  between  States  only. 
Even  on  the  matter  of  law  between  States,  the  methods  for  ensuring  compliance  with  its 
rules  rested  primarily  on  self-help,  good  faith  and  reciprocity.  The  concept  of  sovereignty 
was  absolute,  no  third  party  machinery  or  interventions  were  thought  of  or  proposed. 
In  this  respect,  it  is  the  state  of  nature  in  its  Hobsian  sense  that  prevailed.  Thus,  talk  of 
means  of  ensuring  respect  for  international  law  in  general,  was  in  total  contrast  with  the 
spirit  and  reality  of  that  period.  The  modest  suggestions  made  by  classical  writers  always 
rely  on  the  will  of  the  belligerent.  This  to  me,  is  an  entirely  logical  situation,  since  these 
writers  were  essentially  concerned  with  giving  conceptual  basis  to  the  Westphalian  model 
of  State.  In  this  model,  the  concept  of  third  party  machinery  was  absent. 
(ii)  The  era  of  codification  did  not  depart  essentially  from  what  has  been  said  in  the  first 
conclusion,  although  it  made  law  more  clear  and  unified,  it  did  not  provide  effective  means 
of  ensuring  respect  for  the  laws  of  war,  especially  in  The  Hague  Conventions.  The  latter 
Conventions  concentrated  on  indirect  means  of  ensuring  respect  for  the  laws  of  war,  rather 
than  effective  and  direct  means,  like  the  intervention  of  a  third  party.  Thus,  the  ideas  of 
dissemination,  the  obligation  to  publish  military  manuals  were  inaugurated  officially,  which 
must  be  seen  as  important  steps  in  the  long  road  of  producing  effective  means  for 
compliance  with  the  law. 
Geneva  law,  on  the  other  hand,  with  its  concentration  on  the  protection  of  the  victims 
of  war  rather  than  regulating  the  conduct  of  war  in  the  field  made  modest  but  important 
developments  in  the  area  of  compliance.  The  protecting  power  institution  was  introduced, 
punitive  measures  for  violations  of  the  rules  of  protection  of  the  victims  were  suggested  to 
the  State  and  the  role  of  the  ICRC  was  accepted.  However,  all  these  initiatives  were  to  be 
carried  out  only  between  States  and  with  their  consent.  Sovereignty  still  overrode  the 
dictates  of  humanity. 
125 
For  an  exceLLent  account  of  these  activities,  see  the  work  of  the  ICRC  detegate  at  that  time  MarceL 
Junod  in  Spain,  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  123,  pp.  87-134. 
371 (iii)  In  civil  wars,  the  obsolescence  of  the  recognition  of  belligerency  which  in  many  ways 
facilitated  the  application  of  the  laws  of  war,  as  witnessed  in  the  American  Civil  War,  has 
in  the  Spanish  case  encouraged  violations  of  the  laws  of  war,  since  the  parties  were  under 
no  firm  legal  basis  to  respect  the  laws  of  war.  Protests  by  third  States  also  lacked  that  legal 
basis. 
In  the  matter  of  means  of  ensuring  respect  for  the  laws  of  war  once  recognition  has  been 
granted,  it  is  customary  methods  which  apply  in  civil  wars,  reprisals,  taking  of  hostages  and 
also  punishment  of  war  crimes. 
(iv)  Another  interesting  phenomenon  can  be  observed  in  the  Spanish  Civil  War.  The 
Spanish  Government  did  not,  in  fact,  attempt  to  characterise  protests  made  by  the  third 
States  of  the  League  against  violations  of  the  laws  of  war,  as  intervention  with  internal 
affairs  which,  in  my  opinion,  means  that  at  least  morally  drastic  violations  of  the  rights  of 
the  victims  of  war,  cannot  be  justified  at  all  and  in  all  circumstances  as  necessary  means 
to  protect  the  monopoly  of  sovereignty. 
(v)  In  the  overwhelming  majority  of  cases  of  civil  wars,  the  ICRC,  in  acting  to  give  relief 
and  ass  istance,  ind  irectl  y  helped  in  the  application  of  the  law  of  war.  It  has  never  claimed 
that  it  supervise  the  application  of  the  law.  This  is  the  only  way  by  which  it  has  been 
accepted  by  the  States. 
SECTION  11:  Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  and  Compliance 
The  era  after  the  Second  World  War  witnessed,  in  relation  to  the  subject  of  enforcement  and 
implementation  of  humanitarian  law,  two  important  events.  First,  the  trial  of  war  criminals, 
for  war  crimes  against  peace  and  crimes  against  humanity  at  Nuremburg  and  Tokyo.  It  must 
be  remembered  that  the  first  attempt  after  the  First  World  War  to  try  the  German  Kaiser 
and  also  those  who  were  accused  of  war  crimes  (Versailles  Treaty  Articles  228-230)  was 
disastrous.  The  German  Emperor  was  not  at  his  trial  because  the  Netherlands  refused  his 
extradition.  Moreover.  Germany  refused  to  hand  over  to  other  States  war  criminals  and  it 
proposed  instead  to  try  them  in  Germany  itself. 
The  trials  were,  in  effect,  a  mockery  of  justice.  Thus,  the  Commission  of  Allied  Jurists, 
which  was  set  up  in  January  1922  to  inquire  into  the  Liepzig  trials  concluded  unanimously 
that  'some  of  the  accused  who  were  acquitted  should  have  been  convicted  and  that  in  the 
case  of  those  convicted  the  sentences  were  not  adequate.  '126  Thus,  the  trials  were  not 
international  and  also  were  not  a  good  case  for  enforcing  the  law  of  war. 
However,  although  the  trails  in  Tokyo  and  Nuremburg  were  confined  to  the  losers  of  the 
war,  they  were  a  very  important  landmark  in  the  history  of  enforcing  humanitarian  law. 
They  established  a  precedent  which  may  be  resorted  to  at  any  time.  Pictet  rightly  observed: 
"En  tout  6tat  de  cause  Nuremberg  a  marqud  I'avtnement  d'un  droit  international 
pdnal.  Si  1'experience  fut  imparfaite  elle  t  riche  en  enseignement  et  montre  A  la  foi, 
la  voie  i  suivre  et  les  erreurs  A  iviter.  "'T? 
126Cited  by  S.  Gtueck:  War  Criminals,  Their  Prosecution  and  Punishment.  Knopf,  New  York,  1944,  p.  32. 
1270p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  10,  p.  208. 
372 The  introduction  of  the  concept  of  crimes  against  humanity  is  a  novelty,  and  it  is  important 
in  the  case  of  internal  wars,  since  atrocities  against  the  citizens  by  their  own  Government 
have  become  international  crimes.  This  is  a  limit  on  States  sovereignty,  since  Government 
officials  who  commit  crimes  of  genocide  may  be  tried  and  punished.  This  has  been 
confirmed  by  the  Genocide  Convention  of  1951. 
The  second  most  important  development  is  the  clarification  and  consolidation  of  means 
of  ensuring  compliance  with  humanitarian  law,  contained  in  the  Geneva  Conventions  of 
1949.  The  new  system  of  enforcement  includes  the  following: 
(i)  Reprisals  against  the  victims  of  war  are  prohibited  expressly  in  all  Geneva 
Conventions  (e.  g.  Article  13  of  the  3rd  Convention  and  Article  33  of  the  4th  Convention) 
expressly  forbid  reciprocal  torture  or  execution  of  soldiers  or  civilians. 
(ii)  The  institution  of  protecting  power:  It  has  been  defined  by  Pictet  as  'a  State  instructed 
by  another  State  (known  as  the  power  of  origin'  to  safeguard  its  interests  and  those  of  its 
,  128  nationals  in  relation  to  a  third  State  'known  as  the  State  of  residence.  The  institution  of 
protecting  power  is  'la  pi6ce  maltresse  de  ce  syWme  [of  control]  est  I"institution  de  la 
129  puissance  protectrice. 
The  main  changes  introduced  by  the  Geneva  Conventions,  consist  in  extending  its  role 
to  the  four  Geneva  Conventions.  It  has  also  been  made  mandatory  at  least  in  principle. 
Official  substitutes  were  provided  for  (see  common  Article  10.10.10.11)  its  functions  have  been 
defined  and  enlarged  this  in  addition  to  the  traditional  functions,  the  whole  Convention. 
Thus,  according  to  common  Article  8.8.8.9  'the  present  Convention  shall  be  applied  with 
the  cooperation  and  under  the  scrutiny  of  the  protecting  powers'.  Pictet  observes  in  his 
commentary: 
"This  command  is  addressed  to  the  parties  to  the  conflict  in  the  first  place,  since  the 
responsibility  for  application  is  theirs.  They  are  ordered  to 
I  ascept  the  cooperation  of 
the  protecting  power.  If  necessary,  they  must  demand  it.  "  3 
In  practice  in  the  words  of  Abi-Saab  the  system  Wa  pas  fonctionn6  de  fagon 
satisfaisante".  131  Therefore,  since  1949,  the  cases  in  which  a  protecting  power  has  been 
designated  were  very  rare,  in  fact,  only  in  three  cases  (Suez,  Goa  and  Bangladesh)  and 
even  in  these  cases,  it  did  not  work  according  to  the  way  it  was  designed  in  Geneva  in 
1949.132 
The  reasons  for  such  a  state  of  affairs  have  been  well  put  by  the  UN  Secretary-  General 
in  one  of  his  reports  concerning  human  rights  in  armed  conflicts.  They  are: 
*The  relatively  small  number  of  States  which  could  be  considered  as  truly  neutral  by 
128  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  91,  p.  86. 
129G.  Abi-Saab:  Les  m6canismes  de  mise  en  oeure  du  droit  humanitaire.  82  RGDIP,  1978,  pJ04. 
1300P. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  91,  p.  95. 
131  G.  Abi-Saab:  Le  r6inforcement  du  systbme  d'appitcation  des  r6gtes  du  drolt  humanitaire.  14  RDMDG, 
1974,  p.  277. 
132See  in  this  respect,  Forsythe:  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  7,  pp.  46-48.  See  also  Et  Kouhene,  op.  cit., 
supra.  chapter  4.  n.  278,  p.  173. 
373 all  parties  to  the  armed  conflicts,  the  cumbersome  and  time  consuming  procedure  of 
appointment  of  a  Protecting  Power  which  calls  for  the  agreement  of  the  belligerents 
as  to  these  powers  at  the  time  when  hostilities  are  raging,  the  fact  that  the  military 
phases  of  some  of  the  armed  conflicts  were  over  before  A  Protecting  Power  could  be 
appointed.  The  burden  in  terms  of  material  and  human  resources  which  is  imposed 
on  States  solicited  as  potential  Protecting  Powers  has  also  been  mentioned  as  a 
deterrent  M  well  as  the  risks  of  political  embarrassment  vis-A-vis  the  parties  to  the 
conflict". 
(iii)  Punishment  of  violations  of  the  Conventions. 
The  precedent  of  the  trials  at  Nuremberg  and  Tokyo  seems  to  have  influenced  those  who 
met  at  Geneva  in  1949.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  Article  6/1  (a)  of  the  Agreement  of  London 
(December  8th,  1945)  defines  war  crimes  as: 
"...  [V]iolations  of  the  laws  or  customs  of  war.  Such  violations  shall  include,  but  not 
be  limited  to,  murder,  ill  treatment  or  deportation  to  slave  labour  or  for  any  other 
purpose  of  civilian  population  of  or  in  occupied  territory,  murder  or  ill  treatment  of 
prisoners  of  war  or  persons  on  the  seas,  killing  of  hostages,  plunder  of  public  or 
private  property,  wanton  destrugion  of  cities,  towns  or  villages,  or  devastation  not 
justified  by  military  necessity.  "I  4 
This  definition  in  fact,  is  found  in  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949.  Thus,  common  Articles 
(49,50,129  and  146)  and  common  Articles  (50,51,130  and  147),  introduce  a  very  important 
system  for  suppressing  breaches  of  the  Conventions,  where  the  parties  are  obliged  to  enact 
legislation  for  the  suppression  of  breaches.  Moreover,  they  are  under  obligation  to  search 
for  and  try  persons  guilty  of  such  breaches.  They  can  also  hand  over  such  criminals  to  any 
other  contracting  party  who  has  made  out  a  prima  facie  case  against  them. 
It  must  be  stressed  that  these  obligations  are  made  in  relation  to  the  category  of  'grave 
breaches  of  the  Convention'  which  are: 
"...  [T]hose  involving  any  of  the  following  acts,  if  committed  against  persons  or 
property  protected  by  the  Convention:  wilful  killing,  torture  or  inhuman  treatment 
including  biological  experiments,  wilfully  causing  greater  suffering  of  serious  injury 
to  body  or  health  and  extensive  destruction  and  appropriation  of  pro  eTty,  not 
justified  by  military  necessity  and  carried  out  unlawfully  and  wantonly735 
The  general  view  is  that  in  practice  these  innovations  did  play  only  a  very  modest  role.  The 
reasons  according  to  Sandoz  are: 
"...  [O]n  peut  y  voir  trois  raisons  principales:  la  difficult6  psychologique  dans  un  climat 
de  guerre  qui  suscite  g6n6ralement  la  haine  de  1'ennemi;  le  fait  que  la  responsabilit6 
des  infractions  incombe  souvent  aux  autorit6s  elles-memes  coupables  soit 
intentionnellement  soit,  plus  souvent,  du  fait  de  n6gligence  dans  l'instruction  en 
matiýre  de  droit  international  humanitaire-et  que  la  s6paration  des  pouvoirs 
judiciaires  et  politiques  est  souvent  sdrieusement  compromise  dans  ses  situations; 
I'absence,  enfin,  rdpdtons  le,  de  juridiction  obligatoire  et  de  moyens  coercitifs 
133  Report  of  the  Secretary-  Genera  I:  Respect  for  Human  Rights  In  Armed  Conf  t  Icts.  A/7720  of  Oct.  20th, 
1969,  para.  S. 
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See  the  Agreement  for  the  Prosecution  and  Punishment  of  the  Major  War  Criminals  of  the  European 
Axis,  signed  at  London  on  Aug.  8th,  1945,  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  51,  p.  826. 
1351bid, 
pp.  324,350,408  and  479. 
374 supranationaux  permittant  d'imposer  aux  Etats  le  respect  de  leurs  engagements.  "136 
Nonetheless,  Blishchenko  maintains  that: 
"...  [L]'application  des  Conventions  de  Genbve  dans  plusieurs  conflits  arm 
Nfficacit6  du  r6gime  instaurant  la  responsabilit6  en  cas  de  violations".  13f  sa  r6v616 
The  examples  given  to  substantiate  this  claim  is  that  the  US  from  1965  to  August  1973  made 
36  accusations  of  war  crimes  against  army  personnel  in  court  martial.  20  cases  have  been 
138  tried  and  condemned.  Similarly,  the  trial  and  punishment  in  Angola  in  1976  of 
mercenaries  fighting  with  the  rebels. 
However,  these  examples  are  singular  cases,  since  many  violations  took  place  which  may 
easily  be  considered  as'grave  breaches'  but  have  never  been  brought  to  trial.  This  happened 
in  many  conflicts  which  took  place  after  1949.  In  this  respect,  Meyer  correctly  wrote: 
"...  [T]he  criminal  sanctions  against  violations  have  not  proved  to  be  very  effective. 
The  Nuremberg  and  other  post  1945  war  crimes  trials  remain  rather  singular. 
Although  many  qýve  breaches  of  the  law  have  occurred  since  1945,  only  a  few  have 
been  repressed.  " 
The  general  conclusion  is  that  the  important  developments  made  in  Geneva  in  1949  in 
connection  with  the  means  of  control  of  the  application  of  humanitarian  law  were  from  the 
theoretical  point  of  view  a  real  advancement,  because  they  introduced  the  missing  element 
of  third  party  control.  Furthermore,  they  opened  the  possibility  of  cooperation  between 
States  in  the  domaine  of  punishment  of  war  crimes. 
In  practice,  it  seems  that  these  innovations  had  no  real  impact.  Self-interest,  the  claim  of 
freedom  of  action,  and  military  security,  have  prevailed  over  any  other  reasons.  Moreover, 
the  absence  of  a  permanent  international  penal  institution,  which  can  try  those  guilty  of 
grave  breaches,  had  a  negative  effect,  since  the  search  for  and  trial  of  those  persons  has  in 
practice  remained  in  the  hands  of  States,  which  often  would  take  into  consideration  political 
reasons  in  any  decision  to  try  such  criminals.  The  second  conclusion  is  that  all  these 
innovations  in  a  way  were  expressly  restricted  to  international  wars,  internal  wars,  then, 
have  not  benefitted  from  them. 
Following  this  introduction,  I  now  turn  to  Article  3  itself  in  order  to  see  how  the  problem 
of  compliance  is  dealt  with.  The  following  points  will  be  considered: 
A.  Travaux  Prkparatolres  of  Article  3  and  the  Question  of  Compliance 
136Y.  Sandoz:  Mfse  en  oeuvre  clu  droit  humanitaire,  in:  Les  dimensions  InternationaLes  clu  droit 
humanitaire.  UNISCO-Institut  Henry  Dunant,  ed.  A.  P6clone,  Paris,  1936,  p.  321. 
137  1.  BLishchenko:  ResponsabiLit6  en  cas  de  vioLations  du  drolt  fnternatfonat  humanitaire,  ibid. 
p.  333. 
138  Ibid,  p.  334. 
139M 
A.  Meyer:  Report  on  the  Proceedings  of  the  Conference  on  the  AppLication  of  InternationaL 
Humanitarian  Law.  British  Red  Cross  Society.  March  12th,  1986.  London,  p.  3. 
375 Initially,  the  question  of  means  of  ensuring  respect  for  humanitarian  law  in  internal 
conflicts,  was  not  a  real  subject  of  discussion  at  the  Conference  in  1949.  The  central 
question  was;  whether  to  codify  at  all  any  rules  applicable  to  internal  conflicts,  this  meant 
that  it  was  the  question  of  the  definition  of  armed  conflicts  of  a  non  -international  character 
and  what  are  the  rules  to  be  applied  to  such  conflicts,  that  took  much  time  and  energy. 
States,  it  seems,  were  not  ready  yet  to  tie  their  hands  substantively  and  procedurally.  They 
concentrated  on  the  first  rather  than  the  second  choice. 
Despite  this  general  statement,  references  were  made  to  some  points  which  have  an 
important  impact  on  the  question  of  compliance  with  the  law  in  the  context  of  internal 
wars,  such  as  the  legal  basis  of  the  obligation  of  insurgents  to  apply  Article  3,  the  question 
of  reciprocity  and  the  role  of  the  ICRC  in  the  context  of  such  wars. 
1.  Protecting  Power  In  Civil  Wars 
During  the  initial  discussion  of  the  Draft  Article  2/4  of  the  ICRC,  some  States  made  the 
point  that  the  proposed  Article  brought  the  institution  of  protecting  power  to  civil  wars, 
which  was  not  acceptable  in  their  view.  Canada  stressed  that  in  its  present  form,  the  fourth 
paragraph  would  justify  a  demand  on  the  part  of  a  small  group  of  rebels  for  the  recognition 
of  protecting  power,  and  except  in  the  case  of  a  large-scale  civil  war  in  which  extensive 
section  of  the  national  territory  was  in  the  rebels  hands,  this  would  be  absurd.  140 
This  meant  that  protecting  power  may  operate  only  in  conditions  of  civil  war  which 
resemble  international  war  in  intensity,  and  where  the  insurgents  have  the  characteristics 
of  a  State.  In  all  other  cases,  this  would  not  be  acceptable,  presumably  because  it  can  be 
considered  as  an  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  belligerent  Government.  On  the 
other  hand,  Mexico  took  a  different  view,  since  in  the  context  of  civil  wars,  the  ICRC  can 
act  as  a  protecting  power  since  this  would  protect  the  right  of  the  State  and  place  the 
question  on  purely  humanitarian  grounds.  141 
The  third  view  which  it  seems  was  more  to  the  liking  of  the  defenders  of  the  doctrine  of 
State  sovereignty,  was  against  any  reference  to  protecting  power,  even  when  undertaken  by 
the  ICRC.  General  Oung  of  Burma  noted  'the  mere  presence  of  aliens  on  the  national 
territory  might  be  a  source  of  suspicion.  '142  This  in  fact,  excludes  any  intervention  of  third 
parties,  even  by  impartial  organisations  such  as  the  ICRC,  for  distributing  relief  and 
assistance. 
In  fact,  all  the  five  drafts  which  have  been  submitted  to  the  Conference,  except  the 
second  draft  of  the  first  group  which  stipulates  that: 
"The  provisions  relating  to  Protecting  power  shall  however  not  be  applicable  except 
in  the  instance  of  special  agreement  between  the  parties  to  the  conflict.  " 
The  other  draft  did  not  mention  at  all  any  reference  to  Protecting  power  which  means  in 
140  Final.  Records  of  the  DipLomatic  Conference  of  Geneva,  L949.  VoL.  2  section  6,  FecleraL  Potiticat 
Dept.  Bern,  1950,  p.  13. 
141  lbid,  p.  11. 
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376 my  opinion  that  States  have  implicitly  excluded  any  possibility  for  third  party  control  of 
the  application  of  the  rules  of  Article  3.  This  of  course,  would  be  considered  an  unwanted 
intervention  in  their  internal  affairs. 
2.  The  Legal  Basis  of  Obligation  of  the  Insurgents 
This  is  a  very  important  legal  and  practical  question,  since  if  the  established  Government 
can  be  held  as  obliged  to  respect  and  apply  Article  3  because  it  signed  and  ratified  the 
conventions.  This  is  not  the  case  with  insurgents  since  the  Conventions  are  open  only  to 
States.  It  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  institution  of  recognition  of  belligerency  has 
afforded  this  legal  basis  for  holding  the  insurgents  bound  to  apply  the  laws  of  war 
In  the  Diplomatic  Conference,  some  delegations  tried  to  establish  such  basis.  The 
representative  of  Monaco  has  offered  two  reasons  for  holding  the  insurgents  bound  by  the 
rules  contained  in  the  Article  applicable  to  internal  conflicts: 
"First  because  the  humanitarian  provisions  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  are  of  a  super- 
contractual  character,  and  also,  and  more  particularly,  because  the  contracting  parties 
undertake  not  only  to  respect  them,  but  to  ensure  respect  for  them,  an  article 
providing  for  their  dissemination  among  the  population  through  instituti  n.  Therefore 
rebels  are  a  part  of  the  population  in  revolt  of  the  contracting  States.  "?  43 
The  argument,  it  seems,  stress  that  the  rules  contained  in  the  Article  dealing  with  internal 
conflicts  are  in  fact,  jus  cogens  rules,  which  States  are  to  respect  independently  of  the 
Conventions,  and  secondly  that  the  duty  of  dissemination  means  that  everybody  knows  the 
rules.  However,  it  appears  to  me  that  the  weakness  of  such  an  argument  is  that  it  implicitly 
still  holds  the  insurgents  as  part  of  the  country  and  under  the  control  of  the  Government, 
which  is  not  the  case. 
Greece  on  the  other  hand,  observed  that  the  insurgents  are  bound  by  the  Conventions. 
In  its  view: 
"...  [F]ailure  by  the  insurgents  to  accede  to  the  Conventions  was  not  an  insurmountable 
obstacle".  144 
He  based  his  argument  on  two  reasons:  (i)  The  Conventions  which  were  being  drafted  could 
and  should  be  consideredas  law-making  conventions,  i.  e.  as  rules  which  should  be  applicable 
not  only  on  behalf  or  against  the  contracting  parties,  but  also  in  circumstances  which  were 
analogous  to  those  governed  by  the  said  conventions.  (ii)  Insurgents  and  even  bandits  were 
obviously  nationals  of  some  State,  and  were  thereby  bound  by  the  obligations  undertaken 
by  the  latter.  145 
It  seems  to  me,  that  these  two  arguments  were  couched  in  such  a  way  as  to  exclude  any 
conclusion  that  insurgents  are  even  implicitly  'parties  to  the  Conventions'  which  means  that 
it  is  only  the  actions  of  the  Government  which  binds  the  insurgents.  This  interpretation  is 
143  lbid,  pp.  78-9. 
144  lbid,  p.  94. 
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377 in  favour  of  the  claim  of  the  established  Government  that  it  holds  the  monopoly  of 
representing  the  whole  population,  even  when  its  authority  is  challenged  from  within. 
However,  the  words  'each  party'  found  in  Article  3  have  been  interpreted  by  Pictet  in  the 
following  fashion: 
"Each  of  the  parties  will  thus  be  required  to  apply  Article  3  by  the  mere  fact  of  that 
party's  existence  and  of  the  existence  of  an  armed  conflict  between  it  and  the  other 
party.  The  obligation  is  absolute  for  each  of  the  parties,  and  independent  of  the 
obligations  on  the  other  party"  146 
This  means  that  insurgents  are  bound  by  the  Conventions,  even  if  they  are  non-parties  to 
the  Conventions,  it  is  the  material  element  and  not  legal  consideration  which  can  be 
considered  in  this  context.  In  other  words,  the  effective  control  of  certain  parts  of  territory 
and  the  conduct  of  hostilities  obliges  the  insurgent  to  respect  its  obligations. 
On  the  other  hand,  Pinto  stresses: 
"Au  cours  de  la  pdriode  de  la  guerre  civile,  1'exdcution  des  obligations 
conventionnelles  relýve  ... 
de  toute  autorit6  qui  pr6tend  exercer  et  exerce  un  pouvoir 
d'Etat.  Les  autorit6s  insurg6es  sont  tenues  de  respecter,  A  ce  titre  le  drolt  international 
g6ndral  et  conventionel.  Cest  la  une  consdquence  du  principe  d'effectivitd".  147 
This  interpretation  would  in  effect  give  no  legal  status  to  insurgents,  and  in  the  same  time 
obliges  them  to  respect  the  Conventions. 
3.  Reciprocity 
The  idea  of  reciprocity  was  included  in  some  drafts  submitted  to  the  Conference.  This  was 
done  when  the  intention  of  these  drafts  was  to  apply  the  whole  Conventions  to  internal 
armed  conflicts.  However,  when  it  was  decided  that  only  minimum  rules  would  apply  to 
such  conflicts,  the  reciprocity  clause  was  dropped  intentionally.  148 
Thus,  the  obligations  contained  in  Article  3  are  absolute,  in  the  sense  that  the  non- 
acceptance  of  the  application  of  the  Article  by  one  belligerent  or  its  violation,  does  not 
entitle  the  other  party  to  breach  its  obligations. 
4.  Reprisals  and  the  Taking  of  Hostages: 
The  four  Conventions  of  Geneva  all  contain  an  Article  prohibiting  reprisals  (Convention 
I  Article  46;  Convention  11  Article  47;  Convention  III  Article  13  and  Convention  IV  Article 
33).  However,  Article  3  does  not  contain  such  a  prohibition.  The  question  then  is  whether 
they  are  permitted  in  the  context  of  internal  conflicts. 
The  travaux  pr6paratolres  do  not  show  any  efforts  at  dealing  with  this  subject.  Despite 
this  fact,  Pictet  stresses  in  his  commentary  that  the  silence  of  Article  3  is  not  a  real  obstacle. 
To  him  reprisals  are  prohibited  because: 
146  op.  cit..  supra.  n.  91,  p.  51. 
147pinto, 
op.  cit.,  supre.  chapter  2,  n.  66,  p.  528. 
148  See  Pictet,  op.  cit..  supra.  n.  91,  p.  51. 
378 "...  [T]he  acts  referred  to  under  items  (a)  to  (d)  are  prohibited  absolutely  and 
permanently,  no  exception  or  excuse  being  tolerated.  Consequently  any  reprisal  which 
entails  one  of  these  acts  is  prohibited,  and  so,  speaking  generally  is  any  reprisal 
incompatible  with  the  'humane  treatment'  demanded  unconditionally  in  the  first 
clause  of  sub-paragraph  (1).  v9149 
It  seems  to  me,  that  this  interpretation  is  consistent  with  the  object  and  the  purpose  of  the 
Article,  which  is  the  protection  of  all  victims  of  internal  conflicts.  Reprisals  would  in 
effect,  deprive  such  persons  from  the  protection  provided  by  Article  3. 
The  taking  of  hostages,  which  is  in  fact  a  form  of  reprisal,  was  expressly  prohibited  by 
Article  3.  Thus,  it  is  not  only  killing  hostages  which  is  prohibited,  but  even  their  taking  is 
illegal.  However,  the  important  question  is  whether  this  prohibition  applies  only  to  persons 
hors  de  combat,  or  even  to  insurgents,  combatants.  The  travaux  pr6paratoires  show  that 
there  is  some  evidence  to  support  the  contention  that  the  prohibition  of  taking  hostages 
applies  only  to  persons  hors  de  combat,  combatants  are  not  immune. 
In  this  respect,  during  the  discussion  of  the  Draft  Article  submitted  by  the  second 
working  group  (which  eventually  became  Article  3  after  the  introduction  of  some 
amendments)  the  Netherlands  argued  without  opposition: 
"...  [T]he  new  text  covered  only  two  categories  of  persons.  Those  who  had  been  placed 
hors  de  combat.  As  a  result  of  this  certain  persons  remained  without  protection, 
which  was 
Oparticularly 
regrettable  in  the  instance  of  prohibiting  the  taking  of 
hostages".  15 
According  to  Norway,  the  Government  would  then  be  free  to  execute  combatants  or  take 
them  as  hostages. 
The  conclusion  in  general  is  that  these  institutions  of  enforcing  law  (reprisals  and  taking 
of  hostages)  which  in  general  are  used  against  the  innocent  are  prohibited  at  least  vis-k- 
As  non-combatants  and  the  sick  and  wounded  in  the  context  of  internal  conflict,  which 
must  be  seen  as  a  very  important  step  in  restricting  the  discretion  of  Governments  in 
internal  conflicts. 
5.  Punishment  of  Violations 
Article  3  is  silent  on  this  point,  which  means  the  breach  and  violations  by  soldiers  and 
officers  of  its  minimum  rules,  may  very  well  go  without  any  prosecution.  The  concept  of 
grave  breaches  is  not  included  in  Article  3.  The  travaux  pr6paratolres  do  not  help  in  this 
respect.  Therefore,  when  Italy  suggested  that  'the  parties  would  be  responsible  for  all  acts 
committed  by  persons  belonging  to  their  armed  forces'151  no  real  discussion  took  place  on 
the  issue. 
Article  3  on  the  other  hand  prohibits  only  'summary  justice',  which  means  that  the 
established  Government  can  try  and  punish  the  insurgents  according  to  due  process  of  the 
local  law.  The  mere  fact  of  taking  arms  is  punished,  the  suggestion  that  only  those  who 
149  Mid,  p.  55. 
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379 commit  violations  of  Article  3  can  be  tried  was  not  accepted.  In  this  regard,  the  State 
sovereignty  won  the  day,  since  insurgents  can  be  tried  and  punished.  The  fact  that  they 
did  not  commit  war  crimes  is  irrelevant,  whereas  soldiers  of  the  established  Government 
may  not  be  punished  even  for  gross  violations  of  Article  3.  The  Government  is  completely 
free  to  do  what  it  sees  fit  in  the  circumstances.  Thus,  prosecution  of  violations  of 
humanitarian  law,  which  is  an  effective  means  of  enforcing  respect  for  the  law,  is  totally 
absent  in  the  context  of  internal  conflicts. 
6.  The  Role  of  the  ICRC 
Paragraph  2  of  Article  3  gives  the  right  of  initiative  to  the  ICRC  or  any  other  impartial 
organisation.  During  the  Diplomatic  Conference,  the  ICRC  was  not  left  out  in  the  context 
of  internal  wars.  In  the  discussions  of  the  drafts  submitted,  the  working  groups,  all  views 
expressed  supported  the  role  of  the  ICRC  in  internal  conflicts  with  the  possible  exception 
of  Burma. 
However,  the  main  difference  was  whether  its  offer  of  services  must  be  obligatory  or 
open  to  the  consent  of  the  belligerents.  Britain  and  the  USA  proposed  at  different  times  that 
its  services  must  be  accepted  by  the  belligerents.  However,  even  the  ICRC  delegate  was 
against  such  a  course.  He  stressed  that: 
"The  strength  of  the  ICRC  was  its  independence,  wpich  would  be  jeopardized  if  the 
ICRC  were  mentioned  in  any  mandatory  clause.  "15 
The  Soviet  draft  on  the  Article  applicable  to  internal  conflicts  did  not,  however,  mention 
the  ICRC  at  all.  This  omission  has  been  attacked  by  the  UK  and  France,  the  latter 
observing  that  'the  mention  of  the  ICRC  corresponds  to  an  avoidable  necessity,  etC.  "53  This 
led  the  Soviet  Union  to  declare  that  it  would  agree  to  the  mention  of  the  ICRC. 
The  final  outcome  was  that  the  ICRC  may  offer  its  services  to  the  parties,  which  means 
that  the  consent  of  the  Government  is  needed  for  the  ICRC  to  carry  out  its  activities. 
Moreover,  it  is  to  be  stressed  that  the  ICRC  does  not  act  as  a  protecting  power,  it  has  no 
explicit  right  to  control  the  application  of  Article  3,  its  main  work  consists  of  giving 
assistance  and  relief  to  the  victims. 
Pictet  comments  on  Article  3/2  as  follows: 
"This  paragraph  may  therefore  appear  at  first  sight  to  be  merely  decorative  and 
without  any  real  significance.  Nevertheless,  it  is  of  great  moral  and  practical  value. 
Although  it  is  extremely  gimple,  it  is  adequate  and  the  international  Committee  itself 
asks  for  nothing  more.  "  14 
It  seems  that  the  mere  mention  of  the  ICRC  is  a  triumph  for  humanitarianism.  Since,  even 
if  the  parties  decline  its  offer.  The  new  factor  according  to  Pictet  is  that  the  parties  'can  no 
1520P. 
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380 longer  look  upon  it  as  an  unfriendly  act,  nor  resent  the  fact  that  the  organisation  making 
the  offer  has  tried  to  come  to  the  aid  of  the  confliCtS.  '155 
7.  Conclusions 
The  main  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  the  travaux  pr6paratolres  and  the  question  of 
compliance  with  Article  3  are: 
(i)  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  main  procedures  for  controlling  and  enforcing  the  application 
of  humanitarian  law  (Protecting  Power,  and  prosecution  of  violations)  have  been  reserved 
for  only  international  conflicts.  Recourse  to  such  methods  in  internal  conflicts  can  be 
considered  as  intervention  and  a  breach  of  sovereignty,  since  the  established  Governments 
would  consider  such  methods  as  obstacles  in  fighting  their  opponents. 
(ii)  I  think  also  that  States  were  more  concerned  about  punishing  insurgents  for  the 
violation  of  their  laws,  rather  than  their  possible  infringement  of  humanitarian  law. 
Sovereignty  is  best  served  by  trying  insurgents  for  high  treason,  rather  than  the  breach  of 
some  rule  of  the  law  of  war,  since  the  second  choice  would  appear  to  give  respectability  to 
the  insurgents. 
(iii)  There  was  a  general  consensus  that  the  ICRC  has  the  right  of  initiative  (which  meant 
that  a  fundamental  legal  development  has  been  achieved),  and  that  the  mere  offering  of 
services  to  the  belligerent  can  of  course,  be  refused.  But,  it  can  never  be  considered  as 
intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  States.  However,  there  is  also  a  general  view  that  the 
activities  of  the  ICRC  are  of  assistance  and  relief  and  not  supervisi6ý  of  the  application  of 
the  law. 
(iv)  Although  reprisals  have  been  said  to  be  implicitly  prohibited  as  a  means  for  enforcing 
the  rules  of  Article  3,  the  fact  that  they  were  not  so  mentioned  is  a  loophole  which  can  be 
exploited  in  practice. 
(v)  It  seems  to  me  that  the  general  mood  was  not  yet  ripe  for  the  acceptance  of  any  means 
of  controlling  the  application  of  the  rules  of  Article  3.  This  in  the  eyes  of  the  established 
Governments,  would  be  a  very  serious  handicap  in  their  dealings  with  insurgents,  and 
would  in  any  event  give  a  valid  ground  for  the  insurgents  to  claim  a  certain  legal  status. 
Since  any  means  of  control  accepted  would  be  resorted  to  by  the  two  belligerents.  It  also, 
seems  that  the  very  minimum  rules  included  in  Article  3  do  not  deserve  any  complex  system 
of  control,  especially  by  third  parties. 
B.  Subsequent  Practice  of  Article  3  and  Means  of  Compliance  with  Its  Rules 
Under  this  heading,  three  points  are  to  be  examined,  which  all  have  relation  to  the  means 
of  enforcement. 
1.  Reprisals  and  Taking  of  Hostages 
In  internal  conflicts  the  practice  shows  clearly  that  these  inhuman  methods  have  been 
resorted  to  not  as  a  means  of  compelling  the  other  party  who  violates  the  law  to  respect  its 
obligation  under  Article  3,  but  usually  as  a  means  of  conducting  the  war  itself.  Reprisals 
1551bid. 
381 were  therefore,  used  in  Vietnam  and  Algeria  against  the  civilian  population,  and  especially 
in  connection  with  POW's.  The  insurgents  resorted  to  the  execution  of  the  Governments 
captured  soldiers  as  a  reprisal  against  the  execution  of  their  captured  comrades;  resort  to 
the  taking  of  hostages  as  a  form  of  reprisal  has  been  used  by  both  parties  to  internal 
wars.  156  Also  resort  to  collective  punishment  of  non-combatants  for  the  acts  of  insurgents 
have  been  used  in  Vietnam.  157 
2.  The  ICRC  Role: 
The  ICRC  in  practice  intervened  in  many  internal  conflicts,  in  Algeria,  Vietnam,  Yemen, 
Nigeria  and  many  other  situations.  Wilhem  concludes  that: 
"ll  est  permis  de  dire  que  le  CICR,  par  ses  multiples  interventions,  par  ses  visites  aux 
ddtenus  de  toute  nature,  joue  dans  une  large  mesure  le  r6le  d'un  organisme  qui 
concourt  A  l'observation  rdguliýre  des  rýgles  de  I'Article  3.  "158 
Cassese  affirms  that  whenever  the  ICRC  decides  to  offer  its  services  the  practice  confirms 
that: 
"...  [I]es  parties  au  conflit  ne  peuvent  ni  refuser,  ni  entraver  son  action  humanitaire 
et  de  contr6le.  "  159 
These  statements  then  have  the  implication  that  the  ICRC  has  become,  in  practice,  a  Teal 
organ  of  controlling  the  application  of  the  dispositions  of  Article  3. 
In  my  opinion,  the  role  of  the  ICRC  as  an  organ  of  control  of  the  observance  of  Article 
3,  must  not  be  exaggerated,  since  claims  of  intervention  and  breach  of  sovereignty  may  be 
labled  against  such  an  attempt,  and  would  also  endanger  the  ICRC's  humanitarian  mission. 
The  ICRC  itself  knows  these  limits.  Thus  the  ICRC's  President  Mr.  A.  Haye,  stated  at  the 
XXIV  International  Conference  of  the  Red  Cross  in  Manilla  (November  1981): 
* 
...  [S]a  pr6occupation  principale  West  pas  de  qualifier  juridiquement  les  situations 
conflictuelles  ou  de  pr6ciser  le  status  des  personnes  A  protiger.  11  sait  d'ailleurs  bien 
qu'iI  n'a  ni  la  comp6tence  ni  le  pourvoir  d'imposer  ses  vues  A  ce  sujet.  De  plus  il 
risque  en  le  faisant  de  ne  plus  avoir  accýs  aux  victimes.  Son  attitude  est  donc  dictde 
par  lint6ret  meme  de  ces  derniýres.  Ce  que  le  CICR  souhaite,  non  pour  lui,  mais 
pour  les  victimes  que  la  communautd  internationale  lui  a  donn6  mission  de  prWger 
et  d'assister,  ce  sont  des  possibilit6s  d'action  concr6te,  au-dela  des  interpr6tation 
juridiques.  "160 
This  reference  was  made  to  both  international  and  non-  international  conflicts  and  indicates 
the  aim  of  the  ICRC  is  to  avoid  legal  controversies  with  belligerent  and  concentrate  on  the 
156See  Veuthey,  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  4,  n.  189,  pp.  129-131. 
157  For  good  detailed  examples  see:  S.  Melman  (ed.  ):  In  the  Name  of  America:  The  Conduct  of  the  War 
in  Vietnam  by  the  Armed  Forces  of  the  US  as  Shown  by  Published  Reports.  1968,  pp.  184-191.  See  also 
Hitter,  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  4.  n.  205,  p.  165. 
lS8W!  them,  op.  cit.,  supra.  chapter  4,  n.  131,  p.  396. 
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382 protection  of  the  victims. 
2.1.  In  Algeria 
The  ICRC  sought  always  the  consent  of  the  French  Government  in  its  activities.  Thus  on 
its  report  on  the  Algerian  conflict  it  was  indicated  that'the  ICRC's  humanitarian  action  was 
more  limited  and  depended  on  special  authorisations  for  which  it  had  to  ask  on  each 
occasion.  '161  Moreover,  when  the  French  Government  on  February  2nd,  1955  allowed  the 
ICRC  to  visit  places  where  FLN  combatants  were  detained,  it  was  firmly  understood  that 
the  ICRC  reports  concerning  detention  conditions,  would  be  communicated  to  the  French 
alone.  Furthermore,  the  ICRC  delegates  'would  not  deal  with  the  reasons  for  imprisonment 
,  162 
or  for  assignation  of  residence. 
The  ICRC  was  able  to  exercise  a  form  of  periodic  inspection  of  places  of  detention.  After 
these  visits,  the  delegates  of  the  ICRC  would  usually  discuss  the  situation  with  the  camp 
commander  at  the  camp  and  inform  him  of  their  observations,  and  sometimes  made 
suggestions  as  to  how  to  overcome  these  shortcomings. 
163 
The  ICRC  also  contacted  the  insurgents  and  its  efforts  led  in  some  cases  to  the  release  of 
French  POW's.  The  ICRC  also  engaged  in  cooperation  with  the  French  Red  Cross  and  the 
Algerian  Red  Crescent,  in  large  relief  and  assistance  operations  for  civilians  and  refugees. 
2.2.  In  Nigeria 
The  ICRC  reminded  the  two  parties  of  their  obligations  to  conform  strictly  to  the 
dispositions  of  humanitarian  law  and  especially  Article  3.1  64  The  two  parties  indicated  their 
readiness  to  apply  the  Geneva  Conventions.  However,  violations  were  immense. 
The  most  important  aspect  of  the  ICRC  work,  however,  was  relief.  165  It  must  be  stressed 
that  the  distribution  of  relief  needs  Government  approval.  Thus,  the  question  of  the 
Government  consent  was  a  major  problem  in  Nigeria.  This  led  at  one  time  to  the 
Government  accusing  the  ICRC  of  intervention  in  its  internal  affairs,  and  eventually  the 
ICRC  representative  in  Lagos  was  declared  persona  non  grata.  166  This  incident  indicates  the 
limits  of  action  of  the  ICRC,  even  when  struggling  for  humanity  regard  must  be  paid  to  the 
delicate  sensibilites  of  sovereignty.  Freymond  correctly  put  it: 
161  Report  on  the  ICRC  and  the  Algerian  Conflict.  Geneva,  1962,  p.  3. 
162  lbid,  p.  4. 
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164Rapport  dlectivit6.  CICR,  1967,  pp.  37-8. 
165  For  details  see  E.  I.  Nwogugu:  The  Nigerian  Civil  War:  A  Case  Study  in  the  Law  of  War.  14  IJIL, 
1971,  pp.  33-34;  and  P.  Mertens:  Les  modalit6s  de  Ilintervention  du  Comit6  International  de  la  Croix- 
Rouge  clans  te  conftit  du  Nigeria.  15  AFDI,  1969,  pp.  183-209. 
166  See  D.  Forsythe:  Humanitarian  Politics:  The  International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross.  Johns  Hopkins 
Univ  Press.  Sattimore/London,  1977.  p.  46. 
383 "...  [L]e  CICR,  meme  s'il  est  le  seul  ou  le  principal  representant  de  la  politique 
humanitaire  West  qu"un  des  acteurs  et  il  West  pas  le  plus  puissant.  "167 
Heutsch,  summarised  the  situation  of  the  ICRC  in  Nigeria  which,  in  my  view,  can  be 
envisaged  in  any  internatal  conflict  by  stating: 
"...  [L]a  guerre  du  Nigeria  a  mis  en  6vidence,  plus  cruellement  peut-etre  que  beaucoup 
d'autres  conflits,  les  obstacles  diplornatiques  auxquells  se  heurte  une  enterprise  de 
secours  internationale  au  coeur  d'une  guerre  civile  acharn6e  et,  dans  cette  enterprise, 
les  possibilit6s  et  les  limites  d'une  organisation  telle  que  le  CICR.  "168 
The  conclusion  in  regard  to  the  practice  of  the  ICRC  is  that  nobody  can  deny  the  positive 
impact  of  its  intervention  in  making  the  war  more  humane.  Its  activities  may  in  fact,  result 
in  a  de  facto  supervision  of  the  the  application  of  Article  3. 
The  other  important  conclusion  has  been  well  put  by  Forsythe: 
"The  ICRC  is  interested  in  the  welfare  of  individuals;  a  party  to  the  conflict  may  be 
primarily  interested  in  securing  control  of  the  Government,  or  putting  down  a 
challenge  to  one's  rule.  "  6 
The  result  is  that  the  belligerents  try  to  reduce  their  obligations.  Political  necessity  overrides 
humanitarian  considerations.  However,  the  role  of  the  ICRC  is  to  secure  the  protection  of 
the  victims  of  war.  This  aim  cannot  be  held  to  obstruct  political  aims  of  the  belligerents. 
3.  Punishment  of  Violations  of  Article  3 
One  of  the  weaknesses  of  Article  3,  as  it  has  been  indicated,  is  that  it  contains  no  provisions 
for  prosecution  and  trial  of  those  who  violate  its  fundamental  rules.  It  seems,  however, 
given  the  existence  of  a  real  political  will  and  concern  for  humanitarian  law,  there  is  no 
reason  why  violators  of  such  fundamental  rules  should  not  be  punished,  since  their  breach 
can  fit  easily  in  the  category  of  'grave  breaches'  contained  in  the  Geneva  Conventions. 
Cassese  sustains  that  "rien  n'exclut  formellement  que  parmis  les  'infractions  graves'  en 
question  figurent  les  violations  les  plus  importantes  de  I'Article  3.070 
However,  State  practice  indicates  that  during  the  war,  captured  insurgents  are  either 
executed  in  the  field,  which  is  a  flagrant  violation  of  Article  3,  (which  expressly  prohibits 
summary  execution)  or  are  tried  and  convicted  for  treason,  which  is  a  crime  according  to 
national  but  not  international  law. 
After  the  war,  States  are  more  interested  in  establishing  conditions  for  national  unity, 
rather  than  caring  for  enforcing  humanitarian  law.  Amnesty  laws,  militate  against  any 
attempt  to  try  war  criminals  in  the  context  of  internal  war.  Thus,  in  Iraq,  Decision  No.  1076 
of  August  16th,  1979  and  Decision  1077  of  the  Revolutionary  Command  Council  declared  a 
167  J.  Fremond.  Guerres,  rdvolutions,  Croix  Rouge,  r6flexions  sur  le  r6le  du  Comit6  Internationat  de 
la  Croix  Rouge.  Institut  Universitalre  des  Hautes  Etudes  Internationates,  Gen6ve,  1976,  p.  69. 
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384 general  amnesty  for  all  prisoners  and  fugitive  Kurds  who  were  fighting  a  war  of  secession, 
without  any  exception.  171 
Moreover,  there  is  no  case  of  a  third  State  attempting  to  try  persons  who  committed  gross 
violations  of  Arfticle  3  in  the  course  of  civil  wars  in  another  State.  Any  attempt  would  be 
considered  as  an  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  State  concerned,  which  is  a  valid 
argument,  since  Article  3  does  not  envisage  such  a  possibility. 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  insurgent  movements  had  in  some  cases  set  up  'people's  and 
revolutionary  courts'  to  try  captured  Government  soldiers  for  war  crimes,  especially  against 
the  civilians.  This  happened  in  Algeria. 
However,  a  real  attempt  to  enforce  the  rules  of  humanitary  law  including  Article  3,  has 
been  made  in  the  case  of  Bangladesh.  In  April  1973  the  new  State  declared  officially  its 
intention  to  try  195  Pakistani  prisoners  'for  serious  crimes,  which  include  genocide,  war 
crimes,  crimes  against  humanity,  breaches  of  Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Convention,  murder, 
rape  and  arson.  "72  The  important  precedent  is  the  inclusion  of  breaches  of  Article  3  in  the 
list  of  crimes  to  be  prosecuted.  This  is  a  major  event,  since  it  is  the  first  attempt  to  enforce 
Article  3  in  court. 
In  July  1973,  Bangladesh's  Parliament  enacted  the  International  Crimes  Tribunal  Act. 
Thus,  the  Government  was  permitted  to  set  tribunals  to  try  war  criminals.  However,  the 
trials  never  took  place  and  in  1974  Bangladesh  allowed  India  to  repatriate  the  195  Pakistani 
POW's  without  any  assurance  that  they  would  be  tried.  The  reasons  were  not  legal,  they 
were  political.  Pakistan  supported  by  China  had  made  it  clear  that  any  prospect  of  pacific 
trilateral  relations  between  it  and  Bangladesh  and  India  were  dependent  on  the  return  of  the 
prisoners.  173  However,  despite  the  lack  of  trial,  the  case  of  Bangladesh  offers  a  very  good 
precedent  for  the  future  enforcement  of  general  humanitary  law  and  especially  Article  3 
violations. 
1.3.  Vietnam 
Violations  of  Article  3  and  indeed  of  all  the  rules  of  humanitarian  law  were  common. 
Despite  this,  no  real  efforts  were  made  to  prosecute  the  violators.  General  Westmorland,  the 
Commander  of  US  forces  in  Vietnam,  issued  a  statement  part  of  which  reads  as  follows: 
"...  [W]e  are  sensitive  to  the  incidents  [killing  of  civilians  and  other  crimes]  and  want 
no  more  of  them.  If  one  occurs,  by  mistake  or  accident,  we  intend  to  search  i 
"171  carefully  for  any  lesson  that  will  help  us  improve  our  procedures  and  our  controls. 
Despite  this  vague  statement  on  the  intention  of  enforcing  respect  for  the  laws  of  war,  the 
practice  seems  to  indicate  that  the  view  of  the  US  Commander  was  that  the  very  nature  of 
171  Yearbook  on  Human  Rights  for  t979.  UN  Pub.,  New  York,  1986,  p.  99. 
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1740p. 
cit.,  supra.  n.  157,  p.  421. 
385 the  Vietnamese  war  allowed  these  crimes  to  happen  and  that  it  is  very  hard  to  try  to  punish 
violators  in  these  circumstances.  Taylor  stated  in  this  regard  that  the  enthusiasm  for  the 
body  count  policy,  devastation  of  large  areas  of  the  country,  slaughter  of  villagers  are  'due 
to  features  of  the  Vietnam  conflict  which  have  made  the  laws  of  war  unusually  difficult  of 
application"  75.  Few  cases  were  tried  by  martial  courts.  Schwarz  was  sentenced  to  life 
imprisonment  by  a  military  court  in  Danang,  for  participating  in  the  killing  of  12 
Vietnamese  villagers.  176  Many  other  trials  took  place.  177  The  most  famous  was  the  May  Lai 
(or  Donmy)  which  occurred  on  16  March  1968  where  Lieutenant  Calley  ordered  the  killing 
of  347  civilians  including  women  and  children.  Calley  himself  killed  22  civilians.  The 
Investigation  Commission  found  30  persons  guilty,  only  4  were  tried  and  only  I  person, 
Calley,  was  condemned.  178 
In  the  aftermath  of  Calley  case  the  US  Department  of  Defense  issued  a  directive  on  the 
implementation  of  the  laws  of  war.  Among  the  objectives  listed  in  this  directive:  (i)  to 
ensure  that  the  law  of  war  and  the  obligations  of  the  US  Government  under  that  law  are 
observed  and  enforced  by  the  armed  forces  of  the  US, 
(ii)  to  ensure  that  the  alleged  violations  of  the  law  of  war,  whether  committed  by  the  US 
personnel  or  enemy  personnel,  are  promptly  reported,  thoroughly  investigated,  and,  where 
179  appropriate,  remedied  by  corrective  action. 
After  that  the  Directive  added  'Under  the  head  of  Policy  A',  armed  forces  of  the  US  will 
comply  with  the  law  of  war  in  the  conduct  of  military  operations  and  related  activities  in 
armed  conflicts,  however,  such  conflicts  are  characteristed.  180  The  last  sentence  indicates 
clearly  that  these  efforts  of  implementing  and  enforcing  the  laws  of  war  are  not  confined 
to  international  conflicts,  but  also  internal  conflicts. 
Therefore  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  the  punishment  of  violation  of  Article  3.  This  is  a 
very  interesting  precedent,  which  can  be  used  by  other  States,  in  order  to  create  a 
favourable  atmosphere  for  the  real  enforcement  of  the  laws  of  war  in  internal  conflicts.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  seems  that  States  which  are  faced  with  civil  wars,  will  not  go  that  far  in 
their  view.  This  will  tie  their  hands  in  dealing  with  their  enemies. 
4.  The  Nicaragua  Case  and  the  Question  of  Ensuring  Respect  for  the  Rules  of  Article  3  of 
Geneva  Conventions 
The  Court,  it  must  be  stressed,  has  not  dealt  at  length  with  the  question  of  ensuring  respect 
for  the  application  of  common  Article  3  and  the  means  thereto.  However,  it  emphasised 
some  important  points  in  connection  with  the  obligation  of  States  to  respect  Article  3. 
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386 Thus,  it  held  that: 
*The  Court  considers  that  there  is  an  obligation  on  United  States  Government,  in 
terms  of  Article  I  of  the  Geneva  Convention  to  'respect'  the  conventions  and  even  'to 
ensure  respect'  for  them  'in  all  circumstances'  since  such  an  obligation  does  not  derive 
from  the  conventions  themselves  but  from  the  general  principle  of  humanitarian  law 
to  which  the  conventions  merely  give  specific  expression.  "" 
It  then  added  that: 
"The  United  States  is  thus  under  obligation  not  to  encourage  persons  or  groups 
eýja  ed  in  the  conflict  in  Nicaragua  to  act  in  violation  of  the  provisions  of  Article 
3.8ý 
The  Main  legal  consequences  of  the  pronouncement  by  the  Court  are  in  my  view:  (i)  The 
obligation  to'ensure  respect'  for  humanitarian  law  has  become,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Court, 
one  of  the  general  principles  of  humanitarian  law'83.  In  my  opinion,  this  means  that  States 
are  under  obligation  not  to  encourage  directly  or  indirectly,  other  States  or  insurgent  groups 
of  violating  Article  3.  They  are  under  legal  obligation  to  use  all  their  efforts  to  stop  such 
violations  whenever  they  occur  by  using  all  their  material  and  diplomatic  influence,  in 
accordance  with  the  principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN,  as  defined  by  the  Friendly 
resolution. 
(ii)  All  actions  of  third  States  which  have  the  intention  of  'ensuring  respect'  for  the  rules 
of  Article  3  cannot  be  considered  as  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  State 
conducting  a  civil  war. 
(iii)  Third  States  also  in  order  to  ensure  respect  for  Article  3  may  resort  to  the  trial  and 
punishment  of  persons  who  committed  gross  violations  of  Article  3  whenever  these  violators 
come  into  their  hands. 
5.  Conclusions  on  Compliance  with  Common  Article  3  In  Practice 
(i)  The  practice  makes  it  clear  that  the  absence  of  any  means  of  controlling  the  application 
of  Article  3  meant  that  many  violations  cannot  be  prevented  since  there  is  no  body  who  can 
control  the  Government  or  the  insurgents  in  their  observance  of  the  rules  of  Article  3. 
Thus,  the  arguments  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention  which  in  effect  pushed  away  any 
attempt  to  institute  a  real  machinery  of  control,  meant  in  practice  that  many  victims  deaths 
and  sufferings  could  not  be  prevented. 
(ii)  The  ICRC,  by  its  work  of  assistance  of  relief,  however,  when  accepted  by  the  legal 
Government,  can  effectively  contribute  to  the  amelioration  of  the  conditions  of  the  victims 
of  war,  especially  persons  who  have  no  protection  under  Article  3.  Hence,  the  ICRC 
contributes  indirectly  to  the  implementation  not  only  of  the  rules  of  Article  3,  but  other 
humanitarian  rules  as  well.  However,  it  seems  that  any  successful  work  by  the  ICRC  must 
18125  ILM,  1986,  para.  220,  p.  1073. 
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387 always  be  undertaken  with  the  consent  of  the  Government.  Respect  of  the  sovereignty  of 
the  State  is  the  cornerstone  of  any  succession  operation  by  the  ICRC. 
(iii)  Absence  of  penal  sanctions  coupled  with  the  enactment  of  amnesty  laws  at  the  end 
of  civil  wars,  meant  in  practice  that  demands  of  political  expediency  overrode  demands  of 
humanitarianism.  However,  in  my  opinion,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  States  from  enforcing 
respect  for  the  rules  of  Article  3  by  the  trial  and  punishment  of  its  violators.  The  precedent 
of  Bangladesh,  read  together  with  the  pronouncement  of  the  ICJ  in  the  Nicaragua  Case, 
may  very  well  furnish  a  sufficient  legal  base  for  such  actions. 
SECTION  III:  Protocol  II  and  the  Question  of  Compliance 
Introduction 
My  contention  in  this  section  is  that  claims  of  sovereignty  and  non-intervention  have  been 
successfully  used  by  States  to  block  any  development  concerning  means  of  ensuring  respect 
for  humanitarian  law.  The  Protocol  in  fact,  does  not  contain  any  means  of  control  of  its 
application,  except  the  obligation  of  dissemination.  There  is  no  mention  of  the  ICRC  in  any 
form.  This  led  El  Kouhene  to  rightly  state  that: 
"...  [O]n  constate  donc  encore  une  fois  qye  c'est  paradoxalement  I'Article  3  qui 
'd6veloppe  et  r6affirme'  le  Protocole  11.  "154 
This  indicates  that  Article  3  is  in  advance  in  relation  to  Protcol  II. 
My  second  contention  is  that  human  rights  instruments  can  play  a  significant  role  as  a 
means  of  controlling  the  application  of  fundamental  rights  of  humanitarian  law.  The 
practice  of  the  UN  and  regional  organisations  show  this  tendency  very  clearly.  In  order  to 
prove  the  first  contention,  it  is  necessary  to  go  to  the  travaux  pr4paratolres,  and  to  prove 
the  second  it  is  essential  to  consult  State  practice  and  international  organisations  practice. 
In  the  travaux  prkparatoires,  I  will  deal  with  different  conferences,  ICRC  experts, 
Government  experts,  and  especially  the  Diplomatic  Conference  itself. 
A.  The  Travaux  Prkparatolres  and  the  Question  of  Compliance 
1.  ICRC  Experts  Conferences 
Two  important  points  concerning  the  observance  of  the  application  of  the  rules  of  the 
proposed  Protocol  11  were  dealt  with  by  the  Red  Cross  experts.  The  first  concerned  the 
reinforcement  of  the  role  of  the  ICRC,  and  secondly,  whether  other  mechanisms  of 
supervision  can  be  developed. 
Concerning  the  first  point,  some  experts  felt  that  the  parties  to  an  internal  conflict  are 
bound  to  accept  the  offer  of  the  services  of  the  ICRC.  However,  other  experts  were 
reluctant  to  endorse  such  a  course  of  action.  They  expressly  invoked  the  principles  of 
intervention  and  sovereignty.  185  They  expressed  the  hope  that  'the  ICRC  would  continue 
184 
Op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  160,  pp.  177-i78. 
185 
These  Experts  feared  that: 
"The  strengthened  right  of  Initiative  might  be  treated  by  some  as  a  form  of  Interference  In 
the  Internat  affairs  of  State". 
388 to  carry  on  its  activity  in  pragmatic  manner,  as  it  has  successfully  done  in  the  past"86 
which  means  that  the  consent  of  the  Government  is  needed  for  the  ICRC  to  act. 
On  the  second  question,  the  experts  consulted  in  1969  were  of  the  opinion  that  the  ICRC 
should  be  invested  with  "internationally  recognised  functions  of  supervision,  in  order  that 
it  should  be  binding  on  the  Governments  to  accept  its  assistance  for  the  application  of 
humanitary  rules.  "187  This  meant  that  the  ICRC  would  act  as  a  body  which  oversees  the 
observance  of  the  application  of  humanitarian  law,  however,  the  term  protecting  power  was 
not  mentioned. 
In  the  1970  Conference,  the  mood  changed.  Two  opinions  emerged,  the  first  supporting 
the  idea  of  creating  a  supervisory  body  which  should  be  international,  apolitical  and  neutral. 
Some  felt  that  it  'should  be  composed  of  personalities  known  to  be  impartial.  "88  Others 
considered  that  such  a  body  could  be  set  up  by  the  UN  or  could  constitute  one  of  the 
branches  of  the  10189.  However,  some  experts,  presumably  concerned  about  the  impact  of 
such  suggestions  on  the  ideas  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention,  were  'hesitant'  about 
such  suggestions. 
In  his  second  report  on  human  rights  and  armed  conflict,  the  UN  Secretary-  General 
supported  the  first  idea.  He  wrote  that: 
"Conditions  may  now  be  ripe  to  encourage  consideration  of  the  idea  of  gradually 
moving  away  from  the  ad  hoc  approach...  towards  setting  up,  on  a  durable  standing 
basis,  an  agency  of  implementation  under  the  aegis  of  the  United  Nations.  An 
absolute  prerequisite  for  the  establishment  and  success  of  such  an  agency  would  be 
that  its  character  would  be  exclusively  and  strictly  humanitarian;  it  would  have  to  be 
scrupulously  non-political  and  it  should  strive  to  offer  all  guarantees  of  impartiality, 
efficiency  and  rectitude.  "190 
The  conclusion  is  that  the  ICRC  experts  were  divided  on  the  subjects  of  either  studying  the 
role  of  the  ICRC  or  creating  other  machinery  for  the  supervision  of  the  application  of 
humanitarian  law  to  internal  conflicts.  It  would  seem  to  me,  that  their  stand  and 
understanding  of  the  position  of  the  concepts  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  in  the 
world  today,  have  contributed  essentially  to  that  difference  of  opinions. 
They  also  believed  that: 
NThe  question  of  reinforcement,  or  even  of  the  imperative  nature  of  the  right  to  offer 
humanitarian  services,  was  one  of  the  most  difficult  problems,  and  that  the  time  has  not  yet 
come  when  the  right  to  act  automatically  in  cases  of  non-internationat  conflict  can  be  given 
to  a  body,  whatever  it  may  be.  " 
CGEDHL  (24  May-12  June,  1971).  V.  Protectionof  Victims  of  Non-InternationaL  ArmedConfticts.  Geneva, 
1971,  p.  74. 
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389 2.  The  Government  Experts  Conferences 
The  Second  CGEDHL  (1972)  especially  witnessed  an  important  discussion  concerning  ways 
of  implementing  Protocol  11.  Six  Articles  were  proposed  under  the  chapter  dealing  with 
'Executory  provisions',  which  in  fact  indicates  the  urgency  with  which  the  ICRC  takes  up 
the  matter  of  enforcement.  The  most  important  Article  was  Article  37  which  is  entitled 
'Cooperation  in  the  observance  of  the  present  Protocol.  '  This  Article  in  fact  made  it 
obligatory  for  each  party  to  the  conflict  to  'call  upon  a  body  whitý  offers  all  guarantees  of 
impartiality  and  efficacy  to  cooperate  in  the  observance  of  the  p  esent  Protocol  etc.  '191 
Thus,  a  third  party  is  called  to  ensure  that  the  parhie-ý 
7 
_observe 
the  application  of 
humanitarian  rules  in  internal  conflict.  However,  their  power  of  discretion  was  limited  to 
the  choice  of  the  humanitarian  body  which  they  prefer,  but  does  not  extend  to  the  question 
of  choosing  that  body  or  not. 
The  Western  Experts  in  general  supported  the  ICRC  proposed  Article  37  and  even  tried 
to  strengthen  it.  It  was  proposed  that  the  body  which  was  to  be  appointed  according  to 
Article  37  would  have  its  competence  extended  throughout  the  territory  where  the  conflict 
is  taking  place.  192  Moreover,  the  ICRC  has  been  indicated  as  the  compulsory  substitute  of 
the  humanitarian  body  when  it  is  lacking.  The  UK  Experts  proposed  that  the  impartial  body 
which  supervise  the  implementation  and  observance  of  the  Protocol  11  is  the  ICRC. 
However,  non-Western  States  were  in  general  sceptical  about  giving  any  mandatory  form 
to  the  third  party  involved  in  observing  the  application  of  Protocol  II.  It  was  argued  that 
the  mandatory  form  of  the  ICRC  proposed  Article  37  was  unacceptable  since  'The  use  of 
the  conditional  would  have  been  more  conducive  to  rallying  Governments  to  the  Article  in 
question.  '193  It  was  suggested  implicitly  that  the  mandatory  form  limited  the  discretion  of 
Governments,  hence  it  is  not  in  their  interests. 
The  Indonesian  Experts  submitted  an  amendment  which  would  make  the  agreement  of 
the  established  Government  necessary,  if  draft  Article  37  is  to  work,  they  stated: 
"...  [I]nternational  law  should  not  try  to  weaken  the  powers  of  the  sovereign  States  in 
situations  which  were  actually  threatening  their  very  sovereignty  and  existence.  "  194 
Thus,  in  this  view  any  stipulation  in  favour  of  mandatory  appointment  of  a  body  for 
supervising  the  implementation  of  the  Protocol  was  seen  as  an  incursion  of  State  sovereignty 
and  this  deprives  the  Government  in  very  dangerous  circumstances  from  its  right  to  do  what 
it  sees  fit. 
However,  the  other  Articles  did  not  raise  much  discussion.  195  Nevertheless,  at  least  one 
expert  was  sceptical  about  the  practical  consequences  of  the  Article  dealing  with 
dissemination.  He  feared  that: 
191  CGEDHL  (Session  3  May-3  June,  1972).  1.  Report  on  the  Work  of  the  Conference.  Geneva,  1972,  p.  93. 
192  Ibid,  p.  44.  The  proposal  submitted  by  the  Experts  of  Austria  and  Switzerland.  CE/COM  11/62o 
193  Ibid,  para.  2.300,  'p.  94. 
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390 "The  dissemination  of  the  present  Protocol  might  help  increase  the  possibility  of 
rebellion,  as  the  rebels  would  be  able  to  find  all  information  relating  to  their 
treatment  in  the  text  of  the  Protocol.  "  196 
The  travaux  prkparatolres  of  the  Government  Experts  Conferences  show  that  there  was  a 
consensus,  at  least  about  the  idea  that  third  party  control  of  the  application  of  humanitary 
rules  in  internal  conflicts  is  needed.  However,  there  was  no  consensus  concerning  the  legal 
nature  of  such  control  and  whether  it  is  mandatory  or  discretionary.  Those  who  defended 
the  right  of  the  State  want  a  discretionary  control,  which  in  practice  would  mean  that  the 
Government  is  at  liberty  in  accepting  or  refusing  the  control. 
3.  The  Diplomatic  Conference: 
Under  the  title  'Execution  of  Present  Protocol'  Part  VII  of  the  draft  Protocol  11  of  the  ICRC 
contained  four  Articles  dealing  with  the  question  of  enforcement  and  implementation  of 
Protocol  11  [Article  36:  Measures  for'Execution,  Article  37:  Dissemination.  Article  38: 
Special  Agreements  and  Article  39:  Cooperation  in  the  observance  of  the  present 
Protocol].  197  It  seems  from  the  reading  of  these  draft  Articles  that  the  ICRC  has,  especially 
in  regard  to  third  party  role  in  internal  conflicts,  opted  for  the  idea  of  discretion,  rather 
than  any  mandatory  form,  which  would  not  be  accepted  by  the  majority  of  States. 
Again  the  discussions  in  the  conference,  especially  in  the  last  session  of  the  Conference 
in  1977,  of  the  Articles  in  question  show  clearly  how  the  use  of  the  arguments  of 
sovereignty  and  non  -intervention  have  virtually  led  to  the  elimination  of  any  measures  for 
implementing  the  Protocol  II  except  a  single  weak  Article  on  Dissemination. 
Eide,  who  was  a  member  of  the  Norwegian  delegation  surnmarised  the  whole  feeling 
concerning  the  Articles  on  implementation.  He  stated: 
"The  concern  for  sovereignty,  however,  made  the  Governments  participating  in  the 
conference  very  reluctant  towards  norms  of  implementation.  The  majority  of  States 
were  not  only  reluctant  to  accept  any  kind  of  international  supervision,  but  even  to 
undertake  an  obligation  of  a  specific  nature  concerning  the  international 
dissemination  of  the  Protocol.  "198 
In  other  words,  the  majority  of  States  saw  any  reference  to  means  of  implementation  as 
incompatible  with  their  sovereignty. 
On  one  hand,  Rosemary  Abi-Saab  writes  that: 
"...  [E]n  rdalitd  toute  semblance  d'intervention,  meme  par  un  organisme  humanitaire 
impartial,  n'dtait  pas  acceptable  pour  certaines  ddldgations  qui  ont  su  rendre 
suffisamment  cr6dible  leur  menace  de  refuser  un  texte  qui  attaquerait  de  la  maniýre 
la  plus  minime  soit-elle  le  principle  de  la  souverainet6  dtatique  dans  le  maintain  de 
I"ordre.  "199 
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391 On  the  other  hand,  Cassese  argued  that. 
'This  lack  of  any  international  scrutiny,  which  clearly  resulted  from  the  joint  view 
of  third  world  and  socialist  countries  is  no  doubt  most  unfortunate,  for  it  results  in 
stultifying  the  effect  of  the  protoCOI.  "200 
In  my  opinion,  all  these  views  are  in  a  way  correct  statements  and  observations  of  what 
really  happened  to  measures  for  implementation  during  the  conference,  ideas  of  sovereignty 
and  non-intervention,  killed  all  attempts  at  remedying  this  loophole  (of  supervision)  in 
internal  conflicts. 
It  is  proposed  here  to  deal  with  the  travaux  preparatolres,  since  they  provide  strong 
evidence  of  the  workings  of  the  principles  of  sovereignty  and  non-intervention,  and  how 
they  were  used  to  nullify  piece  by  piece  the  proposals  of  the  ICRC. 
Although  the  four  Draft  Articles  (36-39)  were  interlinked  it  may  be  said  that  they 
contain  two  elements  regarding  means  of  implementing  Protocol  11.  Firstly,  elements  and 
measures  which  depended  on  the  parties  themselves  (mutual  means)  and  secondly,  third 
party  machinery. 
(i)  As  to'the  first  category,  three  Articles  of  the  ICRC  draft  (36,37  and  38)  deal  with  it. 
They  include: 
(a)  The  obligation  of  each  party  to  the  conflict  to  take  the  necessary  measures  for 
ensuring  respect  for  the  Protocol  by  its  persons  subjected  to  its  authority,  either  military 
of  civil; 
(b)  dissemination  of  the  Protocol;  and 
(c)  special  agreement  between  the  parties  to  extend  the  application  of  other  rules  of 
humanitary  law  to  their  conflict. 
Articles  36,37  and  38  which  dealt  with  these  measures  did  not  raise  fundamental 
objections  during  the  discussions  at  the  Committee  level.  The  new  versions  of  those  Articles 
adopted  at  the  Committee  level  did  not  differ  fundamentally  from  what  was  proposed  by 
the  ICRC.  Nevertheless,  they  were  not  favourable  to  defenders  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
intervention.  Thus,  for  instance  draft  Article  37  of  the  ICRC  dealing  with  dissemination 
included  a  reference  to  the  study  of  the  Protocol  11  in  the  programmes  of  military  and  civil 
instruction.  This  reference  was  deleted.  The  new  version  speaks  of  the  obligation  of  the 
parties  to  disseminate  the  Protocol  so  that  it  may  become  known  to  the  armed  forces  and 
the  civilian  population  which  means  in  the  end  that  the  Government  is  free  to  choose  ways 
of  dissemination. 
Similarly,  Article  38  dealing  with  special  agreements  in  the  ICRC  version  opened  the 
possibility  for  the  parties  to  bring  by  'special  agreements  or  by  declarations'  addressed  to 
the  depository  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  or  the  ICRC  all  or  parts  of  Geneva  Committee 
of  1949.  It  is  to  be  noticed  here  that  the  ICRC  explained  that  by  'declaration'  it  meant 
unilateral  declarations  by  either  party,  it  stressed  that: 
"If  such  a  declaration  was  made  by  one  party  alone,  it  would  be  binding  only  on  that 
party.  in  that  case,  the  ICRC,  by  communicating  it  to  the  other  party,  would 
200  A.  Cassese:  Status  of  RebeLs  under  the  1977  Geneva  Protocots.  39  ICLO,  t981,  p.  419. 
392 encourage  it  to  make  a  similar  declaration".  201 
The  implication  of  this  ICRC  statement  is  very  clear.  The  insurgents  can  make  a  unilateral 
declaration  which  would  embarrass  the  Government,  and  would  give  the  insurgents  a  golden 
opportunity  against  the  established  Government.  These  hypotheses  led  at  the  Committee 
level  to  the  modification  of  the  wording  of  the  Article  in  order  to  emphasise  the  mutual 
element  even  in  declarations.  This  of  course  goes  with  the  desire  of  the  established 
Governments  to  close  any  door  through  which  the  insurgents  may  appear  as  responsible 
movements  capable  of  acting  at  the  international  level,  which  would  undermine  the 
legitimacy  of  the  Government  in  holding  power. 
Despite  these  changes,  the  three  Articles  36,37  and  38  were  adopted  at  the  Committee 
level  by  consensus.  This  indicates  that  there  was  a  large  measure  of  acceptance,  that  the 
parties  to  the  conflict  hold  the  ultimate  responsibility  for  implementing  the  Protocol.  In 
other  words,  the  measures  are  left  to  the  parties  themselves.  This  stand  goes  with  the 
theoretical  view  of  the  majority  of  States  that  they  prefer  mutual  and  agreed  ways  of 
enforcing  international  law  rather  than  third  party  involvement  in  that  process. 
(ii)  Third  party  machinery-  Draft  Article  39,  which  was  the  subject  of  heated  discussion 
in  the  Conference,  stipulates  that: 
"Co-operation  in  the  observance  of  the  present  Protocol.  The  parties  to  the  conflict 
may  call  upon  a  body  offering  all  guarantees  of  impartiality  and  efficacy,  such  as  the 
International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross,  to  co-operate  in  the  observance  of  the 
provisions  of  the  presenj  Protocol  such  a  body  may  also  offer  its  services  to  the 
parties  to  the  confliCt.  "20 
The  ICRC  delegate  at  the  Diplomatic  Conference  explained  the  rationale  behind  the 
inclusion  of  this  Article  in  Protocol  11,  as  follows: 
"The  parties  might  come  up  against  certain  difficulties  in  applying  the  provisions  of 
Protocol  11,  in  which  case  the  assistance  of  a  body  monitoring  its  implementation 
might  be  both  desired  and  useful.  "203 
He  tried  to  assure  defenders  of  sovereignty  by  insisting  that: 
"...  [I]ts  activities  [of  the  humanitary  body]  however,  could  only  be  an  auxiliary 
"204  character. 
He  also  insisted  that  the  mention  of  the  ICRC  was  by  way  of  an  example,  the  parties  were 
at  liberty  to  choose  any  impartial  body  they  like.  The  right  of  initiative  of  the  ICRC, 
however,  was  confirmed  in  Article  39. 
Despite  these  ICRC  assurances  and  despite  the  discretionary  nature  of  resorting  to  third 
party  cooperation  for  the  implementation  of  Protocol  11,  the  very  mention  of  such  a 
2019  ORDCHL  (1974-1977),  Geneva,  MDH/I/SR  59,  para.  48,  p.  245. 
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393 possibility  in  the  context  of  internal  armed  conflicts,  was  enough  for  some  States  to  demand 
its  deletion,  because  it  constitutes  an  intervention  in  their  internal  affairs  and  a  breach  of 
their  sovereignty. 
Some  Third  World  States  led  the  attack  against  Article  39.  In  this  context,  they  were 
greatly  supported  by  Socialist  States,  which  as  a  matter  of  principle  stand  against  third  party 
machinery  in  whatever  form,  in  international  law  and  international  relations.  They  do  not 
believe  in  neutrality  in  the  age  of  which  Socialism  and  Capitalism  still  live  together.  Mexico 
led  the  attack  by  pointing  out  that  Article  39  was  'unacceptable  since  it  would  permit  an 
intolerable  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  during  a  non-  international  Armed  Conflict'. 
Mexico  maintained  that  Article  39  was  in  fact,  in  a  conflict  with  the  Article  of  the  Protocol 
205  prohibiting  intervention. 
Iraq  was  very  explicit,  it  stated  that: 
"The  distinction  between  international  and  non-  international  conflict  was  being  lost. 
Article  39  dealt  with  matters  involving  the  infringement  of  State  sovereignty,  and 
internal  matters  would  become  international  matters.  The  sovereignty  of  the  State 
over  its  territory  would  cease  to  exSt.  "206 
Implicitly  then,  the  mere  possibility  of  third  party  machinery,  has  been  seen  as  leading  to 
the  inevitable  taking  of  important  powers  of  the  State,  which  would  deprive  it  from 
overcoming  its  enemies. 
India  on  the  other  hand,  gave  another  reason  why  in  its  view  Article  39  had  no  place  in 
the  context  of  Protocol  11.  It  stated  that  once  the  Article  is  adopted  it: 
"...  [W]ould  inevitably  be  used  for  political  reasons  by  a  party  opposing  or  in  rebellion 
against  a  government.  A  government  which  refused  the  services  of  the  ICRC  or  some 
other  impartial  bo  ý  called  in  by  the  rebel  party  might  be  accused  of  having 
7  something  to  hide.  - 
The  Ukrainian  Soviet  Socialist  Republic  endorsed,  with  other  Socialist  States  (Cuba  and 
Mongolia),  the  view  advocated  by  the  above  Third  World  States.  The  delegation  of  Ukraine 
stressed: 
had  some  doubts  regarding  the  wording  of  Article  39.  There  was  nothing  to 
prevent  the  ICRC  offering  its  help,  even  without  such  an  Article,  which  in  any  case 
would  have  no  effect  on  its  activities.  It  might  be  possible  to  amend  the  Article  by 
adding  a  reference  to  national  Red  Cross  societies,  but  since  some  delegations  thought 
that  the  provisions  of  Article  39  would  endanger  State  sovereignty  he  was  prepared 
to  support  the  Mexican  proposal  that  Article  39  should  be  deleted.  "208 
Therefore,  it  is  not  only  third  party  control  of  the  application  of  Protocol  Il  which  is  seen 
as  infringement  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  State,  but  even  any  mention  of  the  ICRC. 
However,  Western  States  especially  backed  by  some  delegates  from  the  Third  World, 
2051bid, 
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394 supported  what  was  proposed  by  the  ICRC.  Draper,  the  UK  delegate,  expressed  their  view 
when  he  stated  that  the  provisions  of  Article  39  'were  of  undoubted  value  in  Protocol  11'.  209 
He  then  added  that  'it  was  self-evident  that  such  conflict  (internal)  would  lead  to  some 
erosion  of  sovereignty,  but  Article  39  in  no  way  derogated  from  such  sovereignty.  '210 
Tunisia  stressed  the  same  point  of  view: 
"Article  39  was  simply  giving  the  parties  the  possibility  of  calling  on  the  good  offices 
of  impartial  bodies  to  that  end.  As  long  as  it  imposed  no  obligations,  there  was 
nothing  in  it  that  was  prejudicial  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  State.  "211 
This  initial  discussion  of  the  ICRC  Article  39  which  shows  a  fundamental  rift  between  two 
conceptions  of  sovereignty,  led  the  Committee  to  refer  Article39  to  working  groups  and 
sub-groups.  212  Finally.  Article  39  which  was  adopted  at  the  committee  level  simply  states 
'the  ICRC  may  offer  its  services  to  the  parties  to  the  conflict'  and  even  this  modest  version, 
which  is  in  fact,  identical  with  Common  Article  3/3,  was  not  accepted  by  consensus  as  draft 
Articles  36,37  and  38,  it  was  adopted  by  34  votes,  17  against  and  2  abstentions.  213 
In  the  simplified  version  of  Protocol  11  submitted  by  Pakistan,  only  Article  37  which 
became  Article  19  in  the  final  version  of  Protocol  11  survived.  It  simply  stated:  'this  Protocol 
shall  be  disseminated  as  widely  as  possible.  '  All  the  other  three  Articles  had  been  deleted. 
It  must  be  repeated  that  the  deletion  of  those  Articles  and  other  provisions  of  Protocol  11 
has  been  done  in  the  name  of  simplicity  and  the  protection  of  sovereignty  and  non- 
214  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  States. 
The  main  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  travaux  prkparatolres  is  that  the  day  of  more 
procedural  requirements  for  the  control  of  the  application  of  humanitarian  law,  in  internal 
conflicts,  has  not  yet  arrived,  all  moves  in  such  direction  have  been  stopped.  It  is  very  clear 
that  the  failure  of  the  Protocol  to  provide  for  a  thorough  system  for  the  implementation  of 
humanitarian  law  has  been  the  result  of  insisting  that  it  infringes  the  sovereignty  of  the 
State.  The  concept  of  sovereignty  in  the  view  of  the  majority  denies  any  control  of 
application  of  international  law,  when  it  is  applied  to  internal  conflicts. 
After  dealing  with  travaux  prkparatoires,  it  seems  to  me,  appropriate  to  discuss  some 
issues  which  relate  directly  to  means  of  ensuring  respect  for  humanitarian  law,  in  the  light 
of  Protocol  Il  as  adopted.  They  include  the  question  of  reprisals;  repression  of  violations  of 
Protocol  11;  the  relation  between  Article  3  and  Protocol  II  concerning  the  right  of  initiative 
of  the  ICRC;  and  the  question  of  relief. 
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395 3.1.  Reprisals 
Many  commentators  agree  that  the  absence  of  a  prohibition  of  reprisals  ift  internal  conflicts 
in  Protocol  11  is  a  sad  event,  since  the  implication  is  such  recourse  may  tolerated  in  case  of 
violation  of  the  rules  of  the  Protocol.  Bierzanek  stresses  that: 
*The  fact  that  Protocol  11  does  not  contain  any  prohibitions  of  reprisals  considerably 
reduces  the  practical  importance  of  the  prohibition  of  reprisals  adopted  till  now,  since 
non-  international  confliqvj  in  our  times  constitute  no  less  a  danger  for  human  rights 
than  international  ones.  ""':  ) 
Eide  comments  on  the  fact  that  there  was  no  prohibition  against  reprisals  by  stating: 
"The  likelihood  of  an  escalation  in  cruelty  has  not  been  much  reduced  by  the 
"216  performance  at  the  Diplomatic  Conference. 
In  fact,  the  ICRC's  draft  Protocol  Il  contained  two  provisions  which  prohibit  reprisals,  first 
against  the  wounded  and  the  sick,  Article  19  stipulates: 
"Prohibition  of  reprisals:  measures  of  reprisals  against  the  wounded,  the  sick,  and  the 
shipwrecked  as  well  as  against  medical  personnel,  medical  units  and  means  of  medical 
"217  transport  are  prohibited. 
Also  Article  26/4  stipulates: 
"Attacks  aginst  the  civilian  population  or  civilians  by  way  of  reprisals  are 
prohibited.  "  18 
Thus,  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars  was  assumed  also  by  the  way  of 
prohibiting  reprisals. 
When  Article19  was  opened  for  discussion,  Australia  explained  its  amendment  for  its 
deletion  on  the  ground  that: 
" 
...  [R]eprisals  at  least  under  international  law,  involved  an  act  by  one  State  against 
another  State.  However,  in  internal  conflicts  the  concept  of  reprisals  would  seem  to 
be  inapplicable  since  one  party  was  not  a  State  and  he  other  party  was  fighting 
within  its  own  territory  and  against  its  own  people.  "24 
Iraq  on  the  other  hand,  specifically  thought  that  the  inclusion  of  an  Article  on  reprisals  was 
an  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  States.  It  stressed  that: 
"Draft  Protocol  II  dealt  with  internal  conflicts,  in  the  context  of  which  the  idea  of 
reprisals  was  inconceivable  since  a  State  must  protect  its  own  citizens.  It  must  be  left 
to  municipal  law  to  organise  the  relationship  between  citizen  and  State.  A  provision 
of  the  kind  proposed  [Draft  Article  19]  would  be  an  interference  with  sovereignty  and 
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396 *220  would  never  be  applied  . 
It  seems  to  me  that  the  delegations  which  proposed  the  deletion  of  Article  19  and  26/4  (on 
reprisals)  did  not  at  all  imply  they  supported  their  legitimacy,  they  wanted  to  leave  their 
regulation  to  their  natural  laws.  This  view  is  confirmed  by  Indonesia  which  noted  that  it: 
"...  [W]as  not  opposed  to  the  prohibition  of  reprisals;  on  the  contrary  it  disapproved 
of  any  act  of  that  kind,  but  considered  that  Article  19  as  it  stood  represented  an 
interference  in  national  affairs,  an  international  Protocol  should  not  prescribe  how 
a  State  should  treat  its  own  nationals.  It  was  for  the  State  itself  to  take  appropriate 
measures  and  it  would  appear  that  most  States  had  done  SO.  "221 
This  initial  discussion  led  the  Committee  to  refer  the  matter  of  reprisals  to  working  groups 
and  subgroupS.  222  After  a  very  lengthy  discussions  and  amendments.  Article  10  bis  was 
adopted  at  the  committee  level;  it  stipulates: 
"Article  10  bis  Unconditional  Respect: 
The  provisions  of  Parts  11  and  Il  and  of  Article  26,26  bis  and  27  and  28  shall  not, 
in  any  circumstances  or  for  any  reason  whatsoever,  be  violated,  even  in  response  to 
a  violation  of  the  provisions  of  the  Protocol". 
Thus,  a  compromise  was  found,  where  the  idea  of  prohibition  of  reprisals  was  emphasised, 
without  using  the  word  itself  in  order  to  appease  supporters  of  its  deletion. 
At  the  final  session,  Pakistan  proposed  the  deletion  of  this  Article;  the  US  supported  that 
stand  on  the  ground  that  'the  whole  concept  of  reprisals  had  no  place  in  Protocol  ll.  '223 
India  specifically  invited  all  Third  World  countries  to  follow  its  example  in  supporting  the 
deletion  of  Article  10  bis.  Their  delegate  stressed  that: 
"While  appreciating  the  desirability  of  comprises,  he  felt  compelled  to  take  a  stand 
against  gertain  comprises  which  tended  to  jeopardize  the  national  sovereignty  of 
States.  " 
Finally,  the  Article  was  deleted  by  41  votes  to  20  and  22  abstentions. 
The  main  conclusion  to  be  drawn  concerning  the  place  of  reprisals  in  the  context  of 
Protocol  11  is  that  it  is  the  argument  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention  which  killed  it, 
even  in  its  comprise  formula  in  Article  10  bis. 
It  seems  to  me  that  despite  this  above  fact,  there  is  room  for  arguing  against  the  use  of 
reprisals  as  a  means  of  enforcing  the  rules  of  Protocol  11.  Nahlik  maintains  that  it  may  be 
220  lbid,  CDDH/11/SR/32,  para.  52,  p.  336. 
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397 possible  to  find  "des  traces  indirectes  dans  quelques  dispositions  sur  les  guaranties 
fondamentales,  telles  que,  par  example.  Vinterdiction  des  'punitions  collectives'  ou  de  la 
'prise  dotages!  '*.  225  Nevertheless,  he  admits  'mais  le  ne  sont  que  des  d6bris  de  ce  quon  avait 
auparavant  envisagd.  s226 
Italy,  in  its  explanation  of  vote  on  Article  10  bis  (it  abstained)  brought  an  interesting  legal 
argument  to  support  the  contention  that  the  deletion  of  the  Article  (10  bis)  has  no  negative 
effect  on  the  prohibition  of  reprisals.  It  noted  that  Protocol  IT  contains  many  provisions 
which  mention  obligations,  which  the  parties  Must  respect  'in  all  circumstances'  or  rules 
which  must  be  followed  'as  a  minimum'.  This  language  highlights  the  need  for 
unconditional  respect  for  those  rules.  That  kind  of  language  was  used  in  some  fundamental 
Articles  of  Protocol  IT  such  as  Article  8  (Persons  whose  liberty  has  been  restricted);  Article 
12  (Protection  and  care).  Italy,  in  fact,  stated: 
"Clearly  all  those  provisions  demand  unconditional  reW;  ct  and  their  legal  force  is  in 
no  way  diminished  by  the  deletion  of  Article  10  bis.  "" 
These  kinds  of  argument  are  valid  and  can  be  very  well  used  to  argue  against  this  inhuman 
method  of  enforcing  humanitarian  law. 
The  prohibition  of  reprisals,  it  must  be  noted,  has  been  argued  for  in  the  ICRC 
Commentary  on  the  Additional  Protocols.  It  has  been  advocated  that: 
"The  prohibition  of  collective  punishment  was  included  in  the  Article  relating  to  the 
fundamental  guarantees  [Article  4]  by  consensus.  That  decision  was  important  because 
it  is  based  on  the  intention  to  give  the  rule  the  widest  possible  scope,  and  to  avoid 
any  risk  of  a  restrictive  interpretation.  In  fact,  to  include  the  prohibition  on  collective 
punishments  amongst  the  acts  unconditionally  prohibited  by  A  rticle  4  is  virtually 
equivalent  to  prohibiting  reprisals  against  protected  persons". 
Thus,  the  idea  of  prohibiting  collective  punishments  has  been  used  as  a  vehicle  for 
upholding  the  illegality  of  reprisals  in  the  context  of  internal  wars.  This  interpretation  in 
my  view  is  wholly  consistent  with  the  object  and  purpose  of  the  Protocol  11,  which  is 
essentially  the  protection  of  victims  of  war  from  all  forms  of  inhuman  treatment  and  there 
is  no  doubt  that  reprisals  are  a  very  clear  example  of  inhuman  treatment,  since  they  always 
hit  the  innocent. 
3.2.  Repression  of  Violations  of  the  Rules  of  Protocol  H: 
The  Protocol  itself  is  silent  on  this  point.  The  travaux  pr6paratolres  show  also  that  there  was 
no  concern  whatsoever  for  criminal  prosecution  of  violations  of  its  rules.  In  fact,  neither 
the  ICRC  in  its  draft  Protocol,  nor  States  during  the  discussions  raised  the  issue. 
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398 On  the  other  hand,  Article  6/5  of  the  Protocol  in  effect,  encourage  the  enactment  of 
amnesty  laws  at  the  end  of  hostilities.  This  may  very  well  mean  that  all  flagrant  violations 
of  the  Protocol  may  go  unpunished.  In  this  context,  it  seems  that  Protocol  11  takes  into 
account  only  the  interests  of  States,  in  building  a  new  atmosphere  of  political  reconciliation 
after  the  war,  without  paying  attention  to  the  need  for  the  enforcement  of  humanitarian 
law. 
Against  this  background,  two  possible  positions  can  be  taken  in  regard  to  the  question  of 
the  repression  of  violations  of  Protocol  II;  either  they  do  not  exist,  because  they  are  not 
mentioned,  or  it  can  be  argued  that  despite  that  absence  of  their  mentioning,  they  still  can 
be  contemplated.  Sandoz  takes  the  first  position.  He  writes: 
"...  [L]a  violation  de  I'Article  3  des  Conventions  de  Genýve  ou  de  dispositions  du 
Protocol  11  ne  pouvait  etre  qualifide  d'infractions  grave  sticto  sensu  aux  conventions 
et  au  Protocole,  it  n' 
,ýa 
qu'une  obligation  d'y  mettre  fin,  mais  pas  d'obligation  de 
o22.  punir  leur  auteur. 
However,  Blishenko  argues  for  the  second  position.  To  him,  the  effect  of  Articles  13 
(civilian  population  cannot  be  the  object  of  attack)  7.10,12,14,15  and  17  of  Protocol  11  is 
that: 
"11  faut  on  conclure  que  les  actes  prdcitds  devraient  We  considdr6s  comme  des  crimes 
appellant  la  poursuite  et  le  chAtiment  des  criminelS.  "230 
In  his  view,  the  violations  of  the  above  ATticles  constitute  waT  CTimes  which  must  be 
punished.  He  StTessed  that: 
"...  [Lles  Protocoles  de  1977  additionnels  aux  Conventions  de  Gen6ve  de  1949  sur  la 
protection  des  victimes  de  la  guerre  partant  de  la  pr6somption  que  tout  ordre  de 
caractýre  criminel  est  inadmissible'  c'est-i-dire  un  ordre  qui  tend  A  enfreindre  les 
dispositions  de  la  convention  et  des  Protocoles.  Toute  pSrjonne  qui  intime  un  tel  ordre 
"3  devrait  etre  considdrde  coupable  de  crime  de  guerre. 
According  to  him,  punishment  of  war  crimes  is  possible  in  internal  and  international  wars 
alike.  It  seems  to  me  that  there  is  some  support  for  this  stand  in  State  practice.  Thus,  in  his 
letter  of  Transmittal  of  January  29th,  1987  to  the  US  Senate  recommending  the  acceptance 
of  Protocol  11,  President  Reagan  stated  that: 
"This  Protocol  11  makes  clear  that  any  deliberate  killing  of  a  non-combatent  in  the 
course  of  a  non-international  armed  conflict  is  a  violation  of  the  laws  3f  war  and  a 
"2  2  crime  against  humanity,  and  is  therefore  also  punishable  as  murders. 
It  is  very  clear  that  violation  of  some  rules  of  Protocol  11  have  been  characterised  as  war 
crimes  and  crimes  against  humanity,  punishable  under  the  law.  This  is  a  very  encouraging 
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399 precedent,  since  the  silence  of  the  Protocol  has  been  interpreted  in  a  positive  way,  in  the 
direction  of  enforcing  respect  for  humanitarian  law. 
3.3.  The  Relation  Between  Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  and  the  Protocol  11,  In 
Relation  to  the  Question  of  Right  of  Initiative  of  the  ICRC. 
With  the  deletion  of  draft  Article  39  which  provides  for  the  right  of  the  ICRC  to  offer  its 
services  to  the  parties  to  the  internal  conflict,  Protocol  II  does  not  contain  any  reference  to 
the  ICRC.  The  question  then  arises  as  to  whether  the  right  of  initiative  of  the  ICRC 
mentioned  in  Article  3  does  or  does  not  apply  to  conflicts  covered  by  Article  I  of  the 
Protocol  H. 
To  some  authors,  the  deletion  in  the  Protocol  of  any  mention  of  the  ICRC  does  not  in  any 
way  affect  its  right  to  offer  its  services.  In  this  respect,  Abi  Saab  contends  that  Article  3: 
... 
[E]t  en  particular  ses  dispositions  concernant  loffre  de  service  par  les  organtsmes 
humanitaires,  continue  A  s'appliquer  A  tous  les  conflits  rdgis  par  le  Protocol  ll.  "233 
He  then  added  that: 
"...  [P]aradoxalement,  nous  pouvons  dire  que  sur  ce  point  c'est  IArticle  3  commun  qui 
s,  234  'ddveloppe"  et  'compl6te'  le  Protocol  11  plut6t  que  le  contraire. 
This  means  that  the  ICRC  would  be  able  to  offer  its  services  even  in  cases  of  conflicts 
defined  by  Article  I  of  the  Protocol,  and  not  only  in  conflict  of  lesser  intensity  regulated 
by  Common  Article  3. 
Bothe  holds  the  same  view.  To  him,  the  deletion  of  draft  Articles  36-38  and  39  does  not 
constitute  a  real  loss  of  substance  in  the  matter  of  executing  the  Protocol  since  in  his  view: 
"Les  questions  rýgkes  par  les  Articles  38  et  39  sont  largement  couvertes  par  les 
dispositions  de  I'Article  3  communs  aux  quatre  Conventions.  "235 
Then,  in  his  opinion,  the  ICRC  can  offer  its  services  in  conflicts  covered  by  Article  I  of  the 
Protocol  11  and  also  there  is  nothing  to  exclude  the  possibility  that  the  parties  to  the  conflict 
can  conclude  agreements  which  bring  more  humanitarian  rules  into  the  conflict.  He  even 
suggests  that  these  special  agreements  are  not  confined  only  to  the  Geneva  Convention  but 
also  to  the  First  Protocol. 
However,  Cassese  is  more  sceptical.  He  maintains  that: 
"Le  Protocol  11  non-seulement  n'6tablit  aucun  mecanisme  international;  visant  a  en 
surveiller  l'observation,  mais  il  fait  meme  un  pas  en  arri6re  par  rapport  i  I'ATticle  3 
of  1949.  *236 
First,  because  the  mention  of  the  right  of  initiative  of  the  ICRC  has  been  deleted  and 
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drolt  humanitaire.  Ed.  A.  Pidone.  Institut  Henry  Dunant.  UNESCO,  Parts,  1986.  p.  270. 
234  lbid,  pp.  270-71. 
235M.  Boethe:  Confilts  arm6s  Internes  at  drolt  Internationat  humanitaire.  84  RGDIP,  1978,  pp.  89-100. 
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400 second,  because  there  is  no  similar  provision  like  Article  I  of  the  Geneva  Convention  which 
obliges  each  party  to  respect  and  ensure  respect  for  the  Conventions.  On  the  contrary,  in 
his  view,  there  is  a  provision  in  the  Protocol  which  goes  against  the  spirit  of  Article  I  of  the 
Geneva  Convention  of  1949.  That  is  Article  3/2  of  the  Protocol  11  (on  non  -intervention).  in 
Cassese's  opinion: 
"Cela  peut  impliquer  qu'aucun  autre  Etat  contractant  ne  peut  exiger  le  respect  du 
Protocol  de  la  part  d"un  Etat  sur  le  territoire  duquel  une  guerre  civile  est  en  cours, 
car  cette  Etat  pourrait  considdrer  une  telle  d6marche  comme  une  grave  ing6rence  dans 
"237  ses  affaires  int6rieures. 
His  conclusion  is  that: 
"La  seule  consolidation  qui  nous  reste  est  que  I'Article  3  'englobe'  le  Protocol.  Je  veux 
dire  par  11  que  toutes  les  fois  qu'on  appliquera  le  Protocole,  I'Article  3  trouvera 
n6cessairement  application,  et  le  conflit  arm6  interne  b6n6ficiera  des  garanties 
pr6vues  en  faveur  du  respect  de  I'Article  3".  238 
He  then  insists  that: 
"...  [T]outefois  le  CICR  et  les  autres  Etats  parties  aux  quatre  conventions  de  Genýve 
nepourront  exiger  I'application  rigoureuse  du  Protocole  mais  seulement  de  I'Article 
3  339 
He  then  adds: 
"Cest  pourquoi  on  peut  dire  que  le  Protocole  est  comme  un  guerrier  sans  armes:  il 
ddicte  des  ommandements,  mais  ne  dispose  d'aucun  moyen  efficace  pour  les  faire  YO 
observer. 
It  seems  to  me,  that  the  contentions  of  Cassese  are  too  restrictive.  In  my  view,  the  parties 
to  the  Protocol  II  can  always  demand  from  the  party  who  accepted  the  application  of 
Protocol  11  in  its  internal  conflict,  strict  adherence  to  the  rules  of  that  Protocol,  since 
matters  which  are  regulated  by  that  international  instrument  are  no  longer  within  its 
domestic  jurisdiction.  Article  3  of  the  Protocol  cannot  bar  that  demand. 
Similarly,  there  is  very  strong  support  for  the  first  position  taken  by  G.  Abi  Saab  and 
Bothe  (that  the  ICRC  can  always  offer  its  services  even  in  conflicts  of  Protocol  11).  In  fact, 
no  delegation  stated  categorically  that  in  the  context  of  conflicts  regulated  by  Article  I  of 
the  Protocol  11,  the  ICRC  has  no  role  to  play.  On  the  contrary  many  delegations  confirmed 
the  ICRC's  right  of  initiative. 
Thus,  Italy  argued  that: 
"Article  3  common  to  the  1949  Conventions  remains  fully  applicable  in  all  conflicts 
of  a  non  -international  character,  whether  or  not  they  come  within  the  field  of 
2371bid, 
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2381bid. 
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2401bid. 
401 application  of  Protocol  JI".  241 
This  means  automatically  that  the  right  of  the  ICRC  to  offer  its  services  was  upheld. 
The  ICRC  made  a  statement  in  the  conference  to  the  effect  that: 
"The  power  extended  to  the  ICRC  of  offering  its  services  in  such  conrl  s  [internal] 
remains  inviolate,  even  if  it  is  not  confirmed  in  the  present  Protocol.  "RI 
The  ICRC  Commentary  also  goes  in  this  direction.  It  states: 
"Common  Article  3  gave  the  ICRC  the  right  of  initiative  in  situations  of  non- 
international  armed  conflict.  Even  in  the  absence  of  explicit  ruffirmation,  it 
"2  continues  to  apply,  since  Protocol  11  has  an  'additional'  character. 
It  then  adds: 
"The  parties  to  the  conflict  retain  complete  freedom  to  refuse  or  accept  such  an  offer 
of  services,  but  it  may  not  in  itself  be  considered  as  a  hostile  act  or  as  intervention; 
moreover,  the  Protocol  provides  for  the  possibility  of  appealing  to  a  humanitarian 
organization  in  particular  by  mentioning  the  possibility  of  undertaking  international 
relief  actions.  .  244 
The  conclusion  is  then  very  clear.  The  ICRC  has  the  right  of  initiative  even  in  the  context 
of  the  conflicts  regulated  by  Protocol  II,  its  offering  of  services  can  never  be  seen  as  an 
intervention  in  the  internal  affairs.  In  this  respect,  Article  3  indeed  develops  Protocol  11  and 
not  wice-versa.  Again  this  interpretation  in  my  view,  is  consistent  with  the  object  and 
purpose  of  the  Protocol. 
3.4.  Relief  and  Assistance 
in  my  opinion,  relief  is  a  very  important  indirect  means  of  ensuring  respect  for  the 
application  of  humanitary  law,  in  the  context  of  internal  conflict,  its  distribution  can  save 
the  right  to  life  and  prevent  starvation  and  diseases. 
However,  the  issue  of  relief  which  is  humanitarian  in  essence,  has  very  strong  political 
oveLnes.  Governments  which  experience  civil  wars,  seem  to  have  grave  misgivings  about 
it,  since  it  is  'equated  with  foreign  intervention,  with  foreign  assistance  to  rebellion  or  at 
least  a  danger  of  these  things  happening.  '245 
The  ICRC  in  its  Draft  Protocol  11,  submitted  3  Articles  under  Part  VI  under  the  title 
'Relief.  '246  The  main  points  were: 
(i)  Relief  to  civilians  shall  be  agreed  to  and  facilitated  by  the  parties  to  the  conflict;  (ii)  it 
241  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  214,  CDDH/SR/53,  p.  161. 
242  Ibid,  p.  164. 
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op.  cit..  supra.  n.  228,  para.  445,  pp.  i345-1346. 
244 
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gothe  et  at.,  op.  cit.,  supre.  chapter  3,  n.  186,  p.  694. 
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the  text  of  the  ArticLes.  see  op.  cit.,  supra.  n.  197,  p.  43. 
402 has  not  to  be  seen  as  an  intervention;  (iii)  the  obligation  of  the  parties  to  the  conflict  and 
other  contracting  States  to  facilitate  and  accelerate  the  entry,  transport,  obstruction  or 
passage  of  relief;  (iv)  relief  societies  shall  be  permitted  to  pursue  their  humanitarian 
activities. 
At  the  outset  of  the  discussions,  which  were  lengthy,  Nigeria,  which  experienced 
unhappy  memories  of  relief  during  its  civil  war  stressed  (and  was  supported  by  Third  World 
countries)  that: 
"In  non  -international  armed  conflict  relief  action  could  make  the  situation  worse; 
outside  interference  could  magnify  what  was  a  small  matter  to  the  State 
concerned.  "247 
Many  amendments  and  compromises  were  necessary  before  the  adoption  of  a  single  Article 
(18)  in  the  simplified  version.  It  must  be  noted  that  the  essence  of  those  amendments, 
compromises,  was  to  preserve  the  liberty  of  the  established  Government  to  accept  or  refuse 
such  relief.  Article  IS  provides: 
"Article  18  Relief  Societies  and  Relief  Actions 
1.  Relief  societies  located  in  the  territory  of  the  high  contracting  Party,  such  as  Red 
Cross  (Red  Crescent,  Red  Lion  and  Sun)  organizations,  may  offer  their  services  for 
the  performance  of  their  traditional  functions  in  relation  to  the  victims  of  the  armed 
conflict.  The  civilian  population  may,  even  on  its  own  initiative,  offer  to  collect  and 
care  for  the  wounded,  sick  and  shipwrecked. 
2.  If  the  civilian  population  is  suffering  undue  hardship  owing  to  the  lack  of  the 
supplies,  essential  for  its  survival,  such  as  foodstuffs  and  medical  supplies,  relief 
actions  for  the  civilian  population  which  are  of  an  exclusively  humanitarian  and 
impartial  nature  and  which  are  conducted  without-any  adverse  distinction  shall  be 
undertaken  subject  to  the  consent  of  the  high  contracting  party  concerned.  n248 
Article  18  in  fact  fills  a  gap,  since  Article  3  does  not  contain  any  mention  of  relief. 
However,  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  and  the  fear  of  intervention  have  been 
* 
looked  for, 
since  the  Article  as  a  whole  is  based  on  the  idea  that  States  are  the  principal  agents  for  the 
organisation  of  relief.  Similarly,  the  consent  of  the  State  concerned  is  expressly  provided 
for,  when  international  relief  is  envisaged. 
However,  a  practical  difficulty  may  appear,  and  that  is  whether  the  consent  of  the 
established  Government  is  necessary  even  to  areas  controlled  by  the  rebels.  The  literal 
interpretation  of  Article  18/2  is  very  clear.  the  consent  of  the  contracting  party  is  needed 
always. 
According  to  Bothe  'when  it  comes  to  humanitarian  relief,  the  competing  claims  of 
international  status  must  not  be  allowed  to  determine  the  question  of  required  consent'249 
and  then  he  adds  that: 
247H  S.  Levie  (ed.  ):  The  Law  of  Won-InternationaL  Armed  Conflict,  Protocot  11  to  the  1949  Geneva 
Conventions.  Martinus  Nijhoff,  Dordrecht,  Boston,  1987,  pp.  571-572. 
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403 "It  is  rather  physical  control  of  those  areas  through  which  relief  consignment  have 
to  pass  ý2r5  where  they  are  distributed  which,  for  practical  reasons,  have  to  be 
decisive.  0 
The  commentary  of  the  ICRC  on  the  two  Protocols  goes  nearly  in  the  above  direction.  It 
states  that: 
"The  fact  that  consent  is  required  does  not  mean  that  the  decision  is  left  to  the 
discretion  of  the  parties.  If  the  survival  of  the  population  is  threatened  and  a 
humanitarian  organisation  fulfilling  the  required  conditions  of  impartiality  and  non- 
"251  discrimination  is  able  to  remedy  this  situation,  relief  action  must  take  place. 
Despite  the  humanitarian  intent  of  such  arguments  the  practice  suggests  that  the  consent  of 
Government  is  essential.  Thus,  Meyer  notes  that: 
"It  may  be  said  that  in  most  cases  under  the  Geneva  Conventions  and  the  additional 
Protocols,  relief  organisations  are  only  able  to  operate  if  they  have  some  form  of 
Governmental  authorisation,  abstain  from  Folitical  or  military  activity,  and  maintain 
impartiality  in  their  humanitarian  work..  2  2 
Efficaty  to  him,  means  getting  continued  authorisation  from  the  Government,  which  would 
prevent  the  actions  of  relief  from  being  characterised  as  intervention. 
In  this  respect,  when  in  June  1987  India  undertook  a  relief  supply  by  air  over  Jaffra,  Sri 
Lanka  condemned  the  act  as  violation  of  its  sovereignty.  However,  when  the  Indian  Red 
Cross  sought  the  consent  of  the  Sri  Lanka  Government,  the  latter  accepted,  but  stressed  that 
'253  it  did  so  'purely  in  the  interest  of  good-  neighbourly  relations. 
It  is  to  be  stressed  that  the  ICRC  is  not  mentioned  expressly  as  having  the  right  to  provide 
relief  and  assistance,  in  the  context  of  Article  18.  However,  some  argued  that  the  right  of 
initiative  of  the  ICRC,  includes  also  the  right  to  provide  relief  and  assistance  and  that  this 
right  however  has  become  a  part  of  customary  law.  254  Some  other  authors  are  sceptical. 
Jakovijevic  maintains: 
"The  existing  rules  are  certainly  not  sufficia 
., 
nt  to  ensure  the  right  to  humanitarian 
"255  assistance  in  this  type  of  armed  situation. 
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Meyer  admits  that: 
NThe  terms  'High  Contracting  Parties'  refers  to  the  established  Government.  However,  in  some 
cases,  the  authorities  concerned  from  an  operational  view  point  will  be  the  Insurgents,  the 
Government  in  power  not  having  to  grant  transit  to  retieffe. 
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404 That  is  in  internal  conflicts.  However,  to  me,  the  first  stand  is  more  in  conformity  with  the 
humanitarian  spirit  of  the  Protocol  as  a  whole. 
3.4.1.  Humanitarian  Aid  and  the  Nicaragua  Case 
The  ICJ,  in  fact,  made  a  very  important  pronouncement  concerning  the  issue  of 
humanitarian  aid,  the  question  which  was  raised  was  whether  the  decision  of  the  US 
Congress  on  October  Ist,  1984  to  restrict  the  funds  of  assistance  to  the  Contras  to 
'humanitarian  assistance'  can  be  characterised  as  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
Nicaragua. 
The  Court  first  stressed  that: 
"...  [T]here  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  provisions  of  strictly  humanitarian  aid  to  persons 
or  forces  in  another  country,  whatever  their  political  affiliation  or  objectives  cannot 
be  reyrded  as  unlawful  intervention,  or  as  in  any  other  way  contrary  to  international 
law.  "  6 
It  then  made  it  clear  what  are  the  feature  of  such  aid,  which  cannot  be  seen  as 
intervention.  First,  it  said  that  it  must  conform  to  the  principles  declared  by  the  20th 
International  of  the  Red  Cross,  257  and  especially  that: 
"...  [Aln  essential  feature  of  truly  humanitarian  aid  is  that  it  is  given  'without 
discrimination'  of  any  kind.  In  view  of  the  Court,  if  the  provision  of  'humanitarian 
assistance'  is  to  escape  condemnation  as  an  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
Nicaragua,  not  only  must  it  be  limited  to  the  purposes  hallowed  in  the  practice  of  the 
Red  Cross,  namely  'to  prevent  and  alleviate  human  sufferings  and  to  protect  life  and 
health  and  to  ensure  respect  for  the  human  being"  it  must  also,  and  above  all  be  given 
without  discrimination  to  all  in  need  in  Nicaragua,  not  merely  to  the  Contras  and 
their  dependentS.  "258 
The  contribution  of  the  Court  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  stressed  the  element  of  giving  the 
humanitarian  assistance  to  all  those  who  are  in  need,  without  discrimination  on  political 
grounds.  Thus,  it  is  the  element  of  non  -discrimination  which  is  essential  rather  than  the 
consent  of  Government  or  other  bodies.  In  this  respect,  the  judgment  of  the  Court  is  more 
advanced  than  the  Protocol  11  and  is  more  in  conformity  with  the  ideas  of  humanity  rather 
than  sovereignty. 
2560P. 
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257These 
principles  are: 
NThe  Red  Cross,  born  of  a  desire  to  bring  assistance  without  discrimination  to  the  wounded  on 
the  bat  ttef  I  aid,  endeavour-in  its  International,  and  nat  Iona  t  capacity-to  prevent  and  at  tevi  ate 
human  suffering  wherever  It  may  be  found.  Its  purpose  is  to  protect  tife  and  heatth  and  to 
ensure  respect  for  human  beings.  It  promotes  mutuat  understanding,  friendship,  co-operation 
and  tastty  peace  amongst  peoptes". 
And  that: 
"it  makes  no  discrimination  as  to  nationality,  race,  religious  beliefs.  class  or  political 
opinions.  It  endeavour  only  to  relieve  suffering,  giving  priority  to  the  most  urgent  cases  of 
distress.  " 
See  fbid,  para.  242,  pp.  1078-79. 
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405 B.  The  Compliance  with  Humanitarian  Law  after  the  Adoption  of  Protocol  II 
In  the  report  of  ICRC's  activities,  delivered  by  its  President  at  the  25th  International 
Conference  of  the  Red  Cross  (Geneva,  October  1986),  he  stated  that: 
"...  [n]ot  only  are  conflicts  increasing  in  number  and  length,  but  practices  prohibited 
by  international  humanitarian  law  are  becoming  more  and  more  common:  The  taking 
of  hostages  and  sometimes  their  subsequent  murder,  acts  of  terrorism,  torture  and 
other  ill-treatment  of  detained  persons,  and  people  reported  unaccountably  missing, 
it  has  even  reached  the  point  who  whole  civilian  populations  are  subjected  to 
starvation  for  the  purpose  of  war.  "  5 
He  then  added  that: 
"260  "Grave  problems  are  being  encountered  in  the  application  of  humanitarian  law. 
This  means  that  especially  in  internal  conflicts,  which  constitute  the  majority  of  conflicts 
which  are  taking  place,  the  picture  of  observance  of  the  law  is  very  grim  indeed. 
In  El  Salvador,  despite  widespread  revelations  that  certain  officers  are  involved  in 
rampant  violations  of  human  rights,  attempts  to  prosecute  them  have  failed.  Thus,  in  1983 
the  then  US  Vice-President,  G.  Bush  visited  El  Salvador  and  brought  with  him  a  letter  from 
the  US  President  which  included  a  list  of  military  and  civilian  officials  identified  by  the 
US  as  being  involved  in  death  squads.  The  message  contained  an  ultimatum  'suspend  or 
cashier  them'  or  the  US  aid  will  be  cut  by  January  Ist,  1984.  However,  nothing  happened, 
no  officer  was  charged  and  the  aid  continued.  261  This  case  indicates  that  there  is  an  obvious 
lack  of  political  will  to  stop  such  violations. 
It  seems  to  me  that  two  institutions  at  least  in  practice  have  contributed  greatly  to  the 
question  of  controlling  the  application  of  humanitarian  law  in  internal  conflict,  and  by 
this  they  contributed  to  a  certain  measure  to  fill  the  loopholes  left  by  Protocol  11  in  this 
area.  They  are:  (i)  the  role  of  the  ICRC;  and  (ii)  the  role  of  human  rights  instrument.  I  think 
that  their  success,  in  practice,  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  their  use  cannot  be  seen  as 
a  breach  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  State,  or  as  an  intervention  in  its  internal  affairs.  Since 
the  ICRC  has  established  a  good  record  as  a  humanitarian  organ  devoted  to  humanitarian 
needs,  and  secondly  because  human  rights  have  been  generally  accepted  as  a  valid  limitation 
upon  State  sovereignty. 
1.  The  Role  of  the  ICRC 
It  must  be  contended  that  the  mere  presence  of  the  ICRC  in  situations  of  internal  conflicts 
would,  in  practice,  lead  to  a  better  protection  of  the  victims  of  war,  hence,  implicitly 
reinforcing  the  application  of  the  fundamental  guarantees  of  humanitarian  law. 
The  non-recognition  of  the  application  of  Protocol  11  or  even  Article  3  and  the  absence 
of  any  solid  legal  ground  upon  which  the  ICRC  can  oblige  the  parties  to  the  conflict  to 
2591RRC,  1987,  No.  256,  p.  61. 
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406 accept  its  intervention,  has  not  in  practice  prevented  the  ICRC  from  action.  It  seems  to  me 
that  the  ICRC  acts  in  fact  on  the  assumption  that  its  right  to  offer  relief  and  assistance  and 
its  right  to  initiative  has  become  a  customary  rule. 
A  simple  look  at  the  monthly  bulletins  of  the  ICRC  and  its  other  publications,  clearly 
reveals  the  immense  work  carried  out,  both  in  the  past  and  at  present.  Moreover,  they  show 
that  the  ICRC  is  present  in  nearly  every  internal  conflict.  In  fact,  it  is  reported  that  the 
ICRC  is  present  in  Ethiopia,  Chad,  Uganda,  Burundi,  South  Africa,  Namibia,  Sudan, 
Angola,  Mozambique.  Nicaragua,  El  Salvador.  Peru,  Afghanistan,  Kampuchea,  Philippines, 
262  Indonesia,  Burma  and  Lebanon. 
In  all  these  conflicts  its  main  work  consisted  in: 
1.  Visits  to  detainees  and  detention  centres  of  prisoners; 
2.  Looking  after  displaced  persons  by  providing  food,  shelter  and  medical  care; 
3.  Establishing  hospitals  and  first  aid  posts  for  the  wounded  and  sick; 
4.  Monitoring  the  situation  of  civilians  in  conflict  areas; 
5.  Looking  after  refugees  etc. 
These  activities,  of  course,  would  reinforce  the  application  of  the  fundamental  rules  of 
humanitarian  law  and  prevent  breaches  of  humanitarian  law,  at  least  partially. 
The  success  of  the  ICRC  in  these  areas  has  been  explained,  among  other  things,  by  El- 
Kouhene  in  the  following  fashion: 
"Il  [le  CIRC]  oppose  ti  la  raison  d'Etat  la  raison  humanitaire.  Et  partout  oil  il  va  sa 
devise  est  la  neutralitd,  c'est  la  principale  garantie  de  1'efficacit6  de  son  action,  de  son 
63 
autorit6  morale  et  de  sa  credibilite. 
Thus,  it  seems  that  States  at  least  publicly,  in  recent  times,  have  abstained  from  challenging 
or  accusing  the  ICRC  of  intervention  in  their  internal  affairs,  when  the  ICRC  seeks  to  act 
in  internal  conflicts. 
2.  The  Role  of  Human  Rights  Instruments  In  the  Control  of  Application  of  Fundamental 
Humanitarian  Rules 
The  aim  of  human  rights  law  and  instruments  is  the  protection  of  the  rights  and  freedoms 
of  the  individual  in  times  of  peace  especially.  However,  in  times  of  wars  and  emergencies 
certain  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms  are  also  protected  by  such  instrument.  264  In  fact, 
262See  ICRC  Woridwide  1988,  ICRC  Pub.,  Geneva,  pp.  3-20. 
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264Under  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  4  non-derogabte  rights  are  mentioned  (Articte  15/2: 
The  right  to  life,  freedom  from  torture,  the  prohibition  of  slavery  and  ex  post  facto  taws):  the 
United  Nations  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights,  lists  seven  non-derogabLe  rights  (Article  4/2. 
Thus,  the  four  rights  mentioned  in  the  European  Convention  are  included  plus  the  prohibition  against 
imprisoned  for  nonfulfillment  of  contractual  obligations,  the  right  to  be  recognized  before  the  law, 
and  freedom  of  thought.  conscience  and  religion).  Lastly  under  the  American  Convention  on  Human 
Rights,  no  derogation  is  permitted  from  eleven  rights,  including  the  right  to  nationality,  the  right 
to  participate  in  Government  and  the  obligation  of  States  to  ensure  and  protect  the  judicial 
guarantees  essential  for  the  protection  of  these  rights.  That  In  itself  is  a  non-derogable  right  under 
Article  27/2  of  the  Convention.  See  T.  Buergenthat:  The  Inter-Amerfcan  System  for  the  Protection  of 
Human  Rights  in:  T.  Meron  (ad.  ):  Human  Rights  in  International  Law:  Legal  and  Political  Issues.  VoL.  2. 
Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  1984,  p.  450. 
407 the  African  Charter  of  Human  Rights  does  not  contain  any  clause  on  emergencies  and  wars, 
which  would  imply  that  the  Charter  is  applicable  in  times  of  peace  and  wars  either 
international  or  internal. 
Thus,  when  the  Government  does  not  proclaim  the  application  of  Article  3  of  the  Geneva 
Conventions  or  Protocol  11,  human  rights  instruments  adhered  to  by  the  Government  still 
apply,  at  least  in  their  part  reserved  for  emergencies.  The  UN  Covenant  on  Political  and 
Civil  Rights,  goes  even  further.  Its  Article  4  stresses  that  the  derogation  from  the  Covenant 
can  only  be  valid  when  the  public  emergency  is  publicly  proclaimed.  This  led  Robertson 
to  note  that: 
"...  [I]n  order  for  a  derogation  to  be  lawful,  the  public  emergency  must  be  'officially 
proclaimed'.  This  means  that  in  situations  of  undeclared  war  or  civil  strife  no 
derogation  is  permissible  in  the  absence  of  an  official  proclamation  of  a  State  of 
emergency  so  that  all  the  rights  proclaimed  in  the  Covenant  continue  to  be 
"265  respected. 
Carty  in  fact,  insists  that: 
"There  is  a  consensus  that  the  State  does  not  have  an  unqualified  right  to  declare  that 
a  State  of  emergency  exists  which  justifies  derogations  from  human  rights.  A  public 
emergency  has  to  exist  as  a  matter  of  objective  fact,  which  J$  reviewable  where  the 
State  submits  to  the  jurisdiction  of  an  international  body.  "266 
In  other  words,  even  in  cases  of  public  emergencies,  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  is  not 
absolute.  This  is  the  logical  effect  of  international  conventions  on  human  rights. 
In  this  respect,  it  must  also  be  indicated  that  the  Siracusa  principles  on  limitations  and 
derogations  provisions  in  the  Covenant  interpreted  the  obligation  of  States  under  its  Article 
2  (to  ensure  the  enjoyment  of  the  rights  for  all  persons  within  their  jurisdiction,  and  their 
duty  to  adopt  measures  to  secure  an  effective  remedy  for  their  violations)  to  mean  in  cases 
of  emergencies  that  States  shall  take  special  precautions  to  ensure: 
"That  no  official  or  semi-official  groups  engage  in  a  practice  of  arbitrary  and  extra- 
juridical  killings  or  involuntary  disappearances,  that  persons  in  detention  are 
protected  against  torture  and  other  forms  of  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment 
or  punishment,  and  that  no  persons  are  convicted  or  punished  under  laws  or  decrees 
with  retroactive  effeCt".  267 
This  means  in  effect  that  the  right  to  fair  trial  and  due  process  of  law  must  be  respected 
in  all  times.  This  will  lead  in  practice  to  a  real  protection  of  victims  of  wars. 
Carty  also  indicated  that  in  emergencies: 
265A.  H.  Robertson:  Human  Rights  as  Basis  of  Internationat  Humanitarian  Law.  Proceedings  of  the 
Internationat  Conference  on  Humanitarian  Law.  San  Remo  (24-27  Sept.,  1970).  Grassi  Instituto  Ed., 
1970,  pp.  67-68. 
266A.  Carty:  Human  Rights  in  a  State  of  Exception:  The  ILA  and  the  Third  Wortd,  in  T.  Campbett,  D. 
GoLdberg,  S.  McLean  and  T.  Multen:  Human  Rights  from  Rhetoric  to  Reatity.  Basit  BLackwett,  oxford, 
1986,  p.  62. 
267The  Siracusa  Principles  on  the  Limitations  and  Derogations  Provisions  In  the  International  Covenant 
on  Civil  and  Political  Rights.  7  HRO,  1985,  p.  10.  It  must  be  noted  that  the  said  principles  were  drawn 
up  by  31  distinguished  international  lawyers  in  1984  in  Italy. 
408 "...  [N]o  measure  taken  may  discriminate  solely  on  grounds  of  race,  religion,  colour, 
nationality,  sex  or  social  origin.  The  judiciary  retains  the  power  to  ensure  that  there 
is  no  encroachment  upon  non-derogable  rights,  and  that  measureldfecting  derogable 
rights  are  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  proportionality.  " 
At  least,  we  can  indirectly  assume  that  the  fundamental  rules  of  humanitarian  law  are 
contained  in  the  non-deTOgable  rights  of  human  rights  instruments.  Hence,  States  which 
have  not  ratified  Protocol  11  cannot  derogate  from  its  fundamental  rules  on  the  protection 
of  the  victims  of  war  since  they  are  the  same  or,  at  least,  incorporated  in  the  non-derogable 
rights. 
Through  the  non-derogable  rights  clauses  contained  in  instruments  of  human  rights, 
human  rights  law  and  humanitarian  law,  (at  least  in  the  part  relating  to  the  protection  of 
the  rights  to  life,  prohibition  of  torture,  inhuman  treatment  and  punishment  and  the  right 
to  fair  trial),  can  meet.  Hence,  human  rights  can  play  a  useful  role  in  furthering  the 
269  application  of  humanitarian  law  in  civil  wars. 
However,  it  must  be  stressed  that  the  existence  of  permanent  institutions  and  organs 
which  deal  with  alleged  violations  of  human  rights,  can  profitably  be  used  during  times  of 
internal  wars  (which  are  a  clear  example  of  emergencies  which  threaten  the  life  of  the 
nation)  to  stop  or  at  least  prevent  such  violatioýs  from  being  committed.  It  is  precisely  in 
that  respect  that  human  rights  instruments,  organs  and  procedures,  can  play  a  valuable  Tole 
in  monitoring  and  controlling  the  application  of  fundamental  human  rights,  which  are 
identical  with  the  fundamental  guarantees  of  humanitarian  law. 
In  this  respect,  I  will  concentrate  on  two  case  studies,  first  the  UN  instruments  and 
institutions  and  their  contribution  to  the  control  and  application  of  humanitarian  rules, 
through  the  human  rights  approach,  with  a  special  emphasis  on  the  case  of  El  Salvador,  and 
secondly,  the  inter-American  system  and  the  protection  of  human  rights  in  internal 
conflicts  with  special  emphasis  on  the  Nicaragua  case,  among  other  cases.  It  is  hoped  that 
these  two  case-studies  will  give  us  a  clear  picture  of  how,  on  the  universal  and  regional 
levels,  human  rights  instruments  have  been  used  as  a  means  of  controlling  the  application 
of  fundamental  humanitarian  rules  during  situations  of  civil  wars. 
2.1.  The  UN  System  and  the  Control  of  Application  of  Humanitarian  Rules  During  Civil 
War  Situations 
Different  UN  organs  have  dealt  with  questions  of  violation  of  human  rights,  in  States  where 
civil  wars  are  taking  place.  These  organs  include  the  UNGA,  the  ECOSOC,  the  UNCHR 
and  its  Sub-Commission  on  Non  -  Discrimination  and  Minorities. 
These  organs  act  under  the  UN  Charter  which  contains  several  important  references  to 
the  protection  of  human  rights  (particularly  Articles  1,13,14,34,55  and  60)  or  under  special 
procedures  devised  for  these  organs,  which  permit  them  to  deal  with  gross  violations  of 
2680P. 
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a  comprehensive  study  of  the  question  of  humanitarian  taw  and  non-derogabte  rights,  and  the 
probtems  posed  in  this  area  see:  T.  Meron:  Human  Rights  in  Internat  Strife.  Their  international 
Protection.  Grotius  Pub..  Ltd.  Cambridge,  1987,  pp.  29-70.  See  atso  F.  Hampson:  Human  Rights  and 
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409 human  rights  such  as  Resolution  1235  XLII  of  June  6th,  1967  or  Resolution  1503  (XLII)  May 
27th,  1970,  both  resolutions  were  adopted  by  the  ECOSOC. 
These  organs  denounced  the  violations,  invited  States  concerned  to  respect  rules  of 
international  law  relating  to  the  protection  of  human  rights  and  even  humanitarian  law, 
appointed  special  rapporteurs  to  deal  with  specific  cases  of  gross  violations  of  human  rights 
in  certain  countries.  They  invited  the  States  concerned  to  punish  those  who  are  guilty  of 
committing  the  violations,  and  even  explicitly  invited  States  engaging  in  civil  wars  to  apply 
and  conform  to  Article  3  and  the  Protocol  11. 
2.1.1.  El  Salvador  Case 
The  UN  practice  clearly  shows,  in  the  case  of  El  Salvador,  that  all  the  above  mentioned 
steps  have  been  taken  in  relation  to  that  conflict.  Thus,  one  year  after  the  eruption  of  civil 
war  in  that  country,  the  UNCHR  at  its  37th  session  on  March  II  th,  1981  requested  its 
Chairman  to  appoint  a  special  representative  with  a  mandate  to  investigate  all  grave  human 
rights  violations  and  to  recommend  steps  the  Commission  could  take  to  help  secure  the 
enjoyment  of  human  rightS270  in  El  Salvador.  The  Government  of  El  Salvador  and  other 
States  were  invited  to  extend  their  cooperations  to  the  Rapporteur.  The  ECOSOC  approved 
the  decision  of  the  Chairman  of  the  UNCHR  on  May  8th,  1981. 
The  Special  Rapporteur  then  visited  El  Salvador  and  had  a  meeting  with  the  President, 
the  Vice  President  and  members  of  the  Junta.  He  then  submitted  an  interim  report,  which 
pointed  out  that  a  consistent  pattern  of  gross  violations  of  human  rights  existed  and  which 
culminated  with  attempts  on  human  life. 
Moreover,  it  was  reported  that  members  of  the  State  security  apparatus  and  violent  groups 
of  the  left  and  right,  were  involved  in  committing  murder  and  violations  of  human  rights; 
also  it  is  revealed  that  executive  and  judicial  organs  had  adopted  a  widespread  attitude  of 
passivity  and  inactivity  in  regard  to  these  gross  violations.  271 
On  October  28th,  1981,  the  UN  Secretary-General  transmitted  this  interim  report  to  the 
UNGA.  The  latter  then  adopted  Resolution  36/155  on  December  16th,  1981  (by  a  vote  of  90 
in  favour  22  against  and  53  abstentions).  The  Resolution  contains  several  interesting  points. 
In  Paragraph  3  it  states  that  the  UNGA: 
"...  [D]eeply  deplores  all  acts  of  violence  and  all  grave  violations  of  human  rights  and 
fundamental  freedoms,  and  regrets  in  particular  the  persistence  of  a  situation  in 
which  Government  paramilitary  organisations  and  other  armed  groups  continue  to  act 
with  total  contempt  for  the  life,  security  and  tranquillity  of  the  civilian 
"272  population. 
Paragraph  4  stipulates  that  the  UNGA: 
"  ...  [D]raws  the  attention  of  all  parties  concerned  to  the  fact  that  the  rules  of 
international  law,  as  contained  in  Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Convention  of  12  August 
1959,  are  applicable  to  armed  conflicts  not  of  an  international  character  and  requests 
27035  UNY,  1981,  p.  958. 
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410 the  parties  involved  to  apply  a  minimum  standard  of  protection  to  the  affected 
"273  population. 
In  paragraph  7,  the  Government  was  urged  to  take  the  necessary  measures  to  ensure  full 
respect  for  human  rights.  Lastly,  in  paragraph  9,  the  parties  to  the  conflict  were  invited  to 
cooperate  and  not  interfere  with  the  activities  of  humanitarian  organizations,  which  are 
dedicated  to  alleviate  the  suffering  of  the  civilian  population. 
In  fact,  the  UNGA  has  touched  many  important  issues  of  humanitarian  law,  it  stressed 
the  need  for  the  protection  of  the  civilians,  and  the  need  to  provide  them  with  relief  and 
importantly,  it  did  not  hesitate  to  proclaim  the  applicability  of  Article  3  to  the  situation. 
This  is  an  innovation,  since  neither  the  text  of  Article  3  nor  its  travaux  pr4paratolres  gives 
such  a  right  to  the  General  Assembly. 
In  practical  terms  the  action  of  the  UNGA  was  confined  to  demand  from  the  Government 
to  ensure  respect  for  human  rights,  no  sanctions  were  envisaged.  El  Salvador,  however, 
rejected  the  resolution  as  'biased'  and  said  'it  overstepped  the  humanitarian  sphere  and 
included  highly  political  considerations  which  fell  exclusively  under  internal 
,  274  jurisdictions.  It  further  noted  that  it  did  not  recognise  the  legitimacy  of  the  nomination 
of  the  Special  Rapporteur  and  the  validity  of  his  report. 
This  means  that  the  Government  clings  to  ideas  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention  to 
oppose  the  UN  actions.  Nevertheless,  the  interesting  thing  is  that  El  Salvador  did  not 
specifically  question  the  competence  of  the  UNGA  to  characterise  its  conflict  as  being 
governed  by  Article  3. 
Tunisia  on  the  other  hand,  maintained  that  it  was  essentially  up  to  regional  organisations 
(in  this  case  the  OAS)  to  find  solutions  for  problems  of  its  members.  275  However,  even 
Latin-  American  States  did  not  oppose  the  resolution  on  that  stand  which  means  that  they 
do  not  question  the  validity  of  the  UN  action.  They  rather  concentrated  on  the  element  of 
selectivity  of  cases.  Cuba  stressed  that  the  elimination  of  martial  law  and  respect  for  human 
rights  cannot  be  claimed  to  constitute  interference  in  the  internal  affairS.  276 
At  its  38th  session,  the  UNCHR  examined  the  second  report  of  its  Special  Rapporteur. 
In  this  report  it  was  observed  that: 
"...  [S]erious  and  massive  human  rights  violations  have  persisted  because  of  the 
continuing  confliCt.  "277 
Nevertheless,  some  positive  signs  have  been  mentioned,  a  slight  increase  in  the  punishment 
of  human  rights  violations  was  noted,  also  the  authorities  concern  to  encourage  judiciary 
activity  was  pointed  out.  Moreover,  the  report  spoke  of  'cases  of  humanitarian  treatment 
273  Ibid. 
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411 by  both  sides  to  persons  captured  in  combat.  '278  The  UNCHR  endorsed  the  report  and: 
"...  [C]alled  on  all  Salvadorian  parties  to  cooperate  with  humanitarian  organisations  and 
requested  them  to  apply  a  minimum  standard  of  human  rights  protection  and 
humanitarian  treatment  of  civilians.  "279 
The  UN  Sub-Commission  on  Non  -Discrimination  and  Minorities  recommended  the 
Government  to  apply  the  rules  of  international  law,  particularly  Common  Article  3.280 
The  UNGA  for  its  part  adopted  Resolution  37/185, December  17th,  1982,  (71  in  favour, 
18  against  and  55  abstentions).  The  Resolution  repeated  in  paragraph  2  the  application  of 
Article  3  to  the  situation,  and  at  paragraph  9  it: 
"...  [S]trongly  urges  the  Government  of  El  Salvador  to  fulfil  its  obligations  towards  its 
citizens  and  to  assume  its  international  responsibilities  in  this  regard  by  taking  the 
necessary  steps  to  ensure  that  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  are  fully 
respected  by  all  its  agencies,  including  its  security  forces  ano  other  armed 
v.  281  organisations  operating  under  its  authority  or  with  its  permission. 
El  Salvador  rejected  the  resolution  this  time  by  stating: 
"...  [T]hat  it  contrasted  the  report  of  the  special  representative  and  distorted  reality.  "282 
Thus,  the  outcry  of  these  different  organs  have  resulted  in  slight  improvement  in  the 
situation  of  human  rights,  also  the  rejection  by  El  Salvador  of  the  UNGA  Resolution  was 
not  so  strong,  since  it  did  not  at  all  invoke  the  breach  of  its  sovereignty  as  a  result  of  the 
UNGA  action.  Indirectly,  the  use  of  arguments  of  human  rights  have  led  the  Government 
to  try  to  do  something  about  the  violations,  as  the  report  of  the  Special  Rapporteur  reveals. 
In  his  third  report  of  January  1983,  to  the  UNCHR,  the  Special  Rapporteur  noted  that  the 
gross  violations  of  human  rights  are  the  responsibility  of  the  Government  and  the  left  as 
well.  He  emphasised  that  despite  a  slight  increase  in  the  punishment  of  human  rights 
violations,  he  had  not  heard  that  any  of  the  proceedings  had  resulted  in  a  conviction.  283  He 
mentioned  that  the  Geneva  Convention  and  the  two  Protocols: 
"...  [W]ere  still  not  properly  complied  with,  notwithatanding  humanitarian  treatment 
to,  and  even  released  persons  captured  in  combat.  "84 
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412 He  seems  to  hold  the  view  that  the  parties  to  the  conflict  are  expected  not  only  to  apply 
rules  of  Article  3,  but  the  whole  rules  of  humanitarian  law,  including  those  relating  to 
international  conflicts.  He  recommended  that  the  Government  should  adopt  the  following 
measures: 
"The  repeal  of  all  legal  enactments'  and  other  measures  that  were  incompatible  with 
international  human  rights  instruments,  institution  of  real  Government  control  over 
the  armed  forces,  and  all  armed  organisations  and  individuals,  adoption  of  legal 
measures  to  prevent  and  punish  human  rights  violations,  mass  camgaigns  to  promote 
"2  5  respect  for  human  rights  and  administrative  and  social  reforms. 
The  UNCHR  by  a  resolution  of  March  8th,  1983  endorsed  the  report  and  declared: 
"...  [O]nce  more  that  the  provisions  of  the  1949  Geneva  Convention  on  the  Laws  of  War  were 
applicable  to  the  armed  confliCt.  "286 
This  organ  of  human  rights  then  found  it  necessary  to  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  for  a 
better  protection  of  human  rights,  not  only  fundamental  human  rights  must  be  respected 
but,  also  all  rules  of  humanitary  law  contained  in  Geneva  Conventions. 
The  UNGA  also  followed  this  road  and  urged  the  parties  to  respect  all  rules  of 
humanitary  law.  Resolution  38/101  (December  16th,  1983).  Paragraph  3  stipulates  that  the 
UNGA: 
"Again  draws  the  attention  of  the  Salvadoran  parties  concerned  that  the  rules  of 
international  law,  as  contained  in  Article  3  and  Additional  Protocols  I  and  11  thereto, 
are  applicable  to  armed  conflict  not  of  an  international  character,  such  as  in  El 
Salvador,  and  requests  all  parties  to  apply  a  minimum  standarcl  of  protection  of 
human  rights  and  of  humane  treatment  of  civilian  population.  "'ar 
The  resolution  was  adopted  by  84  in  favour,  14  against  and  45  abstentions.  Thus,  in  the  view 
of  a  substantial  number  of  States,  the  humanitarian  rules  applicable  to  international  conflicts 
are  also  applicable  to  civil  wars.  This  is  a  very  interesting  development,  since  the  attitude 
of  the  majority  of  States  at  the  Diplomatic  Conference  (1974-1977)  was  otherwise. 
El  Salvador  stated  that. 
"The  text  was  not  constructive  for  the  promotion  of  human  rights,  it  was  partisan, 
interventionist  and  ... 
ineffective  and  irrelevant".  288 
It  seems  to  me,  that  these  objections  were  largely  directed  against  the  negative  attitude  of 
the  UNGA  toward  the  elections  which  took  place  in  March  1982  in  the  country,  rather  than 
the  obligation  of  El  Salvador  to  respect  humanitarian  rules  contained  in  Geneva  Conventions 
and  the  two  Protocols.  However,  Indonesia  with  eyes  on  East  Timor  considered  the  text  to 
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413 be  an  intervention  in  El  Salvador's  internal  affairs.  289 
In  November  1984,  the  Special  representative  reported  on  the  human  rights  situation  in 
El  Salvador.  He  indicated  that  the  new  Government  was  actively  pursuing  a  policy  of 
improving  the  human  rights  situation  in  the  country.  It  had  disbanded  the  intelligence 
section  of  the  Treasury  police,  dismissed  up  to  45  local  commanders,  restricted  the  activities 
of  'death  squads'  and  created  a  separate  secretariat  for  public  security  in  the  Ministry  of 
Defence,  as  well  as  a  special  commission  to  investigate  political  crimes  having  international 
relevance. 
Moreover,  an  investigation  was  ordered  by  the  Minister  of  Defence  of  alleged 
290 
participation  of  an  army  unit  in  a  massacre  of  68  peasants  in  July  1984. 
Continued  pressure  of  the  UN  among  other  things,  has  in  fact,  led  El  Salvador  to  adjust 
itself  at  least  partially,  in  order  to  conform  to  accepted  human  rights  and  humanitarian 
standards.  The  UNGA,  after  welcoming  the  changes  made  in  El  Salvador,  stressed  that  it: 
"12.  Deeply  deplores  the  fact  that  the  capacity  of  the  judicial  system  in  El  Salvador 
to  investigate,  prosecute  and  punish  violations  of  human  Tights  continues  to  be 
patently  unsatisfactory  and  therefore  urges  the  competent  authorities  to  continue  and 
strengthen  the  process  of  reform  of  the  Salvadoran  penal  system,  in  order  to  punish 
speedily  and  effectively  those  responsible  for  the  serious  human  rights  violftions 
which  have  been  committed  and  are  still  being  committed  in  that  country.  "29 
No  country,  even  El  Salvador,  challenged  the  UNGA  approach  as  intervention  or  breach 
of  sovereignty.  However  the  main  criticism  was  the  rejection  of  selectivity  in  the  text. 
Guatemala  indicated  that  such  a  double  standard  (singling  out  certain  countries  for  human 
rights  violations  while  maintaining  silence  with  respect  to  others  for  the  same  violations) 
weakened  the  credibility  of  human  rights  institutions  and  respect  for  the  UN  Charter.  292 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  of  1966  also  established 
a  system  of  supervision  for  the  specific  rights  included  in  the  Covenant.  The  Human  Rights 
Committee,  instituted  under  Article  40  has  in  fact  the  specific  mission  of  such 
293  supervision.  The  main  function  of  the  Committee  is  to  study  reports  submitted  by  the 
States  parties,  in  accordance  with  Article  40/1  and  to  transmit  its  reports  and  such  general 
comments  as  it  may  consider  appropriate,  to  the  States  parties.  It  may  also  transmit  these 
general  comments  to  the  ECOSOC,  along  with  the  copies  of  the  reports  it  has  received 
from  the  party  States.  However,  it  seems  that  El  Salvador  did  not  submit  its  reports  on  time, 
which  made  it  difficult  for  the  Committee  to  study  the  situation. 
It  is  reported  that: 
*The  Committee  has  conducted  a  constructive  dialogue  with  States  parties,  has  sought 
considerable  information  from  States,  and  has  been  the  source  of  much  information 
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414 and  publicity  about  the  Covenant.  In  so  doing  it  has  contributed  to  a  wider 
dissemination  of  information  and  a  raising  of  consciousness  on  human  rights  issues 
"294  in  the  Governments  and  populations  of  States. 
2.1.2.  Other  Cases 
It  must  be  stressed  that  the  UN  organs  have  also  dealt  with  questions  of  violations  of  human 
rights  in  many  other  countries.  The  UNCHR  has  in  fact  established  many  subsidiary  organs 
to  deal  with  issues  prevalent  in  internal  conflicts.  It  establish  ad  hoc  working  groups  of 
experts  to  deal  with  specific  countries,  such  as  the  ad  hoc  working  group  on  South  Africa 
(1967),  the  ad  hoc  working  group  on  Human  Rights  in  Chile  (1975).  From  1979,  the 
Commission  replaced  the  ad  hoc  working  groups  by  the  designation  of  Special  Rapporteurs, 
Special  representatives  and  special  envoys. 
In  1979,  it  appointed  a  Special  Rapporteur  in  Chile,  and  in  the  same  year  another  one  in 
Equatorial  Guinea;  in  1981  a  Special  Representative  in  El  Salvador,  and  also  another  one  in 
Bolivia  in  1982;  in  Guatemala,  Iran,  1982;  Poland  1982  and  Afghanistan  1984  (  Ermacora).  The 
functions  of  special  rapporteurs  seem  to  contain  an  element  of  fact-finding,  preparing  a 
report  on  the  situation  of  human  rights,  and  also  an  element  of  mediation,  since  they  engage 
in  dialogue  with  the  established  Government. 
The  UNCHR,  also  from  1980,  resorted  to  'thematic  procedures'.  They  consist  in 
appointing  a  working  group  or  special  rapporteur  to  examine  specific  themes,  primarily  on 
the  basis  of  desk  research  and  visits  to  different  countries.  in  this  context,  the  Commission 
created  six  thematic  procedures:  (i)  The  working  group  on  enforced  or  involuntary 
disappearances  (1980).  (ii)  The  Special  Rapporteur  on  summary  or  arbitrary  executions 
(1982).  (iii)  The  Special  Rapporteur  on  torture  (1985).  (iv)  The  Special  Rapporteur  on 
religious  intolerance  (1986).  (v)  The  Special  Rapporteur  on  mercenaries  (1986)  and  (vi)  The 
Special  Rapporteur  on  monitoring  investments  in  South  Africa  (1987). 
It  is  clear  that  the  great  majority  of  these  themes  have  a  direct  relation  with  internal 
conflicts.  They  often  take  place  in  such  a  conflict. 
It  has  been  asserted  in  effect  that: 
"...  [T]aken  together  the  thematic  procedures  could  well  b  regarded  as  an  embryonic 
United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights". 
S95 
And  that  those  procedures: 
"...  [C]onstitute  the  only  devices  of  the  United  Nations  which  act  continuously  and 
report  publicly  on  human  rights  violations  on  a  worldwide  basis  within  the  limitqtions 
"296  of  their  mandate.  They  tend  to  do  this  impartially  and  without  political  bias. 
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415 And  also  that  the  thematic  approach  is  therefore: 
"...  [A]n  effective  antidote  against  the  often  heard  criticism  that  the  UN's  response  to 
human  rights  violations  is  selective  and  politically  prejudicial.  For  this  reason  alone 
the  thematic  procedures  deserve  to  be  nurtured  and  strengthened".  297 
These  different  techniques  used  by  the  UNCHR  (Special  Rapporteurs  for  specific  countries 
or  thematic  groups)  have  all  contributed  in  different  degrees  to  reveal  the  violations  of 
human  rights  and  they  tried  to  remedy  situations  by  mediation,  recommendation  and  lastly 
by  outright  denunciations.  Governments  generally  seem  willing  to  cooperate  with  those 
groups,  which  means  that  they  do  not  see  that  their  work  is  an  intervention  in  their  internal 
affairs. 
As  examples  of  the  work  of  these  organs  and  techniques,  the  Special  Rapporteur  on 
Afghanistan  submitted  a  report  to  the  UNCHR  in  which  it  was  revealed  that  the  situation 
in  Afghanistan  can  be  considered  as  a  situation  of  gross  violations  of  human  rights.  On  the 
basis  of  the  report,  the  UNCHR  adopted  a  resolution,  in  which  it  expressed  its  distress  at: 
"The  widespread  violations  of  the  right  to  life,  liberty  and  security  of  person, 
including  the  common  place  of  torture  against  the  regimes  opponents,  indinriminate 
bombing  of  the  civilian  population  and  deliberate  destruction  of  cropS".  2 
It  ended  by  urging  the  Government  to  put  a  stop  to  such  violations. 
Thus,  a  whole  range  of  denunciation  of  practices,  which  are  essentially  a  violation  of 
humanitarian  law  and  the  rights  especially  of  the  victims  of  war,  and  not  strictly  speaking 
human  rights,  has  been  seen  by  the  UNCHR  as  an  element  of  its  competence. 
Also  the  UNCHR  in  its  Ord  session  adopted  a  resolution  in  which  it  calls  upon  Sri- 
Lanka  to  cooperate  with  the  ICRC  in  delivering  humanitarian  aid  and  continue  to  supply 
299  information  to  the  UNCHR. 
Moreover,  the  working  group  on  enforced  or  involuntary  disappearances,  which  was 
created  by  Resolution  XXXVI  of  February  29th,  1980  by  the  UNCHR,  has  done  some  very 
encouraging  work.  The  group  consisted  of  five  persons,  who  acted  in  their  personal 
capacity.  Their  mission  was  to  seek  and  receive  information  from  Governments,  inter- 
Governmental  organizations,  humanitarian  organizations  and  other  reliable  sources.  The 
working  group,  as  from  1980,  has  used  all  its  influence  to  pressure  Governments  to  reveal 
what  happened  to  thousands  of  missing  people.  The  group  was  able  to  visit  some  countries 
where  disappearances  were  alleged  to  happen  such  as  Cyprus,  Bolivia  and  Peru. 
In  1985  the  group,  as  an  example,  reported  having  received  4,500  allegations  of  enforced 
or  involuntary  disappearances,  and  it  was  able  to  transmit  some  2,200  sufficiently 
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416 documented  cases  to  various  GovernmentS.  300  In  its  report  to  the  UNCHR  in  1987,  the 
group  identified  39  countries  in  which  enforced  or  involuntary  disappearances  persiSt.  301 
Also  the  working  group  in  1987  asked  14  Governments  to  explain  1,094  new  cases  of 
302  disappearances  which  occurred  in  that  year. 
It  should  be  mentioned  that  especially  in  cases  of  recent  and  new  disappearances,  the 
group  was  able  to  send  telegrams  and  make  appeals  which  have  resulted  in  the  release  of 
many  individuals  and  has  caused  Governments  to  acknowledge  that  they  are  detaining 
others.  However,  in  relation  to  old  cases  of  disappearance,  the  working  group  was  able  in 
some  instances  to  clarify  their  situation  and  fate.  303  There  is  a  general  consensus  that  the 
working  group  on  enforced  and  involuntary  disappearance  has  over  the  years  become  an 
effective  instrument  of  implementing  human  rights,  in  a  very  difficult  domaine.  304 
By  resolution  of  the  ECOSOC  1982/35  of  May  7th,  1982,  Mr.  Amos  Wako,  a  Kenyan 
lawyer,  was  appointed  as  a  Special  Rapporteur  to  study  the  question  of  summary  or 
arbitrary  executions.  In  his  first  report  he  revealed  that  at  least  2  million  people  had  been 
executed  arbitrarily  in  37  countries  over  the  past  15  years;  he  indicated  that  there  is  a  close 
relationship  between  summary  or  arbitrary  executions  and  violations  of  human  rights, 
especially  the  right  not  to  be  subjected  to  torture,  inhuman  treatment  etC.  305 
In  his  second  report  he  made  clear  that  summary  or  arbitrary  executions  takes  place 
frequently  in  situations  of  upheaval,  internal  conflict  etc.  306  In  his  report  to  the  44th  Session 
of  the  UNCHR  (1988),  he  indicated  that  he  had  asked  27  Governments  to  respond  to 
allegations  of  executions  and  had  intervened  with  urgent  appeals  to  14.  He  also  dealt  with 
the  question  of  executions  by  armed  opposition  groups  such  as  the  Renamo  insurgents  in 
Mozambique.  307 
The  work  of  the  Special  Rapporteur  on  summary  or  arbitrary  executions  is  in  fact,  very 
useful  in  protecting  the  fundamental  right  to  life.  Thus,  it  helped  even  in  indirect  ways  to 
stop  impending  killings  by  intervention  directly  to  the  Government  concerned.  Also  by 
investigating  past  practices  of  summary  or  arbitrary  execution,  and  finally  in  his  1988  report 
he  indicated  that  he  was  engaging  also  in  finding  international  norms  of  investigating 
suspicious  deaths. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  doubt  that  even  if  his  work  is  not  confined  to  countries 
300  D.  Weissbrodt:  The  Three  'Theme'  SpeciaL  Rapporteurs  of  the  United  Nations  Commission  of  Human 
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417 which  experience  civil  war,  in  practice  it  is  in  civil  war  situations  that  summary  executions 
occur  on  a  large  scale.  Thus,  indirectly  the  work  of  the  Special  Rapporteur  will  inevitably 
especially  benefit  the  victims  of  internal  war  to  escape  such  inhuman  and  cruel  practices. 
2.1.3.  Conclusions  on  the  UN  System  and  the  Control  of  Application  of  Humanitarian 
Rules 
(i)  The  UN  different  organs  have  been  able  to  denounce  violations  of  human  rights  abuses 
and  thereby  violations  of  basic  humanitarian  standards,  through  the  vehicle  of  human 
rights.  This  confirms  first  that  human  rights  are  accepted  by  States  as  valid  limitation  upon 
their  sovereignty  and  secondly,  that  there  is  a  strong  link  if  not  absolute  identity  between 
the  minimum  rules  of  humanitarian  law  and  human  rights,  especially  in  the  field  of  the 
protection  of  war  victims. 
(ii)  The  near  absence  of  any  means  of  controlling  the  application  of  humanitarian  law  in 
internal  conflict  (apart  from  the  pragmatic  role  of  the  ICRQ  has  made  the  role  of  the  UN 
essential  in  that  area.  The  political  and  moral  effect  of  the  UN  action  in  dealing  with 
violations  of  human  rights  and  humanitarian  law  cannot  be  ignored.  It  led  in  practice,  as 
the  El  Salvador  case  shows,  to  the  Government  being  pressured  to  take  steps  towards  ending 
inhuman  practices. 
(iii)  However,  the  UN's  main  means  for  supervising  the  application  of  human  rights  and 
humanitarian  rules  in  internal  conflicts,  as  the  case  of  El  Salvador  shows,  are  publicity  and 
denunciation  but  not  direct  actions  to  stop  such  violations.  This  is  understandable  since  due 
regard  must  be  paid  to  the  legal  and  political  obstacles  in  the  way  of  any  direct  action. 
The  role  of  public  opinion,  publicity  etc.,  can  be  very  effective  in  our  world,  where  means 
of  communication  are  fast  and  well-developed.  The  Government  living  in  a  state  of  a  civil 
conflict  cannot  go  on  ignoring  the  calls  of  the  international  community.  Some  action  is 
needed  on  its  part  to  appease  the  critics  and  these  actions  will  benefit  human  beings  and  the 
victims  of  internal  wars. 
2.2.  The  Practice  In  the  Context  of  Latin-America 
Under  the  Inter-American  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  the  Inter-American  Commission 
on  Human  Rights  can  receive  complaints  from  individuals  (Article  44)  and  also  from  States 
(Article  45).  The  Commission  is  empowered  also  to  conduct  on-site  observation  of  the 
situation  of  human  rights  with  the  consent  of  the  Government  concerned;  but  Government 
refusal  to  grant  such  consent  does  not  prevent  the  Commission  from  preparing  a  report  and 
issuing  public  statements  that  may  embarrass  the  Government.  308 
All  these  mechanisms  for  supervising  the  application  of  the  obligations  contained  in  the 
Convention  have  also  been  used  in  the  context  of  emergencies  and  civil  wars.  Thus 
indirectly  they  contributed  to  the  observance  of  fundamental  humanitarian  rules. 
In  fact,  the  very  presence  of  the  Commission  in  a  country  torn  by  civil  war  (under  Article 
48  of  the  Convention)  has  sometimes  led  to  the  improvement  of  the  situation  of  human 
308  See  In  this  respect.  B.  G.  Ramcharan  (ed.  ):  International  Law  and  Fact-Finding  in  the  Field  of  Hunan 
Rights.  Martinus  NIjhoff,  The  Hague/aoston/London,  1982,  pp.  20-21. 
418 rights  and  humanitarian  law  standards  especially  in  relation  to  the  protection  of  the  victims 
of  war.  One  of  the  principal  activities  of  the  Commission,  in  its  visits  or  on-site  observatory 
missions  in  member  countries,  is  the  inspection  of  jails  and  detention  centres,  and  the 
finding  out  of  reasons  for  the  detention  and  imprisonment  and  whether  torture  and 
inhuman  treatment  had  taken  place.  There  is  no  doubt  that  such  inspections  are  very 
important  during  emergencies  and  internal  upheavals,  where  the  number  of  detainees  and 
interned  persons  can  be  large. 
The  presence,  for  example,  of  the  Commission  in  the  Dominican  Republic  in  October  1961 
saved  hundreds  of  lives  and  led  to  the  release  of  large  numbers  of  prisoners  from  detention 
camps.  309  This  has  been  the  result  of  the  efforts  of  the  Commission  in  the  internal  conflict 
in  that  country. 
However,  here  I  will  concentrate  on  the  Nicaragua  Case  because  the  actions  of  the  Inter- 
American  Commission  of  Human  Rights  have  induced  the  Government  to  take  important 
measures  to  remedy  violations  of  human  rights  and  humanitarian  law.  This  of  course  does 
not  mean  that  other  cases  will  not  be  studied,  at  least  shortly. 
2.2.1.  Nicaragua  and  the  Inter-American  Commission  on  Human  Rights  and  the  Control 
of  Application  of  Human  Rights  and  Humanitarian  Law 
The  Commission  has  on  many  occasions  brought  the  attention  of  the  Nicaraguan 
Government  to  the  fact  that  it  had  violated  some  important  human  rights  of  its  nationals 
and  even  in  some  cases  mentioned  the  violations  of  humanitarian  law.  Thus,  in  its  report 
on  the  situation  in  Nicaragua  in  1978  (when  the  Somoza  regime  was  in  power)  the 
Commission  noted  in  relation  to  the  internal  war  which  was  taking  place  at  that  time,  that 
it: 
"Deplores  the  loss  of  any  human  life  notwithstanding  the  circumstances.  But,  at  the 
same  time,  it  is  evident  that  with  regard  to  this  fundamental  right  to  life,  the 
contending  parties  have  Ihe  duty  of  respecting  the  unarmed  population  which  is 
unable  to  protect  itself.  "310 
The  Commission  went  even  further: 
"Moreover,  the  Government  of  Nicaragua  assumed  the  solemn  obligation  of 
respecting  international  norms  of  humanitarian  law,  especially  those  set  forth  in  the 
Geneva  Convention  of  civilians  in  time  of  war,  signed  on  12  August  1949  which  also 
is  applicable  in  armed  conflicts  not  of  an  international  character,  ratified  by 
Nicaragua  on  December  17,1953.  "311 
This  indicates  that  the  Commission  went  even  beyond  the  express  provisions  of  the  IV 
Geneva  Convention  (on  civilians)  that  it  applies  only  in  international  wars,  and  considered 
that  Nicaragua  even  in  its  internal  conflict  is  bound  by  that  Convention.  It  is  clear  that  the 
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419 object  a  nd  purpose  of  the  Commission  was  to  afford  greater  protection  to  the  civilian 
population  which  was  suffering  greatly  from  the  conflict. 
In  the  same  report,  the  Commission  found  that  Nicaragua  was  'responsible  for  serious 
'312  attempts  against  the  right  to  life  in  violations  of  the  international  humanitarian  rules  . 
The  Commission,  which  is  a  human  rights  instrument,  has  used  the  human  rights  approach 
to  denounce  in  express  terms  violations  of  humanitarian  law.  This  had  been  done 
presumably,  on  the  assumption  that  there  is  no  difference  between  the  two  kinds  of  rules. 
However,  it  is  with  Sandanista  Government  that  the  Commission  was  able  to  obtain  many 
concessions,  which  directly  benefitted  the  victims  of  the  civil  war  in  that  country. 
In  its  annual  Report  for  1982/83  the  Commission  referred  to  Decree  1233  of  April  11th, 
1983  issued  by  the  Government  which  established  what  is  called  the  'Anti-Somoza  People's 
Courts'  with  the  mandate  of  bringing  to  trial  the  country's  own  nationals  for  war  crimes  and 
crimes  against  humanity,  committed  by  the  National  Guard  during  the  war  against  the 
Somoza  regime. 
The  Commission  took  a  negative  step  vis-A-vis  these  courts,  the  reason  being  that  'Anti- 
Somoza  Courts'  were  tainted  from  the  beginning  by  that  indistinguishable  prefix  'Anti' 
which  conveys  or  conditions  their  lack  of  impartiality,  independence  and  autonomy'.  313 
Also,  in  its  annual  report  of  1985/86,  the  Commission  dealt  with  the  decision  of  the 
Government  on  October  15th,  1985  to  establish  a  State  of  emergency,  by  which  many 
important  human  rights  were  suspended  including  habeas  corpus.  It  indicated: 
"This  suspension 
- 
runs  counter  to  the  provision  of  Article  27/2  in  fine  of  the 
American  Conventions  on  Human  Rights  and  creates  conlitions  in  which  serious 
"3  4  abuses  against  the  security  of  the  individual  could  occur. 
The  Commission  then  urged  the  Government  to  repeal  those  measures  and  restore  the  right 
of  habeas  corpus  for  all  individuals  detained  by  its  security  service. 
The  Commission,  in  the  same  report,  dealt  with  the  prison  situation  especially  for  persons 
jailed  for  security  reasons.  It  observed  that: 
"...  [A]  substantial  im  rovement  in  the  prison  conditions  for  those  jailed  for  political 
"PI  5  reasons  is  essential. 
The  Commission  has,  in  fact,  raised  many  issues  which  are  intimately  connected  with  the 
civil  war  which  was  taking  place,  and  used  the  machinery  of  human  rights  instruments  to 
demand  action  from  the  Government  to  improve  the  situation,  which  would  benefit  the 
victims  of  internal  war  in  the  first  place. 
The  Commission  has  also  investigated  the  regime's  dealing  with  its  Meskito  Indian 
minority.  Thus,  in  its  report  of  June  7th,  1984  indicated  that: 
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420 "...  [H]undreds  of  Miskitos  Indians  have  been  arbitrarily  detain  without  formalities, 
under  vague  accusations  of  counter-revolutionary  activities"116 
And  added  that  many  other  Miskitos: 
"...  [W]ere  placed  in  isolation  for  long  periods  and  in  some  cases  the  Commission 
verified  they  were  tortured  and  illegally  punished.  "317 
The  Government  has  never  questioned  the  Commission's  actions,  it  did  not  characterise 
them  as  intervention  or  breach  of  its  sovereignty.  In  fact,  all  the  evidence  suggests  that  the 
Government  has  tried  its  best  to  heal  the  criticisms  labled  by  the  Commission. 
In  this  context,  as  we  stated  in  Chapter  IV  Section  111,  the  Government  granted  amnesty 
to  all  Miskitos  and  even  other  persons  who  had  been  accused  of  violent  actions  against  the 
Government  (Decree  No.  13523  of  December  Ist,  1983).  The  Government  also  satisfied  one 
of  the  most  important  proposals  of  the  Commission,  namely  the  orderly  and  voluntary 
repatriation  of  the  Miskitos  who  had  fled  the  country  (Decree  No.  1353  of  September  4th, 
1983).  318 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  reported  that: 
"Perhaps  the  most  hopeful  sign  in  Nicaragua  is  that  the  Government  has  demonstrated 
sensibility  to  criticism  of  human  rights  abuses  by  the  Americas  Watch  and  other 
groups  and,  in  a  number  of  instances,  has  taken  measures  that  directly  respond  to 
those  crItIcIsms.  "319 
An  example  of  the  allegations  by  inhabitants  of  region  6,  a  conflict  area,  that  widespread 
abuses  by  the  authorities  of  that  region  has  led  the  Government  to  investigate  them.  The 
result  was  the  conviction  of  a  number  of  military  officers  and  others  receiving  prison 
320  sentences  in  March  1984. 
The  practice  in  Nicaragua  shows  clearly  how  an  organ  for  the  control  of  application  of 
human  rights,  serves  useful  to  the  cause  of  giving  respect  to  fundamental  humanitarian  rules 
in  situations  of  internal  wars.  The  intervention  of  that  organ  leads  to  the  reduction  of 
violations  of  human  rights,  which  are  essential  in  times  of  upheavals  and  civil  wars,  such 
as  the  right  to  life,  prohibition  of  torture  and  inhuman  treatment  and  the  right  to  fair  trial 
and  due  process. 
2.2-2.  Other  Cases 
It  must  also  be  indicated  that  the  Inter-American  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  also 
the  Inter-American  Court  of  Human  Rights  have,  over  the  years,  dealt  with  various 
questions  of  humanitarian  law  in  different  countries  of  Latin  America,  always  through  the 
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421 medium  of  human  rights. 
In  its  report  on  the  situation  in  Uruguay  (1977)  the  Commission  laid  down,  in  effect,  the 
minimal  rules  which  must  be  observed  by  the  Government  in  its  treatment  of  captured 
combatants  and  political  prisoners  in  general.  It  stated  in  this  respect: 
"The  Commission  has  repeatedly  condemned  practises  used  by  groups  which,  in  an 
attempt  to  impose  their  political  and  ideological  opinions,  resort  to  all  forms  of 
criminal  activity,  such  as  murder,  kidnappings,  assault,  maintenance  of  private  jails 
and  cruel  treatment.  On  the  other  hand  on  other  occasions  the  Commission  has 
generally  maintained  that  the  authorities  cannot  deprive  subversives  of  the  minimal 
treatment  to  which  enemy  combatants  and  prisoners  are  entitled  both  durin 
"32f  international  and  during  armed  conflict  that  are  not  of  an  international  nature. 
The  Commission  held  also  that  the  holding  of  detainees  in  prison  for  long  and  unspecified 
periods,  without  any  charge  being  brought  against  them,  even  when  it  is  allowed  under 
special  legislation,  is  a  clear  violation  of  human  rights.  Detainees  have  the  right  to  fair  trial 
and  to  due  process  of  law.  322  The  Commission  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  captured 
insurgents  must  be  treated  as  prisoners  of  war,  even  in  situations  of  internal  conflicts,  hence 
it  went  even  beyond  what  Article  3  and  Protocol  11  lay  down  for  this  category  of  victims. 
The  Commission  and  the  Court  also  in  many  instances,  dealt  with  the  problem  of  States 
of  emergencies  and  disappearances  of  persons.  These  problems,  in  fact,  always  arise  in 
situations  of  internal  conflict.  In  connection  with  the  question  of  situations  of  emergency, 
the  Inter-American  Court  on  Human  Rights  in  an  Advisory  opinion  on  habeas  corpus  in 
emergency  situations,  requested  by  the  Commission,  declared: 
"The  Court  must  also  observe  that  the  constitutions  and  legal  systems  of  States  parties 
that  authorize  expressly  or  by  implication  the  suspension  of  the  legal  remedies  of 
habeas  corpus  or  of  'amparo'  in  emergency  situations  cannot  be  deemed  compa-tible 
with  the  international  obligations  imposed  on  these  States  by  the  Convention.  "323 
In  effect,  the  Court  added  a  new  non-derogable  right  which  must  be  observed  in  situations 
of  emergencies,  since  this  right  does  not  appear  in  the  list  of  non-derogable  rights  in  the 
Convention  (Article  27/2)  and  there  is  no  doubt  the  respect  of  habeas  corpus  in  situations 
of  civil  war  will  benefit  greatly  the  victims  of  war,  since  in  such  a  situation  arrests  are 
frequent  and  abuse  commonplace. 
The  Commission,  in  one  of  its  recommendations  to  member  States,  considered  that: 
"...  [E]ven  in  emergency  situations  stemming  from  political  upheavals,  an  attempt  be 
made  to  hold  to  a  minimum  the  restriction  on  fundamental  rights  or  the  violations 
of  such  rights;  particularly  that  the  death  sentence  not  be  imposed  for  political 
offences  or  for  common  crimes  linked  to  political  offences,  and  that  steps  be  taken 
for  the  proper  punishment  of  those  who  indulge  in  excesses  of  violence,  in  acts  of 
cruelty  or  torture,  in  abusive  attacks  on  or  affronts  to  personal  honor  and  human 
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422 dignity.  "324 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Court  in  its  advisory  opinion  on  Restrictions  to  the  Death  Penalty 
of  September  8th.  1983  requested  by  the  Commission  made  clear  that: 
"The  Convention  imposes  an  absolute  prohibition  on  the  extension  of  the  death 
penalty  to  crime5  for  which  such  a  penalty  was  not  previously  proved  for  under  its 
domestic  law.  "325 
This  means  that  States  which  are  confronted  with  civil  wars  and  which  have  not  the  death 
penalty  before  those  conflicts,  cannot  introduce  such  penalties  even  after  the  declaration 
of  State  of  emergency.  In  this  respect,  the  decision  went  beyond  what  Protocol  Il  stipulates 
since  the  latter,  as  we  have  seen,  does  not  contain  an  express  prohibition  on  the  introduction 
of  the  death  penalty  once  civil  wars  erupt. 
As  to  disappearances  which  are  common  practice  in  Latin-  America,  especially  in  cases 
of  internal  conflict,  the  Commission  condemned  this  inhuman  and  cruel  practice  as  a 
violation  of  the  Convention  on  Human  Rights.  Thus,  in  its  Annual  Report  for  1982/83 
considered  that  the  practice  of  disappearances: 
"Constitutes  a  very  serious  present  or  potential  violation  of  such  fundamental  rights 
as  the  right  to  life,  to  freedom  and  to  personal  security  and  integrity  of  a  human 
being.  Moreover,  it  places  the  victim  in  an  absolutely  defenceless  position,  with 
serious  violation  of  the  rights  to  justice,  to  protection  against  arbitrary  arrest  and  to 
due  process  of  law.  "326 
Thus,  on  the  basis  of  violations  of  certain  fundamental  human  rights  contained  in  the 
Convention,  the  Inter-American  Commission  was  able  to  make  resort  to  disappearances 
which  are  not  prohibited  expressly  in  the  Convention  a  violation  of  the  Convention.  Thus, 
again  through  the  vehicle  of  human  rights  rules  and  instruments,  inhuman  practices,  which 
are  commonplace  in  internal  conflicts,  are  made  illegal. 
On  July  29th,  1988,  the  Inter-American  Court  of  Human  Rights  for  the  first  time  dealt 
with  the  question  of  forced  disappearance  in  Velasguez  Rodriguez 
- 
Case,  against  the 
Government  of  Honduras.  The  Court  made  several  important  pronouncements  in  regard  to 
the  question  of  disappearance  and  also  on  the  limits  of  State  power.  It  noted  that: 
"The  phenomenon  of  disappearances  is  a  complex  form  of  hu  n  rights  violation  that 
must  be  understood  and  confronted  in  an  integral  fashion.  "InY 
The  Court  then  added  that: 
"...  [I]nternational  practice  and  doctrine  have  often  categorized  disappearances  as  a 
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423 crime  againsý  humanity,  although  there  is  no  treaty  in  force  which  uses  this 
terminology".  28 
Then  the  Court  invoked  the  basis  upon  which  it  considers  disappearance  as  illegal  and 
hence,  a  violation  of  the  Convention.  First,  it  stressed  that: 
"...  [W]ithout  question,  the  State  has  the  right  and  duty  to  guarantee  its  security.  It  is 
also  indisputable  that  all  societies  suffer  some  deficiencies  in  their  legal  orders. 
However,  regardless  of  the  seriousness  of  certain  actions  and  the  culpability  of  the 
perpetrators  of  certain  crimes,  the  power  of  the  State  is  not  unlimited,  nor  may  the 
State  resort  to  any  means  to  attain  its  ends.  The  State  is  subject  to  law  and  m(2rality. 
Disrespect  for  human  dignity  cannot  serve  as  the  basis  for  any  State  action.  .  529 
The  second  ground  upon  which  it  considered  that  disappearances  are  a  violation  of  the 
American  Convention  on  Human  Rights  was  stated  in  this  fashion: 
"The  practice  of  disappearances,  in  addition  to  directly  violating  many  provisions  of 
the  Conventions  [especially  Article  4  The  Right  to  life] 
...  constitutes  a  radical  breach 
of  the  treaty  in  that  it  shows  a  crass  abandonment  of  the  values  which  emanate  from 
the  concept  of  human  dignit  and  of  the  most  basic  principles  of  the  inter-American 
system  and  the  Convention 
It  then  added  that: 
"...  [T]he  existence  of  this  practice,  moreover,  evinces  a  disregard  of  the  duty  to 
organize  the  State  in  such  a  manner  to  guarantee  the  rights  recognized  in  the 
"331  Convention. 
The  Court  in  fact,  found  Honduras  responsible  for  violating  the  Convention  and  ordered 
the  State  to  pay  the  necessary  reparation  to  the  victim's  family.  Thus,  the  machinery  of  the 
human  rights  instrument  has,  in  fact,  led  to  the  establishment  of  an  effective  control  for 
the  application  of  some  fundamental  humanitarian  rules,  by  holding  the  legal  Government 
responsible  legally  for  some  actions  which  are  widespread  in  internal  conflicts,  such 
asdisappearances.  The  primary  beneficiaries  from  such  control  are  the  real  victims  of 
internal  wars. 
, 
As  a  conclusion,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  practice  in  the  context  of  Latin  America  is  a  very 
welcome  legal  development.  It  shows  that  the  system  of  control  of  application  of  human 
rights  seems  to  be  more  acceptable  to  States.  First,  because  they  agreed  to  it  when  ratifying 
the  Treaty.  Secondly,  because  the  consent  and  the  cooperation  of  the  Government  is  always 
sought.  Thirdly,  the  human  rights  approach  does  not  raise  the  question  of  the  legal  status 
of  insurgents  and  this  indirectly  does  not  in  any  way  question  the  legitimacy  of  State  power. 
All  these  factors  open  the  way  for  more  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars,  in  the 
absence  of  application  of  humanitarian  rules  contained  in  Article  3  and  the  Protocol  11. 
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424 3.  General  Conclusions  Concerning  the  Contribution  of  Human  Rights  Machinery  to  the 
Application  and  Enforcement  of  Humanitarian  Rules  In  Internal  Conflicts 
(i)  Because  of  the  absence  of  any  mechanisms  for  the  control  of  application  of  Protocol  II 
and  Article  3  (apart  from  the  right  of  initiative  of  the  ICRC)  and  because  of  reluctance  of 
States  to  proclaim  even  the  application  of  those  instruments  in  their  internal  wars,  it  seems 
that  human  rights  instruments,  with  permanent  organs,  and  through  the  existence  of  certain 
fundamental  non-derogable  rights,  even  in  cases  of  emergencies  and  wars  in  those 
instruments,  all  these  offer  a  good  hope  for  inducing  States  to  respect  and  apply  those 
fundamental  rights  and  freedom,  which  are  identical  with  humanitarian  law  applicable  in 
internal  conflicts. 
The  use  of  human  rights  machinery  has  the  advantage  of  escaping  the  condemnation  as 
intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  State  or  as  a  breach  of  their  sovereignty,  since  there 
is  a  wide  consensus  that  human  rights  constitute  an  agreed  limitation  upon  State  sovereignty. 
Also,  the  system  is  to  some  extent  effective,  the  international  community  in  the  UN 
framework,  and  also  in  the  regional  framework  of  the  OAS,  have  demonstrated  how  human 
rights  organs  have  sometimes  induced  States  concerned  to  adopt  measures  which  contribute 
to  real  protection  of  some  fundamental  humanitarian  rules  in  cases  of  internal  wars. 
(ii)  The  importance  of  human  rights  organs  in  supervising  the  application  of  human  rights 
is  greater  in  times  of  internal  conflicts.  Since  their  role  is  to  uphold  that  declaration  of 
emergencies  does  not  justify  any  gross  violations  of  human  rights.  These  organs  can 
examine  the  necessity  of  such  derogations  and  can  always  insist  upon  the  application  of 
certain  fundamental  human  rights  whatever  the  circumstances  may  be.  This  of  course  will 
automatically  contribute  to  the  making  of  such  wars  more  humane,  especially  for  the 
helpless  victims. 
(iii)  Practice  also  shows  in  a  very  clear  way  that  States  have  rarely  condemned  the  actions 
of  human  rights  organs  in  dealing  with  specific  questions  of  humanitarian  law,  such  as  the 
protection  of  detainees  who  committed  offences  in  connection  with  the  conflict,  better 
protection  of  civilian  population,  the  right  of  the  victims  to  receive  relief  and  assistance, 
and  even  of  invoking  humanitarian  instruments,  such  as  the  Fourth  Geneva  Convention, 
Article  3  and  Protocol  II. 
425 FINAL  CONCLUSIONS 
My  research  and  study  of  the  influence  of  the  two  important  principles  of  contemporary 
international  law,  namely-  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention,  on  the  development  or  lack 
of  development  of  humanitarian  law  applicable  in  internal  conflicts,  has  resulted  in 
establishing  the  following  points: 
It  is  established  beyond  any  doubt  that  the  subject  matter  of  humanitarian  law,  applicable 
in  internal  conflicts,  touches  directly,  on  the  concepts  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention. 
The  reason  being  that  the  main  aim  of  that  branch  of  international  law,  is  to  regulate  the 
conduct  of  the  State  vis-i-vis  its  own  citizens,  hence  making  the  subject  of  their  (the 
citizens)  treatment,  a  matter  which  is  no  longer  solely  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of 
the  State.  It  becomes  a  matter  of  international  concern  and  subject  to  international  law. 
This  prospect  frightens  many  States,  they  prefer  to  keep  their  full  discretion,  which 
sovereignty  and  non  -intervention  give  them,  so  they  can  subdue  their  internal  enemies,  who 
take  up  arms  against  them  swiftly,  and  without  regard  to  any  international  legal  restraints. 
The  first  and  second  chapters,  which  dealt  respectively  with  sovereignty,  and  non- 
intervention  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  meaning,  content,  limitations,  and  their  place 
in  contemporary  times,  establish  that  those  two  principles,  are  still  the  basis  of  the 
organization  of  our  world. 
The  Westphalian  model  of  the  organization  of  international  society,  based  on  the  existence 
of  independent  territorial  units,  on  pluralism  and  distinctiveness  still  survive. 
Thus,  the  claims  entertained  by  some  quarters  that  the  State  model  with  its  inevitable 
component  parts,  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention.  has  reached  its  end  (mainly  because  the 
nature  of  our  present  world  problems,  such  as  disarmament,  pollution,  under  development 
etc.,  impose  the  necessity  of  universal  solutions).  These  predictions  have  not  materialized 
in  practice. 
In  fact,  State  practice  in  its  different  forms  (treaties,  UN  Declarations,  States 
pronouncement  etc.  J  unequivocally  confirms  the  contrary,  and  establishes  that  sovereignty 
and  non-  intervention  are  not  withering  away.  They  are  maintained  in  effect,  as  the  most 
important  pillars  of  present  day  international  relations. 
Moreover,  it  is  asserted  that  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention,  are  essential  for  the  weaker 
units  of  the  international  community.  They  (the  two  principles)  help  the  peoples  of  those 
States  to  keep  their  national  identity,  protect  their  right  to  decide  freely  their  political  and 
social  organization,  and  eventually  can  be  used  as  legal  and  political  weapons  in  their  fight 
against  inequality. 
However,  there  is  a  near  general  consensus,  that  sovereignty  can  no  longer  be  interpreted 
in  our  present  era  along  the  lines  of  a  Hobsian  outlook  of  international  society,  in  other 
words  sovereignty  is  not  absolute  in  character.  Since  many  developments  in  the  context  of 
international  law  and  international  relations,  for  example  in  the  fields  of  the  use  of  force 
and  especially  of  human  rights  (which  concerns  us  in  this  thesis)  have  restricted  the 
sovereign  rights  of  States,  the  effect  of  this  limitation  (of  human  rights)  in  the  words  of 
D'Amato  is: 
[H]uman  rights  in  international  law  means  that  the  State  is  not  the  sole  entity  that 
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This  limitation  of  human  rights,  is  very  important  in  the  context  of  internal  conflicts,  it 
indicates  clearly  that  the  relationship  of  the  citizens  to  their  own  State  even  in  these  dire 
situations  of  conflict,  where  the  most  inhuman  practices  may  be  resorted  to,  is  somehow 
regulated  by  international  law. 
In  fact,  human  rights  law  contains  the  idea  of  non-derogable  rights  (the  right  to  life, 
prohibition  of  torture  and  inhuman  treatment,  and  the  right  to  fair  trial  and  due  process  of 
law).  These  rights  constitute,  it  is  asserted  the  point  of  meeting,  between  human  rights  and 
humanitarian  law.  Since  those  'sacrosaint  rights'  can  be  very  useful  for  the  protection  of  the 
victims  of  internal  wars,  even  when  the  State  does  not  acknowledge  the  application  of 
instruments  of  humanitarian  law,  to  the  conflict  (Article  3  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  and 
Protocol  11  of  1977). 
The  UN  has  in  fact,  used  human  rights  as  a  door  through  which,  it  discussed  issues  of 
violations  of  human  rights  in  internal  conflicts.  It  seems  that  States  have  never  tried  to 
justify  those  violations,  by  invoking  the  pleas  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention.  This 
indicates  that  they  accept  human  rights  as  a  real  limitation  on  their  conduct  both  in  peace 
and  in  times  of  war  and  emergencies. 
Furthermore,  it  is  established  that  self-determination  in  our  present  era,  that  is  in  the 
post-colonial  period,  means  essentially  respect  for  individual  and  group  rights  within 
sovereign  States.  Self-determination  is  the  other  name  of  respect  of  human  rights.  Thus,  a 
State  which  does  not  conduct  itself  in  line  with  the  requirements  of  human  rights  forfeits 
its  right  to  claim  the  benefits  of  its  sovereignty. 
However,  it  must  be  indicated  that  this  fundamental  limitation  (of  human  rights),  even 
if  no  one  doubts  its  importance,  does  not  mean  that  human  rights  are  enough  for  a  better 
treatment  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars.  Those  victims  in  fact,  need  some  other  rules  and 
standards  which  can  only  be  satisfied  by  humanitarian  law,  such  as  the  right  to  correspond 
for  those  detained  or  interned  for  offences  relating  to  the  conflict,  the  right  to  receive  relief 
and  assistance,  the  right  not  to  be  displaced  and  all  the  rules  connected  with  the  means  and 
methods  of  warfare. 
After  these  preliminary  points,  I  will  turn  now  to  the  main  conclusions  concerning  the 
influence  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention,  on  three  specific  areas  of  humanitarian  law 
applicable  in  internal  conflicts,  namely:  The  definition  of  internal  conflicts,  the  protection 
of  the  victims  of  such  conflicts  and  the  question  of  compliance  and  implementation  of 
humanitarian  law  in  the  context  of  internal  conflicts.  These  subjects  were  dealt  with  in 
Chapters  111,  IV  and  V,  respectively. 
A.  On  Definition  of  Internal  Conflicts 
1.  In  Customary  International  Law 
It  seems  that  customary  law  gave  priority  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  and  non- 
intervention  in  its  internal  affairs,  in  the  sense  that  whenever  established  Governments  are 
'D'Amato, 
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427 faced  with  internal  armed  opposition,  customary  law  protects  them.  That  law  gives  them 
(the  Governments)  full  discretion  to  deal  with  the  situation  on  their  terms.  This  is  implicit 
in  the  fact  that  Governments  faced  with  such  upheavals  are  not  obliged  to  recognize  the 
application  of  the  laws  of  war  to  the  internal  conflict. 
However,  it  must  be  stressed  that  the  institution  of  the  recognition  of  belligerency,  was 
in  fact  the  legal  device  through  which  customary  law  became  relevant  to  civil  wars.  That 
institution  (of  recognition  of  belligerency)  clarified  to  some  extent  the  criteria  which  must 
exist  in  an  internal  conflict,  in  order  to  be  regulated  by  international  law.  Thus,  it  has 
altered  the  term  'civil  war',  from  a  nebulous  concept  to  an  identifiable  legal  term.  This 
means  that  the  recognition  of  belligerency  has  afforded  the  legal  framework  for  the 
definition  of  civil  wars  in  customary  international  law. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  asserted  here  that  the  notions  of  sovereignty  and  non-intervention, 
were  largely  behind  both  the  high  thresholds  (which  must  exist  in  the  internal  conflict  in 
order  to  qualify  for  the  granting  of  the  recognition  of  belligerency),  and  also  the  rarity  of 
cases  of  the  granting  of  such  recognition. 
Thus,  States  by  demanding  very  high  thresholds  for  civil  wars  (in  terms  of  high  intensity, 
duration,  effective  control  of  the  national  territory,  and  the  existence  of  a  political 
organization  of  the  insurgents)  to  which  the  laws  of  war  would  apply.  They  in  fact,  wanted 
to  retain  their  full  discretion  in  the  overwhelming  cases  of  civil  wars,  which  do  not  attain 
such  thresholds. 
However,  even  when  the  civil  war  attains  these  very  high  thresholds,  States  (which  granted 
the  recognition  of  belligerency)  always  try  to  play  down  the  legal  significance  of  such  an 
act,  by  insisting  that  their  action  (of  recognition)  was  directed  only  by  humanitarian 
motives.  This  in  order  to  deny  any  legal  status  to  their  opponents,  and  by  the  same  token 
maintain  their  claim  that  they  (States)  are  the  only  legitimate  authority. 
Besides,  the  granting  of  belligerent  rights  to  the  insurgents  by  third  States  is  always  seen 
by  the  established  Government  fighting  an  internal  war.  as  an  unfriendly  act,  and  therefore, 
an  intrusion  in  its  internal  affairs.  This  fact  in  itself,  does  not  encourage  third  States,  to 
rush  to  such  recognitions,  in  cases  of  internal  conflicts  taking  place  in  other  countries. 
Moreover,  it  is  established  here  that  the  rarity  of  cases  of  internal  wars  in  which  recognition 
of  belligerency  was  granted,  confirms  that  sovereignty  and  the  fear  of  intervention  were 
behind  such  a  state  of  affairs. 
It  seems  that  established  Governments  prefer  to  conduct  their  war  against  their  internal 
enemies  in  accordance  with  their  full  discretion,  which  sovereignty  gives  them,  and  not 
according  to  the  rules  of  the  laws  of  war.  The  latter  would  restrict  their  freedom  of 
choosing  the  means  and  methods  of  dealing  with  their  internal  enemy,  would  give 
respectability  to  the  insurgents,  and  would  finally  signal  that  the  established  Government 
is  far  from  being  in  control  of  the  situation  in  the  country. 
On  the  other  hand,  because  the  recognition  of  belligerency  was  in  fact,  a  limitation  of 
State  sovereignty,  in  the  sense  that  once  it  has  been  granted,  the  Government  in  power  has 
to  apply  the  laws  of  war.  States  faced  with  internal  wars,  claimed  (on  the  basis  of  their 
sovereignty,  and  the  duty  of  other  States  not  to  intervene  in  their  internal  affairs),  that  they 
are  the  sole  power  able  to  acknowledge  the  existence  of  the  conditions  and  the  criteria  of 
1) 
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that  process. 
Similarly,  it  is  asserted  here,  that  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  were  among  the 
principal  causes  of  the  obsolescence  of  the  institution  of  the  recognition  of  belligerency. 
Since  such  an  obsolescence  would  serve  the  interests  of  Governments  fighting  internal 
conflicts,  and  even  the  interests  of  third  States,  the  former  because  in  the  absence  of  such 
recognition.  There  are  no  legal  restrictions  on  their  power  to  crush  their  enemies,  and  the 
latter  (third  States)  it  gives  them,  the  total  freedom  either  of  meddling  in  the  internal 
conflicts  of  other  States,  or  abstaining  from  any  action,  without  being  obliged  to  resort  to 
the  recognition  of  belligerency. 
Finally,  it  is  my  belief  that  the  institution  of  recognition  of  belligerency  was  in  a  way,  an 
attempt  to  bring  the  notion  of  objectivity  into  the  realm  of  international  law,  in  the  sense 
that  whenever  some  conditions  of  fact  and  law  are  present  in  a  situation  of  an  internal 
strife,  the  laws  of  war  would  apply. 
However,  in  the  decentralized  system  of  the  organizations  of  international  community, 
such  an  attempt  has  no  chance  of  success,  mainly  because  it  conflicts  with  sovereignty  and 
non-  intervention.  Objectivity  requires  the  existence  of  a  universal  agency  which  is  above 
the  States  and  has  the  competence  to  take  binding  decisions  and  the  capacity  to  enforce 
them. 
In  the  absence  of  such  an  agency  or  institution  (which  is  in  itself  a  flagrant  example  of 
States'  preference  for  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention),  the  possibility  that  States  might 
be  guided  by  political  and  economic  considerations  in  their  decision  to  grant  or  withhold 
the  recognition  of  belligerency,  rather  than  objective  and  legal  criteria,  remains  open. 
2.  In  the  Context  of  Common  Article  3  of  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949 
In  1949,  the  ICRC,  suggested  a  definition  of  'armed  conflicts  not  of  an  international 
character',  which  would  in  effect,  cover  a  large  segment  of  internal  conflicts.  It  was  the 
first  attempt  to  define  and  regulate  internal  conflicts  in  an  international  instrument. 
However.  the  travaux  prkparatoires  of  the  Diplomatic  Conference  of  1949,  reveals  that  the 
principles  of  sovereignty  and  non-intervention  were  used  extensively  to  limit  to  a  greater 
degree  any  incursion  into  the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  States. 
Two  tactics  have  been  resorted  to.  The  first  stressed  that  the  ICRC  definition  was 
unacceptable,  because  the  criteria  included  in  it  (definition),  were  not  strong  enough,  which 
means  that  many  internal  conflicts  would  be  regulated  by  international  law. 
States  stressed  at  that  stage  that  the  condition  for  their  acceptance  of  the  application  of 
the  whole  Geneva  Conventions  to  armed  conflict  not  of  an  international  character  was  a 
strong  and  emasculated  definition. 
The  definitions  advanced  especially  by  sovereignty-oriented  delegations  were  designed 
expressly  for  the  protection  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  State,  and  the  prohibition  of 
intervention  in  its  internal  affairs.  The  criteria  suggested  for  such  definitions,  were  very 
stringent,  in  fact,  they  were  to  a  large  extent,  a  mere  codification  of  the  recognition  of 
belligerency  in  customary  international  law. 
States  wanted  to  make  it  clear,  that  their  sovereignty  must  not  be  curtailed  in  any 
429 situation  of  internal  conflict,  otherwise,  their  authority  and  legitimacy  would  be  threatened. 
Their  internal  enemies  would  be  indirectly  encouraged  to  take  up  arms  against  them, 
because  they  know  in  advance  that  they  would  be  treated  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of 
war. 
The  second  tactic,  which  was  eventually  adopted,  was  based  on  the  absence  of  any 
definition  of  'armed  conflicts  not  of  an  international  character'  in  the  text  of  common 
Article  3.  It  was  in  fact,  a  compromise  formula,  since  the  need  for  a  definition  in  the  text 
of  the  article,  was  dropped,  when  it  was  agreed  that  only  some  minimum  general  rules  of 
humanitarian  law,  would  apply  to  internal  conflicts  instead  of  the  whole  Geneva 
Conventions.  This  means  that  the  restrictions  on  State  sovereignty,  and  the  chances  of 
intervention  in  its  internal  affairs,  facing  internal  conflicts,  were  kept  to  a  minimum. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  must  stressed  that  the  travaux  pr6paratolres  do  not  suggest  that  by 
adopting  the  second  tactic  (absence  of  definition).  States  which  tried  to  define  'armed 
conflicts  not  of  an  international  character'  have  abandoned  their  earlier  definitions,  thus, 
opting  for  lower  thresholds  in  the  definition  of  common  Article  3.  Although,  it  seems  to 
me,  that  humanitarian  spirit,  and  interpretation  in  good  faith  and  in  accordance  with  the 
object  and  purpose  of  Article  3,  would  be  clearly  against  such  an  approach. 
However,  the  absence  of  definition,  and  the  absence  in  the  text  of  Article  3,  of  any 
indication,  of  which  authority  has  the  power  to  acknowledge  and  verify  the  existence  of  'an 
armed  conflict  not  of  an  international  character,  has  in  practice  played  directly  into  the 
hands  of  States  fighting  internal  strife. 
Thus,  they  argued  in  most  cases  of  such  conflicts  (which  occurred  after  the  entry  into 
force  of  Geneva  Conventions)  that  they  did  not  fall  in  the  ambit  of  Article  3.  Moreover, 
they  insisted,  that  they  are  the  only  legally  responsible  authority,  which  can  decide  the 
existence  of  such  conflict.  In  other  words,  any  attempt  by  any  third  party  to  intervene  in 
that  field  (of  the  determination  of  the  existence  of  armed  conflict  not  of  an  international 
character)  would  be  easily  seen  as  unwarranted  intervention  in  their  domestic  affairs. 
The  UN  practice  seems  not  to  contradict  the  above  the  contention,  at  least  until  the 
beginning  of  1970s.  However,  thereafter,  the  UN  (through  the  idea  of  combatting 
widespread,  massive  and  gross  violations  of  human  rights)  has  stressed  the  all  importance 
of  the  application  of  common  Article  3,  to  ongoing  civil  wars,  in  order  to  mitigate  the 
sufferings  of  the  victims  of  such  unhappy  experiences.  Thus,  the  UN  has  not  hesitated  at 
least  indirectly,  to  determine  and  indicate  the  existence  of  'an  armed  conflict  not  of  an 
international  character'. 
3.  Protocol  II 
In  this  protocol,  which  is  devoted  wholly  to  the  question  of  internal  conflicts,  a  definition 
of  'armed  conflicts  not  of  an  international  character'  was  adopted.  However,  it  seems  on 
that  precise  issue  (of  definition),  sovereignty-oriented  States  (most  Third  World  countries, 
Canada,  Rumania  and  to  some  extent  the  UK)  have  won  the  day.  The  criteria  of  the 
definition,  were  greatly  emasculated,  so  as  to  make  the  application  of  the  protocol  very 
limited  in  practice. 
The  attempt  of  more  humanitarian  -oriented  delegations  (the  Holy  See,  Sweden,  Norway, 
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internal  conflicts,  contained  in  the  definition  (in  order  to  make  the  protocol  apply  to  a 
greater  number  of  civil  wars)  failed. 
Since  sovereignty  oriented-States  made  it  clear,  either  a  stronger  definition,  or  no 
protocol  at  all.  In  their  view.  the  lowering  of  the  thresholds  of  the  definition  would  result 
inevitably,  in  the  breach  of  their  sovereignty  and  hence,  would  open  the  door  for  foreign 
intervention  in  their  domestic  affairs. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  that  the  travaux  prkparatolres,  of  the  Diplomatic  Conference 
(1974-1977)  establish  that  the  overwhelming  majority  of  States  felt  the  need  for  a  clear 
definition  of  'armed  conflicts  not  of  an  international  character',  in  order  to  avoid  the 
imperfections  of  Article  3.  However,  many  States  used  the  device  of  definition  as  a  real 
vehicle  for  strengthening  their  sovereignty  and  preventing  any  third  party  intervention  in 
their  internal  affairs,  simply  by  making  the  threshold  of  internal  conflicts  very  hard  for 
insurgents  to  gain. 
In  this  context,  Article  I  of  the  Protocol  ignores  the  demands  of  guerrilla  warfare,  which 
is  the  main  method  of  warfare  used  by  insurgents.  Since  the  definition  stresses  the 
importance  of  the  control  by  the  insurgents  of  a  part  of  the  national  territory. 
Similarly,  in  regard  to  the  important  question  concerning  the  moment  at  which  the 
protocol  would  be  applicable,  Article  I  is  silent.  But,  there  is  evidence  to  the  fact  that  some 
sovereignty  oriented  countries  continued,  even  after  the  adoption  of  Protocol  11,  to  stress 
that  the  acknowledgement  by  the  established  Government  of  the  existence  of  an  armed 
conflict  not  of  an  international  character,  was  a  conditio  sine  qua  non,  for  the  application 
of  Protocol  11. 
Furthermore,  they  indicated  that  no  third  party  can  intervene  or  verify  such 
determination.  In  other  words,  they  claimed  that  sovereignty  gives  them  that  right  (of 
determining  the  existence  of  an  internal  conflict)  alone. 
However,  it  is  my  view,  that  in  practice,  the  objective  character  of  the  criteria  of  Article 
I  of  the  second  protocol  can  be  apparent,  if  the  legal  Government  acts  in  good  faith  in  the 
fulfilment  of  its  international  obligations.  Moreover,  it  seems  to  me,  that  the  arguments  of 
human  rights,  and  the  need  for  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  non-  international  conflicts, 
would  go  against  any  pretended  exclusive  right  of  the  established  Government  in  that  field 
(determination  of  the  existence  of  an  armed  conflict  not  of  an  international  character),  in 
the  meaning  of  Article  1. 
Consequently,  it  seems  that  on  the  level  of  the  issue  of  definition  of  internal  conflicts, 
as  from  customary  law  to  Protocol  11,  the  principles  of  sovereignty  and  non-  intervention, 
have  been  used,  either  directly  or  implicitly,  by  States  to  block  any  real  progress  in  this 
field. 
Thus,  even  if  Article  3  and  Protocol  11  can  be  considered  as  a  timid  limitation  upon  State 
sovereignty  in  the  field  of  definition,  many  loopholes  exist  in  both  instruments.  This  makes 
sovereignty-oriented  States  free  to  accept  or  reject  the  application  of  those  instruments  to 
their  internal  wars. 
However,  there  is  hope  that  international  organizations  and  especially,  the  UN  can  be 
instrumental  in  acknowledging  the  existence  of  internal  wars  to  which  either  Common 
431 Article  3  or  Protocol  11  apply,  whenever,  some  objective  criteria  exist  in  an  internal 
conflict,  such  as  the  intensity,  duration,  organization  of  the  rebels  etc. 
The  UN  used  in  fact,  its  concern  for  the  protection  of  human  rights,  as  a  basis  for  its 
intervention  in  those  situations  (the  case  of  El  Salvador  illustrates  that).  However, 
everything  depends  in  the  end  on  the  political  will  and  determination  of  the  international 
community  to  give  more  respect  to  the  plight  of  the  victims  of  such  wars  rather  than  to 
some  absolute  conceptions  of  sovereignty  and  non-intervention. 
11.  The  Protection  of  the  Victims  of  Internal  Wars 
A.  In  Customary  International  Law 
In  customary  international  law,  the  laws  of  war'can  be  applied  only,  when  the  recognition 
of  belligerency  takes  place.  Thus,  whenever,  such  recognition  is  granted,  the  sovereignty 
of  the  State  is  curtailed  to  some  extent.  Since  the  victims  are  under  the  protection  of 
international  law  and  not  the  national  law. 
In  this  context,  captured  insurgents  are  to  be  treated  as  prisoners  of  war,  rather  than 
common  criminals,  also  the  sick  and  wounded  are  under  the  protection  of  some  basic 
humanitarian  standards.  However,  the  treatment  of  the  civilians,  and  especially  the  'disloyal 
citizens"  (those  who  support  the  insurgents)  was  very  harsh  (in  order  to  inhibit  them  from 
helping  the  enemy).  In  fact,  the  absence  of  clear  rules  which  regulates  the  fate  of  civilians 
in  customary  law,  meant  that  \  tates  were  free  to  devise  internal  rules  which  protect  State 
sovereignty,  rather  than  respecting  fundamental  humanitarian  considerations. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  abs;  nce  of  the  recognition  of  belligerency  (which  is  the  usual 
case  in  the  overwhelming  majoT 
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ity  of  civil  wars),  customary  international  law,  leaves  the 
State  totally  free,  claims  of  sovereignty  and  non-intervention  reign  supreme,  humanity  and 
moderation,  have  no  place. 
The  practice  suggests  that  in  those  situations,  there  is  no  evidence  that  States  felt  bound 
by  any  other  standards  than  the  dictates  of  their  sovereignty.  The  victims  were  harshly 
treated,  the  idea  of  human  rights  was  not  born  yet. 
B.  The  Protection  of  the  Victims  of  Internal  Conflicts  under  Common  Article  3 
It  seems  that  the  tragedies  of  the  Spanish  Civil  War,  coupled  with  the  rise  of  the  idea  of 
human  rights,  and  the  ICRC  efforts  to  humanize  civil  wars  have  in  different  degrees,  led 
to  the  adoption  of  some  fundamental  rules  of  humanitarian  law  for  the  protection  of  the 
victims  of  armed  conflicts  not  of  an  international  character. 
Those  rules  constituted  modest,  but  important  inroads  into  the  sovereignty  of  the  State, 
since  Governments  are  no  longer  free  to  deal  with  their  internal  enemies,  as  they  like. 
However,  it  is  asserted  here,  that  States  used  specifically  the  arguments  of  sovereignty  and 
non-  intervention,  to  deny  the  application  of  the  whole  Geneva  Conventions  to  internal 
conflicts. 
Thus,  it  was  fiercely  argued  in  the  case  of  civilians  for  instance,  that  because  they  hold 
the  nationality  of  their  State,  they  are  bound  by  the  duty  of  allegiance,  hence  they  were  not 
eligible  for  any  kind  of  extensive  international  protection. 
Captured  insurgents  are  still  seen  as  mere  criminals,  protected  only  from  summary 
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used  to  destroy  any  attempt  at  giving  those  insurgents  any  legal  status. 
In  practice,  however,  even  the  modest  humanitarian  standards  contained  in  Article  3, 
were  not  adhered  to  faithfully  by  States  in  the  overwhelming  majority  of  cases,  they  still 
hold  to  their  sovereign  rights  and  freedoms,  in  choosing  the  means  for  eliminating  their 
enemy,  the  generality  and  vagueness  of  those  standards  have  helped  in  opening  the  door  to 
abuse. 
Moreover,  it  must  be  established  here  that  the  generality  of  the  rules  of  Article  3,  have 
not  hindered  the  United  Nations  action,  thus  it  stressed  in  its  practice  that  respect  for 
human  rights,  leads  logically  and  necessarily  to  the  imposition  of  real  restraints  on  methods 
and  means  of  warfare,  and  hence  to  a  greater  and  real  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal 
wars. 
C.  In  the  Context  of  Protocol  II 
It  is  asserted  here,  that  the  subject  of  the  protection  of  victims  of  war  constituted  the  main 
contribution  of  Protocol  Il  to  humanitarian  law  ýapplicable  to  internal  conflicts.  Thus, 
although  the  principles  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention,  have  been  used  to  kill  many 
important  rules  on  methods  and  means  of  warfare,  and  also  some  important  rules  concerning 
the  protection  of  the  victims  of  war  (as  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  IV  Section  111),  the  second 
protocol  elaborates  many  important  rules  for  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars. 
In  this  context,  the  civilian  population  is  protected  in  a  very  effective  way.  Many 
important  specific  rules  have  been  adopted,  to  limit  the  freedom  of  manoeuvre  of  the 
established  Government  and  the  rebels  alike.  Thus,  compared  with  Article  3  of  the  Geneva 
Convention,  there  is  no  doubt  that  protocol  has  filled  many  normative  gaps,  which  were  not 
regulated  before.  Articles  13-17  witness  to  that  effect. 
It  seems  also  that  the  philosophy  of  human  rights  has  induced  States  to  try  to  give 
thorough  protection  to  civilians,  since  the  rules  contained  in  the  Articles  dealing  with  that 
protection,  are  all  designed  to  protect  the  fundamental  human  rights,  of  rights  to  life  and 
prohibition  of  inhuman  treatment  in  all  its  forms. 
Similarly,  the  sick  and  wounded,  together  with  persons  who  care  and  assist  them,  and  the 
installations  used  for  that  purpose  are  all  protected  by  many  detailed  rules.  In  this  context, 
no  State  dared  to  see  in  these  rules  a  violation  of  its  sovereignty  and  intervention  in  its 
affairs,  the  idea  of  humanity  reigned  supreme  in  that  arena. 
Captured  insurgents  and  civilians  detained  or  interned  in  connection  with  offences 
committed  in  relation  with  the  conflict  (although  still  basically  considered  as  criminals) 
are  afforded  better  protection.  The  conditions  of  their  detention  and  internment  are 
regulated  on  a  more  humanitarian  basis.  Furthermore,  the  questions  of  trial,  judgment  and 
the  sentencing  of  this  category  of  victims,  have  been  all  fixed  in  a  very  humanitarian  spirit. 
Thus,  although  the  claims,  of  sovereignty  and  non  -intervention  still  hold  the  balance, 
because  the  captured  insurgents  and  civilians  tried  for  offences  related  to  the  armed  conflict 
are  still  basically  seen  as  common  criminals.  The  restriction  of  State's  sovereignty  is  that 
those  criminals  are  not  tried  and  sentenced  according  to  the  Government  dictates,  but  in 
accordance  with  some  general  standards  and  rules. 
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confidently  conclude  that  real  developments  have  been  enregistered.  In  my  view,  the 
concept  of  human  rights  has  paved  the  way  for  the  relative  ease  by  which  States  accepted 
those  rules. 
There  was  in  fact,  a  general  consensus  among  States  attending  the  Diplomatic  Conference 
(1974-1977),  that  the  victims  of  internal  strife  should  be  effectively  protected.  The  human 
rights  limitation  on  their  sovereignty  has  taught  them  that  adherence  to  humanitarian  norms 
in  their  treatment  of  their  citizens,  would  not  in  any  way,  challenge  their  sovereignty  or 
open  the  way  for  foreign  interference. 
Sovereignty  must  mean  among  other  things,  that  the  established  Government  must  respect 
certain  basic  standards  of  human  treatment  and  human  dignity.  Thus,  respect  for 
fundamental  human  rights  in  all  circumstances  must  be  the  real  basis  of  the  legitimacy  of 
authority  and  power,  not  force  and  totalitarianism. 
It  must  be  noticed,  that  with  a  good  faith  interpretation  and  in  accordance  with  the  object 
and  purpose  of  the  treaty  (Protocol  II),  the  rules  concerning  the  protection  of  the  victims 
of  internal  wars  contained  in  Protocol  II,  can  be  interpreted,  as  implicitly  containing  many 
other  important  rules  on  methods  and  means  of  war,  and  many  other  humanitarian  and 
human  rights  rules. 
In  practice,  although  no  State  has  accepted  specifically  the  application  of  Protocol  11  to 
its  internal  conflicts  (with  the  possible  exception  of  El  Salvador),  it  seems  at  least  indirectly, 
that  the  rules  of  Protocol  11,  on  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  war  had  no  real  influence 
upon  the  conduct  of  civil  wars  over  the  last  10  years.  There  are  numerous  examples  of 
brutality  and  cruelty  occurring  in  many  places. 
However,  the  case  of  the  Nicaraguan  Civil  War  illustrates  that  the  Government  made 
some  effort  to  adhere  to  certain  humanitarian  standards,  not  through  the  acceptance  of  the 
application  of  humanitarian  instruments  (Article  3  or  Protocol  11)  but  through  an  approach 
based  on  human  rights.  Thus,  it  accepted  many  of  the  recommendations  of  the  Inter- 
American  Commission  on  Human  Rights  in  the  field  of  the  protection  of  the  victims  of 
war.  The  reason  seems  to  be  that  an  approach  based  on  human  rights  is  preferred  by 
Governments,  because  it  does  not  involve  any  implications  that  the  State  accords  any  legal 
status  to  the  insurgents. 
II.  The  Question  of  Compliance  and  Implementation  of  Humanitarian  Law  In  Internal 
Conflicts 
A.  In  Customary  Law 
It  seems  that  in  customary  law,  the  concepts  of  sovereignty  and  non-intervention  have  in 
fact,  blocked  any  development  of  any  machinery  for  the  control,  supervision,  enforcement 
or  implementation  of  humanitarian  law,  either  in  international  or  internal  conflicts. 
Thus,  even  in  the  law  between  States,  the  methods  for  securing  compliance  with  its  rules 
Tested  essentially  on  self-help,  good  faith  and  reciprocity.  The  concept  of  sovereignty  was 
absolute,  no  third  party  machinery  or  intervention  were  thought  of  or  proposed. 
Reprisals,  and  the  taking  of  hostages  were  the  traditional  means  of  forcing  the  enemy  to 
conduct  itself  with  the  laws  of  war,  and  they  were  both  inhuman.  They  fell  always  on  the 
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Sovereignty  meant  in  the  eyes  of  the  established  Governments,  that  no  third  party  could 
actually  judge  their  adherence  to  the  laws  of  war,  and  any  attempt  in  that  direction  could 
be  characterised  as  intervention. 
Moreover,  Governments  were  not  ready  to  punish  those  of  their  soldiers  who  committed 
war  crimes.  Under  sovereignty,  they  are  protected  whenever  they  are  defending  the  State 
even,  in  doing  so,  they  commit  horrible  crimes. 
B.  In  the  Context  of  Article  3 
It  seems  that  the  same  tradition  of  customary  law  continued.  States  were,  in  fact,  more 
concerned  about  punishing  insurgents  for  the  violation  of  their  national  laws,  rather  than 
their  breach  of  the  rules  of  humanitarian  law.  Sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  were  best 
served  by  punishing  insurgents  for  high  reason,  rather  than  breach  of  some  humanitarian 
standards. 
The  institution  of  protecting  power  was  rejected  on  the  express  ground  that  it  constituted 
a  breach  of  sovereignty  and  an  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  States.  No  express 
prohibition  of  reprisals  is  found,  which  was  in  itself  a  clear  gap.  However,  Article  3 
expressly  prohibited  the  taking  of  hostages,  which  must  be  seen  as  an  advance. 
The  practice  shows  clearly  that  the  absence  of  any  means  of  controlling  the  application 
of  Article  3,  means  that  violations  go  unpunished.  Thus,  the  arguments  of  sovereignty  and 
non-  intervention  which  were  used  to  end  any  attempt  at  instituting  a  Teal  machinery  for 
the  control  of  application  of  humanitarian  law,  meant  in  practice,  that  many  deaths  and 
inhuman  treatment  of  victims  cannot  be  prevented. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  ICRC  has  been  given  what  is  known  as  'the  right  of  initiative' 
which  allows  the  committee  to  give  relief  and  assistance  to  the  victims,  however,  on  the 
express  consent  of  the  State  concerned. 
The  ICRC  through  its  right  of  initiative  has,  in  practice,  contributed  effectively  to  the 
amelioration  of  the  conditions  of  the  victims  of  war,  and  especially  prisoners.  Hence  it 
contributed  indirectly  to  the  implementation  not  only  to  the  minimum  rules  of  Article  3, 
but  also  to  other  humanitarian  and  human  rights  standards.  However,  the  consent  of  the 
Government  must  be  sought  in  any  action  of  the  ICRC,  which  means  that  respect  of  the 
sovereignty  is  the  cornerstone  of  any  real  contribution  of  the  ICRC  in  the  context  of  civil 
wars. 
Moreover,  it  must  stressed  that  the  absence  of  penal  sanctions  for  violations  of  the  rules 
of  Article  3,  coupled  with  the  adoption  of  amnesty  laws  at  the  end  of  internal  conflicts 
meant,  in  practice,  that  imperatives  of  political  expediency  overrode  demands  for  respect 
for  the  law. 
C.  In  Protocol  11 
Sovereignty  and  non-  intervention  arguments  have  been  used  extensively  by  sovereignty 
oriented  States,  to  kill  any  attempt  at  instituting  any  procedural  requirements  for  the  control 
of  application  of  the  rules  of  Protocol  11.  The  only  means  adopted  are  good  faith  of  the 
parties,  and  the  dissemination  of  the  rules  of  the  Protocol. 
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put  an  end  to  any  speculation  of  the  possibility  of  third  party  control. 
Even  the  mention  of  the  ICRC  right  of  initiative  was  not  included,  although  it  survives 
under  Article  3.  However,  it  seems,  that  practice  shows  that  the  instruments  and  organs  of 
human  rights  can  fill  the  gap  in  the  area  of  controlling  the  application  of  humanitarian  law, 
at  least,  to  some  extent. 
The  examples  of  the  UN  and  the  Inter-American  experiences  in  the  context  of  some 
internal  conflicts  (especially  El  Salvador  and  Nicaragua)  are  cases  in  point.  The  explanation 
of  the  tacit  acceptance  of  States  of  this  approach  lies  in  the  fact,  in  my  opinion,  that  the  use 
of  human  rights  machinery  has  the  advantage  of  escaping  the  condemnation  as  an 
intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  States,  or  a  breach  of  their  sovereignty.  Because  there 
is  a  general  consensus  that  human  rights  are  a  legal  limitation  of  State  sovereignty. 
The  general  conclusion  then  of  this  thesis  is  that  sovereignty  and  non-intervention  have 
been  used  in  connection  with  the  main  three  themes  of  humanitarian  law  applicable  in 
internal  conflicts  (namely:  definition  the  protection  of  the  victims  of  war  and  compliance 
and  implementation),  in  a  very  extensive  way,  either  directly  or  indirectly. 
They  (sovereignty  and  non-  intervention)  have  won  the  day  in  many  instances,  especially 
in  the  domain  of  definition  of  internal  conflicts  and  compliance  with  humanitarian  law. 
However,  many  inroads  into  State  sovereignty  have  been  made,  notably  in  the  area  of 
protection  of  the  victims  of  internal  war. 
Human  rights  and  their  development  have,  in  different  ways,  influenced  and  will 
influence  in  future  developments  in  the  field  of  humanitarian  law  applicable  in  internal 
conflicts.  Human  rights  show  to  the  States  that  respect  of  the  fundamental  rights  of 
individuals  and  groups.  in  peace  or  emergency  and  war  times,  is  a  sure  way  of  gaining 
legitimacy  for  their  authority.  They  (human  rights),  it  is  asserted,  are  not  a  negation  or 
challenge  to  sovereignty,  they  are  in  fact  another  name  for  exercising  sovereignty  in  a 
civilized  way. 
Thus,  despite  all  the  cruelties  and  horrors  of  civil  wars,  and  the  efforts  of  sovereignty- 
oriented  States,  we  can  safely  advance  that  many  normative  developments  have  been 
enregistered  in  Article  3  and  Protocol  11  of  1977.  This  has  strengthened  the  humanitarian 
law  applicable  in  internal  conflicts,  at  least  from  the  normative  point  of  view.  In  fact,  the 
mere  adoption  of  Article  3  and  the  Protocol  11  must  be  seen  in  themselves  as  fundamental 
advances  for  humanity. 
A  final  observation  concerning  the  value  of  normative  and  legal  restraints  in  diminishing 
the  evils  of  civil  wars  is  in  order  in  my  view.  One  should  note  that  there  are  many  people 
who  maintain  that  internal  conflicts  are  always  and  will  be  always  cruet  and  ruthless,  for 
the  simple  reason  that  each  side  in  the  conflict,  seeks  a  total  victory  over  its  opponent,  and 
not  a  truce  or  a  compromise. 
In  such  an  atmosphere  of  hatred  and  vengeance,  any  talk  about  legal  restraints  is 
pointless,  irrelevant  and  impractical.  According  to  this  view,  neither  the  test  of  morality  nor 
restraints  of  legal  norms  have  much,  if  any  place,  in  situations  of  civil  wars. 
However,  it  seems  to  me,  on  the  contrary,  legal  restraints  are  very  important  in  order  to 
attain  that  very  victory  in  cases  of  those  unhappy  experiences  (civil  wars).  Otherwise, 
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This  state  of  affairs  in  my  view,  is  not  in  the  interests  of  the  winning  party  itself,  since 
its  chances  of  gaining  real  political  support  among  the  governed  would  be  very  slight 
indeed.  In  fact,  the  lack  of  political  support  would  encourage  the  reign  of  totalitarianism, 
and  violations  of  basic  human  rights  of  the  population,  and  thus  the  victory  of  one  party 
in  gaining  political  control  will  result  in  the  loss  of  the  population  of  their  freedoms,  which 
would  in  its  turn  open  the  way  for  further  turmoil  and  war. 
In  my  opinion,  if  legal  restraints  especially  norms  concerning  the  protection  of  the 
victims  of  war,  are  not  respected,  the  fight  may  be  turn  into  a  "dirty  fight'.  The  latter  has 
been  correctly  defined  by  Nigel  in  these  terms: 
"...  [T]o  fight  dirty  is  to  direct  one's  hostility  or  aggression  not  at  its  proper  object  but 
at  a  peripheral  target  which  the  proper  object  can  be  attained  indirectly".  2 
In  my  view,  fighting  dirty  in  the  context  of  internal  conflicts,  by  attacking  the  civilian 
targets  for  example,  will  never  result  in  a  lasting  victory.  The  experiences  in  Algeria  and 
Vietnam  have  firmly  established  that  attacking  the  civilians,  has  not  resulted  in  the  breaking 
of  the  morale  of  the  population  or  the  destruction  of  the  insurgent  movement. 
On  the  contrary,  the  breeding  ground  for  the  insurgents  widened  and  recruitment  rose 
when  the  violations  of  humanitarian  law  become  more  brutal.  This  means  that  the  normative 
restraints  contained  in  Article  3  and  especially  Protocol  II  can  be  very  useful  in  reducing 
events  of  underhanded  tactics.  Consequently,  this  would  restrict  resort  to  total  war,  diminish 
the  sufferings  of  the  victims  of  internal  wars,  and  by  the  same  token  make  sovereignty 
more  human. 
2T.  Niget:  War  and  Massacre,  In  Ch.  Beltz,  M.  Cohen,  T.  Scanton  and  J.  Simons  (eds.  ):  Internatio'nat  Ethics. 
PUP,  Princeton,  New  Jersey,  1985,  p.  64. 
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